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eguaglianza e digniTà delle persone lgbTi
Stefano Rodotà
Abstract
The author looks at the advancements in the protection of LGBT rights. He considers the 
recognition of family unions in European law. The text dwells on the impact of terms such 
as sexual orientation, sex and gender and the need to overcome dualism. However, discri-
mination is still an alarming phenomenon. We certainly need to embrace equality, but must 
also include dignity. There is no dignity without identity, which in turn requires freedom. 
Homophobia and discrimination undermine one’s dignity, and exclusion makes people 
“non persons”. The essay then looks at the Italian legal context and considers the decision 
on marriage by the Constitutional Court.
* * *
Vorrei cominciare con un riferimento a due documenti europei: la Carta dei diritti 
fondamentali dell’Unione europea ed i rapporti dell’Agenzia per i diritti fondamen-
tali. La Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea ha dedicato al tema della 
discriminazione verso le persone LGBTI (gay, lesbiche, gay, trans e intersessuali) 
un’attenzione non voglio dire particolare, ma certamente specifica. Ciò avviene non 
solo con la norma generale sull’antidiscriminazione, dove il riferimento all’orienta-
mento sessuale è ripreso dal Trattato di Maastricht, ma soprattutto con l’articolo 9. 
Esso riguarda le unioni ed è uno dei più innovativi dal punto di vista nella sequenza 
delle dichiarazioni dei diritti che interessano l’Europa. Inoltre smentisce la tesi per 
cui la Carta dei diritti sarebbe soltanto un documento in qualche modo riproduttivo 
del già esistente nel contesto europeo.
È innovativo perché rispetto alla Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo il 
cambiamento è radicale. L’articolo 12 della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uo-
mo afferma: «Uomini e donne in età maritale hanno diritto di sposarsi e di formare 
una famiglia secondo le leggi nazionali regolanti l’esercizio di tale diritto». L’articolo 
9 della Carta dei diritti, invece, si discosta sostanzialmente da questa impostazione, 
scrivendo: «Il diritto di sposarsi e il diritto di costituire una famiglia sono garantiti 
secondo le leggi nazionali che ne disciplinano l’esercizio». Cade il riferimento alla 
diversità di sesso. Quello che era un diritto unico, il diritto di sposarsi e di formare 
una famiglia, viene invece, nell’articolo 9 della Carta, sostituito da due diritti distin-
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ti. È chiarissima l’espressione verbale: «Il diritto di sposarsi e il diritto di costituire 
una famiglia sono garantiti». Sono due diritti diversi, equiordinati, e non c’è una 
gerarchia, anche se vi è un riferimento al diritto nazionale. Il cambiamento è tuttavia 
radicale. Nel quadro delineato dal diritto dell’Unione europea oggi non si può so-
stenere una superiorità gerarchica del matrimonio tradizionale, né si può identifica-
re ciascuno di questi istituti soltanto in base alla diversità di sesso.
La seconda considerazione è relativa all’articolo 21, dove si fa riferimento 
all’orientamento sessuale. È bene ricordare il cambiamento che è intervenuto pro-
prio nella terminologia dei documenti europei. L’elenco, peraltro non esaustivo, 
delle cause di discriminazione si apre storicamente con il riferimento al sesso e si 
chiude con quello all’orientamento sessuale. Mentre il riferimento al sesso è eviden-
temente il riflesso storico tradizionale di quella che è l’identificazione attraverso un 
genere di appartenenza, attraverso il riferimento all’orientamento sessuale c’è una 
soggettivizzazione. Ciò che viene in evidenza, e quindi può divenire causa di discri-
minazione, è il modo in cui ciascuno costruisce la propria personalità anche per ciò 
che riguarda i profili sessuali e affettivi. Questo è un altro elemento da prendere 
molto seriamente in considerazione, ma che ci porterebbe aldilà delle discussioni su 
identità e attribuzione di genere. Un recente libro di Flavia Monceri, Oltre l’identità 
sessuale, è molto critico rispetto alle categorie tradizionali e parla del superamento 
della logica binaria che si ritrova nel mondo. Come evidenziato da un caso del New 
South Wales in cui un certificato di nascita è stato rettificato lasciando per il campo 
«sesso» «not specified», la soggettivizzazione impone anche il superamento del ca-
rattere binario della discussione sul sesso.
I documenti dell’Agenzia dei diritti fondamentali, che registrano il modo in cui 
si è venuta evolvendo la legislazione in Europa, sottolineano con molta nettezza lo 
scarto ancora verificabile nell’ambito sociale. Nell’ultimo rapporto si dice «la situa-
zione sociale è preoccupante». Il rapporto tocca una serie di settori: la parola, la li-
bertà di riunione, il mercato del lavoro, l’istruzione, la salute, la religione, lo sport, i 
media, il diritto di asilo. Si tratta di una documentazione puntuale di discriminazio-
ni che permangono malgrado i progressi sul terreno della legislazione. E allora, non 
a caso, sta per uscire in Italia un libro che proprio riguardando questo gioco e que-
sta dialettica tra regola e situazione effettiva, ha come titolo L’abominevole diritto. È 
un libro che esce nei prossimi giorni, di Matteo Winkler e Gabriele Strazio, che ci 
dice molte cose proprio sulla ricostruzione necessaria del contesto.
Allora, come guardare al tema dell’eguaglianza per le persone LGBTI? Partendo 
dall’eguaglianza certo. Ma il riferimento all’eguaglianza richiede un orizzonte un po’ 
più variegato. Consideriamo la sequenza di alcuni grandi documenti costituzionali 
del dopoguerra e prendiamo le mosse dalla Costituzione italiana, semplicemente 
perché è la prima nella sequenza, scritta nel 1947 e entrata in vigore il 1° gennaio 
1948. In uno degli articoli chiave, esattamente quello sull’eguaglianza, c’è già nelle 
prime righe un mutamento significativo, perché si dice: «Tutti i cittadini hanno pari 
dignità sociale». L’associazione tra eguaglianza e dignità e la sua proiezione nella 
dimensione sociale è un connotato di assoluta originalità per il tempo della Costitu-
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zione italiana ed è un’indicazione che io cito, non per ragioni di patriottismo nazio-
nalistico, ma perché sarà poi l’indicazione che ritroveremo ampiamente in una serie 
di documenti. Ed è un’indicazione già più ricca di quella che ritroviamo nella Di-
chiarazione dei diritti dell’uomo delle Nazioni Unite, che giunge un anno dopo, nel 
1948. Si apre con le parole: «Tutti gli esseri umani nascono liberi ed eguali in digni-
tà e diritti». Anche qui, rispetto alla tradizione costituzionalistica della fine del Set-
tecento, vi è un’innovazione perché la formula classica è che tutti gli esseri umani 
nascono liberi ed eguali nei diritti. Invece qui vi è l’aggiunta del riferimento alla 
dignità. Il punto, non d’arrivo, anzi di chiarissima emersione di questa linea, è l’ar-
ticolo 1 del Grundgesetz, della costituzione tedesca del 1949, che si apre con le pa-
role: «La dignità umana è inviolabile». Le ragioni storiche di questa apertura non 
hanno bisogno di sottolineatura, ma l’eredità, la linea indicata alla fine della prima 
guerra mondiale negli anni tra il 1947 ed il 1949, la ritroviamo integra nella prima 
dichiarazione dei diritti del terzo millennio. È appunto la Carta dei diritti fondamen-
tali dell’Unione europea ad aprirsi con il riferimento alla dignità. «La dignità umana 
è inviolabile. Essa deve essere rispettata e tutelata».
Ciò che ricaviamo da questa ricostruzione è che la persona è inseparabile dalla sua 
dignità. Potremmo dire, riprendendo i riferimenti a due grandi ricerche di Louis Du-
mont, una sull’homo hierarchicus e una sull’homo aequalis, che quel tragitto descritto 
da Dumont, dalla gerarchia all’eguaglianza, non si è fermato all’eguaglianza, che pure 
è stata la grande rivoluzione, la grande promessa tra Settecento e Ottocento, una pro-
messa, peraltro, ancora non adempiuta. Quel tragitto è continuato con la rivoluzione 
della dignità, è l’homo dignus che si affianca all’homo aequalis. Naturalmente il riferi-
mento alla vicenda drammatica presente ai costituenti tedeschi, non paragonabile a 
nessun’altra, la vicenda della Shoah, richiede sempre molta prudenza, perché rischia-
mo di banalizzare quella che nella storia dell’umanità ha segnato la caduta in un abisso 
senza eguali, sul quale dobbiamo continuare a sporgerci consapevoli della sua unicità.
Le parole di uno tra i grandi interpreti di quel dramma, Primo Levi, sono impor-
tanti: «Per vivere occorre una identità, ossia una dignità». Ecco delineato il quadro: 
eguaglianza certamente, ma dignità e identità. C’è un articolo della Costituzione 
italiana dove questo profilo è ben sintetizzato. In essa man mano che si affrontano 
queste questioni compaiono parole ignote al lessico costituzionale storico. La parola 
«esistenza» ricorre intensamente nei più diversi documenti e forse la formulazione 
più felice e comprensiva, o che ci offre più spunti di riflessione, la troviamo nell’ar-
ticolo 36 della Costituzione dove si parla di «esistenza libera e dignitosa». Si tratta 
di una nuova associazione: non solo l’eguaglianza è associata alla dignità, ma la di-
gnità a sua volta è associata con la libertà. E questa associazione con la libertà ci 
dice una cosa molto importante, e cioè che la costruzione della dignità non può es-
sere il risultato di una imposizione dall’esterno, per meglio dire di una imposizione 
da parte di un altro. Essa è associata alla libertà della persona, e quindi la sua è il 
risultato di una costruzione tutta affidata all’interessato.
Vediamo, allora, che cosa accade quando la dignità viene messa in discussione. 
Quando la dignità viene negata nei modi più diversi, è evidente qual è il risultato, 
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anche dal punto di vista linguistico. La persona di cui si nega la dignità diventa so-
cialmente indegna. Questo è il punto drammatico che noi cogliamo nelle vicende, in 
particolare, ma non solo, che coinvolgono le persone LGBTI.
Come si separano questi due elementi che avevo detto indissociabili, eguaglianza 
e dignità, conclusione di quel tragitto che ritroviamo nell’articolo 1 della Carta dei 
diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea, che è giuridicamente vincolante dal 1° 
dicembre 2009 con lo stesso valore giuridico dei trattati? La dignità umana è invio-
labile. Dunque, la persona è inseparabile dalla sua dignità in via di principio. Nei 
fatti, tuttavia, questa separazione accade, si manifesta drammaticamente. Accade 
con la parola in primo luogo, la parola sociale, il linguaggio. Non c’è bisogno di 
arrivare alla frontiera dell’hate speech, il linguaggio dell’odio, basta il linguaggio 
quotidiano della stigmatizzazione, della costruzione aggressiva dell’altro, del confi-
namento in una diversità irredimibile, per far precipitare chi è oggetto di questa 
parola nella categoria di coloro che non attingono alla pienezza della dignità. In 
qualche modo, appunto, vengono costruiti come indegni. E quella parola porta con 
sé un rifiuto, una condanna sociale.
Quando ho cominciato a presiedere l’Autorità garante per la protezione dei dati 
personali, la prima audizione riguardò proprio le discriminazioni nei confronti degli 
omosessuali. I componenti di quella autorità erano certamente rappresentativi di 
culture molto diverse tra loro. E tuttavia fummo concordi nel ritenere che la legge 
sulla privacy ci imponeva di affrontare subito questo tema. Mi presentai a quella 
audizione, alla quale partecipavano quelli che allora rappresentavano molto bene il 
mondo delle persone omosessuali, mostrando il titolo di un giornale, di non molto 
tempo prima: «Architetto omosessuale ferito in un incidente d’auto». È evidente il 
carico di stigmatizzazione di un titolo come questo, in cui il riferimento all’omoses-
sualità non aveva assolutamente alcun valore informativo, ma rifletteva nient’altro 
che un modo di guardare a queste persone da parte di chi riteneva di fare attività di 
informazione.
Queste punte estreme sono scomparse? Non ne sono così sicuro. Anzi, dopo un 
periodo in cui c’era stato un abbandono di stereotipi nella comunicazione ufficiale, 
in troppi luoghi dell’informazione questi stereotipi, se vogliamo chiamarli benevol-
mente così, stanno ricomparendo. E questo accade in forme che accompagnano il 
risorgere o il riemergere molto forte dell’omofobia, non solo come stigmatizzazione, 
ma come aggressione fisica. La parola di disprezzo non solo vuole far piombare le 
persone nell’indegnità, ma le indica come bersagli.
Si è avuta notizia del fatto che l’ufficio della motorizzazione di Brindisi ha nega-
to la patente ad una persona omosessuale perché portatrice di una “patologia” che 
potrebbe essere di pregiudizio per la guida. Come era già avvenuto per il caso di 
Danilo Giuffrida, ma lì in sede giurisdizionale, questo provvedimento è stato annul-
lato dall’organo gerarchicamente superiore. E tuttavia la parola del diritto, la parola 
delle istituzioni, può continuare ad essere questa. Dobbiamo esserne consapevoli, 
perché in questo modo si nega l’eguaglianza e si fanno precipitare le persone nell’in-
degnità.
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Tutto questo spiega il persistere di infinite resistenze. I segni sono chiari: una 
sentenza recente parla di atti contrari alla pubblica decenza per due ragazzi che si 
erano baciati in pubblico, viene bloccata una norma sull’omofobia, le persone 
LBGTI sono considerate indegne di accedere al matrimonio, all’omogenitorialità, 
all’adozione, alla stessa identità. È il tragitto che partecipa alla costruzione di un 
contesto che porta alla trasformazioni di alcuni soggetti in “non persone”. Questo 
fu l’esito estremo della Shoah che, con tutte le cautele ricordate prima, non possia-
mo dimenticare. La costruzione dell’indegno certamente ebbe nel regime nazista la 
sua massima manifestazione con la creazione di un altro non solo indegno, ma da 
confinare nella categoria delle non persone. La “non persona” è l’omosessuale, è il 
dissidente politico, lo zingaro, in fine e massimamente è l’ebreo. “Non persone”, e 
quindi non portatrici di diritti, alle quali dunque può essere negato tutto perché, 
trasformati in oggetto, possono divenire, appunto, assoggettate a un potere che si 
serve di loro nel modo più violento. Il processo ai medici nazisti di Norimberga nel 
1946 ci ricordò tutto questo.
Ma noi non possiamo ritenere che tutto questo né ci appartenga storicamente, né 
appartenga soltanto al passato perché, quando si fanno grandi elogi della modera-
zione e della mitezza italiana, è vero che, in confronto alla violenza drammatica 
della Shoah, possiamo anche in qualche modo rassicurarci. E tuttavia non possiamo 
dimenticare, quando nel 1939 venne pubblicato il primo libro del codice civile, che 
l’articolo 1, terzo comma, disponeva che «le limitazioni alla capacità giuridica deri-
vanti dall’appartenenza a determinate razze sono stabilite da leggi speciali». Era cioè 
possibile creare attraverso la legge delle “non persone”. Dobbiamo sempre tenerlo 
presente. Certo, quel grado estremo e aggressivo oggi non appartiene ai nostri ordi-
namenti, ma non per questo dobbiamo chiudere gli occhi di fronte ad un abomine-
vole diritto che confina, nega, esclude e costruisce un altro, il quale può essere og-
getto di aggressione per molti motivi.
Non è un caso che l’«altro» inaccettabile in questa fase storica, non solo in Italia, 
sia l’immigrato. Abbiamo così due figure oggetto del rifiuto e dell’aggressione. Da 
una parte quelli che rientrano nell’acronimo LGBTI, cioè coloro che hanno costru-
ito e manifestato precisi orientamenti sessuali; dall’altra l’immigrato, anch’egli og-
getto di rifiuto.
Il punto è molto significativo, e ci impone di ribadire che cosa voglia dire costru-
ire l’altro non solo come diseguale, ma indegno. La disuguaglianza non dà la legitti-
mazione all’aggressione. Ma quando l’altro è considerato indegno di appartenere alla 
stessa comunità alla quale appartengono tutti gli altri, ciò può giustificare il rifiuto 
prima e l’aggressione poi. Tutto questo è l’effetto di una costruzione sociale significa-
tiva, dalla quale noi non possiamo separarci, né possiamo ritenere che sia tutto som-
mato irrilevante. Ed è una costruzione sociale che deriva da ciascuno di noi. È una 
costruzione sociale che certo trova le parole del diritto, ma è l’altro che mi costruisce 
come indegno. Non c’è una natura, un’essenza che mi costruisce come tale. C’è una 
frase molto efficace di Sartre, che si riferisce all’ebreo. Sartre dice: «L’ebreo dipende 
dall’opinione sulla sua professione, sui suoi diritti, sulla sua vita». Dunque l’ebreo 
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non è l’appartenente ad una razza, è il risultato di una costruzione sociale che non 
solo lo discrimina, ma lo vede appartenente a qualcosa di lontano, altro.
Torno a Levi e alle cose che lui ha scritto, anche qui usando prudentemente il 
riferimento al dramma oggetto delle sue narrazioni. Uno dei capitoli più belli del 
libro I sommersi e i salvati è quello intitolato a «La zona grigia», nella quale non 
solo l’indegno viene costruito in quanto tale, ma viene spinto ad estremizzare la 
propria indegnità per poter sopravvivere. Questo è un dato che non possiamo di-
menticare ed è per questo che mi è apparso importante dare una serie di riferimen-
ti al contesto.
Una annotazione ulteriore: la costruzione da parte dell’altro mi porta a dire che 
tollerare non basta più. Ecco il punto chiave. Perché oggi, per esempio – penso so-
prattutto agli immigrati – si tollera molto, ma si riconosce pochissimo. Io accetto che 
l’immigrato stia qui, ma finché fa la badante, viene a lavorare in casa mia, e la sera 
deve divenire invisibile, si deve allontanare il più possibile da noi. Leviamo le pan-
chine dai giardini perché gli immigrati non possano sedersi, avere vita sociale, avere 
la dignità sociale di componente di una comunità. Questo dobbiamo tenerlo sempre 
presente. La tolleranza, passaggio fondamentale della civilizzazione. Il riconosci-
mento, momento ancora difficile proprio perché è l’altro che mi costruisce come 
lontano, diverso, indegno.
Inutile parlare della situazione italiana. La nostra Corte Costituzionale, quando 
è stata investita del problema del matrimonio tra persone dello stesso sesso, ha ef-
fettuato, all’interno di una sentenza che ha alcuni punti assai significativi e che non 
dobbiamo lasciar cadere, un’azione interpretativa, quindi di politica del diritto, non 
accettabile. Non è accettabile perché ha dato dell’articolo 29 della Costituzione una 
lettura che per altro contraddice altre sentenze della Corte, nelle quali questa met-
teva in evidenza come l’istituto matrimoniale si sia profondamente trasformato. 
Nella sentenza n. 138/2010 ha letto l’articolo 29 della Costituzione come il principio 
in base al quale poi deve essere reinterpretato il principio di uguaglianza, mentre è 
ovvio che dovrebbe essere l’opposto. Bisogna infatti misurare l’accettabilità istitu-
zionale di una lettura dell’articolo 29 sul matrimonio in base ai principi di eguaglian-
za tra le persone. Anche se questo non è avvenuto, non dispero della possibilità che 
la Corte si manifesti in modo più aperto in futuro, come già è avvenuto altre volte 
nella sua storia. Si pensi all’adulterio della donna, la cui sanzione penale venne pri-
ma ritenuta legittima, poi incostituzionale.
Il ragionamento della Corte non è obbligato. Negli stessi giorni nei quali si espri-
meva la Corte italiana, basandosi su una lettura tradizionale del matrimonio per 
escludere l’accesso da parte di persone dello stesso sesso, il Tribunale costituzionale 
portoghese, muovendo da una disposizione costituzionale sostanzialmente identica, 
arrivava alla conclusione opposta. Oggi che c’è uno sguardo reciproco tra le corti 
– si parla di una global community of courts – penso che abbiamo buone ragioni per 
ritenere che bisogna continuare ad insistere su questo terreno. Intanto, però, pren-
dendo molto sul serio tre aspetti della sentenza della Corte: il riconoscimento delle 
unioni tra omosessuali come formazioni sociali; il diritto fondamentale delle persone 
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che costituiscono queste unioni ad avere un riconoscimento legislativo; l’affermazio-
ne secondo la quale «può accadere che, in relazioni a ipotesi particolari, sia riscon-
trabile la necessità di un trattamento omogeneo tra la condizione della coppia coniu-
gata e quella della coppia omosessuale». È l’impegno della Corte a vigilare affinché 
la disciplina parlamentare rispetti le sue indicazioni. Il punto chiave è la natura di 
diritto fondamentale.
Ancora oggi il diritto fondamentale riconosciuto dalla Corte è negato dall’inerzia 
del Parlamento, è negato dalla disattenzione della politica, è negato dalla scarsa ri-
levanza che la cultura italiana attribuisce alle grandi battaglie per i diritti delle per-
sone. Questo vuol dire che il lavoro di ricerca e di sensibilizzazione, la tenacia nel 
mantenere questi temi nella discussione pubblica, la denuncia continua dell’insensi-
bilità della politica ufficiale, prigioniera di infiniti opportunismi, costituiscono per 
tutti una obbligazione morale e civile.
Chiudo con una citazione da un’intervista al New York Times di Martha Nus-
sbaum. Ad una domanda riguardante l’eventualità di un suo nuovo matrimonio, 
Nussbaum ha risposto così: «Se pensassi di sposarmi, sarei preoccupata del fatto che 
godrei di un privilegio negato alle coppie dello stesso sesso».
Questa è la via da seguire. Non solo rispettare l’altro, ma costruire tutti noi nella 
dignità e nell’eguaglianza.

i.
Sex and Gender

gender and beyond:
disaggregaTing legal CaTegories
Alexander Schuster
Abstract
Western legal tradition relies on cryptotypes, implicit and silent legal categories that shape the 
law and the homo juridicus, the legal agent that unconsciously represents the model for crafting 
both civil and common law. He has long been the symbol of sexism and heteronormativism, 
but is now undergoing a profound evolution epitomized by the shift from the legal notion and 
term of sex to gender. The essay argues that gender is the legal category for overcoming discri-
mination and favouring gender-neutrality. It identifies trends and inconsistencies in national 
and international systems and argues that for instance same-gender marriage should be the 
expression to be used. In the meanwhile a homo juridicus europaeus has come to light.
* * *
The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-philosophicus, 5.6.
1. Homo juridicus, quo vadis?
For a long time they remain hidden, away from everyday thoughts. Society is not 
aware of their presence, yet it decides and moves in a way that implicitly reaffirms 
their existence and influence. Jurists unconsciously rely on them for crafting new 
laws and legal codes and for founding their legal reasoning. They are the crypto-
types, tacit ideas of society that turn into implicit legal categories, axioms deemed to 
be as obvious and inherent in the nature of things that they are not even mentioned 
and considered totally unquestioned assumptions.
A prominent Italian legal scholar borrowed the term cryptotype (from Ancient 
Greek κρυπτος and τυπος) from synchronic linguistics and applied it to legal phe-
nomena1. When we speak we follow several rules. Speakers are fully aware of some 
1 On the notion of cryptotype applied to law see Rodolfo Sacco ‘Introduzione al diritto com-
parato’ in Id. (ed.), Trattato di diritto comparato (UTET 1992) 125ff. See also Id., entry Crittotipo, 
in Digesto disc. priv. (4th edn, UTET 1993) 39 f.
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rules, but not of others, because they are implicit and specific to language use. The 
same goes for the law. Lawyers draft new legislation, interpret regulations and apply 
norms using a background of categories that are covert.
Whereas legal cryptotypes have always existed and always will, the era of Euro-
pean codifications in the XIX and XX century has significantly wrought changes in 
the way they impact legal routine and reasoning. Starting with the Code Napoléon 
codifications are epitomes of systematic approaches. The efforts to build a rational-
istic-deductive legal system by XIX century German scholars yielded for example 
the Begriffsjurisprudenz. Inspired by Cartesian logic, the legal order is based on and 
coincides with exact, complete, exhaustive and systematic jurisprudence. Its axioms, 
however, are not all overt, with far-reaching consequences on the degree to which a 
legal system can evolve and adapt to social changes.
Social sciences build theories by relying on an ideal set of assumptions, and as 
far as human behaviour is concerned they define an agent summarizing the strong-
holds of the theory2. Microeconomics has developed what is the best example of a 
rational model, i.e. the economic agent. The homo oeconomicus is a purely theo-
retical agent, who acts in view of obtaining the highest possible well-being for 
himself based on the information available and respecting in a rigorous, rational 
way his set of preferences3. Microeconomics developed theories explaining this 
homo oeconomicus and his behaviour and thereby defining the rules of the market. 
Theory and practice, however, do not always coincide. This homo is perhaps selfish, 
and rationality does not always lead our actions, which are subject to emotional 
swings, so that critiques arose against this theoretical model. A similar pattern ap-
plies to the law as well.
The European legal tradition similarly relies on an implicit vision of the human 
being. This is the agent of the law and the system draws from these ideal rules of 
conduct, obligations, rights applying to the individual and to society as a whole. This 
agent is endowed with rationality and therefore is expected to react to legal incen-
tives and sanctions. He has individual preferences, benefits from a social status and 
has a certain place in society by being part of social groups such as a family, associa-
tions, political parties, and enterprises. The more a system puts efforts to concen-
trate the founding pillars of its legal order in a limited number of sources, such as 
codes, the more it is drawn to rely on an original set of axioms most of which are 
tied together in a model of a legal agent. The common law tradition is not a strang-
er to cryptotypes and equally relies on implicit ideas and categories epitomized by a 
model of legal agent. Its traditional core does not differ substantially from the civil 
law one.
2 See the homo sociologicus introduced by Ralf Dahrendorf in 1958: Homo Sociologicus: Ein Ver-
such zur Geschichte, Bedeutung und Kritik der Kategorie der sozialen Rolle (VS Verl. für Sozialwis-
senschaften 2006), English translation Homo sociologicus (Routledge & K. Paul 1973).
3 For an overview of the homo oeconomicus see for instance Joseph Persky, ‘Retrospectives: The 
Ethology of Homo Economicus’ [1995] Journal of Economic Perspectives 221.
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The era of codifications has opened the gates of the law to the modern homo 
juridicus4. Such a formidable advancement in legal history required a theoretical 
framework and a common ground, which was however not made fully explicit. The 
homo juridicus is to legal sciences what the homo oeconomicus is to economics. They 
both permit the reduction of the multitude of human beings to unity; they are the 
means for the reductio ad unum of the human landscape. He is – so to say – the one 
man that rules them all, the model of legal subject, and the main character in Eu-
rope’s legal narrative. Yet one element significantly distinguishes the economic and 
legal models from each other. Whereas the economic human is firstly theorized 
thoroughly – explicitly starting with economic theories that are developed moving 
from the assumptions the model is based off –, the law takes a completely different 
route. The legal order does not presuppose a full theory of the legal human as a 
precondition for the definition of the law. The model is implicit. Its theoretical 
definition, rather than preceding the production of norms, emerges all along legal 
history. Only the social evolution of the law unravels the deepest assumptions. 
Whilst the homo oeconomicus is the explicit starting point of the system, the homo 
juridicus is an implicit foundation that is given a fuller description rather at the end 
of his life, i.e. when he is progressively disavowed by the law.
The craftsmen of the French Code civil of 1804 and of Germany’s Bürgerliches 
Gesetzbuch, the BGB of 1900, sketched an agent by using a highly dogmatic toolbar. 
Who he or she really is has long remained an unaddressed question. His character-
istics became clear at a later stage, when the eternal fight throughout history for 
equality and justice challenged the status quo. Still today not all is evident and 
known. As the law continues to evolve and the legal culture adapts to new inputs 
and social claims, history unravels assumptions that we were not aware of before, no 
matter how essential they might be to our construction of society. Actually, the more 
foundational they are, the deeper we have to dig.
In the past two centuries history has taught us much about the agent that is com-
mon to the Western legal tradition. Racism and sexism have shown that this homo 
juridicus was not representing any and every human being, but took the appearance 
of the masculine side of humanity. Moreover, his skin had a very specific colour: 
white. It was with this background that the law depicted rights and freedoms of the 
individual. All those not matching this legal agent fell outside the Law, confined in 
other parts of the legal systems, never enjoying the main stream of protection of the 
law. Exclusion reached the point of denying any legal subjectivity to human beings, 
4 This expression occurs for the first time in the work by a well-known French author, Alain 
Supiot, who developed the idea of homo juridicus as the link between man as a finite biological 
and material entity and its legal dimension that overcomes this limits. See Homo juridicus essai sur 
la fonction anthropologique du droit (Seuil 2005), English translation by Saskia Brown, Homo Ju-
ridicus. On the Anthropological Function of the Law (Verso 2007). The same expression, even 
though it has commonalities with Supiot’s, is employed in the present essay independently and 
performs a different function.
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from ancient times to very recent history5. Racial laws and gender discrimination 
equally pertain to the history of all Western legal traditions and are common to 
other ones as well. For a long time all of the above was perceived as natural, self-
evident, based on axioms not to be contested and not requiring any justification. 
African Americans, Jews and women shared a common fate.
Our past tells us more. Our homo juridicus was also a religious man. In many in-
stances he was linked to just one religious confession. Dissenting people not sharing 
the established creed were deprived of rights, placed outside the protection of the law. 
The religious wars that devastated Europe throughout the centuries brought essen-
tially an increased separation of Church and state. Nonetheless our man was still in-
herently religious and the perceived and recurring menace of non-Christian religions 
at the borders of Europe contributed to his identification with a Christian man, a com-
mon model for Western countries. All Christians rallied their forces under a common 
faith. By indulging in creating Latin writing, we could say that the homo christianus 
successfully replaced in the law the homo catholicus and the homo protestans. The his-
tory of family law is evidence to the common ground of civil law and common law 
traditions, deeply rooted in canon law and modern Christian traditions. The position 
of the wife vis-à-vis the husband, the role and powers of the father over his children, 
as well as the privileges granted to the so-called legitimate family, holding for centuries 
and still today the monopoly over the legal notion of family are all examples of issues 
that European and North American jurists have debated in terms of equality.
Yet this white, Christian and masculine individual soon acquired new nuances. 
The rise in awareness by minorities and neglected sectors of society and their claims 
for recognition cast a new light on the legal agent. History progressively showed that 
this man was also mostly wealthy and a bourgeois. Today we know through the 
emerging of hidden discrimination that our homo juridicus is healthy and far from 
disabilities. The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is clear 
evidence to this, as it aims to set new remedies to discrimination derived from a law 
conceived for non-disabled individuals.
In the last decades, however, we also realized that he is heterosexual. The model 
of legal agent that the whole family law postulates influences above all marriage and 
parenthood, and thereby curtails rights in several other fields of the law, such as 
inheritance law, employment and social rights. The impact of the heterosexual side 
of the homo juridicus on the system and on individuals was not even perceived, as 
axiomatic arguments based on tradition and nature – whatever these terms may re-
fer to – made elementary gender-based rules and assumptions self-evident.
The advancement of rights campaigns and the increase of social pressure for 
greater equality make assertive self-evident arguments no longer sustainable and in-
5 Hannah Arendt saw in this a new form of despotism. In The Origins of Totalitarianism (George 
Allen & Unwin 1967) 237 she wrote: “The first essential step on the road to total domination is 
to kill the juridical person in man”.
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duced judiciaries to reason ex novo on the justifications for certain statutory provi-
sions or traditional norms derived from never questioned interpretative options. If 
we consider the gender requirement for two eligible spouses, we know that until re-
cently many legal systems did not explicitly state diversity of gender as a requirement. 
They even deny that same-gender marriage performed elsewhere is something resem-
bling marriage and therefore conclude its non-existence rather than invalidity6.
Cryptotypes remain covert until historical sensitivity does not point to traits of 
the homo juridicus that were until then unknown and yet deeply entrenched in our 
minds. Sexism and heteronormativity7 are still prime examples of contemporary at-
titudes of the legal orders and at the centre of the legal shift towards broader inclu-
sion and greater equality. The way is now paved for abandoning the shores of these 
two deeply rooted attitudes and for the move towards a legal system based on gen-
der-neutrality. The bearing is set. How to navigate the hazardous waters of legal 
innovation is yet to be seen. The starting point is certainly a critical and sound com-
prehension of cryptotypes and the legal semantics associated thereto.
2. From cryptotypes to legal notions
2.1. Sexual dualism
Traditional legal systems considered man as the legal agent. The existence of women 
was a fact that the law would take into consideration where strictly needed. It would 
take it for granted that the world is based on a sexual dualism and regard it as a mere 
fact for most of its provisions. However, following the rise of women’s right, either 
implicitly or explicitly, in discriminating in favour or against, the legal system would 
rely on the idea of sex as a criterion. Its relevance brought it to the status of an au-
tonomous legal notion: the law depends on sex as one of its categories.
Masculinity and femininity appear such self-evident elements of our natural 
world that no legal definition of sex is provided, not even in international instru-
ments. This is not surprising if one considers that sex as a legal requirement is often 
implicit, albeit of the greatest importance. Marriage perhaps provides the best ex-
6 A traditional doctrine in Italian civil law that nowadays is aptly questioned affirmed that same-
ness of gender of the spouses does not even allow to preliminarily categorize their union under 
marriage, although other legal systems lawfully would do so. The Supreme Court of Cassation 
stated that the essential, “natural” elements of marriage are not even given, so that such “mar-
riages” in the eyes of Italian law are condemned to be “non-existent”, a consequence much more 
negative than annulment.
7 According to L Berlant and M Warner, ‘Sex in Public’ [1998] Critical Inquiry 24, 547-566, 548, 
“[b]y heteronormativity we mean the institutions, structures of understanding and practical ori-
entations that make heterosexuality seem not only coherent – that is, organised as sexuality – but 
also privileged. Its coherence is always provisional, and its privilege can take several (sometimes 
contradictory) forms: unmarked, as the basic idiom of the personal and the social; or marked as 
natural state; or projected as an ideal or moral accomplishment”.
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ample of how the law relies on sex without providing any reference to it8, but there 
are others. In Italy electoral laws did not explicitly postulate the right to vote as 
limited only to men, but when the limitation was challenged courts found it unnec-
essary to seek textual support for constructing the provision as limiting voting rights 
to men, as it was considered self-evident9. Only in 1946, when Italians were given 
the choice to opt for the monarchy or the republic, did women gain full equality.
The legal idea of sex builds on its naturalistic evidence and makes it a category, 
a label for classifying individuals and a requisite to which consequences are at-
tached, not last of which is inequality. We can nowadays apprehend several critical 
issues due to this category.
Firstly, this purported naturalistic origin of the dualism rests on biological evi-
dence, but is still a cultural construct. The binary interpretation of chromosomes is 
led by cultural paradigms and overlooks that nature does not always fit in categories 
created by mankind. Intersexuality is a telling example. If one had hypothetically to 
concede that sexual organs and chromosomes had to play a role in the law, an ex-
clusively binary system would not be satisfactory. Such a system overlooks the situ-
ation of some individuals – no matter how many – and forces them to adapt to life 
schemes that they did not want to choose, be it because they fell in a category not 
matching their feelings or simply because they did not want any label imposed but 
were forced nevertheless to opt for one. The absence of a legal definition of sex 
leaves it to administrative registrars and to judges to ultimately decide critical cases.
Secondly, the more women became fully-fledged legal subject with rights and 
duties in an increasing number of legal fields, the more sex became an explicit ele-
ment in identifying privileges and reiterating discrimination. For instance, the 
dominance of men in the employment sector could no longer be based on implicit 
8 Laws provide differently for men and women and provide legal instruments to combat dis-
crimination, but do not define sex or gender. See for instance the most important international 
instrument in the field of non-discrimination against women: Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979 by the UN General As-
sembly. However, the equivalent instrument adopted by the Council of Europe Committee of 
Ministers on 7 April 2011, the Convention on preventing and combating violence against women 
and domestic violence, CM(2011)49 final, CEST No 210, provides at article 3 a definition of 
gender. It shall mean “the socially constructed roles, behaviours, activities and attributes that a 
given society considers appropriate for women and men”. No definition for sex is given, even 
though both terms are mentioned and used in the text. Article 4 on Fundamental rights, equality 
and non-discrimination mentions both sex and gender as non discrimination grounds. The ex-
planatory report does not explain such a choice. Both texts are available online <http://conven-
tions.coe.int>, accessed 28 May 2011.
9 Following the experience in the United States Maria Montessori, a prominent Italian peda-
gogue, in 1906 supported a campaign for the extension of the right to vote to women, who were 
asked to register on the electoral lists. The Italian Court of Appeals rejected with one exception 
the application. The Court of Cassation eventually quashed the decision of the Court of Appeal 
of Ancona of 25 July 1906, which had granted the request. The reasoning by the courts drew on 
tradition and the natural roles in society given to men and women.
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sexist assumptions. In some cases sex became an explicit requirement, in others sex 
started to be mentioned as a non-discrimination ground.
The introduction of a new term, gender, is the turning point in the awareness 
process of how discrimination occurs, which is taking place in society. The legal his-
tory of gender discrimination testifies to the role that the category of sex has played 
and still plays in society and in the law in particular.
2.2. Sex and gender
Different treatment of men and women was justified by biological differences and 
was considered self-evident. As time passed, justifications were increasingly ques-
tioned, up to the point where differences in employment conditions and pay, family 
law etc. were strictly scrutinized. It became clear that the reasons for discriminating 
were not chromosomes and biological traits per se, but rather the social construct of 
man and woman. By then it became clear that not sex, but gender was the target of 
discrimination. For this very reason reference to sex in public policies and legal 
discourse faded out in favour of gender, so that expressions such as “gender equal-
ity”, “gender balancing”, “gender-neutrality” are now of common usage. The law is 
part of this terminological change, to which the notion of gender identity offers a 
significant contribution10.
Chromosomes do not account for the character and the psyche of individuals, 
nor for their attitudes and preferences like manner of dressing or taste in music. If 
gender refers to the identity, appearance or behaviour as perceived by an individual, 
her or his most intimate identification, then it does not relate to her or his “biologi-
cal file”, which usually accounts for the sex assigned at birth.
The protection of women and of gender identity at European and national level 
shows that in the eyes of the law gender prevails over sex. On the one hand sex is 
replaced by gender or reinterpreted as meaning gender, on the other hand legal 
systems affirm the legal supremacy of gender over sex. With regard to the first as-
pect, besides the formal use of “gender identity” in specific legislation, both in the 
English legal terminology and in some Latin languages gender is now used instead 
of sex, with the double positive consequence of focusing on the real object of dis-
crimination, which is gender and not sex, and of including also transgender persons. 
See for instance the recent gender violence legislation in Spain, but also the Council 
of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and 
domestic violence, which was the very first international instrument to explicitly 
10 According to the Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law 
in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity gender identity is understood to refer to each 
person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may not corre-
spond with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal sense of the body (which may involve, 
if freely chosen, modification of bodily appearance or function by medical, surgical or other 
means) and other expressions of gender, including dress, speech and mannerisms.
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mention protection on the ground of gender identity11. The prevalence of gender 
over sex occurs also in all instances where the law prohibits enquiries into the his-
tory of transgender persons. Civil status certificates, records and diplomas have to 
be updated with the new gender and disclosure of previous personal history is pro-
hibited for the protection of private life. This certainly follows from the protection 
of sensitive personal data, but also signifies that what matters to the state is no lon-
ger the sex of the individual, but her or his gender. This is the category that the law 
now embraces, biological evidence being a mere fact to which the law pays no legal 
attention unless it is relevant as an element of a given legal situation.
3. Disaggregating legal categories
With the shift from sex to gender the cryptotype of a sexual dualism as a social 
construct comes to the surface. By embracing the term gender jurists show aware-
ness of the fact that rules are in reality linked to the social role assigned either to men 
or to women. The more public policies and the legal system realize that disparate 
treatment between genders in many instances is unjustified and not based on “heavy 
reasons”, the more the system moves towards gender-neutrality. At the same time, 
gender-neutrality leads the legal order to a development that permits to dismiss not 
only sex, but gender itself as a legal category, reaching the fullest degree of gender-
neutrality.
Is a legal order without gender conceivable and in how far can the system cur-
rently move in this direction? Would abandoning gender as a legal category entail a 
denial of the biological difference of human beings that is associated with the tradi-
tional sexual dualism? Certainly not. The viewpoint of the current analysis is strictly 
legal and its scope is the legal phenomenon. Other sciences may well rely on sex and 
gender as relevant notions. This, however, does not imply that the same notions 
must be part of the set of elements that build the legal fact or the legal system. A 
natural fact, like a colour of a building, is not a legal fact. The frame of the law does 
not coincide with the frame of reality. Therefore, the law does not deny that “indi-
vidual X” may well be from a social point of view a man or a woman, yet the eyes of 
the law see individual X just as a human being, without attaching any more relevance 
to gender than to ethnic origins or sexual orientation.
This does, however, not mean that the law is or must always be blind to human 
biology and its evidence. Before discussing the relevance of one of the most signifi-
cant issues – pregnancy – an example will clarify how physical or natural elements 
determine certain legal consequences without becoming legal categories. Discrimi-
nation grounds should always be left open, as they know no limit: Article 21 of the 
Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union contains a quite lengthy list 
11 See below for the more detailed analysis of the usage of gender in language groups.
29GENDER AND BEYOND: DISAGGREGATING LEGAL CATEGORIES
of protected grounds, which is however open-ended as it may well cover other 
grounds. The scope of the protection is even broader as discrimination may occur 
per association or operate intersectionally. One hypothesis that may take place is 
discrimination because of one’s height, e.g. discrimination against short people seek-
ing a job and deemed unfit to perform the required duties. Height is not a legal 
category, yet the law identifies and reacts against discriminatory situations that are 
based on height like on any other physical trait such as weight (for instance, bullying 
at school against obese children). In several occasions judicial scrutiny has struck 
down height as a condition because it is not related to any genuine job requirement.
The law can approach pregnancy in a way similar to height. Biological evidence 
is not denied by the legal notion of gender and protection does not diminish in a 
gender-neutral legal system. Discrimination against or in favour – protective mea-
sures or legitimate differences in treatment – would still find their place in the legal 
scenario as they did before. However, the focus is no longer on sex per se, but on 
biological evidence. Pregnancy would be protected as such, regardless of gender12. 
Critics of comprehensive gender-neutrality may consider such theories merely 
speculative and incapable of meeting a common feeling that mandates to stick to the 
legal protection of women during pregnancy. It must be understood that protection 
does not diminish and actually such a move is necessary to allow the system to fur-
ther protect situations that may lead to heavy and socially pernicious discrimination, 
e.g. when sex and gender do not coincide and a biological mother is of masculine 
legal gender.
The dissociation of biological facts from sex and even from gender solves issues 
that the law is soon called upon to address, i.e. gay and transgender parenthood. 
Recognizing the protection of parenthood in general, rather than of motherhood on 
the one side and fatherhood on the other side, leads systems to gender-neutrality 
also with regard to parental authority, parental leaves and other benefits related to 
12 The US Supreme Court dealt with the issue of discrimination and pregnancy in Geduldig v. 
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 n. 20 (1974). The Court held that “[w]hile it is true that only women can 
become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a 
sex-based classification […] The program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant 
women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes 
members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the program thus accrue to members of 
both sexes”. Upon this decision Congress passed the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and specified that 
“[t]he terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include, but are not limited to, because of or 
on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions”. Also the European Court of 
Justice had to deal with a similar issue and decided that discrimination on ground of a person 
being pregnant is direct discrimination against women. See case C-179/88, Handels-og Kontor-
funktionærernes Forbund [1990]ECR I-3979, para 13; C-394/96, Brown [1998] ECR I-4185, paras 
24-27; C-460/06 Paquay [2007] ECR I-8511, para 29. An analysis of European and North Amer-
ican cases is found in Christa Tobler, Indirect discrimination: a case study into the development of 
the legal concept of indirect discrimination under EC law (Intersentia 2005) 46 ff.
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parenting13. More importantly, dissociation appears to be the only coherent way to 
approach the legal issues that will arise from the positive trend to abandon the ster-
ilisation requirement for gender reassignment14. A transgender person is considered 
by the law as belonging to the reassigned gender, without any relevance left for pre-
vious history related to the biological sex. There is no “legal resurrection” of the 
biological dual category when a non-sterilized biological female person of male gen-
der delivers a child or an MtoF transgender person fathers a child because her male 
reproductive organs were still functional15.
By focusing on pregnancy and not on femininity the law effectively addresses the 
real situation that deserves protection, i.e. human reproduction. By embracing a 
gender-neutral approach in all fields – e.g. family and employment – the legal order 
could eventually also dismiss the legal category of gender. All this becomes possible 
without causing inconsistencies in the legal order only if the focus is narrowed down 
to the real situation in need of protection and thereby overcoming critiques that 
there is no legal possibility of relinquishing sex or gender16. Abandoning both sex 
and gender actually contributes to avoiding inconsistencies that originate from the 
most recent jurisprudence on gender identity, such as parenthood by transgender 
persons retaining their reproductive capacity.
13 This is the approach to a certain extent of Council Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 
implementing the revised Framework Agreement on parental leave concluded by BUSINESSEU-
ROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and ETUC and repealing Directive 96/34/EC.
14 The most recent overview on European national legislations regulating gender recognition is 
provided by: Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Discrimination on grounds of 
sexual orientation and gender identity in Europe (report, 2011), 85-87.
15 When the German Federal Constitutional Court decided that mandatory surgery for full gen-
der recognition was unconstitutional – BVerfG, 1 BvR 3295/07 of 11 January 2011 – it did con-
sider the issue of how to classify the relationship between a transgender parent and the child that 
is born before or after reassignment. The Court decided that the parent should be considered a 
father or a mother based on his or her biological sex, which would solve the problem. This deci-
sion by the Court is doubtful and could on this point be decided differently in view of the progres-
sive position expressed on the recognition of same-gender parenthood through adoption by the 
life partner of the biological mother in 1 BvL 15/09 of 10 August 2009.
16 The Constitution Court of Belgium stated that sexual dualism was not a constitutional pillar 
of the national legal order. The judgement No 159/2004 of 20 October 2004 says it clearly: “La 
Cour répond ensuite que la circonstance que la Constitution attribue une importance particulière à 
l’égalité entre hommes et femmes, par le biais des articles 10.3 et 11bis de la Constitution, n’a pas 
pour effet que la ‘dualité sexuelle fondamentale du genre humain’ puisse être considérée comme un 
principe de l’ordre constitutionnel belge. L’article 12 CEDH et l’article 23 du Pacte international 
relatif aux droits civils et politiques ne peuvent pas davantage être interprétés en ce sens qu’ils 
obligeraient les États contractants à considérer la ‘dualité sexuelle fondamentale du genre humain’ 
comme un fondement de leur ordre constitutionnel”. Although still perceived as social evidence, 
dualism is not a founding pillar of the legal system. The judgement may be interpreted as ex-
pressing the view that the law must not incorporate all social categories and assumptions, but 
should be limited instead to those notions and categories that are strictly needed to regulate 
society and the common living.
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Dissociation of behaviours, attitudes and biological traits narrows down the 
scope of the legal protection and targets the specific element that only justifies the 
preferential treatment. EU law has actively dismissed any approach that reiterates 
social constructs like gender. The Test Achats case17 may be read in this way. The 
ECJ has not upheld the possibility to base insurance plans purely on gender. Such 
practice would indeed reinforce ways of classifying individuals that have long served 
to nurture stereotypes. Insurance companies can certainly distinguish on statistics 
and maintain actuarial schemes, yet they must do it based on other patterns than the 
ones that have served discrimination. Other schemes are possible, however they 
must be objectively justified and not rely on social assumptions that reproduce dis-
criminatory patterns.
4. Sex and gender: an assessment
4.1. The semantic shift in Western languages
Is the semantic and practical distinction of the terms sex and gender only abstract 
speculation or is there evidence that legal systems have already – either consciously 
or unconsciously – implemented a shift from sex to gender? In order to respond to 
this question reference to language families ought to be made.
All legal vocabularies share sex as the original term to distinguish between men 
and women. They evolved however differently and we can currently identify three 
main trends. A first group of legal systems embraced gender as the new term replac-
ing sex. Whereas sex still is the term in the less recent legislation, gender progres-
sively replaces it in newest legislation and case-law. Although a sort of cohabitation 
of the two terms occurs, the trend is set. The semantic shift is taking place in full 
knowledge of their difference in meaning: not biology, but the social, cultural and 
psychological identification as man or woman is at the core of the legal reasoning. 
This is notably the case of the United States, the United Kingdom and other Eng-
lish-speaking countries. Also some Romance languages now widely use gender. 
Spanish género is found in the legislation of both the state and the subnational enti-
ties, the so-called comunidades18.
In a second group of legal systems gender is employed less extensively. Gender 
is either used by legal scholars but not in everyday practice or its use is still insuffi-
ciently widespread to be considered as having already replaced sex. However, in 
some cases there seems to be a positive trend, which is likely to be strengthened by 
a positive dissemination of the true meaning of gender as opposed to sex and of the 
17 Case C-236/09 Test-Achats and Others v. Conseil des ministres [2011] OJ C 130/4.
18 See for instance ley orgánica 1/2004, de 28 de diciembre, de Medidas de Protección Integral 
contra la Violencia de Género; ley 30/2003, de 13 de octubre, sobre medidas para incorporar la 
valoración del impacto de género en las disposiciones normativas que elabore el Gobierno.
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advantages of the semantic shift in abandoning gender stereotypes in the law. Espe-
cially in these contexts it is of paramount importance to have legal practitioners 
understand that gender is not a matter for scholars, but a legal concept that must be 
embraced as part of an evolving legal trend to eradicate discrimination. Some 
French scholars use gender (French genre), but they represent a minority and the 
French case is currently closer to the third group described below. Italy’s record is 
more positive. Not only scholars, but also the national legislator and the regional 
legislative assemblies have embraced gender19. European Union law progressively 
embraces gender. By way of example Directive 2006/54/EC20 uses both sex and 
gender, however without any apparent reason for the use of one rather than the 
other. Moreover the name of the newly established agency for the equality of men 
and women is called European Institute for Gender Equality and countless acts by 
EU institutions employ this term, e.g. the European Pact for Gender Equality (2011-
2020)21. The European Court of Human Rights has started to use gender in some 
English written judgements and is likely to move forward in this direction. In Kon-
stantin Markin v. Russia22 the Court dealt with parental rights denied to fathers in 
the armed forces and made a statement in favour of relinquishing the ‘traditional 
gender roles’ (rôle traditionnel des deux sexes in the French version). In other judge-
ments there is evidence of the use of the term gender as a discriminatory ground or 
as the privileged term for referring to men and women or to parental gender23. In 
19 At the regional level see regional law Tuscany May 13, 2004 No 25, Norme per l’elezione del Con-
siglio regionale e del Presidente della Giunta regionale, art. 8 (gender is now the preferred term in the 
field of electoral law). The Italian Parliament has recently employed gender in the law November 4, 
2010 No 183 (so called Collegato lavoro), whose article 46, uses expressions such as “differenze di 
genere” (gender differences) and “discriminazioni di genere” (gender discrimination).
20 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women 
in matters of employment and occupation (recast) [2006] OJ L204/23. See especially the recitals 
and article 29 on gender mainstreaming. The latter expression is translated in the other official 
languages quite differently and this diversity is evidence to the variety of semantic options in the 
national legal orders.
21 See Council conclusions on the European Pact for gender equality for the period 2011-2020 
adopted at the Council meeting of 7 March 2011. The Court of Justice also uses the term gender.
22 App no 30078/06 (ECHR, 7 October 2010).
23 The Court uses gender in the most recent decisions. See for instance Németh v. Hungary App 
no 29436/05 (ECHR, 14 June 2011) dealing with visitation rights of divorced parents and using 
only the term gender; Rytchenko v. Russia App no 22266/04 (ECHR, 20 January 2011), where sex 
is used only once and gender is the preferred term in dealing with a child custody dispute among 
opposite-gender parents); T.N. v. Denmark App no 20594/08 (ECHR, 20 January 2011). See also 
the partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion of Judge Sajó in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece 
[GC], App no 30696/09 (ECHR, 21 January 2011), who refers to Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkan-
dali v. the United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, § 78, Series A no. 94 as a case on discrimination on the 
ground of gender. Gender instead of sex is also used in Kolkova v. Russia App no 20785/04 
(ECHR, 13 January 2011). With regard to the advisory jurisdiction of the Court, see Advisory 
opinion on certain legal questions concerning the lists of candidates submitted with a view to the 
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the English only written judgement of Schalk and Kopf v. Austria the Court uses 
both sex and gender when reviewing their case-law on marriage of transsexuals. The 
use of the terms, however, does not appear consistent, as will be seen below.
Finally, a third group of legal systems do not use the term gender, but neverthe-
less incorporate the notion it stands for. Languages that have not included gender in 
their legal terminology stick to sex, yet have reviewed its definition so to include 
what currently is better understood under the label gender. In other words, sex 
coincides currently with gender and expands on the meanings of sex that depart 
from its biological dimension and embrace the psychological and social ones. In P v 
S24 the European Court of Justice certainly redefines for the first time the term sex 
in EU legislation in order to cover also discrimination against persons that have 
undergone or intend to undergo sex reassignment surgery. Advocate General Tes-
auro argued that the traditional male-female dichotomy is far too narrow and sex 
should be addressed as a continuum25. The Court could only rely at the time of the 
decision on EC provisions combating discrimination on grounds of sex and nation-
ality. As a consequence it had to stretch the ground of sex in order to protect the 
situation of Ms P. However, that this was only a strategic means to reach a higher 
goal – dignity and freedom – is evident from the reasoning itself26. As long as gender 
identity is not included as such in the text of EU legislation the Court will have to 
rely on sex and reinterpret it as including at least transsexuals.
Reinterpretation of the term sex as including also gender is the common approach 
of Germanic languages. German legal terminology uses only the term Geschlecht, 
which includes both the notions of gender and sex. The pivotal notion in the German 
system is “sexual identity”, which ensures also protection on the grounds of sexual 
orientation and gender identity27. The same applies to the Swedish legal vocabulary, 
where kön – literally sex – is considered to cover both sex and gender28 and the na-
election of judges to the European Court of Human Rights, 12 February 2008, where gender is the 
prevailing term, although sex is still considered – perhaps due to its occurrence in legislative 
documents – as synonyms. The French version of the advisory opinion only uses sexe.
24 Case C-13/94, P v S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I-2143. See also Case C-423/04 
Richards [2006] ECR I-3585. The principle set out in the case-law was then codified in Recital 3 
of the Preamble of the Gender Recast Directive.
25 See Case C-13/94, P v S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I-2143, Opinion of AG 
Tesauro, para 17.
26 “To tolerate such discrimination would be tantamount, as regards such a person, to a failure to 
respect the dignity and freedom to which he or she is entitled, and which the Court has a duty to 
safeguard”. P v S, para 22.
27 German law transposing EU directives sticks to this approach and avoids reference to the cor-
responding EU terms: see the Allgemeine Gleichbehandlungsgesetz (AGG) of 2005. However, al-
though sexual identity is still the prevailing legal notion in Germany, some subnational entities, 
the Länder – see for instance the Constitution of the Land of Thüringen – now employ the expres-
sion sexual orientation.
28 An analysis of the semantics of sex and gender in Swedish legal jargon is found in the expert re-
port to the Government on the status of refugees and gender-related persecution Flyktingskap och 
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tional non-discrimination law29 uses the broad kön (sex) compound expression kön-
söverskridande identitet eller uttryck (transgender identity or expression) to cover 
gender identity. The influence of the latter expression in affirming the prevalence of 
the term gender is evident and deserves now a specific analysis.
4.2. The impact of the expression gender identity
Whereas legal terminology varies considerably with regard to the use of sex and 
gender, there is a certain convergence with regard to the use of gender identity. Due 
to the novelty of the term and the relatively recent protection provided to transgen-
der persons, it is explicitly mentioned only in few legal sources. Nevertheless, jurists 
are familiar with the expression world-wide and a common use can be traced in the 
legal jargon, in legislation and/or in case-law. Italian national legislation still does not 
employ the term and law no. 164 of 1982 is titled “rectification of sex attribution” 
(rettificazione di attribuzione di sesso) and focuses on transsexualism. However, sub-
national legislation uses this expression widely, an evidence to the increasing trend 
to include gender identity in the legal discourse30. Even where other corresponding 
legal expressions are dominant, gender identity is not a stranger to the law, although 
in some instances there might be a problem in creating a literal equivalent in those 
languages that do not use gender as a legal term, e.g. Germany. Also international 
organisations employ the expression regularly31.
The notion of gender identity and its protection as a ground of non-discrimina-
tion are quite recent. The homo juridicus was modelled on biological sex as long as 
it was perceived as a self-evidence of human nature. When gender roles were “disag-
könsrelaterad förföljelse, Stockholm, SOU 2004:31, 73-76 and 163-168, available at <http://www.
sweden.gov.se/sb/d/108/a/11484> accessed 23 May 2011. See the Executive Summary in English, 
p. 17: “The Swedish word kön refers in legislative contexts to both the biological concept of ‘sex’ 
and the cultural and social concept of ‘gender’”. The discussion in the report is triggered by the use 
in English written documents of the term gender as in UNHCR, Guidelines on international protec-
tion: Gender-Related Persecution within the context of Article 1 A (2) of the Convention and/or its 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/02/01, 7 May 2002, mentioned in the report itself.
29 Diskrimineringslag (2008:567).
30 See the Italian regional laws of: Liguria 10-11-2009, no 52, Norme contro le discriminazioni 
determinate dall’orientamento sessuale o dall’identità di genere; Marche 11-02-2010, no 8, Dispo-
sizioni contro le discriminazioni determinate dall’orientamento sessuale o dall’identità di genere, 
and Marche 11-11-2008, no 32, Interventi contro la violenza sulle donne, art. 1; Piemonte 29-05-
2009, no 16, Istituzione di Centri antiviolenza con case rifugio, art. 4; Puglia 19-09-2008, no 23, 
Piano regionale di salute 2008-2010; Toscana 15-11-2004, no 63, Norme contro le discriminazioni 
determinate dall’orientamento sessuale o dall’identità di genere; law of the Autonomous Province 
of Trento 09-03-2010, no 6, Interventi per la prevenzione della violenza di genere e per la tutela 
delle donne che ne sono vittime, art. 3.
31 See for instance Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe to member States on measures to combat discrimination on 
grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity and UN Human Rights Council Res 17/19 (15 June 
2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/L.9/Rev.1 on Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity.
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gregated” from chromosomes, gender became an autonomous notion. However, the 
complex distinction of the two notions and the apparent overlap of situations re-
ferred to by using either sex or gender did not favour a consistent legal usage of the 
two terms. Whereas both notions refer to the same individual with regard to cisgen-
der persons, i.e. individuals whose gender coincides with the traditional binary 
sexual category they are associated with, transgender people necessarily call into 
question this overlap.
Gender identity casts a new light on the legal discourse of sexual dualism as 
traditionally conceived and results in a litmus test for verifying the heteronormativ-
ity of a legal system at different levels: openness of the legal discourse to the latest 
developments in social sciences; coherence in the use of legal terminology; and, 
consistency of the legal order, with special regard to family law.
Medical sciences, philosophy and social sciences use gender as a leading catego-
ry. Medical diagnostics use expressions such as gender identity disorder and phi-
losophers have developed theories and still engage in a lively debate on the notion 
and implications of gender. Social sciences other than law have developed instru-
ments to approach diversity and equal opportunities such as gender budgeting and 
gender mainstreaming. Legal sciences are now faced with challenges that deserve 
new concepts and new instruments in order to understand social developments. By 
incorporating the new perspective of gender it adapts to the most recent develop-
ments in the study of society. Gender as well as sexual orientation are significant 
contributions for unravelling the homo juridicus and for abandoning stereotypes and 
prejudice.
Legal sciences have actually already engaged in a dialogue with other social sci-
ences, yet quite often fertilisation remains very theoretical and far from everyday 
legal discourse. The use of the term gender in legislation and case-law is not coher-
ent. In many instances gender is used as a synonym for sex and some expressions 
seem just to be fixed and employed without any critical approach as to their justifi-
cation. For instance ‘gender identity’ is correctly used, but then other expressions 
seem incapable of being embraced, like same-gender, even though it would seem the 
most appropriate concept to be included. A telling example are so-called same-sex 
unions.
5. Same-sex unions is not the issue
Whereas we talk of gender-neutrality with special regard to family institutions, only 
the expression same-sex unions and similar are used. In so far as a legal system has 
already included the term gender, the persistent use of sex in legal discourse is doubt-
ful. Coherence in theory is here linked to semantic coherence. The expressive powers 
of language dictate what problems one is able to solve. A few points may clarify why 
the current use is inconsistent at the very least for the first group of languages that 
was described above, the one in which gender is the widespread legal notion.
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If we consider the history of marriage and of inequality between spouses the law 
served the purposes of preserving gender roles. The authority of the husband and 
the position of the wife are all linked to gender. The role of the wife essentially co-
incides with the position of women in society and inequalities moved along this line 
from family institutions to employment. The traditional construction of marriage is 
sexist and heteronormative. It is based on gender, not on sex. As long as discrimina-
tion was justified as inherent in nature and, therefore, in sex, one could aptly talk of 
same-sex unions. However, once inequality is understood as an effect of a social and 
cultural construct, discrimination in family institutions is correctly linked to gender, 
not to sex. Consequently, it is gender, not sex that matters in marriage and to an 
equivalent, yet different extent in parenting.
The issue of the legal and social debate of the past two decades is not same-sex 
unions, but same-gender unions. At stake is the suitability of the conjugal bond to 
include and protect a love that long dared not speak its name. Can two men or two 
women nourish an intimate feeling that is equally strong and equally passionate as 
the one between opposite-gender persons? Is this feeling dependent on the chromo-
somes of the couple or rather on the perception one has of the social roles of hus-
band and wife? By opening up marriage the legal system rejects gender roles in 
marriage and makes a true step towards reaffirming full equality within the marital 
institution, now conceived as a bond between two persons placed on the same foot-
ing. It is no accident that so-called gay marriage is a step towards gender-neutrality 
(and not sex-neutrality). It is therefore very surprising to see how extensively and 
without any critical exception common-law and in general English-language based 
legal systems use the expression same-sex.
Without dwelling too much upon parenthood, a similar reasoning applies to same-
gender parenthood. Whereas the biology of the members of the couple has no bearing 
in defining a common life or the quality of a loving relationship, it is a significant fac-
tor in human reproduction. Nonetheless, parenthood today goes well beyond genet-
ics. Reproductive techniques, intentionality and social parenthood cast a new light on 
parental institutions and international and national courts and legislators have em-
braced this new perspective32. A good parent and the best interest of the child are 
defined by having in view not the sex, but rather the gender of the adults involved33. 
The aptitude of a household to welcome a child should be decided on the basis of the 
qualities of the prospective parent or parents, regardless of their chromosomes.
The closing argument in support of the expression same-gender is the history of 
gender identity and marriage. The tradition definition of marriage is linked to the 
32 About the evolution of family law and the gendered nature of parenting law see Susan B. Boyd, 
‘Gendering Legal Parenthood: Bio-Genetic Ties, Intentionality and responsibility’ (2007) 25 
Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 63.
33 The Council of Europe European Convention on the Adoption of Children (Revised) of 2008, 
CETS no 202, does not mandate adoption for same-gender couples. However, it includes this 
option in several of its provisions. See articles 7.2, 5.1, 8 and 9.
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legal category of sex. A mostly implicit rule provided that only two persons of the 
opposite sex could marry. No regard was given to the gender identity of the indi-
vidual, as only the sex assigned at birth mattered. Then, the recognition of gender 
found its place in the legal discourse and an increasing number of states granted 
recognition to the psychological dimension of one’s identity and set aside sex as the 
legal notion. Transsexual and to a lesser extent transgender people could also marry 
another person they previously could not. Where marriage is not open to gay and 
lesbian couples, this other person must be of the opposite gender or, in those lin-
guistic contexts where sex is reinterpreted as meaning gender, of the opposite (psy-
chological and legally assigned) sex. In these systems there has been a subtle move 
from an opposite-sex to an opposite-gender marriage. This is notably the case under 
the European Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR).
Article 12 of the ECHR reads: “Men and women of marriageable age shall have 
the right to marry and to found a family, according to national laws governing the 
exercise of this right”. It has been interpreted until Goodwin v. UK34 as being re-
lated to sex and protecting same-sex marriage only. After Goodwin article 12 has 
been reinterpreted by the Court as protecting opposite-gender marriage, so that a 
transsexual person such as Ms Goodwin could marry a male partner. However, the 
Court in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria35 delivers a judgement that casts doubts on how 
the judges conceive and use sex and gender in their discourse. The two terms seem 
to coexist, as if there were two marriages under article 12, an opposite-sex marriage 
and an opposite-gender marriage36. Yet the Court recognises that also cisgender 
persons have a (legal) gender and that they enter into opposite-gender marriages, an 
explicit expression used by the Court37. Moreover, the Strasbourg judges use gender 
34 ECHR 2002-VI; (2002) 35 EHRR 447.
35 App no 30141/04 (ECHR, 24 June 2010).
36 At para. 51 of the judgement the Court says: “In a number of cases the question arose whether 
refusal to allow a post-operative transsexual to marry a person of the opposite sex to his or her as-
signed gender violated Article 12. In its earlier case-law the Court found that the attachment to the 
traditional concept of marriage which underpins Article 12 provided sufficient reason for the con-
tinued adoption by the respondent State of biological criteria for determining a person’s sex for the 
purposes of marriage”. The first period seems to suggest that in a couple made of a cisgender and a 
transgender person, the first falls within the category of sex, the other into the category of gender. 
The second period points to sex (not gender) as being the requirement for marriage. In para. 52, 
however, the Court affirms that article 12 relies on the category of gender (therefore not sex) and 
says that: “[In Goodwin the Court] considered that the terms used by Article 12 which referred to 
the right of a man and woman to marry no longer had to be understood as determining gender by 
purely biological criteria”. (Emphasis added.)
37 Para. 53 clearly shows that the Court considers opposite-gender a correct expression also with 
regard to a union between two cisgender persons. However, it also proves that the Court consid-
ers it as interchangeable with the expression “same-sex”. Referring to two precedents on manda-
tory divorce for gender reassignment, the judges write that the Court there “noted that domestic 
law only permitted marriage between persons of opposite gender, whether such gender derived from 
attribution at birth or from a gender recognition procedure, while same-sex marriages were not 
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also in other contexts, as the cases on parental leave and custody mentioned above 
have shown (e.g. “gender role” or “gender discrimination”).
The most recent jurisprudence of the Court shows that there is a move towards 
the replacement of sex by gender, both as term and notion38. Yet the use of the two 
terms by the 47 judges remains unclear. The Court should fully embrace gender and 
the use by article 14 of the term sex is no obstacle. Schalk and Kopf is not a case on 
same-sex marriage. It is a case on same-gender marriage. Two transgender persons 
recognized in their reassigned gender willing to marry pose exactly the same legal 
issue as two cisgender persons asking for the same right.
6. The rise of the homo juridicus europaeus
Compared to other national and international contexts European institutions are at 
the forefront of the legal shift from sex to gender. This is not surprising. The legal 
systems of the Council of Europe and of the European Union both are carriers of 
equality and of gender-neutrality. By combining their fields of intervention they cover 
all sectors of the national legal orders, from employment to family law, from criminal 
law to social rights. They converge towards a common set of rules in the field of fun-
damental rights and of non-discrimination. This is already true today, but certainly the 
accession of the EU to the ECHR will strengthen this convergence. The shift is also 
taking place at the national level. Western countries, with few exceptions, are increas-
ingly embracing gender-neutrality in parenthood and family law in general.
The trend towards gender-neutrality cannot be properly conceived with the use 
of the term and notion of sex. Cases involving gender inequality, sexual orientation 
and gender identity can be better seized if analysed under the legal category of gen-
der. A conceptual effort to disaggregate sex from gender accompanied by a semantic 
shift in legal terminology will allow the law to meet the challenges of a society that 
is moving towards greater social inclusion and shows a sincere commitment to 
eradicate inequality39.
permitted”. Therefore, also cisgender persons are given a legal gender at birth. The construction 
of gender by the Court as encompassing in the analysis of article 12 also cisgender people is con-
firmed in para. 59: “Christine Goodwin is concerned with marriage of partners who are of differ-
ent gender, if gender is defined not by purely biological criteria but by taking other factors including 
gender reassignment of one of the partners into account”. The confusion with sex, considered as an 
equivalent term, is however clear in the subsequent period: «Similarly, Article 12 enshrined the 
traditional concept of marriage as being between a man and a woman. The Court acknowledged 
that a number of Contracting States had extended marriage to same-sex partners…” See also 
other paragraphs in the Court assessment. (Emphasis added.)
38 It is worth mentioning that in P.V. v Spain App no 35159/09 (ECHR, 30 November 2010) the 
Court explicitly included transsexual persons under the protection of Article 14 of the Convention.
39 Much thought of this essay derived from the seminal article by MAC Case ‘Disaggregating 
Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurispru-
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Undoubtedly, what matters is not the term, but rather the implementation of the 
new legal notion: gender. Therefore, legal systems that are not ready or are unwilling 
to embrace the term have reinterpreted the traditional term of sex, giving it new 
substance. However, this leads to confusion in what it really means and most jurists 
are inclined to read it as conveying the biological dualism of mankind.
The homo juridicus as defined by the codifications of the past centuries is coming 
to an end. A new legal human is taking shape and a key role is played by European 
citizenship. As the Luxembourg judges said in 2001 and restated in several occa-
sions, EU citizenship “is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the 
Member States”40. Dignity and equality are cornerstones of the European system, 
whose main actor has appeared on the horizon. The homo juridicus europaeus lives 
out the European dream of an inclusive and equal society. Her or his traits express 
the protection of dignity and fundamental freedoms. Gender-neutrality is part of the 
legal world he populates.
Although he is not the main character of a European codification, he is the actor 
against which his national counterparts are compared. He is a vector for gender-
neutrality and for fighting discrimination in a society that is willing to cream off 
remnants of stereotypes, unquestioned tradition and social exclusion. Neutrality of 
the law is the outcome of a process that scrutinizes legal norms without considering 
that tradition is a sufficient justification for reiterating social roles and prejudice. 
Gender-neutrality calls for a new analysis of what really deserves legal protection 
and for focusing on the fact, on the real situation rather than on social constructs. 
By questioning and rebuilding the links between legal provisions and the specific 
cases they aim to protect the system evolves and adapts to new social challenges.
The homo juridicus europaeus has limited, although powerful, means to influence 
national legal orders. They are required to adapt only incidentally if a breach is 
found, i.e. with regard to specific situations. European case-law has an impact in 
specific cases and does not impose new foundations to the legal order. However, the 
most reluctant member states face an increasing number of challenges that eventu-
ally lead to a critical point. Respect for gender-neutrality in family law, for instance, 
though originally limited to a few sectors, expands steadily. The pillars of the system 
begin to show signs of strain. Only a new codification of family law may solve oth-
erwise unavoidable inconsistencies. A new homo juridicus drawn with the colours of 
equality and justice is coming to light.
dence’ [1995] Yale LJ 1. The author writes in her concluding remarks: “By disaggregating gender 
from sex and sexual orientation focusing attention on the reasons why the feminine might have 
been devalued in both women and men, I hope to protect what is valuable about the tradition-
ally feminine without essentializing it, limiting it to women, or limiting women to it” at 105.
40 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR 
I-6193, para 31. See also Case C-434/09 McCarthy v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2011] OJ C186/5, para 47; Case C-34/09 Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi [2011] OJ 
C130/2, para 41; Case C-135/08 Rottmann v Freistaat Bayern [2010] OJ C113/4, para 43.

esT-il jusTe de diviser le genre humain
en deux sexes ?
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Résumé
Les individus sont juridiquement classés en deux sexes de leur naissance. Cette assignation 
semble si naturelle qu’il résulte pratiquement impossible de la questionner. Alors que ni la 
race, ni la classe ou encore moins la religion ne figurent plus dans les actes de l’état civil, 
l’appartenance aux catégories masculines ou féminines non seulement s’imposent à nous 
mais déterminent, de surcroit, droits et obligations spécifiques. La suppression du classe-
ment juridique par sexe mettra fin non seulement aux problèmes rencontrés par les trans-
sexuels et les intersexuels mais aussi à la prohibition du mariage entre personnes de même 
sexe ainsi qu’à l’homoparentalité. A partir d’une analyse du droit français, l’auteur critique 
la naturalisation du classement par sexe mais justifie son utilisation à des fins protectrices. 
Si le sexe n’est plus pertinent pour l’identification des personnes, il demeure un outil es-
sentiel dans la lutte contre les discriminations et la promotion de la diversité.
Abstract
The Law classifies individuals into two sexes at their birth. This assignment seems so 
natural that the result is that it is practically impossible to question it. Whereas neither 
race, class nor religion appears more in the acts of the civil statue, membership to the 
categories of male or female not only are binding on us but determine, in addition, spe-
cific rights and obligations. The end of legal classification by sex will put an end not only 
to the problems encountered by transsexuals and interssexuals but also to the prohibition 
against marriage between people of the same sex and other rights including homoparental-
ity. Starting from an analysis of French law, the author criticizes the naturalization of clas-
sification by sex but justifies its use at protective ends. If sex is no longer relevant for the 
identification of people, it remains an essential tool in the fight against discrimination and 
in the promotion of diversity.
* * *
1. Introduction
En France, le terme « genre » comme synonyme de « sexe » est dépourvu d’exis-
tence juridique. Le mot « genre » apparaît surtout dans les textes relatifs au droit 
d’auteur pour désigner le « genre littéraire, artistique ou un type d’industrie ». Le 
langage juridique correspond ici à la langue courante : le genre fait référence à l’en-
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semble d’êtres ou d’objets ayant la même origine ou liés par la similitude d’un ou de 
plusieurs caractères : appartenir à un genre, rentrer dans un genre.
C’est sous le terme «  sexe  » que la catégorie sociologique de genre apparaît 
dans le droit national. Au niveau international, depuis la conférence de Beijing de 
1995 le droit international a consacré l’émergence du concept de genre pour faire 
référence aux rapports sociaux de sexe et surtout à la discrimination des femmes1. 
C’est donc par le droit international que la catégorie entrera indirectement en 
droit français.
Même, si plusieurs rapports européens font référence au genre, les textes juri-
diques de l’Union Européenne utilisent le vocable « sexe » (égalité ou discrimina-
tions fondées sur le sexe) ou «  hommes et femmes  » (égalité entre hommes et 
femmes). Ainsi, les directives relatives aux discriminations se référent à toute « si-
tuation, disposition, critère ou pratique qui désavantagerait particulièrement les 
personnes d’un sexe par rapport à des personnes de l’autre sexe ». L’action posi-
tive est définie par le droit européen comme des mesures « destinées à faciliter 
l’exercice d’une activité professionnelle par le sexe sous-représenté ou à prévenir 
ou compenser des désavantages dans la carrière professionnelle ». Le harcèlement 
est « la situation dans laquelle un comportement non désiré lié au sexe d’une per-
sonne survient avec pour objet ou pour effet de porter atteinte à la dignité d’une 
personne et de créer un environnement intimidant, hostile, dégradant, humiliant 
ou offensant ».
En tout état de cause, les dispositifs juridiques aussi bien nationaux, européens 
qu’internationaux se fondent sur la présupposée existence de deux sexes juridique-
ment établis. Les individus se trouvent ainsi assignés à l’une ou l’autre de ces deux 
catégories distinctes et stables : hommes et femmes.
Le droit ne fait ici que refléter une tradition multiséculaire qui a naturalisé cet 
arrangement binaire du genre humain.
Le contenu du terme sexe apparaît clairement défini par le droit interne comme 
assignation à une catégorie, d’une part, et comme injonction à la non-discrimination, 
d’autre part. Le sexe est donc à la fois identification et protection.
Permettez-moi, dans un premier temps, de présenter cette double signification 
du vocable pour, par la suite, tester sa pertinence juridique.
1 Je n’aborde pas dans mon article le passionnant débat sur l’articulation entre les catégories sexe 
et genre dans les sciences humaines, mon objectif est bien plus modeste et consiste uniquement à 
placer le débat au niveau concret du droit. Sur les questions théoriques et philosophiques, je 
renvoie le lecteur aux articles suivants : Fabienne Malbois « Les catégories de sexe en action. Une 
sociologie praxéologique du genre », Sociologie 1/2011 (Vol. 2), p. 73-90). Jean-Pierre Vidal « De 
la déconstruction de la différence des sexes à la “ neutralisation des sexes ”, pour une société 
“ postsexuelle ” ! », Connexions 2/2008 (n° 90), p. 123-138.
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2. Le sexe comme catégorie d’identification des personnes
Dès leur naissance, les individus sont juridiquement classés dans la catégorie mâle 
ou femelle. Cette assignation trouve son origine dans le tréfonds de notre culture. 
Ainsi, le récit de la Genèse, raconte que Dieu créa l’homme d’abord puis « L’Éternel 
forma une femme de la côte qu’il avait prise de l’homme, et il l’amena vers l’homme. 
Et l’homme dit : Voici cette fois celle qui est os de mes os et chair de ma chair ! On 
l’appellera femme, parce qu’elle a été prise de l’homme. C’est pourquoi l’homme 
quittera son père et sa mère, et s’attachera à sa femme, et ils deviendront une seule 
chair ». L’évidence d’une Humanité binaire trouve ses origines dans la Bible.
F. Héritier va encore plus loin que la théologie lorsqu’elle affirme :
la différence sexuée et le rôle différent des sexes dans la reproduction. […] Il s’agit 
là d’un butoir ultime de la pensée, sur lequel est fondé une opposition conceptuelle 
essentielle : celle qui oppose l’identique au différent, un de ces thematha archaïques 
que l’on retrouve dans toute pensée scientifique ancienne comme moderne, et dans 
tous les systèmes de représentation2.
Dès l’origine donc l’assignation sexuée des individus n’a pas seulement une fina-
lité réflexive (par rapport à soi) mais aussi relative (aussi bien dans une relation de 
subordination que dans un rapport de supplémentarité) : il s’agit à la fois d’une ma-
nière de s’auto-définir et de désigner l’altérité pour mieux décrire la nécessaire com-
plémentarité (subordination ou suprématie) du sujet référent. Le sexe indique, dans 
le même temps, la nature biologique des êtres sexués (mâle et femelle) et les rapports 
familiaux et sociaux qu’entretiennent les genres masculin et féminin entre eux. Cette 
vision relationnelle du sexe suppose une idéologie (longtemps implicite) qui est non 
seulement celle de la subordination des femmes mais surtout de la nécessaire com-
plémentarité entre les sexualités, autrement dit, l’hétérosexualité obligatoire.
Le sexe fait donc référence à la fois à un statut et à une fonction : l’appartenance 
aux classes mâles ou femelle (statut) et la hiérarchie des genres et des sexualités 
(fonction). La différenciation du sexe-statut et du sexe-fonction est donc dépourvue 
d’existence matérielle, elle sert toutefois à comprendre la complexité et la dimension 
polyfonctionnelle de la catégorie ainsi qu’à intervenir juridiquement sur la réalité.
2.1. Le sexe comme statut
Les individus qui entrent à leur naissance dans les catégories sexuées ne peuvent 
échapper à leurs groupes ou désister de leurs alignements que très difficilement 
(avec l’autorisation du médecin et du juge et toujours dans le cadre d’une procédure 
administrative) du fait de la permanence du signe biologique de la différence des 
sexes. Le sexe apparaît comme le cas le plus strict d’assignation identitaire. Il s’agit 
d’une partition irrémédiable de l’humanité car fixée de manière définitive.
2 Françoise Héritier, Masculin/féminin : la pensée de la différence, Paris, Odile Jacob, 1996, p. 17-18.
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Ainsi, le premier alinéa de l’article 57 du Code civil dispose : « l’acte de naissance 
énoncera le jour, l’heure et le lieu de la naissance, le sexe de l’enfant et les prénoms 
qui lui seront donnés… ».
C’est l’examen des organes génitaux externes du nouveau-né qui détermine :
– l’appartenance à l’un ou l’autre sexe,
– la reconnaissance de cet état par la société (état civil),
– l’attribution de prénoms, le plus souvent sans ambiguïté quant au sexe de celui 
ou celle qui le porte.
Selon la jurisprudence, « tout individu, même s’il présente des anomalies orga-
niques, doit être obligatoirement rattaché à l’un des deux sexes, masculin ou fémi-
nin, lequel doit être mentionné dans l’acte de naissance »3. De surcroît, l’Instruc-
tion générale relative à l’état civil précise que « lorsque le sexe du nouveau né est 
incertain, il convient d’éviter de porter l’indication ‘sexe indéterminé’ et l’officier 
d’état civil doit conseiller aux parents de se renseigner auprès de leur médecin 
pour savoir quel est le sexe qui apparaît le plus probable compte tenu, le cas 
échéant, des résultats prévisibles d’un traitement médical. C’est ce sexe qui sera 
indiqué dans l’acte, sauf à le faire rectifier judiciairement par la suite en cas d’er-
reur  »4. Appelé autrefois hermaphrodisme (fils d’Hermès et d’Aphrodite)5, ce 
phénomène est connu scientifiquement aujourd’hui sous le terme d’intersexua-
lisme6. Cas de force majeure, cette situation permet une modification du sexe dé-
claré, considéré comme résultant d’une erreur matérielle du fait de l’incertitude 
initiale  : l’article 288 de l’Instruction générale relative à l’état civil est complété 
comme suit :
Si, dans certains cas exceptionnels, le médecin estime ne pouvoir immédiatement 
donner aucune indication sur le sexe probable d’un nouveau-né, mais si ce sexe 
peut être déterminé définitivement, dans un délai d’un ou deux ans, à la suite de 
traitements appropriés, il pourrait être admis, avec l’accord du procureur de la 
République, qu’aucune mention sur le sexe de l’enfant ne soit initialement inscrite 
dans l’acte de naissance. Dans une telle hypothèse, il convient de prendre toutes 
mesures utiles pour que, par la suite, l’acte de naissance puisse être effectivement 
complété par décision judiciaire. Dans tous les cas d’ambiguïté sexuelle, il doit être 
conseillé aux parents de choisir pour l’enfant un prénom pouvant être porté par 
une fille ou par un garçon.
Ainsi, la cour d’appel de Versailles a fait suite à la demande de rectification de 
l’état civil et de changement de prénom d’un enfant ayant présenté dès la naissance 
3 Cour d’Appel de Paris, 18 janvier 1974 : D. 1974, p. 196 conclusion Granjon.
4 Instruction générale relative à l’état civil, Art. 288.
5 Le mythe d’Hermaphrodite raconté par Ovide dans le livre IV des Métamorphoses est la pre-
mière explication de ces individus qui semblent « n’avoir aucun sexe ou les avoir tous deux ».
6 Caractérisé par la présence chez un même sujet de tissu testiculaire et de tissu ovarien séparés 
ou fusionnés en un seul organe.
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des organes sexuels masculins extrêmement insuffisants, puisque finalement le sexe 
indiqué à l’origine s’était révélé erroné7.
En dehors des cas d’hermaphrodisme, la Cour de cassation adoptait une position 
restrictive et n’acceptait les demandes en rectification de l’état civil que dans cer-
taines circonstances exceptionnelles. Pendant longtemps la justice française était 
sourde aux demandes des transsexuels et si l’opération de réassignation sexuelle 
était tolérée, la modification de sexe dans les documents d’identité leur était refusée 
au nom de l’indisponibilité de l’état des personnes, principe d’ordre public en vertu 
duquel seule l’Administration a qualité pour fixer et authentifier l’état civil de l’in-
dividu sujet de droit.
Le transsexualisme met en évidence la complexité du sexe : sexe génotypique, 
sexe phénotypique, sexe endocrinien, sexe psychologique, sexe culturel et sexe 
social. Lorsqu’il n’y a pas accord entre les aspects biologiques et les aspects psy-
chosociologiques du sexe, certaines personnes se trouvent face à une situation de 
trouble d’identité de genre. Souvent elles souhaitent se soumettre à une interven-
tion chirurgicale pour rectifier leur anatomie8 et changer d’état civil. Le refus de 
mettre en accord les documents d’identité avec le nouveau sexe a été considéré 
par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme contraire au respect du droit de 
la vie privée9 provoquant un revirement de la jurisprudence française10. De sur-
croit, depuis la circulaire du 14 mai 2010, il n’est plus nécessaire d’avoir subi une 
opération de réassignation sexuelle (c’est-à-dire d’ablation des organes génitaux), 
les traitements médicaux-chirurgicaux ayant entraîné des changements irréver-
sibles pouvant être suffisant pour justifier la demande de changement de sexe à 
l’état civil.
2.2. Le sexe comme fonction
Le sexe apparaît non seulement comme un statut (attribut de la personnalité) mais 
aussi comme une fonction qui renvoie aux rôles sociaux attendus de l’un et l’autre 
sexe. Pendant longtemps le sexe-fonction organisait juridiquement la subordination 
des femmes. Ainsi, du droit constitutionnel au droit civil, du droit du travail au droit 
de la famille, les lois excluaient les femmes des droits fondamentaux tels le droit de 
vote, le droit de disposer de son patrimoine, de l’égalité au sein de la famille…
7 Cour d’Appel de Versailles, 22 juin 2000, JCP 2001.II.10595, note Guez.
8 Les premières opérations de changement de sexe eurent lieu durant le 1er et 2ème siècle av. J.-C., 
G. Androutsos, M. Papadopoulos, S. Geroulanos, « Les premières opérations de changement de 
sexe dans l’antiquité », Andrologie (2001), 11 n° 2, p. 89-93.
9 B. c. France du 25 mars 1992 (n° 13343/87). Cette décision de la CEDH produit un changement 
de sa propre jurisprudence. En effet dans les affaires Van Oosterwijck c. Belgique du 6 novembre 
1980 (n° 7654/76), Rees c. Royaume-Uni du 17 octobre 1986 (n° 9532/81), Cossey c. Royaume-Uni 
du 27 septembre 1990 (n° 10843/84), la CEDH n’avait pas condamné les Etats qui ne modifient 
pas l’état-civil des transsexuels.
10 Ass. Plén., 11 décembre 1992, JCP 1995 II, 21991.
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Si l’appartenance à l’un ou l’autre sexe n’apparaît plus comme un élément déter-
minant dans la jouissance des droits alors pourquoi continuer à en faire un élément 
de l’état civil ? La seule raison d’une telle continuité renvoie à l’institution matrimo-
niale, considérée par la jurisprudence de la Cour de cassation et du Conseil consti-
tutionnel comme nécessairement hétérosexuelle.
Il résulte également significatif que les lois soient en général rédigées d’une ma-
nière neutre (sans genre)  : «  toute personne a le droit…  », «  tout individu a le 
droit… », « Chacun a le droit… » ou encore « nul ne peut être… » mais, lorsqu’il 
est question du mariage, les créanciers dudit droit fondamental deviennent des su-
jets sexués : « A partir de l’âge nubile, l’homme et la femme ont le droit de se marier 
et de fonder une famille… »11.
En droit français ce n’est pas seulement la différence des « sexes-statut » qui est 
une condition sine qua non du mariage mais aussi la différence des « sexes-fonc-
tion ». En effet, en 2005 le procureur de la République s’est opposé au mariage de 
Camille Barré, transsexuelle de 46 ans (femme pour l’état civil) et Martin León 
Benito, transgenre (homme pour l’état civil) de 30 ans qui se faisait appeler « Mo-
nica » à cause d’absence d’une « véritable volonté matrimoniale, le but exclusive-
ment recherché étant étranger à celui de se comporter comme mari et femme ». Se 
présenter habillées en femme suffi pour rendre le consentement suspect. Si l’absence 
de différence de sexes n’apparaît pas comme le motif explicite empêchant cette 
union (elle est souvent évoquée pour renforcer la simulation dénoncée), la manière 
d’organiser la logique argumentative laisse entrevoir une ambiguïté quant à la qua-
lification de l’opposition à mariage. Ainsi, derrière la simulation, le Procureur et le 
tribunal entendent sanctionner également l’absence de différence de sexe, comprise 
non pas dans de différence biologique mais comme absence de désir hétérosexuel. 
Ce qui pose problème au Procureur ce n’est pas tant que Camille soit une femme 
mais plutôt qu’elle désire des individus avec une apparence féminine. Or, le fait que 
M. Leon s’habille en femme et revendique un prénom féminin ne constitue nulle-
ment la preuve d’un défaut de sincérité de l’intention matrimoniale. Le TGI de 
Nanterre confirmera l’opposition à mariage même si la volonté de respecter le de-
voir conjugal et l’affectio maritalis semblaient incontestable. Ce qui est contesté par 
le tribunal n’est pas tant le fait que les requérants ne souhaitent pas se soumettre au 
devoir conjugal mais la manière dont ils entendent l’exécuter. Ainsi, s’abritant der-
11 Art. 12 de la Convention Européenne des droits de l’Homme. L’article 16 de la Déclaration 
universelle des droits de l’Homme établit : « A partir de l’âge nubile, l’homme et la femme, sans 
aucune restriction quant à la race, la nationalité ou la religion, ont le droit de se marier et de 
fonder une famille. Ils ont des droits égaux au regard du mariage, durant le mariage et lors de sa 
dissolution ». Conscient des enjeux futurs, le parlement européen cesse de définir le mariage à 
partir de la différence des sexes dans la Charte européenne des droits fondamentaux et énonce 
simplement : « Le droit de se marier et le droit de fonder une famille sont garantis selon les lois 
nationales qui en régissent l’exercice » (article 9).
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rière la théorie de la simulation12, les juges entendent mettre en cause l’existence 
même du mariage. Pour ce faire, ils opèrent un glissement conceptuel : à la place de 
la différence de sexes comme statut, ils introduisent la différence de sexe comme 
fonction (avoir l’apparence de sexes opposés et répondre au désir hétérosexuel). Le 
tribunal va ainsi utiliser un artifice qui permet de s’opposer au mariage le qualifiant 
à la fois d’acte simulé et d’union homosexuelle. Même si les requérants démontrent 
leur volonté commune et durable de vivre comme conjoints, leur union ne peut 
exister puisqu’elle ne prend pas la forme hétérosexuelle. Par cette décision, les juges 
estiment que M. Benito, tout en étant un homme aux yeux de loi, ne peut pas ac-
complir convenablement le devoir conjugal  : il ne désire pas une femme en tant 
qu’homme mais en tant que femme13. Ce qui compte pour la bonne exécution du 
devoir conjugal, ce n’est pas seulement le sexe-statut mais aussi le sexe-fonction. 
Conscients de la difficulté à assumer la différence de sexes-fonction comme conditio 
sine qua non du mariage, les juges de la Cour d’appel de Versailles ont confirmé 
l’opposition à mariage en se fondant sur la théorie de la simulation sans renoncer 
pour autant à condamner le mariage homosexuel :
qu’en réalité les appelants entendent […] s’unir en tant que femmes et contrevenir 
pour mieux la combattre la prohibition actuelle du mariage entre personnes de 
même sexe » et « qu’une telle intention équivaut à un défaut de consentement…14.
Les parties ne s’étant pas pourvues en cassation, la décision de la Cour d’appel 
est devenue donc définitive.
Ces décisions mettent de manifeste que dès nos jours, le sexe-fonction (sur un 
plan juridique) ne plus tellement un instrument de la domination des femmes mais 
plutôt une catégorie de domination des homosexuels : pas de droit au mariage pour 
les couples de même sexe, pas de succession ab intestat, pas de pension de réversion, 
pas de filiation adoptive ou par procréation artificielle.
Afin de restituer sa pleine capacité protectrice, la catégorie sexe, pris dans sa 
dimension relationnel, devrait faire référence non seulement aux « rapports sociaux 
de sexe » mais aussi aux « rapports sociaux de sexualités ». La dimension protectrice 
de la catégorie trouverait ainsi toute sa souplesse et tout son sens.
12 L’impossibilité d’attaquer frontalement la nature homosexuelle du mariage explique l’utilisa-
tion abusive de l’argument de la simulation afin de rendre l’union d’un homme et d’une femme 
sur le plan juridique impossible car elle ne prend pas l’apparence d’une union hétérosexuelle.
13 « Force est en l’occurrence d’observer que Monsieur Benito, Martin Leon quelles que soient 
les circonstances, revendique sa féminité, arbore l’apparence d’une femme, signe avec le prénom 
féminin de Monica qu’il s’est attribué », TGI Nanterre, 10/06/2005.
14 Cour d’Appel de Versailles 1er Ch. 08/07/2005.
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3. Le sexe comme catégorie de protection des personnes
L’analyse du droit positif révèle que le fait d’appartenir à un sexe plutôt qu’à un 
autre emporte de moins en moins l’application d’un statut spécifique. En effet, la 
plupart des règles qui accordaient à la femme un statut juridique inférieur à celui de 
l’homme ont disparu au cours du XXe siècle et ceci grâce aux politiques antidiscri-
minatoires et de promotion de l’égalité qui ont fait du « sexe » une catégorie non 
plus de domination mais d’émancipation.
3.1. Le sexe comme catégorie antidiscriminatoire
L’égalité des sexes est consacrée au niveau constitutionnel depuis le préambule de la 
Constitution de 1946. Elle figure également parmi les missions fondamentales de la 
Communauté européenne (article 2 du traité CE). La Convention européenne des 
droits de l’homme et la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’UE consacrent l’éga-
lité des sexes et combattent les discriminations fondées sur le sexe. En droit civil, 
aucune disposition ne fait de la femme un être inferieur soumis à la puissance du 
mari et en matière d’autorité parentale, le principe est celui de l’exercice commun 
par le père et la mère. En droit du travail est affirmé le principe de l’égalité de trai-
tement entre les hommes et les femmes. Cette égalité se manifeste notamment à 
propos de l’accès à certaines professions qui étaient auparavant interdites aux 
femmes et à propos de l’égalité des rémunérations. Les principes d’égalité des sexes 
et de non discrimination constituent la règle, au point d’avoir entraîné en 2001 la 
disparition de l’interdiction du travail de nuit des femmes.
Sous l’angle du droit conventionnel des droits de l’Homme, la CEDH a consi-
déré que le terme « sexe » de l’article 14 de la convention (non discrimination) de-
vait être interprété comme incluant l’orientation sexuelle15.
Le « sexe » comprend alors aussi les « sexualités » pour les juges de Strasbourg. 
Les juges du droit communautaire ont fait une interprétation différente : Le 30 avril 
1996 une femme transsexuelle réussie à convaincre la Cour de Luxembourg que son 
licenciement constituait une discrimination fondée sur son sexe. Si la notion de 
discrimination fondée sur le sexe protège les transsexuels on aurait pu imaginer 
qu’une telle protection pouvait être élargie aux gays et lesbiennes. Ce fut l’argument 
développé par l’avocat de Lisa Grant, une femme lesbienne qui décida de saisir la 
Cour de Justice de Communautés Européennes invoquant l’article 119 du traité de 
Rome sur l’égalité de traitement des sexes. L’avocat général de la Cour suivant les 
arguments de l’avocat de la demanderesse, a considéré que la notion de discrimina-
tion fondée sur le sexe pouvait également comprendre la discrimination fondée sur 
l’orientation sexuelle. Ainsi, en comparant la situation de Lisa Grant à celle d’un 
homme hétérosexuel, l’avocat général conclu que c’est le sexe de Mme Grant qui est 
à l’origine de la discrimination et non pas le fait qu’elle soit lesbienne. Effective-
15 Salgueiro da Silva Mouta c. Portugal (1999) du 21 décembre 1999 (n° 33290/96).
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ment, si la requérante avait été un homme et non pas une femme, elle aurait pu 
bénéficier des avantages découlant de sa vie de couple avec une femme. Il s’agirait 
bien donc d’une discrimination fondée sur le sexe entrant dans le domaine de com-
pétence de la Cour. Bien que la CJCE suive généralement l’opinion de son avocat, 
dans l’affaire Grant la cour s’en est éloignée en statuant qu’il n’y avait pas de discri-
mination fondée sur le sexe mais sur l’orientation sexuelle, écartant ainsi sa juridic-
tion. Cette interprétation de la CJCE a révélé la nécessité d’instruments spécifiques 
de protection contre les discriminations envers les gays et les lesbiennes. C’est la voie 
empruntée par le traité d’Amsterdam du 20 octobre 1997 lorsqu’il introduit un 
nouvel la catégorie « orientation sexuelle » dans un nouvel article 13 du traité. C’est 
donc à cause d’une vision du sexe limité à sa dimension de statut et non pas de 
fonction que la cour de Luxembourg à obligé le législateur européen à créer la ca-
tégorie « orientation sexuelle ».
3.2. Le sexe comme catégorie promouvant la diversité
Le sexe est non seulement une catégorie antidiscriminatoire mais aussi une catégorie 
de promotion de la diversité. En effet, à la fin des années 1990, pour la première fois 
en France, les lois dites «  sur la parité » ont marqué l’émergence d’une politique 
publique volontariste en faveur des femmes dans la représentation politique. La loi 
constitutionnelle du 8 juillet 1999 a ajouté à l’article 3 de la Constitution un alinéa 
disposant que « la loi favorise l’égal accès des femmes et des hommes aux mandats 
électoraux et aux fonctions électives ». Un an plus tard, la loi électorale du 6 juin 
2000 a fixé les modalités pratiques censées « favoriser » cet égal accès des femmes 
et des hommes dans le champ de la représentation politique. En tant qu’instrument 
favorisant l’égalité matérielle, la parité tend à corriger une situation politique histo-
riquement défavorable aux femmes.
Sans me prononcer sur les bienfaits d’une telle politique, il est permis de se poser 
la question de savoir si, suivant le raisonnement de la CEDH qui fait du sexe une 
catégorie englobant l’orientation sexuelle, la parité ne devrait-elle pas également 
bénéficier les homosexuels. En effet, comme les femmes, les gays sont très nettement 
sous-représentés dans les assemblées électives au niveau local et national. Par 
ailleurs, les lesbiennes pouvant invoquer la parité, cette situation crée une inégalité 
entre les hommes et les femmes homosexuel-les.
4. Pertinence de la catégorie « sexe » dans le Droit
Le problème que pose le sexe comme catégorie juridique est bien celui de l’essenti-
alisation de types pour une classification cherchant à légitimer son ordre ou sa hié-
rarchie en l’appuyant sur des distinctions inscrites dans la nature des choses et des 
êtres. La marque biologique du sexe inscrit la différence dans les corps et dans les 
chairs se renfermant sur les individus qui ne peuvent s’évader de leur prison identi-
taire. L’utilisation du terme sexe dans les registres de l’état civil présuppose une 
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réalité biologique première ce qui implique de reconnaître cette enfermement des 
individus et de cautionner une pérennisation des identités obligatoires.
En tant que catégorie explicite, le sexe, comme élément identificatoire des per-
sonnes entretien l’illusion de la naturalité de la différence entre les hommes et les 
femmes et surtout de sa nécessaire complémentarité. Comme l’avait dejà souligné E. 
Balibar par rapport à la race, l’histoire naturelle des sexes n’est autre chose que la 
justification de l’hétérosexualité comme identité dans une perspective d’une identi-
fication avec les valeurs mystiques d’une civilisation supra-juridique et trans-histo-
rique à la fois naturelle et spirituelle (rappelons-nous les cris d’alerte des anthropo-
logues, psychanalystes et autres experts, annonçant la fin de la civilisation si jamais 
le PaCS était adopté).
Cependant, comme nous l’avons souligné auparavant, la catégorie «  sexe » ne 
produit pas les mêmes effets lorsqu’elle est utilisée à des fins identificatoires qu’à des 
fins protectrices. L’inscription de l’appartenance sexuée dans le droit comme élé-
ment d’identification entraine une « fatalisation » des caractères psychosomatiques 
de genre : la contingence est ainsi transformée en nécessité. L’individu ne saurait dès 
lors échapper à la catégorie fatale à laquelle l’assigne son apparence physiologique. 
La catégorie sexe, juridiquement défini l’est sur la base de critères naturels allégués. 
Cette utilisation de la marque biologique donne aux catégories ainsi sexuées des 
caractéristiques spécifiques. D’abord, elle joue sur la perception et la représentation 
de la différence, le sexe biologique (et l’hétérosexualité) se manifestant sous le signe 
de l’évidence. Ensuite, elle installe un mode particulier de fonctionnement social, 
dans la mesure où la différence de sexe renvoie historiquement à la subordination 
de la femme et aujourd’hui à l’hétérosexualité nécessaire (au moins au niveau du 
couple et de la filiation). La différence de sexes est bien une réalité symbolique fon-
dée sur la croyance de la suprématie culturelle de l’hétérosexualité. Il faudrait donc 
conformément à la tradition républicaine française bannir le « sexe » (comme caté-
gorie d’identification) de tous les documents d’identité à commencer par l’acte de 
naissance et le numéro de la sécurité sociale.
En revanche, le sexisme et l’hétérosexisme doivent continuer à être combattus 
par la loi. Autrement dit, la catégorie « sexe » et « orientation sexuelle » se trouvent 
justifiées lorsqu’elles ont comme finalité non pas enfermer les individus dans des 
catégories identitaires mais leur permettre justement de s’en émanciper.
Comme pour les statistiques ethniques et les politiques d’affirmation de l’égalité 
et la diversité, on pourrait utiliser pour le sexe aussi la méthode de l’auto-identifica-
tion. Elle consiste soit à fournir une liste de modalités pré-établie (homme, femme, 
sexe neutre…) que les répondants sont invités à sélectionner, soit à laisser ouverte la 
réponse, ce qui suppose que le libellé de la question utilise des termes non équi-
voques pour les enquêtés.
Voici le paradoxe auquel on n’échappe pas sous peine de faire disparaître le 
point d’appui du changement social : Refuser la catégorie au niveau identificatoire 
pour mieux la revendiquer sur le plan anti-discriminatoire.
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Conclusion
Pour répondre concrètement à la question qui a donné le titre de mon intervention 
« Est-il juste (pertinent, souhaitable…) de classifier juridiquement le genre humain 
en deux sexes ? ».
Nous pouvons dire « oui », « non » et « ça dépend ».
– Non, lorsque le sexe est utilisé comme une catégorie imposé par l’Etat aux in-
dividus à des fins d’identification, cela permettrait de résoudre un certain nombre 
de problèmes auxquels sont confrontés les intersexués et les transsexuels. Aussi, 
l’interdiction du mariage entre personnes de même sexe deviendrait caduque.
– Oui, lorsque le sexe sert comme catégorie de protection contre les discrimina-
tions et comme mesure correctrice favorisant la diversité mais à condition que cette 
notion (déjà appliqué évidemment aux femmes mais aussi aux transsexuelles et aux 
lesbiennes) soit extensible à d’autres groupes historiquement discriminés ou sous-
représentés en raison de leur sexualité comme c’est cas des hommes homosexuels.
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inTervenTo di saluTo e ringraziamenTo…
Con un aCCenno a qualChe TemaTiCa
di diriTTo CosTiTuzionale
Ludovico A. Mazzarolli
Riassunto
Nel breve intervento che segue, l’A. porta ai Convegnisti, a nome del Dipartimento di 
Scienze giuridiche dell’Università di Udine – soggetto «capofila» del Progetto – i saluti, 
approfittando dell’occasione offerta per ringraziare molti dei soggetti che hanno reso pos-
sibile la realizzazione dello stesso. Svolge, inoltre, alcune brevi considerazioni in tema di 
«tolleranza», «pluralismo» e «eguaglianza».
Abstract
Professor L.A. Mazzarolli addresses his greetings on behalf of the Department of Legal 
Sciences of the University of Udine, leading partner of the Equal Jus Project. He then adds 
some short considerations on the constitutional aspects of tolerance, pluralism and equality.
* * *
Autorità, Colleghi, Signore e Signori,
un grazie vivissimo a tutti gli organizzatori del Convegno per avermi voluto qui a 
Firenze, a porgere uno dei saluti di benvenuto in questa fase di apertura dei lavori.
Il mio Intervento di saluto – forse un po’ (… ma poco) più lungo di quelli che mi 
hanno preceduto – si motiva con la circostanza che attualmente ricopro la carica di 
Direttore del Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche dell’Università di Udine, soggetto 
«capofila» del Progetto europeo Equal Jus - European Network for the Legal Support 
of LGBT Rights.
Comprenderete e scuserete, quindi, come, innanzitutto, mi corra l’obbligo di 
ringraziare una serie di persone, senza il contributo e l’opera fattiva delle quali, il 
Progetto non avrebbe visto l’inizio, né, quindi, tantomeno la fine, in questa splendi-
da cornice… in questa comunque splendida cornice.
È vero, l’originariamente prevista collocazione del Convegno nel fine-quattro-
centesco Salone dei Cinquecento di Palazzo Vecchio aveva un sapore del tutto parti-
colare, ma, a mio avviso, non tanto per questioni relative al prestigio della colloca-
zione, quanto piuttosto perché si tratta della più ampia sala italiana, realizzata al 
precipuo scopo di gestire pubblicamente il potere civile. Il che, quindi, avrebbe as-
sunto una ragione del tutto particolare in relazione ai temi del Convegno.
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Ma, come diciamo noi giuristi, ubi maior, minor cessat e la visita del Presidente 
della Repubblica italiana a Firenze ha costretto a un imprevisto (e imprevedibile) 
cambiamento di programma.
Ed eccoci quindi nell’Istituto degli Innocenti, o, meglio, nello Spedale degli Inno-
centi o degli Orfani: primo orfanotrofio d’Europa, ospitato in uno stupendo edificio 
più antico di più di mezzo secolo rispetto al Salone del Cinquecento.
Non ci abbiamo dunque perso né dal punto di vista storico-architettonico, né dal 
punto di vista per così dire «evocativo», anzi: siamo nel posto giusto perché si possa 
discutere di diritti di chi è, o comunque si sente, «parte debole»1.
In primis, allora, un grazie a Francesco Bilotta, professore aggregato nella Facol-
tà di Economia dell’Università di Udine, che, del Progetto, è stato ideatore e propu-
gnatore, assumendo le vesti di responsabile scientifico dello stesso.
Un grazie vivissimo all’avv. Alexander Schuster che è stato co-iniziatore del Pro-
getto e che, come assegnista esterno all’apparato universitario, ha assunto il difficile 
incarico di «coordinatore» dell’iniziativa a partire dal 1 dicembre 2010 e con termi-
ne stabilito al 31 maggio prossimo, avvalendosi della collaborazione di altri assegni-
sti, tra i quali i dott. Tommaso Giovannetti e Flavio Guella. Sempre l’avv. Schuster, 
d’intesa con i Partners, ha poi anche assunto – e a titolo gratuito – fino al 28 febbra-
io scorso, la Direzione del «Centro studi Lenford» di Firenze, attivato dal Partner 
«Avvocatura per i diritti LGBT», in adempimento del Progetto.
Notevole mole di lavoro ha svolto anche il supervisore finanziario – il Financial 
Officer – del tutto: il dott. Osman Ahmed Bashir, così come ha fatto – spendendo 
molto più tempo di quello che risulterà agli atti – il personale di ruolo della Segre-
teria del Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche dell’Università di Udine, con partico-
lare riguardo per la Signora Rossana Savastano, Segretario Amministrativo del Di-
partimento, che non si è mai sottratta al tentativo di dare una mano fattiva allo 
svolgimento del Progetto, anche con riguardo a mansioni, incarichi e compiti che 
non rientravano nei suoi doveri, nel suo monte ore ecc., nonché per la dott.ssa Sonia 
De Marchi, senza l’ausilio della quale sarebbe stato ben più difficile chiudere il Pro-
getto nei tempi prescritti. Ma, d’altra parte, come sanno bene gli universitari italiani 
oggi qui presenti, la continua attività per così dire di «sussidiarietà orizzontale» di 
chi lavora nell’Università e per l’Università, è oramai pressoché necessaria a che 
questa nobile, ma poverissima, Istituzione, posa svolgere – come può – i compiti, o 
almeno parte dei compiti, che le sono propri.
Chiudo la parte dei ringraziamenti con un pensiero riconoscente ai diversi Part-
ners del Progetto (sulla diversa misura dei diversi apporti dei quali penso meglio Vi 
dirà l’avv. Schuster nel corso dei suoi interventi durante il Convegno), ma soprattut-
to un «grazie» alla Commissione europea e, per essa, a chi oggi qui la rappresenta 
e/o l’ha rappresentata, agendo in nome e per conto della stessa, nel corso dei fre-
1 Tanto è vero che l’edificio ospita stabilmente il Centro Nazionale di Documentazione e Analisi sull’In-
fanzia e l’Adolescenza, l’organismo, cioè, di cui l’Osservatorio nazionale per l’infanzia e l’adolescenza si 
avvale per lo svolgimento delle proprie funzioni (cfr. <http://www.minori.it/?q=centronazionale>).
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quenti e vari contatti con il Dipartimento di Scienze Giuridiche udinese, intervenu-
ti nei lunghi mesi di questo impegno.
Due sole battute «nel merito» per concludere il presente Intervento.
«Non sono d’accordo con quello che dite, ma difenderò fino alla morte il vostro 
diritto di dirlo».
Proposizione normalmente e di regola attribuita a Voltaire, come contenuta nel suo 
Trattato sulla tolleranza universale del 1763, ma in realtà della poco conosciuta scrittrice 
inglese Evelyn B. Hall che, di Voltaire, fu solo biografa, scrivendo, all’inizio del Nove-
cento (1906) e sotto lo pseudonimo di S.G. Tallentyre, il libro: Gli amici di Voltaire.
Adopero la citazione perché quel che mi interessa porre il rilievo, come cultore 
del Diritto costituzionale italiano, è non solo che unicamente il radicarsi di una cul-
tura della tolleranza consente l’espressione delle diversità e quindi di quel valore del 
pluralismo sui cui si fondano, in ambiti molteplici, le più moderne Costituzioni de-
mocratiche contemporanee, compresa quella italiana; ma, a ben guardare, che solo 
il prendere piede della predetta cultura della tolleranza può consentire a chi oggi 
esprime il pensiero della maggioranza di potere rivendicare, un domani che diven-
tasse minoranza, il diritto di esprimere le proprie idee.
Il porre in essere l’attività del «tollerare», da questo punto di vista, non significa 
affatto «sopportare», il che sarebbe sminuente, ma garantire gli altri, garantendo sé 
stessi, o, se preferite, garantire sé stessi, garantendo (anche) gli altri.
E, da questo punto di vista, chi insegna il Diritto costituzionale e chi si appresta 
a impararne i fondamenti, non dovrebbe mai trascurare la lettura e la dovuta consi-
derazione dei classici del pensiero liberale moderno [si pensi, oltre al già citato 
Voltaire, p. es., a lavori di un secolo prima o di un secolo dopo: come l’Epistola 
sulla tolleranza di John Locke (1685, ma pubbl. nel 1689), o Il saggio sulla libertà di 
John Stuart Mill (1859)]: è in essi, e in altri lavori dello stesso spessore, che già af-
fondano le radici tutte le caratteristiche che consentono di considerare un’odierna 
civiltà come liberale e/o democratica.
In secondo luogo, chi studia il Diritto costituzionale non può fingere di non sape-
re e di non sentire il dovere di ribadire sempre e con forza a chi il Diritto costituzio-
nale non lo frequenta, che il tanto conclamato – ma solo quando fa comodo – «prin-
cipio di eguaglianza» non si limita a tutelare la parità di trattamento tra situazioni 
eguali (o il trattamento simile di situazioni simili), ma presenta anche una seconda 
faccia, forse meno conosciuta, ma non per questo meno importante. Esso, infatti, al 
contempo impone (non consente!) di trattare in maniera diversa situazioni diverse e 
in maniera dissimile situazioni dissimili, adeguatamente e previamente motivando.
«Tolleranza», «pluralismo», «eguaglianza», «diseguaglianza»… e potrei continuare.
Mi fermo, invece, onde non sottrarre tempo agli illustri relatori, venuti anche da 
lontano, che siete qui per ascoltare.
Augurandomi di veder presto pubblicati gli Atti del Convegno, per soffermarmi 
su di essi con l’attenzione che il tema merita, posto che «la libertà di parola, senza la 
libertà di diffusione [del pensiero manifestato] è solo un pesce dorato in una vaschet-
ta rotonda» (Ezra Pound), un cordiale augurio di una buona prosecuzione dei lavori.

reThinking The judgemenT on disCriminaTion: 
a horizonTal analysis of european
jurisprudenCes
Carmelo Danisi
Abstract
Being increasingly called upon to express its opinion on measures that directly or indi-
rectly give rise to discriminating practices, the European Court of Human Rights uses 
different parameters based on the risk factors involved. A horizontal comparison of the 
jurisprudence stated in Article 14 has shown clearly that where sexual orientation is con-
cerned, the discretion afforded to judges fosters an excessively indulgent approach to-
wards State reason, whereas higher protection standards have been adopted with reference 
to other factors.
This scenario is further complicated by the ever-growing importance given to standards 
prevalent in the European Union, also considering the EU’s possible accession to the 
ECHR. A convergence with the Court of Justice, which is also oriented towards a differ-
entiated protection of the relevant discrimination grounds, is thus possible.
The contribution of the Charter of Nice represents a fundamental step towards “rethink-
ing” the judgement on discrimination, in order to enable the European Courts to act in a 
univocal manner for all risk factors. The protection of the rights of vulnerable groups 
should prevail over the comparison of situations. This must be achieved through certain 
and transparent judgement phases. With this aim in mind, dialogue between the Courts 
may converge on the defence of human dignity.
* * *
Introduction
This essay is based on a study of discrimination case law pertaining to the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). A com-
parative analysis between these jurisdictions is increasingly necessary in the perspec-
tive of European Union (EU) accession to the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR). Both the ECtHR and the ECJ have developed tools to evaluate vio-
lations of the prohibition against discrimination, and the exchange of ideas between 
them is most welcome to reinforce the strength of judgements independently of the 
specific risk factor involved. Without clear statements on how a discrimination claim 
is analysed, the increasing demand for substantial equality would not find a rational 
answer. Three sections will follow: (1) a horizontal analysis of the protection granted 
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to discrimination claims by both European courts; (2) questions arising from the 
recent jurisprudence on discriminatory treatment based on sexual orientation; and 
(3) suggestions for rethinking judgement in discrimination cases in order to: (a) es-
tablish clear standards in relation to all grounds of discrimination, thus limiting ju-
dicial discretion; and (b) envisage the possibility of including dignity as the core 
value to be defended in discrimination related applications.
1. A Horizontal Analysis of Recent European Case Law
Article 21.1 of the Charter of Nice contains the most comprehensive – although not 
exhaustive – list of prohibited factors, including ethnic origin, gender, religion and 
sexual orientation. Through its judicial activity, the ECtHR recently identified two 
more discrimination grounds: transexuality1 and HIV status2. The extension of the 
notion of “vulnerable groups” can be seen as a sign of the vitality of the European 
non-discrimination protection system. Moreover, new concepts require special con-
sideration, starting with the increasing importance of discrimination based on mul-
tiple grounds. A recent European Agency of Fundamental Rights (FRA) report 
showed that there is now a sizable group of people discriminated against for more 
than one reason and new mechanisms have to be defined to address their claims, 
above all setting aside the definition of a comparator3. For the ensuing horizontal 
analysis the selection of judgements is limited to the most significant.
1.1. The ECtHR approach
Judge Tulkens said recently:
alors que l’article 14 a eu pendant longtemps une existence assez effacé, au point 
que le président Melchior posait la question de savoir s’il était vraiment nécessaire, 
il connaît aujourd’hui une singulière évolution et même une ‘profonde mutation’4.
There are several relevant elements to be considered. Firstly, nowadays the 
ECtHR is more willing to examine applications under Article 14 also when a viola-
tion of a substantial right has been found5. Secondly, the extension of Article 14’s 
1 PV v Spain App no 35159/09 (ECHR, 30 November 2010), para 30.
2 Kiyutin v Russia App no 2700/10 (ECHR, 10 March 2011), para 64.
3 FRA, Focus report: Multiple discrimination (EU-MIDIS 5 Data, February 2011).
4 Francoise Tulkens, ‘L’évolution du principe de non-discrimination à la lumière de la jurispru-
dence de la Cour européenne de droits de l’homme’ in Jean-Yves Carlier (ed.), L’étranger face au 
droit (Bruylant 2010) 193. In her study Judge Tulkens has also recalled that in the Inter-American 
Human Rights protection system the Court has defined the right to not being discriminated as a 
jus cogens rule of international law (Advise OC-18/03, 17 September 2003).
5 Recently, O’Donoghue and others v UK App no 34848/07 (ECHR, 14 December 2010). Among 
others, Aaron Baker, ‘The Enjoyment of Rights and Freedoms: a New Conception of the ‘Ambit’ 
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field of application both ratione materiae and ratione personae means that at the pres-
ent time the “within the ambit” is a less decisive factor because of ECtHR interpreta-
tive power. Thirdly, the growing recognition of indirect discrimination as well as the 
obligation for States to provide specific significant reasons for adopting different 
treatment in relation to the most sensitive grounds. In addition, the recent interpreta-
tion of Article 14 has made it clear that not only procedural requirements must be 
observed by national authorities, but also that positive actions are required to prevent 
discrimination among private persons. This means the prohibition has an essentially 
horizontal effect. Finally, it is now possible to obtain partial reversal of the burden of 
proof in favour of the claimant. Thanks to these developments, higher new standards 
were recently reached by the Court in cases concerning gender and ethnic origin: 
Opuz v Turkey6 and Orsus and others v Croatia7. They are a perfect example of the 
ECtHR’s attempt to narrow the margin of appreciation the States enjoy in the intro-
duction of differential treatment on the grounds of the identified factors.
The Opuz case was the first instance of the Court ruling that gender-based vio-
lence is a form of discrimination under the ECHR. Article 14 was read in combina-
tion with the right to life and the prohibition of torture, condemning a widespread 
phenomenon that Turkey has tried unsuccessfully to eradicate. Moving from this 
specific case, judges have criticized the general social attitude towards women and 
disregarding the fact that it is influenced by dominant cultural and religious values, 
the ECtHR has ruled that Turkish authorities have to observe positive obligations. 
After finding violations of Article 2 and Article 3 ECHR, the Court referred widely 
to international standards in declaring that a State’s failure, albeit unintentional, to 
protect women from domestic violence breaches their right to equal protection be-
fore the law8. In such a case, it is clearly irrelevant to find a comparator for con-
demning violation of Article 14. The claim was resolved from the standpoint of the 
general situation of disadvantage that women still face in Turkey, facilitated by the 
judicial passivity toward married men which may be said to have had an important 
role. The ECtHR could not have reached a similar standard, already affirmed in 
international law and several domestic law, without taking into account the vulner-
able condition of women, as well as stereotypes and prejudices that damaged the 
dignity of Mrs. Opuz and her mother.
under Article 14 ECHR’ (2006) 69 MLR 714; Jeroen Schokkenbroek, ‘The Prohibition of Dis-
crimination in Article 14 of the Convention and the Margin of Appreciation’ (1998) 19 HRLJ 31; 
Stephen Livingstone, ‘Article 14 and The Prevention of Discrimination in the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights’ (1997) 1 EHRLR 25; Robert Wintemute, Sexual Orientation and Human 
Rights: the United States Constitution, the European Convention, and the Canadian Charter (Ox-
ford, Clarendon Press 1995) ch 4 and 5; Chiara Favilli, La non discriminazione nell’Unione Euro-
pea (Bologna, il Mulino 2009), ch 4.
6 Opuz v Turkey App no 33401/02 (ECHR, 9 June 2009).
7 Orsus and Others v Croatia App no 7710/02 (ECHR, 15 June 2010).
8 Opuz (n 6) para 191.
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The same approach can be observed in the Orsus case, in which the Grand Cham-
ber noted primarily an issue of discrimination rather than a per se violation of a right, 
i.e., the right to education guaranteed by Article 2 Protocol 1. At the heart of the claim 
there was the applicants’ placement in separate classes and only with pupils of their 
own ethnic origin as schoolchildren, on account of their lack of proficiency in the 
Croatian language. The forced segregation caused them emotional and psychological 
harm but according to national courts, later confirmed by the Constitutional Court, 
the complainants did not suffer discriminatory treatment. The Grand Chamber, in 
opposition to the Chamber’s judgement, found a violation of Article 14, stressing that 
the case could not be limited to the individual applicants but had to include reference 
to their minority group9. Since the Roma are a specific, disadvantaged and vulnerable 
group, Croatian authorities must also take into account relevant special needs in exer-
cising a wide margin of appreciation in the education sector. In particular, without any 
reference to the comparability of situations, the Strasbourg Court affirmed:
even without any discriminatory intent on the part of the relevant State authorities, 
the fact that the measure in question was applied exclusively to the members of a 
singular ethnic group […] calls for an answer from the State to show that the prac-
tice in question was objectively justified by a legitimate aim and that the means of 
achieving that aim were appropriate, necessary and proportionate10.
In the final analysis, the Grand Chamber held that no objective and reasonable 
justification was given for the treatment of the applicants. It is interesting to note 
that in this ruling dissenting judges saw mainly an opportunity to develop “the 
ECHR concept of discrimination”, stressing the situation of the group and disre-
garding both the margin of appreciation and the consensus of CoE States, the latter 
defined in the judgement as “only” emerging.
1.2. The ECJ approach
Within its field of competence, the EU has developed a unique non-discrimination 
system whose scope has recently been extended thanks to ECJ interpretation11. The 
enforcement of the Treaty of Lisbon has paved the way for a stronger role for EU 
institutions not only due to the content of the Charter of Nice but also to its Article 
21.1, introducing for the first time a right to non-discrimination in EU law12. The 
9 Orsus (n 7) paras 147-8.
10 Ibid., para 155.
11 Andrea Eriksson, ‘European Court of Justice: Broadening the scope of European nondis-
crimination law’ (2009) 7 IJCL 731; Gavin Barrett, ‘Re-examining the Concept and Principle of 
Equality in EC Law’ (2003) 22 YEL 117; P Craig and G De Bùrca, EU law: text, cases, and mate-
rials (OUP 2008).
12 Among others, Ursula O’Hare, ‘Enhancing European Equality Rights: A New Regional Frame-
work’ (2001) 8 MJIL 133; Sejal Parmar, ‘International Human Rights and the EU Charter’ (2001) 
8 MJIL 351.
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EU Treaty’s Article 2 recalls equality as well as dignity as two of the fundamental 
values on which the Union is built and it foresees a pluralistic, tolerant, fair and 
non-discriminatory society. Moreover, the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU has 
reaffirmed EU involvement in the fight against discrimination based on specific 
grounds and changed legislative procedures for the adoption of new texts granting 
a proactive role to the Parliament. Bearing these institutional developments in mind, 
we shall consider the ECJ approach to discrimination claims and explore the scope 
for stronger dialogue with ECtHR in this field of law13.
Some key points may be addressed briefly. Firstly, the ECJ must ensure it main-
tains a fair balance between member State and EU attributions14. Secondly, in EU 
law a clear distinction has been established between direct and indirect discrimina-
tion; consequently only the latter may be justified. Moreover, in contrast to the 
ECHR, the ECJ emphasizes the need for a comparative evaluation to establish di-
rect discriminatory treatment15. It is questionable if the distinction still makes sense 
in light of the case law of both Courts16. Thirdly, once a prima facie case of direct 
or indirect discrimination has been established, the burden of proof lies with the 
respondent to show that there has been no breach of the prohibition; in this re-
spect, the protection seems more effective in the EU system than in the ECHR 
framework.
On more than one occasion the ECJ has been able to enhance the effectiveness of 
EU non-discrimination provisions. There are two highly significant cases in which the 
Court preferred a broader interpretation of the relevant directives in order to grant 
protection. Thus, in Feryn the ECJ stated that the aim of Directive 2000/43 is to foster 
conditions for a socially inclusive labour market and its achievement justifies that the 
existence of direct discrimination is not dependant on the identification of a complain-
ant who claims to have been a victim17. In Coleman the ECJ held that prohibition of 
13 On the role of human rights in EU after Lisbon, see Lucia Serena Rossi, ‘How Fundamental 
are Fundamental Principles? Primacy and Fundamental Rights after Lisbon’ (2008) 27 YEL 65. 
The Author states: “the Charter […] reduces the wide discretionary powers of the ECJ to decide 
what rights are fundamental and their scope”, 78; Marta Cartabia, ‘I diritti fondamentali in Eu-
ropa dopo Lisbona: verso nuovi equilibri?’ (2010) 3 GDA 221.
14 Case C-13/05 Chacon Navas [2006] ECR 2006 I-06467; Case C-411/05, Palacios de la Villa 
[2007] ECR I-08531, Marco Peruzzi, ‘Da Mangold in poi. L’interpretazione delle direttive 
2000/43 e 2000/78 nelle pronunce pregiudiziali della Corte di Giustizia’ in Laura Calafà and 
Donata Gottardi (eds.), Il diritto antidiscriminatorio (Ediesse 2009) 105.
15 Mark Bell, ‘The Right to Equality and Non-Discrimination’ in Tamara Hervey and Jeff Kenner 
(eds.), Economic and social rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: a legal perspective, 
(Oxford-Portland, Hart 2003) 91. It must be noticed that in this study the author observes that 
while Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter are horizontal provisions, the subsequent ones deal with 
specific forms of discrimination thus requiring a proactive role in relation to gender, disability, 
children and elderly people.
16 Denis Martin, Egalité et non-discrimination dans la jurisprudence communautaire: étude critique 
à la lumière d’une approche comparatiste, (Bruxelles, Bruylant 2006) 587.
17 Case C-54/07 Feryn [2008] ECR I-05187. The case concerned Mr. Feryn publicly stating his 
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discrimination and of harassment in EU law is not applicable only to people who are 
themselves disabled but also to those treated less favourably as parents of a disabled 
child18. The Court rejected the observations submitted by several EU member States 
who claimed that only persons in a comparable situation, treated less favourably in rela-
tion to specific grounds, can rely on the EU directive19. Since the prohibition would have 
been undermined by an opposite decision, the ECJ ruled in favour of raising a notion of 
“discrimination by association”. While in Feryn the Court protected the group dimen-
sion since every person of that particular ethnic origin could be humiliated and demoral-
ized by the statements at issue, given their already disadvantaged position in society, in 
Coleman the ECJ seems to accept the idea expressed by Advocate General Maduro:
The aim of Art 13 EC and of the Directive is to protect the dignity and autonomy 
of persons belonging to those suspect classifications […] Treating someone less well 
on the basis of reasons such as religious belief, age, disability and sexual orientation 
undermines this special and unique value that people have by virtue of being hu-
man […] Similarly, a commitment to autonomy means that people must not be 
deprived of valuable options in areas of fundamental importance for their lives by 
reference to suspect classifications […] The discriminator who discriminates 
against an individual belonging to a suspect classification unjustly deprives her of 
valuable options. As a consequence, that person’s ability to lead an autonomous life 
is seriously compromised since an important aspect of her life is shaped not by her 
own choices but by the prejudice of someone else […] At this point, it is fair and 
reasonable for anti-discrimination law to intervene20.
Thus, values must be taken into account when judging discriminatory treatment. 
The weight given to “valuable options” by people who are treated differently on the 
ground of an identified risk factor must be afforded consideration by the judge as 
well as by the legislator in order to evaluate when it is reasonable to intervene.
2. Sexual Orientation: A Risk Factor Without Relative Guarantees? Inconsistent 
Approach by the Courts
Has this kind of proactive approach been adopted in all discrimination claims? If 
we analyze those cases in which there is a claim of an alleged discrimination based 
intention not to hire persons of a certain racial or ethnic origin, thus excluding de facto those 
persons from the application process.
18 Case C-303/06 Coleman [2008] ECR I-05603. It is worth noticing that the EU judges were 
conscious of the consequences of this ruling: “It is apparent from the order for reference that, 
should the Court’s interpretation of Directive 2000/78 contradict that put forward by Ms Cole-
man, her application to the referring tribunal could not succeed under national law”, para 25.
19 Ibid., para 41.
20 Case C-303/06 Coleman [2008] ECR I-05603, Opinion of AG Maduro, para 10 (italics added). 
See also Case C-54/07 Feryn [2008] ECR I-05187, Opinion of AG Maduro, para 14.
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on sexual orientation, some doubts arise. In effect, both Courts seem unable to de-
rive related guarantees from the status that sexual orientation has acquired recently.
2.1. The ECHR system
After L. and V21. and Karner22 included sexual orientation among suspect grounds, 
the effectiveness of counteraction to discrimination was enhanced by procedural 
rules. In this context Professor Brems states:
[…] the effect of the 2003 shift in the case law is decisive. The ‘very weighty rea-
sons’ test restricts the state’s margin of appreciation and reduces the importance of 
balancing between a right and its restriction ground, which is the field in which the 
consensus criterion plays. Comparative argument, whether bearing on legislation or 
public opinion, will not normally amount to ‘very weighty reasons’ that may justify 
rights restriction23.
Thus, in the recently decided Kozak v Poland24, the ECtHR had an important 
opportunity for reaffirming this strict scrutiny test. Acknowledging for the first 
time that same-sex couples shall enjoy family life and were thus protected under 
Article 8 ECHR25, the Strasbourg Court followed some key stages in judgement to 
rule whether the measure was in compliance with Article 14: firstly, the existence 
of a different treatment based on the applicant’s homosexuality; secondly, the re-
quest to the State for the reasons underlying this treatment and the control of the 
legitimacy of the aim pursued in adopting it; thirdly, the need for evident propor-
tion between the measure at issue and the aim sought. Through this strict test the 
ECtHR was able to affirm the legitimacy of the aim – the defence of the “tradi-
tional” family – but at the same time to protect a disadvantaged person whose 
position in Polish society is particularly vulnerable. This line of reasoning allowed 
the ECtHR to apply the same guarantees affirmed in Opuz and in Orsus to dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation, concluding in favour of the applicant and 
against State discretion.
Against this well-established jurisprudence, the evaluation of the alleged violation 
of Article 8 read in combination with Article 14 in Schalk and Kopf v Austria26 was 
21 L and V v Austria App no 39392/98 and 39829/98 (ECHR, 9 January 2003).
22 Karner v Austria App no 40016/98 (ECHR, 24 July 2003).
23 Eva Brems, ‘Should Rights Shape Societies and Their Values, or Should Societal Values Shape 
Rights?’ in Andras Sajò and Renata Uitz (eds.), Constitutional Topography: Values and Constitu-
tions (Eleven International Publishing 2010) 167.
24 Kozak v Poland App no 13102/02 (ECtHR, 2 March 2010).
25 It anticipates the stronger statement made in Schalk, see Carmelo Danisi, ‘Successione nel 
contratto di affitto: quale protezione per la famiglia tradizionale dopo il caso Kozak c. Polonia 
alla Corte di Strasburgo?’ [2010] F&D 10.
26 Schalk and Kopf v Austria App no 30141/04 (ECtHR, 24 June 2010). See Loveday Hodson, ‘A 
Marriage by Any Other Name? Schalk and Kopf v. Austria’ (2011) 1 HRLR 170.
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very surprising. Leaving aside concerns about Article 12, we can concentrate on the 
procedures followed by the ECtHR to discharge Austrian authorities for having dis-
criminated against the applicants. To start with, in contrast to the Orsus approach, 
the ECtHR held that although there is a growing consensus on this issue, a majority 
has still not been reached. Relying only on this rule, the judges also failed to interpret 
the ECHR as a living instrument: the distinction made by Austrian authorities was 
not analysed in light of the condition of contemporary society and standards of pro-
tection already established by the Court. The line of reasoning followed was atypical. 
Firstly, the judges addressed the issue of whether the applicants were in a relevant 
similar situation to different-sex couples; secondly, they assessed the existence of an 
emerging European consensus towards legal recognition of same-sex couples; thirdly, 
they referred to a wide margin of State appreciation in this context. Although it did 
find that “same-sex couples are in a similar situation to a different-sex couple as re-
gards their need for legal recognition and protection of their relationship”27, it did 
not investigate the very serious reasons. Questionably no analysis at all was dedicated 
to the evaluation of proportionality between the desired aim and the means used by 
Austria, assuming that the aim – the defence of the traditional family – was already 
declared legitimate. It is not surprising that the main critics of the final decision were 
the dissenting judges as their opinion clearly demonstrates.
Arguing that the ECtHR must maintain credibility towards CoE member States 
and does not anticipate changes in the domestic arena cannot be a justification for 
failing to follow clear procedures in the evaluation of discrimination claims28. The 
suspicion of arbitrariness in relation to this specific case is reinforced by the decision 
to reject the request for referral to the Grand Chamber29: the panel of five judges of 
the Grand Chamber did not deem that the case raised a serious issue of general 
importance (!).
2.2. The EU system
Similar remarks can be advanced in relation to the inconsistency seen at EU level when 
sexual orientation is at issue. It seems that both Courts converge in limiting their pro-
active role in addressing bias against homosexuals. If we look back to the past, this 
tendency has already been demonstrated in the well-known Grant case30, in which EU 
27 Ibid., para 99.
28 In the Seminar “Mainstreaming diversity”, ECtHR building, Strasbourg, 3-4 February 2011, 
the attending judges stressed that the Court must exercise self-restraint due to the subsidiary 
character of the ECHR.
29 Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights, ‘Court’s judgment concerning Austrian 
authorities’ refusal to allow marriage of homosexual couple becomes final’ (ECHR Press Release, 
29 November 2010) <http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/header/press/links/archived+news/ar-
chivesnews_2010.htm> accessed 10 April 2011.
30 Case C-249/96, Grant [1998] ECR 1998 I-636. See Steve Terrett, ‘A Bridge too Far? Non-
Discrimination and Homosexuality in European Community Law’ (1998) 4 EPL 487; Paolo Pal-
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judges were unable to affirm that discrimination based on sexual orientation was pro-
hibited under Community law.
The first case in which the ECJ has given an interpretation of Directive 2000/78 with 
respect to this factor is Tadao Maruko31. After Mangold and the surprising affirmation 
of the prohibition of discrimination based on age as a general principle of EU law, the 
ECJ was expected to adopt a proactive role in answering doubts advanced by the Ger-
man Court. Although the ECJ clarified the extent of Recital 22 of the directive, mak-
ing it clear that in exercising their competence on marital status, member States must 
comply with Community law and with the provisions relating to the principle of non-
discrimination, the ECJ moved away from the opinion expressed by Advocate Gen-
eral Colomer32. The ruling was thus based on the notion of direct discrimination and 
on the comparability of situations: a deliberate underestimating of the right at issue 
and of Mr Maruko’s vulnerable condition is evident. Although the ECJ is not a human 
rights court, on other occasions it has demonstrated a deeper approach. Notwith-
standing the indications given to the referral judge about the existence of a direct 
discrimination as to whether a surviving life partner could be considered to be in a 
situation comparable to that of a spouse and be entitled to the benefit in question, it 
is unclear why the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation could not 
be affirmed as being a general principle of EU law. The identification of different 
treatment as direct discrimination is suspicious: in a similar case before the ECtHR, 
judges in Strasbourg would probably have applied a strict review test after identifying 
discriminatory treatment based on sexual orientation33.
The ECJ has recently had an important opportunity to review its previous case law. 
In the Römer case, the question of the existence of a “specific” general principle of EU 
law was advanced by the referring court and, as Advocate General Jääskinen also 
claimed in his opinion34, a negative answer must require a convincing explanation of 
the reasons why sexual orientation has a different status compared to other grounds 
listed in Article 21.1 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this light it is worth 
noting that the ECJ has recently repeated the Mangold approach in the Kücükdeveci 
case35. This strong position was taken by the ECJ in one of the first rulings delivered 
after the enactment of the Charter of Nice. Referring also to Article 21 of the Charter, 
the Court reaffirmed that Directive 2000/78 only establishes a general framework for 
laro, ‘I diritti degli omosessuali nella Convenzione Europea per i diritti umani e nel diritto comu-
nitario’ (2000) 2 RIDU 104.
31 Case C-267/06 Tadao Maruko [2008] ECR I-01757. However, the Case C-117/01 K.B. [2004] 
ECR I-00541 is also very significant.
32 Case C-267/06 Tadao Maruko [2008] ECR I-01757, Opinion of AG Colomer.
33 PB and JS v Austria App no 18984/02 (ECHR, 22 July 2010) in which the Court adopts a 
strength approach in relation to a violation of the right to property in combination to Article 14 
concerning a same-sex couple. See Carmelo Danisi, ‘Sulle conseguenze del riconoscimento della 
vita ‘familiare’’ [2011] F&D 1.
34 Case C-147/08 Römer (ECJ, 10 May 2011), Opinion of AG Jääskinen, para 46.
35 Case C-555/07 Kücükdeveci [2010] OJ C 63/05.
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opposing discrimination based on included grounds while the principle of equal treat-
ment derives from various international instruments and from the constitutional tradi-
tions common to the Member States. As in the case of gender36, age is protected by a 
general principle which operates both as interpretational guidelines and as standards 
of review by which executive and legislative acts must be judged. The expected state-
ment in Römer concerning the EU commitment on sexual orientation has not been 
made37: it is evident that this factor cannot not be derived by the constitutional tradi-
tions of member States but the age could not be found in a different position. An 
important suggestion in the Advocate General’s opinion is worth quoting here, even 
if he stressed that it is a field in which each member State has exclusive competence:
[…] un cas de figure dans lequel un État membre n’admettrait aucune forme 
d’union légalement reconnue qui soit ouverte aux personnes de même sexe pourrait 
être considéré comme constituant une discrimination liée à l’orientation sexuelle, 
parce qu’il est possible de faire dériver du principe d’égalité, combiné avec le devoir 
de respecter la dignité humaine des personnes homosexuelles, une obligation de 
reconnaître à celles-ci la faculté de vivre une relation affective durable dans le cadre 
d’un engagement juridiquement consacré38.
It must be remembered that, also in exercising their powers, domestic authorities 
must respect the principle of non-discrimination to avoid imposing disadvantages 
derived from a way of life based on a different sexual orientation. No constitutional 
provisions on the special value of a traditional union can thus provide a reasonable 
justification. Logically, given the legitimacy of the aim in this field, a strong role of 
necessity as well as proportionality is appropriate.
3. Rethinking Discrimination Judgement Through Dialogue Between Courts: 
The Need for a Consistent Approach
Despite the controversial issues that emerged in Schalk, the case showed the close 
bond between the two European law systems. The ECtHR relied on secondary EU 
36 Recently, Case C-236/09 Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats ASBL [2011] OJ C 
130/4.
37 The judgement was delivered on the 10th of May 2011. Through an unsatisfactory reasoning the 
EU Court found direct discrimination based on sexual orientation but restricted the occurrence 
of the discriminatory treatment to several conditions (see § 52). As far as the question on the ex-
istence of a EU general principle of discrimination based on sexual orientation is concerned, the 
Court answered indirectly: it only held that the right to equal treatment could be claimed by an 
individual only if the related case falls within the scope of European Union law (§ 60) – i.e., from 
the expiry of the period for transposition of the Directive 2000/78. It is even more surprising that 
neither the Charter of Nice nor its Article 21 was recalled in any part of the judgment and no 
references were dedicated to the inspiring analysis of the Advocate General.
38 Case C-147/08 Römer (ECJ, 10 May 2011), Opinion of AG Jääskinen, para 76 (italics added).
69A HORIZONTAL ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCES
law to extend the concept of family life to same-sex couples39 while it recalled the 
Charter – which has the same legal value as the treaties – and its Article 9 to assert 
that “the Court would no longer consider that the right to marry enshrined in Article 
12 must in all circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of the op-
posite sex”40. It cannot be denied that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights ac-
quired two main functions: on one hand containing rights with wording that reflects 
changes in European society, being thus a good reference for an interpretation of the 
ECHR as a living instrument; on the other hand it expresses the consensus existing 
at least amongst the 25 European States on current human rights standards (if we 
exclude the UK and Poland for their position on the Charter). It follows that how the 
ECJ interprets the Charter’s provisions may have an important impact on ECtHR 
case law as well as on the ongoing dialogue in the field of non-discrimination41. More-
over, the effect on ECtHR of EU Commission’s proposals to facilitate freedom of 
movement for all couples in EU cannot be underestimated.
Introducing a general prohibition of discrimination in Article 21, the Charter has 
not only narrowed the gap between the two systems of protection in force in Eu-
rope, but on closer observation has also restored two important values to the Euro-
pean scenario: equality as stated in Article 20 and dignity, which opens the entire 
catalogue of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter. The ratification of Pro-
tocol 12 ECHR by all EU member States will complete this reinforced framework42.
These developments are certainly welcome, but without an overall rethinking of 
the judgement on discriminatory treatment we feel they will not be enough. As far 
as Protocol 12 is concerned, it probably increases the material scope of Article 14 
less than had been supposed43. If substantial guarantees are not provided by the 
ECtHR during judgement, it will be able to shape procedures in order to limit in-
tervention in sensitive issues44. Thus key criteria must be outlined, as can be ob-
served from the experience of non-European Courts45. Clear mechanisms are 
39 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (n 26) para 94.
40 Ibid., para 61.
41 Koen Lenaerts and Eddy de Smijter, ‘The Charter and the Role of the European Courts’ (2001) 
8 MJIL 90.
42 CoE, ‘Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms: CETS No.: 177’ (Council of Europe - Treaty Office, 4 November 2000) <http://conven-
tions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=177&CM=8&CL=ENG> accessed 15 June 
2011. Total number of ratifications by May 2011: 18 States.
43 Robert Wintemute, ‘Filling the Article 14 “Gap”: Government Ratification and Judicial Con-
trol of Protocol No. 12 ECHR’, (2004) 5 EHRLR 484.
44 Sedic and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina App no 27996/06 and 34836/06 (ECHR, 22 Decem-
ber 2009). From this first judgement in which Protocol 12 was applied, it cannot be affirmed that 
the Court is willing to change its approach to discrimination claims. Article 14 standards will be 
thus maintained. See Lucy Claridge, ‘Protocol 12 and Sejdic and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
A missed opportunity?’ (2011) 1 EHRLR 82.
45 Murray Wesson, ‘Contested Concepts: Equality and Dignity in the Case-Law of the Canadian 
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needed to enhance control of the inclination of judges to shape their rulings accord-
ing to the grounds of discrimination and of the rights at issue. The dialogue between 
the ECtHR and ECJ can be very useful in this context. With the Charter of Nice, 
the ECJ will be called upon to face claims based on grounds included in the text, 
and common solutions can be found.
The main advantage for the Courts will be avoiding suspicion of arbitrariness 
while enhancing the protection of the most disadvantaged groups. It seems crucial 
for the legitimacy of human rights, and it will increase legal certainty by furthering 
the predictability of interpretations46. In this way, the inconsistency shown in claims 
of discrimination based on sexual orientation can probably be overcome. In par-
ticular, as far as the ECHR is concerned, the danger is that the same discretion 
showed in Schalk could be applied in two highly significant pending cases: Gas and 
Dubois v France47 and Chapin and Charpentier v France48.
At the same time, given the present day standards of protection and the faint-
hearted attempt to include values in the Courts’ previous case law, the dialogue 
between Strasbourg and Luxemburg might explore the possibility of including val-
ues in equality claims49. Using dignity to recognize discriminatory treatment can be 
useful for identifying the sense of granting those valuable options to which Advocate 
General Maduro referred above.
3.1. Clear procedures in the evaluation of discrimination claims
Distinguished scholars have pointed out that the approach of the Courts has not 
always been consistent or logical50. To assure coherence with the European non-
discrimination system some key points may be advanced.
A. Focus on Rights - The difficulty of granting an effet utile to the prohibition of 
discrimination has been constrained by the research of analogy between relevant 
situations. When European judges face delicate issues they usually start their reason-
ing from this point, with the risk that in the event that it is not verified, they proceed 
no further. Such an approach is nowadays unsatisfactory and even the case law re-
called above shows that this stage has already lost its importance in part. Instead, 
Supreme Court and South African Constitutional Court’ in Andras Sajò and Renata Uitz (eds.), 
Constitutional Topography: Values and Constitutions (Eleven International Publishing 2010) 271; Gay 
Moon, ‘From Equal Treatment to Appropriate Treatment: What Lessons can Canadian Equality Law 
on Dignity and Reasonable Accommodation teach the United Kingdom?’ (2008) 6 EHRLR 695.
46 Eva Brems, Should Right Shape Society (n 23) 147.
47 Gas and Dubois v France App no 25951/07 (ECHR, 31 August 2010).
48 Chapin and Charpentier v France App no 40183/07 (ECHR).
49 Gay Moon and Robin Allen QC, ‘Dignity Discourse in Discrimination Law: A Better Route to 
Equality?’ (2006) 6 EHRLR 610.
50 Among others, Denis Martin, Egalité et non-discrimination dans la jurisprudence communau-
taire (n 16) 608; Gavin Barrett, ‘Re-examining the Concept and Principle of Equality in EC Law’ 
(n 11) 135.
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European Courts can concentrate their attempts to limit discrimination by focusing 
on rights. Thus, the question requiring an answer is “on what grounds has an indi-
vidual been denied a right or refused the advantage of higher protection provided 
by the law?” If the answer is “on suspect grounds”, a strict review test must be ad-
opted and the analogy stage disregarded. The European discrimination law in this 
way may attempt to grant equal rights and protection to all the different groups liv-
ing in European society and overcome their historical disadvantage.
B. Suspect grounds - As has been described, the EU Charter provides the most up-
dated list of prohibited grounds and the same can be found in ECtHR case law. After 
the enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon, the ECJ may be asked to further develop its 
case law, granting the same level of protection and status to all grounds. Most of them 
refer to groups with a long history of ignored rights as well as prejudice and vulner-
ability: the dimension of the group is already recognized in ECtHR case law but the 
impact of biased treatment on the complainant in relation to their position in society 
is often neglected. For an effective protection of human rights proclaimed in the 
ECHR and in the EU Charter, the perspective of the individual or the group of origin 
must be taken into account rather than that of the perspective of the society at large. 
Again, if the effect of the treatment is to keep the claimant in a disadvantaged posi-
tion in society or give rise to the idea that they are less deserving of concern, respect 
and consideration, then both Courts are called upon to assure a strict scrutiny test.
C. Strict scrutiny test - Recognizing that a right has been denied or that lesser protec-
tion has been afforded due to a risk factor must always require a review that takes 
into account the legitimacy of the alleged discrimination while evaluating the related 
necessity and proportionality. The ECtHR’s approach based on “very weighty rea-
sons” has proved to be useful because the test is hard to satisfy when prima facie 
discrimination is perceived. It is interesting to note that the EU Charter has followed 
this approach: its equality provisions must be read in conjunction with Article 52.1, 
whose limitations are subject to the principle of proportionality and may be made 
only if they are necessary, intending to fulfil EU general interest or protect the rights 
of others. In light of this, a more central role might be accorded to proportionality: 
European judges may require a high degree of intensity to render distinctions or 
different impacts especially difficult to justify. In short, a vulnerable position shall in 
any case and in relation to any rights require a strict scrutiny test. Cases such as 
Schalk cannot be accepted in a coherent human rights system.
D. Consensus/margin of appreciation - Both Courts have recognised the right for 
European States to act freely in specific domains. As for the ECJ the division of 
competences between the Union and member States is fundamental in this connec-
tion; the ECtHR has several times recalled that States enjoy a wide margin of ap-
preciation in deciding how to treat different situations. The criteria often used seem 
to be related to the right at issue and do not follow a coherent approach: the ECtHR 
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has mentioned it only when it wants to leave room for diversity among States. In-
deed, when there is a wide consensus in a specific field the margin left to domestic 
authorities is often restricted. However, this operation is done with a high level of 
discretion: thus in Orsus a violation of Article 14 was found although the consensus 
was only growing. The question that can be moved to European Courts is rather 
simple: when the protection of human right is at issue, does the margin of apprecia-
tion/consensus doctrine really matter? Although the Charter of Nice has to be ap-
plied within the EU fields of attribution and the ECHR does not contain a full cata-
logue of fundamental rights, it is clear that member States are required to respect 
equality and non-discrimination provisions when acting in areas of their exclusive 
power. In short, when a suspect ground is concerned neither the margin of appre-
ciation nor the consensus have to weigh in the judgement.
E. Kinds of discrimination - In light of the above and of a deeper dialogue between 
European Courts in this field of law, doubts arise about the distinction between 
direct and indirect discrimination in EU law in relation to the consequences that the 
ECJ derives from it. Although it has been important for focusing the attention on 
masked discrimination, this distinction may lose its significance with a focus on 
rights, suspects grounds and the consequent strict review test. The requirement of 
analogy for finding a direct discrimination at the ECJ is unsatisfactory from a human 
rights point of view: a more flexible approach may be necessary. Thanks to the strict 
review test every form of discrimination can be prohibited at the same level and 
suspicion of judges’ manipulation of this notions in their reasoning will disappear. 
In addition, new concepts have acquired importance such as discrimination on mul-
tiple grounds or discrimination by association. The ECtHR can thus take advantage 
of the developments issued in EU law.
F. Indivisibility of rights - The Charter of Nice has innovated human rights law not-
withstanding the intention of its authors. Moreover, through a peculiar structure, it 
seems to stress the indivisibility of rights: no one needs more consideration than 
others. From this clear statement we can easily assert that no matter what right is at 
issue, they deserve the same level of scrutiny when alleged discrimination is de-
nounced in their enjoyment or refusal. The present day conditions of European 
society require a higher standard of protection that cannot be limited to some rights 
or freedoms.
3.2. A potential common value: the protection of human dignity
The ECtHR and ECJ have generally made limited use of values in the context of 
non-discrimination51. However, it is not an entirely alien concept, being used to 
51 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ 
(2008) 19 EJIL 655.
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define harassment as a form of discrimination. Relying on the Charter of Nice, 
European Courts are called to think about the opportunity to use dignity to 
strengthen their common involvement in limiting discriminatory treatment. Tak-
ing into account criticism of the available experiences of non-European Constitu-
tional Courts, it cannot be denied that many of the abovementioned cases were 
finally found to be in violation of the prohibition of discrimination through a 
consideration of the particular disadvantaged social position of the related group 
and the consequences of the alleged treatment on their dignity, intended as the 
value recognized to them by society. In this way, the protection of rights will shape 
society and not the contrary52. The dimension of equality put aside in the past with 
more weight given to non-discrimination is now shaping the European system of 
protection. The Charter, with its emphasis on “dignity” and “equality”, must be 
seen as an increasing European consensus on the importance of placing those 
values at the heart of human rights legislation53. Moreover, the Charter is struc-
tured in such a way as to stress the indivisibility of rights, and every single provi-
sion has to be interrelated with the others54. Thus dignity and equality/non-dis-
crimination have to shape every right and the ECJ, followed by the ECtHR 
through an evolutionary interpretation of the ECHR, can be called upon to drive 
the change.
Harsh criticism has been moved against those jurisdictions that have used dig-
nity to evaluate discriminatory claims. However, the proposal here is simpler: dig-
nity can be used as a secondary means of analysis for European Courts, advanced in 
light of their recent judgements and of Charter content. Dignity can be expressly 
addressed in relation to all relevant risk factors while it matches perfectly with the 
stages outlined above: it does not require a comparison to be made but is able to 
crystallize the equal worth of every person55. Including dignity in the fight against 
discrimination will therefore lead to a society based on the right to be different since 
equal concern and respect for every person will be recognized. Moreover, thanks to 
the focus on dignity provided by the Charter, a positive argument can easily be de-
rived. If State actions are limited by the defence of dignity, the latter can also be seen 
as an aim: its achievement can be pursued by granting valuable options to those who 
are currently deprived of it. As it has been noted: “new relationships between prin-
52 Eva Brems, Should Right Shape Society (n 23).
53 Stefano Rodotà, ‘La Carta come atto politico e documento giuridico’ in Andrea Manzella and 
others (eds.), Riscrivere i diritti in Europa. Introduzione alla carta dei diritti fondamentali 
dell’Unione europea (Bologna, il Mulino 2001).
54 See the comments of the Praesidium responsible for drafting the Charter, available at <www.
europarl.eu.int> accessed 15 June 2011.
55 Gay Moon and Robin Allen, ‘Dignity Discourse in Discrimination Law’ (n 49) 638. The au-
thors state: “dignity is working today its way into the assessment of how and when generic com-
parisons should be made, as well as showing when they should not be made. The mere recitation 
of the equal treatment principle without argument as to what was or was not comparable could 
not have achieved this result”.
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ciples are clearly growing with respect to dignity, which is more and more effec-
tively interacting with freedom and equality”56.
4. Conclusions
The “cross-horizontal” case law analysis herein shows that a commitment by Euro-
pean Courts to non-discrimination is evolving but is neither consistent nor clear. 
The enactment of Protocol 12 ECHR and of the Charter of Nice may not be suffi-
cient for higher levels of protection. A proposal is to define criteria for an enhanced 
analysis of discrimination claims, thus limiting judicial discretion. Both the ECtHR 
and ECJ have developed effective protection tools and for mutual European dis-
crimination law a reciprocal comparison may be required in order to identify each 
system’s pitfalls. Although Courts were set up with different objectives, the growing 
importance of human rights in the EU has drawn Strasbourg and Luxembourg 
closer. A further step is now needed: an overall afterthought on discrimination rul-
ings adopting a human rights approach. Values can be an important part of recover-
ing the equality dimension in prohibiting discrimination. Focusing on the protection 
of rights and of vulnerable groups, European judges are called upon to avoid suspi-
cion of arbitrariness and to ensure all risk areas are reviewed equally. Perhaps by 
following this path, equality and non-discrimination may finally develop from 
comparison-based concepts into the interpretative measures of the entire catalogue 
of Europe’s human rights.
56 Stefano Rodotà, ‘La bandiera della dignità’ Repubblica (Rome, 15 February 2011) <http://www.re-
pubblica.it/politica/2011/02/15/news/la_bandiera_della_dignit-12474868/?ref=HREA-1> accessed 10 
April 2011.
ConsTiTuTional paradoxes from inequaliTy 
equaliTy To equaliTy: The iTalian Case
(wiTh a liTTle help from abroad)
Pietro Faraguna
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to investigate the constitutional significance of the risks of an 
abrupt shift from a situation characterised by a strong social and legal stigma of homo-
sexuality to the full recognition of equality between same-sex couples and heterosexual 
couples. The article focuses on the motivational strategies of the constitutional courts deal-
ing with cases concerning equality: there may be reasons to affirm the appropriateness of 
the constitutional courts’ self-restraint, the paradoxes arising from a broader (but still not 
full) recognition of the equality of same-sex couples suggest the importance of a flexible 
constitutional approach by the courts themselves thus allowing a future overruling.
* * *
1. Introduction: expectations, surprises, and the “time factor” in the protection of 
fundamental rights
Any reader of this book is probably well aware of the fact that the Italian constitu-
tional court gave its first pronouncement on the issue of same-sex marriage on April 
15th 20101. The same reader may not be abreast of the fact that the commentators’ 
reactions to this ruling were very diverse, but shared a common denominator: a lack 
of surprise2.
Italy remains, in fact, among the western legal traditions, one of the few countries 
(perhaps the only one) which accords a very low level of legal relevance to the social 
fact of same-sex unions. It could be said that the Italian legal order gives this fact no 
1 Corte costituzionale, sent. n. 138/2010, then confirmed by Corte costituzionale ordd. nn. 
276/2010 and 4/2011.
2 See Barbara Pezzini, Il matrimonio same-sex si potrà fare. La qualificazione della discrezionalità 
del legislatore nella sent n. 138 del 2010 della Corte Costituzionale [2010] Giur. Cost. 2715; M. 
Croce, ‘Diritti Fondamentali Programmatici, Limiti all’Interpretazione Evolutiva e Finaità Pro-
creativa del Matrimonio: dalla Corte un Deciso Stop al Matrimonio Omosessuale’ (Forumcosti-
tuzionale, 23 April 2010) <http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/stories/pdf/documen-
ti_forum/giurisprudenza/2010/0008_nota_138_2010_croce.pdf> accessed 27 April 2010.
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relevance at all: just as the cohabitation between my cat and me3 has no meaning in 
the legal world, so does a stable union between two persons of the same sex.
Considering this legal background, it was easy to predict that the constitutional 
court would reject the claim to the highest level of equalization between same-sex 
unions and heterosexual unions.
Nonetheless, I find it anything but trivial to remark that even the legal scholar-
ship which implored the court to declare the law unconstitutional would not have 
bet any money on the Courts’ response.
Is this just because the lawyers (especially the constitutional ones) are conscious 
of the political soul of a constitutional court, which suggests, leads, and constrains 
the juridical one4? I think there are much deeper reasons for the “constitutional 
caution” of the commentators, and that the same caution is of relevance to the ac-
tions of any player involved in the debate about the recognition of same-sex relation-
ships.
A comparative overview shows that the way to equality is not a static claim, but 
a dynamic process: not necessarily slow, but still a process; and any process, in order 
to be dynamic, has to deal with time.
I need to start with a rude simplification. I will assume a hypothetical route to-
wards a full affirmation of equality between same-sex couples and heterosexual 
couples, in order to set the vector of the process in question.
I will draw the most common points of this hypothetical route to equality accord-
ing to a comparative overview (section 2). Afterwards, the experiences will be or-
dered on the grounds of an “equality vector” (section 3). Subsequently, the follow-
ing analysis will focus on the possible contradictions arising from a incremental 
recognition of same-sex unions’ recognition (section 4).
In the final section, the above considerations will be applied to the Italian case, 
where the legal recognition of same-sex couples could be set at stage zero, and 
where the Constitutional Court was recently asked to jump the whole incremental 
process through the mere extension of a constitutional right to marry to same-sex 
unions (section 5).
2. Identifying the equality stair rungs through a comparative overview
The main object of this contribution does not focus on a comparative overview of 
the different legal assessments of same-sex unions in different countries, neverthe-
less a brief comparative overview may be useful, even merely because homosexual-
ity is a universal social fact, which means that everywhere around the world there is 
3 The provoking comparison is drawn from Matteo Bonini Baraldi, La famiglia de-genere (Mime-
sis 2010) 147.
4 Croce (n 2) 1.
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a potential claim for equality. In this section I will summarize different countries’ 
legal responses to that claim, and identify the legal players involved in the process.
2.1. Same social fact, different levels of legal protection
The same-sex marriage issue developed recently and quickly. Not later than in the 
late ’80s discussing about same-sex marriage would have been considered more as a 
form of legal fiction rather than a scholarship’s exercise. In 1986 the Supreme Court 
of the United States pronounced on Bowers v. Hardwick. At that time sodomy was 
a crime in twenty-four States and in the District of Columbia in the U.S.5. In seven 
of those states the prohibition only regarded homosexual couples.
Since then, things have changed radically. Every single day a new country is 
added to the list of those recognising same-sex marriage. Without wanting to be 
exhaustive, and limiting the list to European Countries, since 2001 (when same-sex 
marriage became legal in the Netherlands) homosexuals have obtained the right to 
marry a person of their sex in Belgium, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Portugal and Ice-
land. Four other Countries are now passing similar legislations (Luxembourg, An-
dorra, Finland and Slovenia)6.
Taking into account also non-European countries, the list goes on and it becomes 
really hard to keep it updated: same-sex marriage is nowadays legal in Canada, Ar-
gentina, South Africa, five States in the U.S., in the District of Columbia and in two 
districts of Mexico.
As fast as this process may have been, it was correctly described as a gradual7 and 
necessary8 process. It was gradual, in the sense that it was composed of “several 
small, sequential steps”9. It was necessary, in the sense that each step towards the 
expansion of civil rights was critical to enabling the next10.
The legal scholarship11 identifies certain trends and patterns in this global pro-
5 Comment, ‘Inching Down the Aisle: Differing Paths Toward the Legalization of Same-Sex Mar-
riage in the United States and Europe’, [2004] Harvard LR 2004.
6 A recent and updated recognition may be found at Marco Gattuso, ‘Matrimonio tra Persone 
dello Stesso Sesso’, in Paolo Zatti (ed.), Trattato di Diritto di Famiglia (Giuffré 2011 forthcoming) 
and on-line <http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/stories/pdf/documenti_forum/pa-
per/0265_gattuso.pdf>.
7 Kees Waaldijk, ‘Others May Follow: the Introduction of Marriage, Quasi-Marriage, and Semi-
Marriage For Same-Sex Couples in European Countries’ [2004] 569.
8 Comment, ‘Inching Down the Aisle’ (n 5) 2009.
9 Waaldijk (n 7) 577.
10 Yuval Merin, Equality for Same-Sex Couples: the Legal Recognition of Gay Partnerships in Eu-
rope and the United States (University of Chicago Press 2002) 308; Comment, Inching Down the 
Aisle (n. 8) 2009.
11 Waaldijk (n 7) 571; similar categories were tracked by Caroline Forder, ‘European models of 
Domestic Partnerships Laws’, [2000] Can. J. Fam. L. 371, 390 and Robert Wintemute, ‘Conclu-
sion’ in Robert Wintemute, Mads Adenas (eds.), Legal Recognition of Same-Sex partnerships: A 
Study of National, European and International Law (Hart Publishing 2001) 764.
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cess, and distinguishes three levels of legal protection of same-sex unions: the 
broader, and in a certain sense stronger one, is the mere extension of the “tradi-
tional” marriage to same-sex couples. The second level consists of the recognition 
of a “quasi-marriage”, a new legal form of partnership created by a formal act of 
registration and consists of almost all of the rights and obligations of the “tradi-
tional” marriage. The third level of recognition is identified as a “semi-marriage”, 
which consists of a new legal form of partnership, different from the “quasi-mar-
riage” because it results in only a limited selection of the rights and obligations of 
marriage.
Considering a global move, at least in western Countries, towards a legal eman-
cipation of homosexuality, the “gradual and necessary” process seems far from be-
ing completed.
The incompleteness emerges not only from the fact that the process still appears 
inhomogeneous, but also because it is hard to set a finish line. A full recognition of 
the right to marry is in fact, on the one hand, one of the strongest reactions of a legal 
order to the claim for equality; but on the other hand it opens the floodgate to a new 
wave of claims for equality, related to the familiar status and the recognition of legal 
parenting12.
The incompleteness also derives from the fact that in certain Countries the pro-
cess has arrived to the recognition of registered partnerships, a second-class status 
of registered same-sex couples.
Moreover, even within the gay and lesbian movement it was argued that the for-
mal recognition of the right to access “traditional” marriage should not be the move-
ment’s final wish: this is because, from that point of view, accessing the traditional 
marriage would mean to inherit the whole conservative and hegemonic configura-
tion of marriage13.
2.2. Same legal issue, same legal argumentations
Taking into consideration the global diffusion of same-sex marriage, many of the 
arguments in favour and against its recognition are exportable or importable.
It may be useful to summarize the most common arguments against the recogni-
tion of same-sex marriage14. The first argument is the definitional one, which pre-
supposes a legal and/or traditional conception of marriage in the sense it includes 
only heterosexual couples: this argument is obviously stronger in those cases where 
traditional conception is strengthened by formal provisions of positive law. The ar-
gument gains significant power if the gender neutrality of marriage is excluded by 
an explicit constitutional provision. This interpretation of marriage leads to the af-
12 An efficient and recent synthesis can be found in Kees Waaldijk, ‘Overview of Forms of Joint 
Legal Parenting Available to Same-Sex Couples in European Countries’ [2009] Droit et Société 383.
13 Nancy D. Polikoff, ‘We Will Get What We Ask for: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage 
Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage”’ [1993] Va. LR 1636.
14 The synthesis is draft from Monini Baraldi (n 3) 35.
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firmation of the non-discriminatory character of traditional marriage: every man is 
entitled to marry a women and vice versa.
The second argument is the functional one: marriage and family are connected 
notions, and marriage serves the traditional purpose of family, in other words, pro-
creation and education of the offspring.
The third and final argument presupposes the public irrelevance of same-sex 
couples, whose liberty could be protected only in a private dimension.
Conversely, the most common arguments in favour of the legalization of same-
sex marriage are based on the recognition of a fundamental right to marry, which 
would be included among the inalienable human rights; this right includes the 
freedom to choose freely one’s spouse; homosexuals are excluded from this funda-
mental right; gays and lesbians fundamental right to privacy would also be violated 
in this way.
2.3. The Constitution, the legislator, the judges, the courts, the people
The inhomogeneity of the forms of legal recognition of the same social fact is not 
limited to a quantitative aspect: different legal orders not only accord different 
rights and obligations to same-sex couples, but also recognise those rights and obli-
gations in highly different ways.
In some countries the introduction of new forms of legal recognition of same-sex 
unions has been the result of a legislative reform; in some of these countries the 
Constitution was gender-neutral, in others it was necessary to amend it in order to 
encompass a broader notion of marriage, capable of including same-sex unions; in 
other countries the legislative process had to take into account popular consulta-
tions; in others, judicial contribution played the most significant role to get the 
process started.
As far as the Constituent (or the constitutional legislator) is concerned, same-sex 
marriage is explicitly prohibited in 29 States of the U.S.A. and in fifteen other coun-
tries (Lithuania, Poland, Latvia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia, Ukraine, Belarus, 
Moldova, Honduras, Ecuador, Congo, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda).
The constitutional prohibition of same-sex marriage may not consist of a clear 
norm: in this frame, the constitutional experience in Spain seems very important. 
Although the Spanish Constitution expressly states (Article 32) that “men and 
women have the right to marry”, it was interpreted in the sense that all men and 
women have the right to marry, but not necessarily to marry a person of the opposite 
sex15. This constitutional reading admitted the enactment of the legislation introduc-
ing same-sex marriage without any constitutional amendment.
It has been said that the role of the judiciary in the same-sex marriage issue was 
greater in common law countries than in civil law ones. This aspect is not surprising 
15 See Marc Carrillo, ‘La legge spagnola sul matrimonio tra omosessuali e i principi costituzionali’ 
[2005] Foro It. 264.
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if considered in the general frame of the relationships between legislator and courts 
in the common law traditions, compared to civil law systems16.
In at least nine states a court’s pronouncement had a decisive role in the intro-
duction of same-sex marriage: it was directly imposed by the courts in South-Africa, 
in five states of the U.S.A. (Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, New Hampshire and 
Vermont) and in the District of Columbia; the Supreme Court of Nepal did not 
declare null the exclusion of same-sex couples from the right to marry, but ordered 
the legislator to provide a new gender-neutral legislation; finally, in Israel, the Su-
preme Court admitted the recognition of same-sex marriages which were validly 
celebrated abroad.
A common denominator of this list is self-evident: none of these Countries are 
European. It is said that the European approach has always been much more 
“incremental”17, and the biggest steps were taken by the democratic legitimate bodies.
As far as popular participation is concerned, the constitutional experience of the 
United States gives unequivocal indications: where and when a referendum was 
held, the result was in most cases against the extension of marriage to same-sex 
couples. This happened both in case where the referenda’s object was set in positive 
terms (would you like same-sex marriage to be recognised?)18 and also in cases 
where it was set in negative terms (would you like same-sex marriage to be 
banned?)19.
The popular consultations gave similar results even in those cases in which the 
question wasn’t raised on the recognition of same-sex marriages, but on the recogni-
tion of weaker forms of registered partnerships20.
On the whole, in 31 cases the polls were contrary to same-sex couples’ claims, 
whereas in only two cases the results were different: in Arizona a bill introducing a 
ban of on same-sex marriages and registered partnerships was rejected in 2006, but 
was subsequently approved by another poll in the same State two years after. Fi-
16 It is also to consider that, on the other hand, for “Anglo-American lawyers, the pattern of in-
cremental social change is a familiar one, especially in the gradual extension of civil rights”: see 
Graham Gee and Gregore C.N. Webber, ‘Same-Sex Marriage in Canada: Contributions From the 
Courts, the Executive and Parliament’ [2005] KCLJ 132.
17 Comment, ‘Inching Down the Aisle’ (n 5) 2010.
18 This was the case of Maine, 2009. The data result from Paolo Passaglia, ‘Il matrimonio tra 
persone dello stesso sesso in alcuni stati europei’ (Cortecostituzionale.it) <http://www.cortecosti-
tuzionale.it/documenti/convegni_seminari/CC_SS_Il_matrimonio_tra_persone_stesso_ses-
so_12012010.pdf> accessed 14 April 2011.
19 This was the case of eleven U.S. Countries: Alaska, 1998, Hawaii 1998, Nevada, 2002; Missis-
sippi, 2004; Missouri 2004; Oregon, 2004; Colorado, 2006; Tennessee, 2006; Arizona, 2008; Cali-
fornia, 2008.
20 In nineteen cases the people of a State rejected such a legislation: Nebraska, 2000; Arkansas, 
2004; Georgia, 2004; Kentucky, 2004; Louisiana, 2004; Michigan, 2004; North Dakota, 2004; 
Ohio, 204; Oklahoma, 2004; Utah, 2004; Kansas, 2005; Texas, 2005; Alabama, 2006, Idaho, 2006; 
South Carolina, 2006; South Dakota, 2006; Virginia, 2006, Wisconsin, 2006; Florida 2008.
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nally, in only one State (Washington), a popular consultation approved a bill that 
extended rights and obligations of de facto heterosexual partners to homosexual 
couples.
In this framework, the constitutional experience of California is especially nota-
ble: in 1971 the Constitution came to a gender-neutral definition of marriage, al-
though in 1977 the heterosexual requirement of marriage was settled by law. In 2002 
a popular consultation on the proposition 22 (disposing the heterosexual character 
of marriage) approved this requirement, nonetheless the legislature seriously at-
tempted to introduce a bill legalising same-sex marriage twice, in 2005 and 2007. 
Both bills were stopped by the Governor’s veto, on the ground of the popular sup-
port expressed by the 2002 referendum.
Since 2007 the same-sex marriage issue followed two parallel paths in California: 
on one hand, the compatibility of proposition 22 was questioned in front of the 
courts, on the other the political circuit gave momentum to the process for consti-
tutional amendment in order to constitutionalize the necessary heterosexuality of 
marriage.
As far as the judicial way is concerned, proposition 22 was upheld by the Su-
preme Court of California on 15th May 200821. But only a few months later a popu-
lar consultation was called on the issue of introducing proposition 8 into the Cali-
fornian constitution, which disposed the same-sex marriage ban.
A narrow majority approved the ban, and substantially overruled the Court’s 
pronouncement. Those rapid and wide normative swings led to serious inter-tempo-
ral issues, casting legal uncertainty over the 18.000 same-sex marriages celebrated 
between May and November. Moreover, it was questioned whether the constitu-
tional amendment introducing proposition 8 was, rather than an amendment, a 
constitutional revision, altering the substantial identity of the Californian Constitu-
tion22. Again, the Supreme Court was called to rule on both issues: the decision 
confirmed the legitimacy of the same-sex marriages that were valid according to the 
law at the time they were celebrated. As far as the second issue was concerned, the 
Supreme Court declared the constitutional compatibility of the amendment process, 
both formally and substantially.
3. Ordering the stair rungs on the equality’s vector
This comparative overview shows that the reactions of different legal orders to the 
same claim for equality were and are very diverse: it is of course too ambitious, and 
probably impossible to say which of them are the most successful in legal terms.
21 In re marriage cases, 43 Cal.4th 757 (2008) [Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 183 P.3d 384 76].
22 See Comment ‘California Supreme Court Classifies Proposition 8 as “Amendment” Rather 
than “Revision” - Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009)’ [2010] Harv. LR 1516.
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Nonetheless, through a dynamic analysis of the different legal experiences it 
seems possible to sketch a hypothetical equality’s vector which tracks the route ori-
ented towards the removal of any difference regarding the treatment of homosexual 
and heterosexual. The vector generally coincides with the timeline of the legal eman-
cipation of homosexuality: from the starting point; the decriminalization of homo-
sexual conduct, the next steps are the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation, and the extension of social and economic rights to gays and les-
bians; these steps precede the legalization of registered partnerships, which could 
serve as a social preparation for the legalization of same-sex marriage23.
The timing of this process wasn’t homogeneous in the countries where it devel-
oped, until the arrival of the final step, the recognition of same-sex marriage. Limit-
ing the survey to European Countries that introduced same-sex marriage, only in the 
Netherlands and Belgium the legalization of homosexuality has ancient roots: in the 
latter it was established in 1843, in the former in 1811. In the remaining four coun-
tries the legalization of homosexuality is relatively recent: 1944 in Sweden, 1979 in 
Spain and 1983 in Portugal.
Remarkably, every European Country where same-sex marriage is legalized had 
introduced some form of registered partnership before: Norway came first (and in 
general, second only to Denmark24) in 1993, and, in the following years, strength-
ened the legal protection of same-sex couples, making, since 2002, second parent 
adoption of a partner’s child possible. Sweden introduced registered partnerships in 
1994, enacting a legislation with a considerable proximity to the “traditional mar-
riage” (joint adoption was recognised and since 2005 even the IVF for lesbian cou-
ples). Similarly, in 1997 the Netherlands introduced a new form of legal protection 
for same-sex couples, establishing a frame of rights and obligations not very far from 
marriage, with the remarkable exception of adoption rights.
The legislative jump to same-sex marriage has been relatively bigger for Belgium, 
Spain and Portugal. In the first of these three Countries, same-sex couples were 
only entitled, since 1998, to access a form of “legal cohabitation” (cohabitation lé-
gale), equally accessible to heterosexual and homosexual couples, which legal con-
tent was quite far from the marriage status.
In Spain the “preparation” of the same-sex marriage legislation was arranged on a 
23 It is significant to remark that the same Country (the Netherlands), that first recognised the 
same-sex marriage, was also the first Country to decriminalize homosexuality (1811), and to adopt 
explicit criminal provisions to prosecute sexual orientation discrimination (1992). On the other 
hand, in the United States experience, there are some examples of States, such as Illinois, where 
sodomy was decriminalized a long time ago, but same-sex unions received slower recognition: see 
Richard Posner, ‘Should There Be Homosexual Marriage? And If so. Who Should Decide?’ in 
Mich. LR [1997] 1578, 1579. Illinois recently passed (January 2011) legislation on civil unions, 
that provides to same sex couples the same rights and duties of marriage under state law.
24 Denmark was the first European Country to introduce a form of registered partnership avail-
able to same-sex couples in 1989, but never adopted a legislation enacting the same-sex marriage.
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regional ground: in thirteen Comunidades Autónomas out of seventeen some form of 
registered partnership was introduced before 2005 (year of the enactment of the Span-
ish same-sex legislation). Finally, since 2001, in Portugal homosexual couples are en-
titled to join the same rights and obligations provided for de facto heterosexual unions.
While the legislative experience towards the legal recognition of rights and duties 
for same-sex couples has not generally experienced significant stops, things went 
differently when the Courts played a decisive role in the process. In this frame, the 
Californian experience shows the risks of a popular backlash when the step forward 
is taken by a Court.
4. The egualitarian paradox
Not surprisingly, different countries derive diverse legal consequences from the 
same social facts (in this case a stable union between two persons of the same sex): 
in fact “law always picks and chooses among facts in the worlds, deeming some 
relevant and ignoring others”25. Nevertheless, the selection of relevant facts in the 
world may not be irrational or arbitrary. Just as none would doubt the unconstitu-
tionality of a norm excluding blond people from the right to marry another blond, 
the prohibition of same-sex marriage needs to find a legally relevant justification.
This is, in fact, the very essence of equality: its classic formulation, in force of 
which “people who are alike should be treated alike” and “people who are unalike 
should be treated unalike”, was described as an empty idea26, which it is indeed. 
However, once the empty idea is filled up with legal significances, the principle of 
equality presupposes rationality: any form of discrimination should be rational and 
connected to a legitimate public purpose27.
From this point of view, it may be easier to justify the rationality of a system 
where a stable union between two men or two women has no legal significance, 
rather than affirming the rationality of a legal order according only some rights and 
obligations of marriage to same-sex couples aspiring to a legal recognition.
As far as a legal order accords no relevance to same-sex unions, the idea of equal-
ity towards the right to marry remains in fact “empty”. This is not to say that this 
25 Andrew Koppelman, ‘Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay 
Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein’ [2001] Ucla LR 519, 533.
26 Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, Harv. LR [1982] 537 and Kent Greenawalt, How 
Empty Is the Idea of Equality? Col. LR [1983] 1167. The idea that the principle of equality may 
be considered as an empty principle was already discussed in Italy by Livio Paladin, Il Principio 
Costituzionale d’Eguaglianza (Giuffré 1965).
27 This idea was justified in terms of the deliberative process by Cass R. Sunstein: “the distribution 
of benefits or the imposition of burdens must reflect a conception of the public good. Benefits and 
burdens may not be based solely on political power or on a naked preference for one group over 
another”, Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy. What Constitutions Do (OUP 2001) 188.
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solution is also just, but only to remark that a situation of total inequality equality is 
paradoxically easier to justify in terms of equality.
On the contrary, once homosexuals are given the chance to access registered 
partnerships, for example, it becomes very difficult to justify their exclusion from 
the right to “marry traditionally”. The legal order, in that case, recognises a situation 
worthy of protection: the stable union between two persons of the same sex. Con-
sequently, the empty idea of equality cited above gets filled up with legal contents 
which are very hard to reconcile.
Commonly, registered partnership are intended as a “good substitute” for mar-
riage. This configuration seems to accord to registered partnerships a “second best” 
solution in terms of equality, in case the political conditions do not consent to aim 
at the legalization of same-sex marriage.
The possibility of intending registered partnerships as a valid substitute for mar-
riage firstly depends on the rights and duties covered by the legal form. As men-
tioned above, the legislative solutions were so significantly diverse as to impede a 
common consideration of the phenomenon.
Moreover, if the registered partnerships consist of a new form of legal recogni-
tion of two persons (homosexuals or heterosexuals), a “second best” solution could 
lead to even worse results in terms of equality than the situation arising in case of 
loss of any legal recognition available to same-sex partnerships.
In fact, if heterosexual couples had access to the new form of registered partner-
ship under a conscious and free renunciation of the traditional model of marriage, 
same-sex couples would not have the room for any choice.
Signs of this paradox in terms of equality emerge when ad hoc new forms of 
registered partnerships carry the same rights and obligations of marriage, but are 
still separated by a nominal watershed. Marriage remains a privileged word, its use 
is limited to heterosexual couples; registered partnerships (or civil unions, or other 
terms), even though legally equal to marriage, are nominally put on another ground. 
This nominal issue was argued, not only by the legal scholarship28, but also in front 
of some U.S. Courts. In some relevant cases, the courts decided that the nominal 
separation was a constitutional violation29.
Perfectly symmetrical are the motivations that, in 2007, induced the Hungarian 
constitutional court30 to declare the law on registered partnerships unconstitutional31. 
28 See recently Courtney Megan Cahill, ‘(Still) Not Fit To Be Named: Moving Beyond To Explain 
Why “Separate” Nomenclature for Gay and Straight Relationships Will Never Be “Equal”’ 
[2009] Georgetown LJ 1156.
29 I’m referring to a decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court and a trial’s Court decision in 
Connecticut. Respectively Lewis v. Harris, [2006] NJ, 908 A.2d 196 and Kannegan v. State [2006] 
Conn. Supr Ct., 909 a.2d 89.
30 Decision 154/2008 (XII. 17.) AB.
31 Law n. CLXXXIV, 17 December 2007 promulgated in the Official Gazette 2007/186 on 29 
December, 2007, with the planned date of coming into force at 1 January 2009.
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Considering that the new form of legal recognition was available to both heterosexuals 
and homosexuals, the constitutional court qualified civil unions as a marriage’s duplica-
tion, diminishing the traditional marriage’s supremacy, protected by the Constitution.
5. The Italian case: from Zero to Hero (and back?)
The success of a comparative overview ends where a significant diversity of positive 
law emerges. As for the same-sex marriage issue, the relevant data of positive law are 
at least of three kinds. First, the constitutional provisions in marriage and family 
matter; second, the legislative context in the same matter; third, the position and 
authority of the supreme/constitutional Court in the relevant legal order.
Following these three paths, the isolation of the Italian legal order, mirrored in 
the denial of any form of recognition to same-sex unions finds some plausible expla-
nation.
As for the part recognizing family as the natural society based on marriage, Article 
29 of the Italian Constitution gives some arguments to a hermeneutic approach which 
considers the adjective “natural” as excluding homosexuals from the right to marry.
These arguments are certainly not decisive, and apart from the convincing op-
posite argument of an author32 who noted the paradox of putting together a natural 
entity (family) with an institutional one (marriage), the Spanish case cited above 
shows that such constitutional provisions do not prohibit a legislative enactment of 
a same-sex marriage legislation.
As far as the second field is concerned, the legislative context regarding family’s 
matter does not seem to prohibit a new configuration of the legislative notion of 
marriage, aiming at the inclusion of same-sex couples.
On the contrary, the family’s law reform in 1975 proved the elasticity of the notion 
of marriage included in the Italian constitution: without any formal amendment, the 
insolubility of marriage was broken, and a general reform of the relationship between 
spouses was enacted, not against, in the frame of the constitutional provisions.
As far as the third and final field is concerned – the position and authority of the 
constitutional Court in the legal order – the issue is quite controversial. A serious 
analysis of this point falls outside the scope of this contribution, but would explain 
the reason why nobody was surprised by the first Italian Court’s judgement on same-
sex marriage. Although the composition of the Italian constitutional Court suggests 
a strong independence of its members from politics33, the action of the Italian court 
must be aware of the political reaction of its decision in socially sensitive matters 
such as family law.
32 Roberto Bin, ‘La Famiglia: alla Radice di un Ossimoro’ [2000] Studium Iuris 1066.
33 This is what emerges from a comparative survey of the judges’ selection procedures: see Ernst-
Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie. Studien zur Verfassungstheorie und zum 
Verfassungsrecht (first published Suhrkamp 1991, Giuffré 2006) 643.
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5.1. Legal tools for a step further
Considering the issue of same-sex marriage in the Italian legal order from a purely 
theoretical point of view, there are at least three ways of obtaining legal recognition 
of same-sex unions.
The first is legislative reform, which was taken successfully in most European 
countries. The recent legislative attempts in that direction showed that, as far as It-
aly is concerned, the time is not likely ripe for such legislation, and in reality will not 
be for a while.
Another mechanism – again from a purely theoretical point of view – could be 
the referendum under Article 75 of the Constutition, which allows the people to 
abrogate a legislative norm. This path is really purely theoretical, because the exclu-
sion of same-sex couples from the right to marry is not provided expressly by any 
explicit rule: it has been said that the prohibition consists of a norm not correspond-
ing to any rule34.
This legislative darkness would require a really dangerous two-step process. 
Firstly, an express ban of same-sex marriage could be introduced in the civil legisla-
tion, and then a referendum could be called in order to abrogate the new law. Con-
sidering the high validity turnout required for this kind of referendum (half of the 
electorate) and the perception of same-sex marriage as a minority claim, this way 
appears as a sure legal suicide for the issue of same-sex marriage35.
The normative darkness has led at least one commentator36 to affirm that the 
absence of an imperative rule prohibiting same-sex marriage should enable common 
judges to interpret the law in the sense of admitting same-sex marriages. Although 
this solution is based on several consistent arguments, it was not adopted by the 
judges who referred the issue to the constitutional court for the first time. The latter 
approved the judges’ configuration, recognising a settled interpretation of the civil 
law intending heterosexuality as a constitutive element of marriage.
The last tool provided by the Italian legal order seems to be the submission of 
the question to the constitutional court.
5.2. The embarrassed reaction of a constitutional court in front of a “virtual” fundamental 
right
Once considered the theoretical legal ways of obtaining some kind of legal recogni-
tion of same-sex couples, it is not surprising that the first submission of a constitu-
34 Gilda Ferrando, ‘Questo matrimonio non si può fare?’, in Roberto Bin and others (eds.), La 
«società naturale» e i suoi “nemici” (Giappichelli, 2010) 137.
35 I will not try to foresee the orientation of the Italian people on the merit of the hypothetical 
question (want you the same-sex marriage be abrogated?), although some polls showed less triv-
ial results than what I imagined; see, for example, Eurispes, Gli italiani e i gay. Il diritto alla dif-
ferenza, 2003, where 51% of the interwiees were in favour of recognising the right of same-sex 
couples to marry.
36 Francesco Bilotta, ‘Matrimonio (gay) all’italiana’ [2006] Nuova Giur. Civ. Comm. 91.
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tional question on same-sex marriage in the Italian experience followed a long pe-
riod of legislative inactivity on the same matter.
The parliamentary debate concerning a new bill on some form of registered part-
nership always fell through tough political contrasts37.
In this frame the Constitutional Court’s judgment pronounced on April 15th 2010 
found an inexorably hostile ground.
This is the reason why the importance of the Constitutional Court’s ruling does 
not reside in the acceptance or rejection of the constitutional question, but in the 
motivational strategy behind the rejection.
The comparative overview played a significant role in the court’s reasoning, not 
in a quantitative manner, but in a qualitative one38. In fact, the constitutional judges 
firstly stated that same-sex unions fall within the “social formations”, according to 
which the Republic recognises the inalienable human rights (Art. 2 of the Constitiu-
tion). Secondly, from this inclusion, the Court derived the fundamental right of 
same-sex couples to live their couple status and to gain – “in the time and within the 
limits established by the law”39 – legal recognition of the related rights and duties.
This reasoning could perfectly serve as a motivation moving toward the necessity 
of equalization of homosexual and heterosexual couples as far as marriage is con-
cerned, being the latter the social formation whereas heterosexual couples live their 
couple status.
However, drawing from a comparative survey, the Court ascertained that, since 
different legal orders accorded diverse levels of legal protection to same-sex unions, 
the claim for recognition may be satisfied through different solutions, among which 
the legislator is the only player entitled to choose.
Behind this reasoning, the Court operated a division of the constitutional ques-
tion submitted, in two parts: the first concerning the recognition of a right to live 
life together as a couple; the second concerning the recognition of a right to marry.
Once detected – with some help from a comparative view – that the first aspira-
tion could be satisfied through different means, the Court excluded a constitu-
tional violation through the ban of same-sex marriage. The motivation of the Court 
on this aspect was considered very weak40 in the part it resided on an originalist 
argument.
37 A survey of these (failed) experiences is reported by Augusto Barbera, Le convivenze paraconi-
ugali: dai PACS ai dico (Cacucci 2007). The only provisions taking into account the legal relevance 
of “other forms of cohabitation” are disposed by some regional Statute, but the constitutional 
court (Case n. 372 and 378/2004, 29th November 2004) cleared that such provisions have no 
prescriptive value.
38 The use of comparative arguments was an high selective one, otherwise it would have imposed 
a much more progressive approach, as noted by Andrea Pugiotto, ‘Una lettura non reticente 
della sent. n. 138/2010: il monopolio eterosessuale del matrimonio’ (Forumcostituzionale, 19 
January 2011) 18 accessed 10 April 2010.
39 Corte costituzionale, sent. n. 138/2010.
40 See Pugiotto (n 38) 12.
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The Courts’ reasoning was indeed mostly focused on the interpretation of Article 
29 of the Constitution, and left little room for the question of the compatibility of 
the ban on same-sex marriages with the principle of equality included among the 
parameters. In this frame, heterosexual and homosexual couples were apodictically 
defined as inhomogeneous.
This reasoning led a commentator to note that the Court’s ruling was at the same 
time too broad and too narrow41: the Court said too much, where it recognised a 
fundamental right, conditioned by the legislator’s intervention (“within the times, 
modalities and limits established by law”42). At the same time the court said too 
little, because no urgent warning was consequentially addressed to the legislator.
Consequently, the implementation and protection of a fundamental right depend 
on the intervention of a reluctant legislator. Moreover, specifying that the recogni-
tion of a fundamental right is not only conditioned by the time of the legislative in-
tervention, but also by its limits, the Court gave some arguments to interpret its 
decision as an implicit constitutional prohibition of same-sex marriage43.
Indeed, the commentators’ readings of the ruling transformed as the question 
was raised on the constitutional compatibility of same-sex marriage and not – as it 
really was – on the constitutional compatibility of the ban on same-sex marriage.
The shift in legal discourse on the second front (is same-sex marriage compatible 
with the constitution?) is extremely dangerous44. As comparative experience shows, 
in those countries where the constitution expressly bans same-sex marriages, a rip-
ple effect on legislative ground commonly emerges: although the constitutional 
prohibition of same-sex marriages does not impede the adoption of legislative mea-
sures extending other forms of legal recognition to same-sex couples, in fact this 
does not happen.
The darkness of constitutional provisions on equality and marriage allows in fact 
the reconstruction of three interpretative paths.
Following the first one, same-sex marriage would be constitutionally imposed, 
and the constitutional court should declare the legislation prohibiting it incompati-
41 Roberto Romboli, ‘Il diritto “consentito” al matrimonio ed il diritto “garantito” alla vita fa-
miliare per le coppie omosessuali in una pronuncia in cui la Corte dice “troppo” e “troppo poco”’ 
(2010) 00 RivistaAIC <http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/rivista/2010/00/Romboli01.
pdf> accessed 2 July 2011.
42 Corte costituzionale, sent. n. 138/2010 (8 c.i.d.).
43 See Pugiotto (n 38). Even if it is also possible to find opposite arguments in the motivation, 
where the court denies that a legal recognition of same-sex couples could consist only (and so, 
implicitly including this option) of the recognition of same-sex marriage. In this direction see 
Pezzini (n 2).
44 A part of the legal scholarship denies in fact that the Italian constitution would allow any form 
of recognition of an union between two human beings other than marriage: see Antonio Ruggeri, 
‘Idee sulla famiglia e Teoria (e Strategia) della Costituzione’ [2007] Quad. Cost. 751, 753; Vin-
cenzo Tondi della Mura, ‘La Dimensione Istituzionale dei Diritti dei Coniugi e la Pretesa dei 
Diritti Individuali dei Conviventi’ [2008] Quad. Cost. 101.
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ble with the constitution. This was the reconstruction of the constitutional question 
submitted to the Court, and rejected in its decision n. 138/2010.
Following the second interpretative path, same-sex marriage would be forbidden 
by the Italian constitution. The motivation behind the rejection of the same-sex is-
sue by the constitutional Court gave some arguments pointing at that direction. 
Notably, those inferences do not find any legal justification, assuming that a rejec-
tion ruling does not bind any player of the legal order45.
Following the third path – logically set in the middle of the first two – same-sex 
marriage would not be forbidden, nor imposed by the Italian constitution. Although 
this interpretation seems to be quite reasonable, it falls in deep constitutional con-
tradictions: is the right to marry a fundamental one? It seems to be46, but only in its 
traditional configuration: in other words, the legal order only recognises a funda-
mental right to marry a person of the opposite sex. Nonetheless the Italian constitu-
tional Court recognised a fundamental right to live life as a couple, to which homo-
sexual and heterosexual couples are equally entitled.
Finally, the latest, apparently reasonable interpretative path seems to turn into 
unreasonable implications. We should assume the existence of two separate fun-
damental rights: the right to marry, reserved to heterosexual couples, because this 
is the original meaning of the constitutional provision regarding marriage; and 
the right to live life together as a couple, as fundamental as the first, but not en-
acted. The ratio of this separation remains unclear, if it is true (and it is) that 
procreation is an unsuitable argument, for being both over-inclusive and under-
inclusive47.
5.3. Conclusions
Nevertheless, the third path (the constitution allows, but does not require, nor for-
bid same-sex marriage) has a decisive quality: it does not ask too much, and consents 
the same gradual process that took place in other European countries.
The imposition of same-sex marriage through a constitutional court’s decision 
would face a serious risk of a political and/or popular blacklash.
I do not consider this argument as a mere political one: the hitches of the equal-
ity’s walk in some U.S. countries where the judicial branches pushed too much 
against the will of the population, showed the concrete risks of a popular backlash. 
Should this happen in Italy, it would not be hard to find a broad legislative consen-
45 Francesco Dal Canto, ‘Le coppie omosessuali davanti alla Corte costituzionale: dalla “aspira-
zione” al matrimonio al “diritto” alla convivenza’ (2010) 00 19 RivistaAIC <www.associazionede-
icostituzionalisti.it/rivista/2010/00/Dal_Canto.pdf> accessed 2 July 2011.
46 The Italian constitutional court recognised a fundamental right to marry in several judgements: 
among other, see Corte costituzionale, sent. n. 445/2002.
47 It is over-inclusive because it does not take into account those spouses, validly married, who do 
not wish or cannot procreate. It is under-inclusive, because it ignores (at least) those lesbian 
couples who use IVF.
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sus in order to change the constitution, and to expressly state the heterosexual 
character of marriage48.
As a consequence, the last resort (or better, the second last resort) would be to 
hold a referendum under Article 138 of the Constitution: in this case, on the one 
hand, the absence of a valid turnout would help a result in the sense of protecting a 
minority; on the other hand it would not be so easy to find any subject legally enti-
tled to call the referendum.
In case the referendum should not take place, the last resort may only be the 
constitutional adjudication on the constitutional amendment. The constitutional 
Court has indeed qualified equality as one of the supreme principles of the legal or-
der, which not even Constitutional Law can remove. It is certainly a big risk, and 
likely not desirable, to play for such high stakes on the table of constitutional justice49.
In 1997, when the issue of same-sex marriage was moving its first steps in the 
American constitutional debate, Richard Posner wrote that “judges must accord 
considerable respect to the deeply held views of the democratic majority. When the 
Supreme Court moved against public school segregation, it was bucking a regional 
majority but a national minority (white southerners). When it outlawed the laws 
forbidding racially mixed marriages, only a minority of states had such laws on their 
books. Only when all but two states had repealed their laws forbidding the use of 
contraceptives even by married couples did the Supreme Court invalidate the re-
maining laws. It created a right of abortion against a background of a rapid increase 
in the number of lawful abortions. Were the Court to recognize a right to same-sex 
marriage today, it would be taking on almost the whole nation”50.
The opposite risk laying behind this sort of reasoning is the abdication of the 
proper role of constitutional justice: the protection of fundamental rights against the 
democratic majority.
The risk is quite serious in a country where the recent past casts a deep mistrust 
on the capacity of the legislator to satisfy the claim for recognition emerging from 
same-sex couples.
48 Something similar happened when the legislator amended art. 111 Const. after a harsh contrast 
with the constitutional court: see Nicolò Zanon, ‘La Corte, il legislatore ordinario e quello di re-
visione, ovvero del diritto all’ultima parola al cospetto delle decisioni d’incostituzionalità’, [1998] 
Giur. Cost. 3169.
49 This is because most of the constitutional lawyers would qualify equality’s as a supernorm: see 
Alessandro Pizzorusso, Che cos’è l’eguaglianza (Editori Riuniti 1983) 49 and Costantino Mortati, 
Istituzioni di Diritto Pubblico (IX ed. Cedam 1976) 1023. The constitutional court itself qualified 
equality as a supreme principle of the legal order (Corte costituzionale sent. n. 15/1996). But 
someone else, without refusing this qualification, could also mean that the protection of tradi-
tional, heterosexual marriage is a supreme principle of the legal order as well: see Antonio Rug-
geri, ‘Idee sulla famiglia e teoria (e strategia) della Costituzione’ in Roberto Bin and others (eds.), 
La «società naturale» e i suoi “nemici” (Giappichelli 2010) 757.
50 Richard Posner, ‘Should There Be Homosexual Marriage? And If so, Who Should Decide?’ 
[1997] Mich. LR 1578, 1586
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In Italy the same-sex protection issue seems to be laying in an “institutional cul-
de-sac”. In fact, the incremental process is steady at the zero stage, and it is hard to 
imagine any constitutional player moving the first step. Moreover, the time does not 
seem ripe for unlocking the impasse with a legislative intervention, nor ripe for put-
ting such expectations on the constitutional court.
Nonetheless simply taking note that the issue of the recognition of same-sex 
unions in Italy is stationary would be dishonest, and there is no chance to foresee 
some development in the following years.
The reality is certainly harsh: same-sex marriage is forbidden by law, as it was 
before April 15th 2010. No forms of civil partnerships are disposed by law, and there 
is no bill with reasonable chances of approval before the Parliament.
Nevertheless, same-sex marriage has become in few years a central issue of de-
bate, both for legal scholarship and the public opinion. In the past months, several 
academic symposiums took place on this issue; same-sex marriage became a com-
mon topic in law students’ theses; and recently a question on this issue submitted to 
the constitutional court gave birth to an intense debate in the media and the public 
opinion.
This would have been unthinkable a few years ago. A further sign of change can 
also be drawn from some of the reactions to decision n. 138/2010 of the constitu-
tional Court. A small part of the legal scholarship whose opinions are firmly contrary 
to the recognition of same-sex marriage observed that the constitutional court only 
save the nominal value of traditional marriage, and opened to an occult expropria-
tion of its substantive value51.
The constitution does not merely reflect the definition of the constitutional 
court: sensitive issues, such as the one discussed in this paper, need to be constantly 
shaped through the active contribution of all constitutional players (public opinion 
and legal scholarship included) working as an open community of interpreters52.
51 Vincenzo Tondi della Mura, ‘La Sentenza della Corte Che Ha Difeso la Parola “Matrimonio”’ 
(Ilsussidiario, 19 April 2010) <http://www.ilsussidiario.net/News/Cronaca/2010/4/19/SOCIE-
TA-La-sentenza-della-Corte-che-ha-difeso-la-parola-matrimonio-/80480/> accessed 5 April 2011
52 I refer here to the conception of Peter Häberle, Die Verfassung des Pluralismus (Athenäum 
1980).
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Abstract
During the last decade, old and newer forms of sexual divergence from heteronormativity 
have acquired a growing importance within the public debate in India and Nepal, culmi-
nating in some recent Court decisions about the rights of “sexual minorities”.
In the first part of my paper, I will focus on the history of the recent legal struggles, analyz-
ing the requests presented by the petitioners, the arguments of the opponents and the 
Court decisions.
Then, I will analyze some interesting aspects of the wider public debate about sexual mi-
norities, where pro and con ideological arguments are forged, and where potential con-
flicts between the rights of LGBT(I) people and other groups could arise. I will underline 
both the aspects specific to each country, and the similar elements, i.e. a strong link be-
tween sexual minorities and HIV/AIDS-related issues, the need to (re)construct an indig-
enous history of sexual diversity and the visible presence of “third gender” people as a 
cultural matter of fact.
Finally, I will focus on the potentiality and weaknesses of the actual LGBT(I) groups’ argu-
ments and practices, through the analysis of the connections between old problems and 
new perspectives.
* * *
1. Introduction
In recent years, sexual-minority-related issues have acquired a growing visibility in 
many developing countries, including India and Nepal, both in the wider public 
debate and in the more specialized legal discourse. Activists from NGOs, intellectu-
als and ordinary people have worked patiently in the often difficult process of imag-
ining and creating a more comprehensive space for all who do not recognise them-
selves in heteronormativity1. This long journey led the way to some important Court 
decisions.
* I would like to thank Annarosa Agate, Ilaria Caputo, Pietro Denaro and Paola Parolari for their 
help, and Smadar Lavie for her interesting comments.
1 I use this term as a synonym of the phrase “normative heterosexism”.
LISA CAPUTO94
We can find similarities as well as differences in the general context of the two 
countries. From the legal point of view, the main divergence regards the decision-
making judicial hierarchy. As a matter of fact, in Nepal it was the Supreme Court 
that ruled in respect of LGBT(I)2 rights, whereas in India the recent decriminaliza-
tion of “sodomy” was made by the Delhi High Court. In this case the choice of filing 
a petition at a High jurisdictional body instead of recurring to the apex Court de-
pended on the specific features of this country, namely a socio-legal climate less 
open than in Nepal. For this reason, such a choice could have different effects on 
the future of LGBT(I) discourse in each country.
2. Nepal
2.1. Background information on LGBTI people in Nepal
Nepal’s recent history has been very complex3. The country’s first Constitution 
dated back to 1990 and it defined Nepal as a constitutional monarchy and a 
Hindu reign. In 1996 a cruel guerrilla war between the Government and Maoist 
rebels began. As a result, a large number of people became internally and exter-
nally displaced and approximately 12,000 more died during a single decade. In 
2001 the royal family died in unclear circumstances and Gyanendra, the brother 
of the late king, took the power. In 2005 the new king decided to declare an emer-
gency status during which the fundamental rights of Nepalese citizens were 
greatly limited. King Gyanendra’s harsh decisions led to a revolution and as a re-
sult Nepal lived an important political transition between 2006 and 2007. In the 
new Interim Constitution, 2063 (2007 AD), the country is no more a monarchy 
but “an independent, indivisible, sovereign, secular, inclusive federal democratic 
republican State”4.
Therefore, despite the continuing critical situation, the last few years have been 
beneficial with regard to the rise of anti-discriminatory issues. The shaping of a new, 
really inclusive and deeply democratic country is a big challenge but also a great 
opportunity for a wide range of “minorities”, that is all the groups once discrimi-
nated by law or by custom. LGBTI people are one of those groups.
Until recently, Nepalese LGBTI people did not experience a friendly environ-
2 I write the “I” part of the acronym within brackets as a unique sign for the different definitions 
used in each country, usually LGBTI in Nepal and often LGBT in India. In this latter, however, 
different definitions based on other criteria can be found (see here, paragraph 3.4).
3 A very useful online resource on Nepal is the website <http://www.nepalresearch.org>, ac-
cessed 20 April 2011. It provides regularly updated and well organized reviews of articles in 
English.
4 Article 4 of the Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2063 (2007). See UNDP NEPAL, The Interim 
Constitution of Nepal, 2063 (2007). As amended by the first to sixth amendments (January 2009) 
at <http://www.nic.gov.np/download/interim-constitution.pdf> accessed 20 April 2011.
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ment. Even if in the Muluki Ain5 there was no specific “anti-sodomy” provision6, the 
norm of the society was the heterosexual family and at least in theory sexual activity 
should have taken place only within the marriage. Different forms of sexuality were 
perceived as shameful. The most visible part of the sexual minority, that is the metis, 
cross-dressing men/transgendered women, were an easy target for police harass-
ment and violence, which usually went unreported and unpunished.
The protagonist of the Nepal’s LGTBI struggle is the Blue Diamond Society 
(BDS)7, the most important NGO aimed at improving sexual health, human rights 
and well being of sexual and gender minorities. It was founded in 2001 by Sunil 
Babu Pant, now the first openly gay MP and member of the Constitutive Assembly. 
BDS was the initiator of the legal struggle that ended with the Supreme Court’s 
decisions.
2.2. The Supreme Court judgments
The history of the Nepalese legal struggle is a short one. In fact, the whole process 
took less than two years. On April 18th 2007, BDS and other petitioners filed a Pub-
lic Interest Litigation (PIL)8 in the Supreme Court of Nepal. On the December 21st 
2007, the Court issued a first decision. Finally, on November 17th 2008, it delivered 
its final judgment, confirming the previous decisions (full rights to LGBTI people 
on their own identity, also in the new Constitution) and giving its consent to same-
sex marriages9.
5 That is “Country Code”. It is a comprehensive legislation that includes criminal law provisions, 
dating from 1854. At the moment, the Nepalese law system is going through a radical renewal.
6 A provision against “unnatural sex” can be found in part 4, chapter 16 “Sex with Animals”, art 
1: “No one may penetrate an animal or make an animal penetrate him/her or may do or make 
another person do any kind of unnatural sex”; art. 4 “In this chapter, not mentioned in other sec-
tions, anyone who does or makes someone practice unnatural sex may be sentenced to one-year 
jail or 5000 Nrs fine”.
7 Due to the fact that the Constitution of Nepal did not recognize sexual minorities, BDS was 
registered as a sexual health programme. Its mission is to improve the sexual health, human rights 
and well being of sexual and gender minorities in Nepal including third-genders, gay men, bi-
sexuals, lesbians, and other men who have sex with men (MSM). BDS website is <http://www.
bds.org.np> accessed 20 April 2011.
8 The PIL is an important tool of the so-called judicial activism. It is a specific form of writ peti-
tion, in which the locus standi is quite widened. Under art 107(2) of the Interim Constitution, 
every Nepalese citizen can file a PIL on matters of important public interest, especially when the 
people or the group whose rights are compressed have not the possibility or the strength to file a 
petition by themselves.
9 In this work, only the first decision will be analyzed, since a translation of the final verdict does 
not exist. For a good analysis of the Nepal’s background on sexual minorities’ rights and of the 
Supreme Court hearings till November 2007, see IGLHRC, ‘Nepal Supreme Court Case on Relief 
for Sexual and Gender Minorities: Observers’ Report’ (December 2007) <http://www.iglhrc.org/
binary-data/ATTACHMENT/file/000/000/111-1.pdf>. For the English translation of the sen-
tence see National Judicial Academy, ‘Sunil Babu Pant and Others v Nepal Government and 
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The petitioners’ requests10 were mainly three: to recognize the civil rights of 
transgender people without asking them to renounce one gender identity for an-
other; to amend existing discriminatory laws and create new ones preventing dis-
crimination and violence against LGBTI communities; and to require the State to 
make reparations to LGBTI victims of state violence and/or discrimination.
The opponents11 denied that existing laws were discriminatory and affirmed that 
since the Interim Constitution held many grounds aimed at assuring the right to 
non-discrimination – namely religion, sex, caste, origin, race, language or belief – 
there was no need for further special legal protection for the petitioners.
The Supreme Court’s general reasoning was that LGBTI people, who are not 
male or female in terms of sex, or masculine or feminine in terms of gender due to 
natural and biological factors, are nevertheless natural persons and Nepalese citi-
zens, and therefore are entitled to the enjoyment of the rights provided by Constitu-
tion, law and the human rights’ conventions ratified by Nepal. For this reason, the 
State has an obligation to create a non-discriminatory and favorable environment 
and to formulate laws accordingly.
Then, the Court specified the main grounds of the decision, i.e. rights to equality 
and non-discrimination. It displayed the theoretical legal frame on which the decision 
would rely, i.e. Part III and IV of the Interim Constitution and some important inter-
national instruments, namely the ICCPR and ICESCR. The references to Part III of 
the Constitution regarded Article 12, i.e. right to freedom, and specifically 12(1), 
right to live with dignity, and Article 13, right to equality (read in connection with 
Article 26 of the ICCPR). Regarding Part IV, the Court referred to Articles 33, “Re-
sponsibilities of the State”, and 34, “Directive Principles of the State”.
The judges held a second specific argument about same-sex marriage, based on 
Articles 2, 16 and 17 of the ICCPR and on Article 10 of the ICESCR. All these were 
read jointly with the aim of “correcting” the apparently exclusive man/woman fram-
ing of the Article 23 of ICCPR on family.
The Court also quoted sources external to the Nepalese legal system such as 
judgments of the European Court of Human Rights12, the South African Constitu-
tional Court13 and the U.S. Supreme Court14, specialized books and recent interna-
tional instruments as the Yogyakarta Principles.
Others [Decision on the rights of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual and Intersex (LGBTI) 
People]’ 2 NJA L.J. (2008) 261 <http://njanepal.org.np/Anex_2.pdf>. Both documents accessed 
20 April 2011.
10 Blue Diamond Society, MITINI Nepal, Cruse AIDS Nepal and Parichaya Nepal.
11 The Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers, Legislature-Parliament, and Min-
istry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs.
12 Christine Goodwin v the United Kingdom App no 28957/95 (ECHR, 11 July 2002)
13 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others, 
1999 (1) SA 6, 1998 (12) BCLR 1517
14 Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558 (2003)
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The decision is deeply intertwined with the human right view, strongly underlin-
ing the importance of the concepts of privacy and dignity.
Finally, the Supreme Court decided to issue two directive orders to the Govern-
ment of Nepal. The first declared the need to formulate appropriate legislation or 
to amend the existing laws inconsistent with the dignity claim of LGBTI people. 
The second, more specific, regarding the right to same-sex marriage, asked the Gov-
ernment to form a committee to carry out research about the practices regarding gay 
and lesbian marriage and related jurisprudence developed in other countries, and to 
take initiatives as recommended by that committee.
The final judgment of November 17th 2008 recognizes the right to own property 
and to employment. It rules that cross-dressing is not perversion but an expression 
of individual freedom. Furthermore, it orders that the language of the new Constitu-
tion, to be completed by May 2011, must not discriminate against the sexual mi-
norities. Besides, it reiterated the admissibility of same-sex marriage and ordered the 
Government to enact a law on that subject.
At the moment, the orders have not been implemented, yet, but a bill regarding 
same-sex marriage is going to be drafted in the next months.
2.3. Peculiar features of the discourse about LGBTIs in Nepal
Although the history of the LGBTI rights was closely linked to the HIV/AIDS issues, 
the legal strategy adopted by the petitioners has not been limited to that matter. Due 
to the continuous work by NGOs like BDS and to the favorable socio-political situ-
ation, the requests had been shaped and formulated within an inclusive and compre-
hensive ideological frame. For example, the choice of the acronym LGBTI, compris-
ing also the “intersex” category, suggests a will for the widest inclusion. The petition 
was not a challenge towards an existing discriminatory law, but a wider request of 
constitutional conformity of the whole legal system to the fundamental rights of 
sexual minorities. The requests to the Court about LGBTIs’ identity focused both on 
gender identity and on sexual orientation, highlighting the different needs of all the 
members of the sexual-minority community15.
However, the struggle of LGBTI activists is aimed at changing not only the law, 
but also the perception of alternative sexualities by the society at large. In this 
regard, the group uses a joint perspective through which LGBTIs are one minor-
ity amongst many others, working together to build a thoroughly inclusive and 
democratic country. At the same time, many efforts are made to raise the self-
confidence of LGBTI people as well as to improve the skills of the most deprived 
members of this community, to allow them to become economically independent 
and to earn a living out of their capacities. This approach, definable as a “holistic” 
one, seems highly profitable. As a general trend, the media are looking favourably 
15 During the hearings before the apex Court, meti people played an important role through their 
presence and their testimony.
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upon LGBTIs and society is demonstrating a growing acceptance of the commu-
nity. At the moment, BDS continues to be the main spokesperson for Nepalese 
LGBTIs.
3. India
3.1. Background information on LGBT people in India
India, the “world’s largest democracy”, is at the same time a multiform and also a 
contradictory country. It is a secular state16, but its legal system as well as its social 
and political life are based on “religious” differentiations often leading to open and 
violent interreligious conflicts, resulting sometimes in real pogroms17. The political 
frame is characterized by a growing Hindu “fundamentalism”, aimed at the creation 
of a “Hindu nation” inhabited only by real Hindi-speaking Hindu people. The 
criminal law is unified for all the citizens, but the personal laws are differentiated 
according with “religious” criteria18. In general, the public debate is characterized 
by a communal trend which leads to continuing unsettlements. Therefore, on 
highly debated issues like women’s and sexual minorities’ rights, the Government is 
often likely to give in to the pressures of “religious” or reactionary groups.
As in Nepal, sex has been and is yet a taboo. The accepted social norm is the 
heteronormative one, with a strong underlining of the procreative purpose of “natu-
ral” sex. Accordingly to that vision, all not procreative sex is a sin or a shame, i.e. 
“unnatural”. Until the decision by the Delhi High Court of July 2009, “sodomy” was 
considered a criminal offence, punishable with imprisonment and a fine.
During the last decade, however, a heterogeneous movement claiming the rights 
of LGBTs has originated. Stemming from different backgrounds and somehow set-
16 The Preamble of the Constitution states that India is “a sovereign socialist secular democratic 
republic”.
17 We can recall the riots during the Partition period, the 1984 anti-Sikh pogrom in Delhi, the 
1986 destruction of the Babrji Mashid in Ayodya, the 2002 anti-muslim Gujarat pogrom.
18 I use quotation marks for the term “religious” to highlight the peculiar use of this word in the 
context of the Indian secularism. Without dwelling excessively on this specific matter, it is funda-
mental to underline its features. Firstly, the current rigid distinction of Indian citizens within dif-
ferent socio-religious groups, normally perceived and described as “traditional”, actually origi-
nated during the colonial period in the frame of the British reorganization of the “native” laws, 
so that some critics define these mongrelized systems as “anglo-hindu” and “anglo-islamic”. At 
the same time, the framing of these differences in the legal system led to a strenghtening of the 
religious distinctions in the political realm, which increased the communalism, that is an intoler-
ant attitude within the Indian society. Secondly, in such a system individuals cannot choose which 
specific religious community to belong to, since this is imposed on them as from their birth, which 
gives rise to a problem of “imposed identity”. Thirdly, the criteria used to identify the members 
to whom different personal laws apply have often been superficial; i.e. people belonging to het-
erodox “religions” as buddhists and jainas are compelled to follow the Hindu law.
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ting themselves different goals, the members of this community have nevertheless 
acquired a certain visibility on the social arena.
3.2. The “Naz” petition: a long and difficult history19
In September 2001, after the arrest of some activists involved in HIV/AIDS counsel-
ing work, the Naz Foundation20 decided to file a Public Interest Litigation21 in the 
Delhi High Court. After the initial hearings, in November 2004 the Court dismissed 
the PIL on a minor technicality about the locus standi of the NGO22. The Naz Foun-
dation, the Lawyers Collective23 and the LGBT group that had gathered around the 
NGO and the legal case decided to file an appeal to the Supreme Court asking 
whether the dismissal by the Delhi High Court was founded. In February 2006 the 
apex Court stated that the matter of the PIL did require consideration and remitted 
it to the Delhi High Court, which finally emitted its decision, on July 2nd 200924.
The history of the “Naz petition” tells not only the mere chronology of a legal 
question, but also the birth, growing and developments of the “sexual-minority 
community” of India. During the decade in which the petition had followed its dif-
ficult legal path, the rising LGBT community often criticized the quite narrow focus 
used by the Naz Foundation in its arguments before the Court.
In actual facts, the petition addressed only private male homosexual activity in 
the context of HIV/AIDS. On one hand, that peculiar framing left aside many 
other problems and alternative sexual identities, narrowing the significance of sex-
ual-minority-oriented politics and risking to be turned into a dangerous new source 
of social stigma; on the other hand, however, it was probably the only way to start a 
19 For an in-depth and punctual analysis of the Naz petition history and its precedents, see Radhika 
Ramasubban, ‘Culture, Politics, and Discourses on Sexuality: A History of Resistance to the Anti-
Sodomy Law in India’ in Richard Parker, Rosalind Petchesky and Robert Sember (eds.), SexPolitics. 
Reports from the Front Lines, <http://www.sxpolitics.org/frontlines/book/pdf/sexpolitics.pdf> ac-
cessed 20 April 2011.
20 The Naz Foundation (India) Trust is a New Delhi based NGO working on HIV/AIDS and 
sexual health since 1994. It uses a holistic approach to combat HIV, focusing on prevention as 
well as treatment, trying to reach out to the marginalized population infected and affected by HIV, 
and to sensitize the community about the virus, as well as to highlight issues related to sexuality 
and sexual health. See <http://www.nazindia.org/> accessed 20 April 2011.
21 In India, the concept of PIL has found a juridical approach. In a 1981 sentence, SP Gupta v 
Union of India [1981] (Supp) SCC 87, Justice PN Bhagwati acknowledged the right to seek judi-
cial redress for the legal wrong or legal injury caused to a person or a determinate class of persons 
under article 32 of the Constitution of India.
22 The Delhi Court stated that the petition could not be maintained since the Naz Foundation 
was not personally aggrieved in that no case under the challenged section had been filed against 
the group.
23 The Lawyers Collective, established in 1981, is one of the leading public interest service provid-
ers in India. See <http://www.lawyerscollective.org/> accessed 20 April 2011.
24 The judgment is available on the Naz Foundation’s website, <http://www.nazindia.org/judgement 
_377.pdf> accessed 20 April 2011.
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change in Indian law and society. In any case, the delays and the obstacles occurred 
during the eight-year-long legal struggle allowed the sexual-minority community to 
grow up, to cement, to give a wider outlook of itself on the Indian society, and to 
add new and different materials – in the form of reports, personal statements, affi-
davits and so on – to support the Naz petition before the Court.
3.3. The Delhi High Court decision25
The petition challenged section 377 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) on “Unnatural 
Offences”26 punishing same-sex intercourse27, as violative of Articles 14 (equality), 15 
(non-discrimination), 19 (freedom) and 21 (life) of the Indian Constitution. Further-
more, the Naz Foundation added that the provision was detrimental for public health, 
because it hampered the work of prevention of HIV/AIDS, concealing the activities of 
gay men and MSM, i.e. “men who have sex with men”, through fear of social stigma 
and violence. However, due to the fact that section 377 IPC is used to punish crimes 
relating to child sexual abuse and to fill a lacuna in the rape law, the challenge was 
only partial. The request was to declare the involved section as constitutionally invalid 
insofar as it affected private sexual acts between consenting adults, or alternatively that 
it should be read down as to exclude consenting same-sex sexual acts between adults28.
The opposing arguments proposed by some of the respondents29 were mainly 
25 Naz Foundation v Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 160 Delhi Law Times 277 (Delhi High Court 2009).
26 Section 377 IPC states: “Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature 
with any man, woman, or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprison-
ment of either description for term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
Explanation: Penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal intercourse necessary to the offence 
described in this section”. The offences punishable under s 377 IPC are considered as quite seri-
ous. For that reason, bail cannot be granted and a police officer can file a report (FIR), and arrest 
the accused person without a court warrant.
27 The jurisprudence of s 377 IPC regards normally male same-sex intercourse, but at least in one 
case the provision had also been used to prosecute a lesbian couple, see Naz Foundation v Govt 
of NCT of Delhi at para 22. Since the provision’s enactment, however, there have only been a few 
trials based on criminalization of same-sex conducts between consenting adults. The real force of 
the provision was its ideological power, which was used very often to blackmail potential “crimi-
nals”, putting on them a strong social stigma and therefore undermining the self-esteem of this 
large section of society.
28 Naz Foundation v Govt of NCT Delhi, paras 6-7.
29 The Naz Foundation was the only petitioner, whereas the respondents were eight. Some of 
them proposed a vision opposed to that of the Naz Foundation, for example the Union of India 
through the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Joint Action Council Kannur and Mr. B.P. Singhal. 
Others, like the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare through the National Aids Control Orga-
nization (NACO) and Voices Against 377, supported partially or totally the petitioner’s argu-
ments. Due to the fact that the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare provided opposing stances, the Delhi High Court declared that “[a] rather peculiar fea-
ture of this case is that completely contradictory affidavits have been filed by two wings of Union 
of India”, see ibid. para 11.
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based on the need to protect public morality against the rise of decadent/repugnant 
homosexual conducts. This view was strictly linked to the “traditional culture” argu-
ment, according to which India cannot accept homosexuality as a foreign behavior 
contrary to the traditional/cultural norm of the country. Regarding the public health 
question, the opposing argument stated that section 377 IPC, by way of criminaliz-
ing homosexual activity, was the only barrier against the spread of HIV/AIDS virus. 
With regards to equality and non-discrimination, the opponent parties stated that 
section 377 IPC was not discriminatory as it was framed as gender neutral. As far as 
the possible infringements of the freedom of expression, it was asserted that section 
377 IPC did not impact upon it as what was criminalized was only a sexual act and 
people should have the freedom to canvass any opinion of their choice including the 
opinion that homosexuality should be decriminalized. Finally, it was declared that 
maintaining section 377 IPC was necessary, because if it had been struck down, it 
would be impossible for the State to prosecute any crime of non-consensual carnal 
intercourse against the order of nature or gross male indecency30.
The Delhi High Court articulated its position in a one-hundred-thirty-two-
paragraph-long judgment. Its minor arguments were based on the analysis of similar 
decisions in other jurisdictions, on international instruments including the Yogya-
karta Principles, and on scientific findings with regard to the nature of homosexual-
ity31. At the same time, however, it seems the Court felt the need to ponder its deci-
sion, probably because of the necessity of ruling out a steady and well balanced 
sentence on a highly debated and controversial subject.
The Court’s core argument relies on the analysis of the concepts of dignity, au-
tonomy and privacy guaranteed under Article 21, i.e. right to life, and of the ques-
tion of equality and non-discrimination, respectively mentioned in Articles 14 and 
15 of the Constitution.
The Court stated that human dignity is based on the autonomy of the private will 
and on a person’s freedom of choice and of action. It relies upon recognition of the 
physical and spiritual integrity of the human being, his or her humanity, and his 
value as a person, irrespective of the utility he can provide to others32. The guarantee 
of human dignity forms part of the Indian constitutional culture. Similarly, the right 
to privacy recognizes not only the negative right to occupy a private space free from 
government intrusion, but also a positive right to a sphere of private intimacy and 
30 Ibid. para 24 (iii-iv).
31 Besides quoting the “standard” judicial cases – the already mentioned Goodwin v UK, Law-
rence v Texas, The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v The Minister of Justice, the 
Delhi Court also cited other judgments notable for the debated subject.
32 It is interesting that the Delhi High Court used the female pronoun only once. The reasons can 
be different: maybe the judges bore in mind the neutral idea of “person” or maybe, considering 
the fact that they were ruling on male same-sex activity, they felt unnecessary to introduce the 
female pronoun. However, this fact could demonstrate that the abstract subject of law continues 
being imagined predominantly as male.
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autonomy which allows every human being to establish and nurture human relation-
ships without interference from the outside community. The way in which one gives 
expression to one’s sexuality is at the core of this area of private intimacy. Both dig-
nity and privacy rights are guaranteed by and can spelt out from Article 21 of the 
Indian Constitution33.
Regarding the constitutional guarantees of equality and non-discrimination, the 
Court stated that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness, because it involves negation of 
equality. Criminalizing private conduct of consenting adults which causes no harm 
to anyone else, section 377 IPC had no other purpose than to criminalize a conduct 
which failed to conform with the moral or religious views of a section of society. This 
discrimination severely affects the rights and interests of homosexuals and deeply 
impaired their dignity. The criminalization of private sexual relations between con-
senting adults, absent any evidence of serious harm, deemed the provision’s objec-
tive both arbitrary and unreasonable. Regarding the right to non-discrimination 
enshrined in Article 15, the Court held that “sexual orientation” must be considered 
a ground analogous to “sex”. Then, discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
is not permitted by the aforesaid Article. Furthermore, the Court stated that dis-
crimination on the ground of sexual orientation is impermissible even on the hori-
zontal application of the right enshrined under Article 15, that is discrimination 
towards homosexuals must be exerted neither by the State nor by other citizens34.
As evident, the judges connected the right to dignity with the freedom of choice 
and of action as well as with the claim to equality. Furthermore, the Court also ex-
tended the scope of the petitioner’s request, originally limited to the mere recogni-
tion of a private space allowing consensual same-sex acts in which the State could 
not intrude. In fact, even if the judges did not rule specifically on the conformity 
between section 377 IPC and Article 19 (right to freedom) of the Constitution, by 
mentioning the horizontal application of the right to non-discrimination, they fur-
ther connected this latter to freedom of movement. By doing so, they broadened the 
concept of privacy35.
With connection to public health, the sentence adopted and widened36 the views 
of the petitioner. The judges declared that section 377 IPC acted as a serious im-
pediment to the success of the interventions for the prevention and treatment of 
33 Naz Foundation v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, paras 26-41.
34 Ibid. paras 88-104.
35 Even if in para 126 ‘Infringments of Article 19(1) (a) to (d)’, the Court declares “In the light of 
our findings on the infringement of Articles 21, 14 and 15, we feel it unnecessary to deal with the 
issue of violation of Article 19(1)(a) to (d). This issue is left open”, it seems quite obvious that, 
following the main statement, the infringements are evident.
36 As a matter of fact, the Court also used the technical material and language provided by NACO 
affidavit – see for example the term “High Risk Group”. The affidavit underlined that the se-
crecy caused by s 377 IPC had negative consequences not only on the homosexuals, but also on 
the society as a whole.
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HIV/AIDS not only in relation to MSM individuals but also with regards to their 
potential female sexual partners. The compelling state interest demanded that pub-
lic health measures be strengthened by means of decriminalization of homosexual 
activity, so that High Risk Groups could be identified and better focused upon37.
As far as the cultural/traditional issue is concerned, the Court stated that section 
377 IPC was based on a moral Victorian principle imported in the Subcontinent 
during the colonial period by the British law rather than on a core value of the In-
dian society. This latter traditionally displayed a high degree of inclusiveness. When-
ever society displays inclusiveness and understanding, even people perceived by the 
majority as “deviants” or “different” can be assured of a life of dignity and non-
discrimination38.
With regards to morality, the Court declared that popular morality or public 
disapproval of certain acts is not a valid justification for restriction of the fundamen-
tal rights under Article 21, i.e. right to life, to live with dignity and to privacy. Unlike 
constitutional morality originating from constitutional values, popular morality is 
based on shifting and subjective notions of right and wrong. If there is any type of 
“morality” that can pass the test of compelling state interest, it must be “constitu-
tional” morality and not public morality39.
Furthermore, by quoting two founding fathers of India such as Nehru and 
Ambedkar40, the Court shaped a consistent argument in which the various funda-
mental rights and values were intertwined.
Finally, the Court held as follows:
We declare that Section 377 IPC, insofar it criminalises consensual sexual acts of 
adults in private, is violative of Articles 21, 14 and 15 of the Constitution. The provi-
sions of Section 377 IPC will continue to govern non-consensual penile non-vaginal 
sex and penile non-vaginal sex involving minors. By “adult” we mean everyone who 
is 18 years of age and above. […] This clarification will hold till, of course, Parliament 
chooses to amend the law to effectuate the recommendation of the Law Commission 
of India in its 172nd Report which we believe removes a great deal of confusion41.
The Delhi High Court’s decision bears a high ideological importance for the sake 
of the homosexual people’s rights. Nevertheless, it remains only a persuasive author-
ity in the rest of India, insofar it is up to every state’s High Court to decide whether 
to follow it or ignore it. In September 2009, the Central Government decided not to 
37 Naz Foundation v Govt of NCT Delhi paras 61-74 and 86.
38 Ibid. at paras 92 and 130.
39 Ibid. at paras 79-81 and 86.
40 Dr Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, the architect of the Indian constitution and India’s first law 
minister, was quoted with regard to the opposition between public and constitutional morality, 
ibid. at para 79. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, was cited on the subject of 
equality within the Indian Constitution at para 129.
41 Ibid. para 132.
LISA CAPUTO104
oppose to the Delhi decision and this was perceived as a positive outcome by many 
Indian activists. At the moment, the Supreme Court is in the process of judging on 
appeal.
3.4. Peculiar features of the discourse about LGBTs in India
As we have seen, Naz’s requests originated from and were aimed at the resolution of 
a specific question, i.e. the decriminalization of (male) same-sex conduct in private 
between consenting adults. The challenge was based mainly on HIV/AIDS-related 
issues and on the public health argument. The focus was on sexual orientation/male 
homosexual activity, namely on MSM individuals, in the context of the spreading of 
HIV/AIDS virus. Furthermore, the concept of privacy used by the Naz Foundation 
was both decisional and zonal42. Such a way to conceive privacy required the respect 
of both a metaphorical space, i.e. the subject’s autonomy, and of a physical one, i.e. 
a private and enclosed space safe from external interferences. In this respect, a prob-
lem could arise with all those members of the LGBT community – normally the 
most vulnerable ones – who use public spaces such as parks to meet and often also 
to have sex.
The acronym used normally does not include the “I” of “intersex”. Instead it is 
sometimes spelled as LGBT-K or LGBT-Kothis, therefore including a traditional 
definition of alternative forms of sexuality perceived as different than the homo-
sexual ones. This “kothi” identity is wider than these latter ones and more deep-
rooted within the Indian culture. Gender-identity-related issues are often linked to 
“traditional” figures, as kothis and especially hijras43.
Additional features are an often difficult relationship with other minorities, es-
pecially with social-religious communities, as well as highly complex interactions 
with the public opinion. All this can be easily noticed in considering the vicissitude 
of the Supreme Court appeal. The first Special Leave Petitions (SLP)44 have been 
filed by individuals and groups, mainly religious ones, fearing a decadence in the 
morality of the country. At the same time, a wide alliance pro-LGBT has originated 
and groups of academics, doctors and parents of LGBT people are filing their peti-
tions in the Supreme Court, with the aim of the Delhi High Court’s decision not be 
overruled.
42 For an in-depth analysis of the possible readings of the “privacy” right, see Lawrence v Texas 
(n 14).
43 On hijras, see Serena Nanda, Neither Man Nor Woman: the Hijras of India (2nd edn, Wadsworth 
Publishing, Belmont, CA 1999) and Gayatri Reddy, With Respect to Sex: Negotiating Hijra Iden-
tity in South India (University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2005) who analyzes also the Hyderabad-
Secunderabad third-gender community. This latter also includes kothis, i.e. persons male by birth 
but whose gender becomes feminine at different degrees.
44 The SLP, both civil or criminal, is an appeal granted by the Supreme Court on important con-
stitutional or legal issues which only the apex Court can clarify.
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4. Similar elements regarding sexual minorities in India and Nepal
4.1. A strong link between sexual minorities and HIV/AIDS-related issues
Unlike in many Western countries, Nepalese and Indian sexual-minority communi-
ties present what we can call a post-HIV/AIDS origin. Despite the forced silence on 
sex issues, by the 1980s problems related to the HIV/AIDS epidemic came into 
sight.
At the beginning, the ideology that opposes “East” and “West” along the di-
chotomy “spiritual” and “material” permitted the silencing of the feeble voices of 
new discourses about sexuality. In that scheme, HIV/AIDS could never become an 
“Oriental” problem due to the higher morality of East in comparison to the deca-
dent West. Reality was rather different and forced silence about sexual issues pro-
voked a widespread diffusion of the virus. The easier and often the only way to 
register NGOs aimed at helping sexual-minority groups was to link the aims of the 
association with the HIV/AIDS epidemic as a problem of public health.
This strategy, however, permitted the creation of some important NGOs, such as 
BDS in Nepal and the Naz Foundation in India, and the surfacing of new discours-
es by a wide range of alternative sexualities.
4.2. (Re)constructing an indigenous space for diversity
A by-product of the above mentioned ideological opposition between “East (moral-
ity)” and “West (decadence)” is the accusation towards LGBT(I) people of being 
“westernized” and, as a consequence, also “elitist”. In other words, sexual “devia-
tions” and specifically those relating to sexual orientation would be a capricious 
“importation” coming from abroad.
For that reason, the LGBT(I) communities of nations like India and Nepal feel 
the need to provide a new and different reading of the ancient cultural history of their 
countries in order to demonstrate that “hetero” has never been the only possible way 
to experience sexuality, therefore stating that alternative forms of sex have always 
existed and that they are deeply rooted within the collective cultural history45.
This approach leads to a two-edged attitude. On one hand, it allows the re-intro-
duction of the concept of difference into the cultural mainstream and it can be 
considered as an attempt to shift towards inclusion; on the other hand, it underlines 
the existence of locally rooted alternatives to heteronormativity as a search for dif-
ferentiation. Due to the existence of hegemonical and all-encompassing western 
categories, the above mentioned differentiation can be regarded also as an attempt 
to confront them.
45 In recent years, many books have been written on the subject. Amongst the most important, it 
is worth mentioning Ruth Vanita (ed.), Queering India: Same-Sex Love and Eroticism in Indian 
Culture and Society (Routledge, New York 2002) and Nivedita Menon (ed.), Sexualities (Zed 
Books, London 2007).
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4.3. The visible presence of “third gender” people as a cultural matter of fact
Both countries present wide and easily recognizable “communities” of transgender/
transsexual people.
In Nepal, meti is the term used to describe a normally cross-dressing person with 
a male physiology but a female gender identity.
In India, the traditional transgender community is composed by the hijras (or 
hijdas), well known even outside Indian borders because they seem to be a perfect 
example of the existence of a third gender. This is a very strictly organized commu-
nity, with hierarchical relationships and specific customs.
It is really important to stress that the existence of a traditional socio-cultural 
space for these gender “deviances” does imply neither a social acceptance of those 
specific groups nor a friendly environment for alternative sexualities in general. In 
actual facts, this traditional setting is often used to include the difference within the 
mainstream vision of “sex”, so that any subversive potential stemming from it may 
be eliminated. Those traditionally recognized groups are socially very humble and 
their lack of skills leads most of them to end up in the sex trade. Besides, due to their 
immediately recognizable or easy-to-know identity, they are often targets of harass-
ment and violence by many actors, from family to police, and of discrimination at 
different levels.
In other words, the space of identification merges with the sphere of marginaliza-
tion46.
5. Conclusions: old problems, new perspectives
In recent years, LGBT(I) rights have undergone important changes all over the 
world. Sometimes these have been a noteworthy improvement of factual situations, 
while other times they have weakened the critical potentialities of “sexuality dis-
courses” against heteronormativity.
As previously stated, both in India and Nepal there are traditional groups with 
their own self-definition and customs, whose identity is normally quite complex and 
cannot be defined only on the basis of sexuality47. They are clearly recognizable and 
deeply inserted within the social community. In addition to these, there are also new 
communities, joined by the LGBT(I) acronym, which are somehow linked with the 
western definition of homosexuality. Unlike traditional groups, these communities 
use the sexuality feature as the main identifier.
46 Regarding the recent rise of hijras’ electoral visibility in the highly sexualized Indian political 
arena, between emancipation and new forms of marginalization, see Gayatri Reddy, ‘‘Men’ Who 
Would Be Kings: Celibacy, Emasculation, and the Re-Production of Hijras in Contemporary In-
dian Politics’ (Spring 2003) 70 (1) Social Research 163.
47 Regarding the concept of izzat, “honor”, which is frequently used by kothis and is referred to 
as the main preoccupation for hijra, see Gayatri Reddy (n 40 and also ibid., ch 2).
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Traditional groups as hijras normally have their own “mythology”, because they 
have always existed in the cultural space. At the same time, these communities feel 
the urge of rearticulating their identities in new forms, and of sharing and compar-
ing their visions with those of the “new” groups. In these highly complex contexts, 
sexual minorities are trying to carve out a niche for themselves and maybe also to 
reshape the “sexual” division of society utilizing internal and external ideological 
tools.
Despite the difficulties, it seems that, in these States, the law is following the right 
direction, linking LGBT(I) rights to human rights and granting wider spaces of 
equality than before. The current aim should be not to allow the law to limit 
LGBT(I) identity as well as not to halt the propulsive energy coming from these new 
discourses, so that no LGBT(I) hegemonic ideology could destroy the diversity of 
different perspectives.
In the years to come, it will be more evident if and how LGBT(I) people’s situa-
tion has improved in India and Nepal. Currently, it can only be hoped that the 
imaginary space claimed by alternative sexualities be as wide and inclusive as pos-
sible.
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Abstract
Since the 1950s social relations in the United States have evolved resulting in the develop-
ment of organized movements of certain social groups which aimed at gaining more rights 
and freedoms from the U.S. government. As the main institution responsible for final ad-
judication in civil rights cases, the U.S. Supreme Court decided numerous cases concern-
ing racial and gender issues, establishing new scope of various constitutional guarantees of 
freedom of speech, of religion, the right to privacy, or due process of law. The LGBT 
groups, however, did not receive any significant protection from the government, as the 
Court adjudicated in cases which limited the rights of homosexual community. For exam-
ple, in 1986 the Supreme Court upheld the anti-sodomy laws of Georgia stating that ho-
mosexuals do not enjoy full protection under the constitution (Bowers v. Hardwick). 
Things have changed recently, when in 1996 for the first time the Justices decided in favor 
of the LGBTI groups (Romer v. Evans), and in 2003 when they overruled the 1986 deci-
sion giving the homosexuals equal rights by guaranteeing their right to privacy (Lawrence 
and Garner v. Texas). Despite the change in Court’s adjudication, U.S. federal judiciary it 
is still reluctant to follow some of the state laws which granted the LGBT groups the right 
to marry. Therefore, today we can observe a double standard in U.S. legal system towards 
the treatment of LGBTI groups: the states are more liberal than the federal government. 
The paper addresses the issue of development of the right to privacy of homosexuals in 
the United States Supreme Court.
* * *
1. Introduction
Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT, recently LGBTI – including inter-
sex) rights have become an increasingly important issue in American society since 
the 1950s, when civil rights and human rights movements began to dominate the 
social and political life of the United States. Most of the legal decisions concerning 
the status of civil rights in America have been faced by the judiciary, the role of 
which does not only consist in settling disputes between parties, but also in inter-
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preting the existing law and creating binding norms for the future. The judge-made 
law in the common law system attracts various social and political actors who bring 
cases to courts in order to seek justice, but also in order to promote their own opin-
ions and values. The story of the fight of LGBT groups for equality and justice is 
therefore a story of various lawsuits, arguments, failures and successes in courts. The 
desire to enjoy the same rights as other minority groups in the country forced vari-
ous LGBT organizations to engage in lawsuits seeking recognition of the right to 
privacy.
It is important to acknowledge that there has been a lot of case-law regarding 
LGBT rights on the state level. Many important issues have also been addressed in 
various decisions of the lower federal courts (district or circuit). But the main pur-
pose of this study is to present the most important LGBT cases decided by the 
highest judicial instance in the United States, the Supreme Court. The position of 
the Court in the U.S. governmental system, as well as its highly political role make 
the institution both attractive and indispensable in the process of shaping social 
norms in America. The study has been mainly based on analysis of federal case-law 
regarding LGBT rights, since the 1950s until today, and it aims at finding answers 
to questions often raised by the homosexual community: why the federal judiciary 
took so long to broaden constitutional protection of sexual minorities in the United 
States, and what kind of future awaits LGBT rights in the years ahead – dark or 
rainbow – considering the current ideological attitude of the Justices of the Court.
2. Development of the right to privacy
LGBT groups are becoming more and more active in American social and political 
reality, as the topic of sexual minorities’ rights is becoming one of the main areas of 
contemporary American constitutionalism. The 20th century in the United States 
was full of examples of liberty movements which have had a significant impact on 
the process of creation of law on both the state and federal level. This situation oc-
curred due to the growth of awareness of American society willing to define the 
scope of various freedoms and liberties of individuals and groups, as well as an in-
crease of power of the courts, which actively confronted these issues in numerous 
cases, thus deciding about the meaning of the most crucial constitutional clauses 
concerning those rights and liberties. Most of these activists very quickly realized 
that one judicial decision regarding their issues may become far more influential for 
the future of the movement than traditional means of drawing social attention, such 
as the press, electronic media or open street protests. Long before the growth of 
judicial awareness of LGBT groups, other movements forged the path of the consti-
tutional fight for equality within society. It can be observed with relation to African-
Americans and the National Association for the Advancement of the Colored People 
(NAACP), which brought numerous cases to state and federal courts aimed at end-
ing racial segregation. As the controversial separate-but-equal doctrine was estab-
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lished by the judiciary, it was the judicial department which determined the uncon-
stitutionality of that doctrine. In 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme 
Court overruled its former precedent thus initiating the process of abolishing racial 
segregation in the United States1.
After confronting racial issues, the Court turned to reproductive rights, as vari-
ous feminist and liberal groups began to actively lobby for judicial determination of 
such issues as contraceptive rights, mixed marriages, and abortion. As a result, the 
judiciary established a new category of Constitution-based rights concerning the 
privacy of an individual. There is no doubt that the liberal interpretation of the 
Constitution by the Supreme Court in the 1960s and 1970s led to the creation of the 
modern constitutional approach to civil and human rights, which can be observed 
in the decisions concerning the right to privacy. Among the most important of the 
Supreme Court’s precedents in this respect were: Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), 
Loving v. Virginia (1967), and Roe v. Wade (1973). A brief analysis of these is impor-
tant since they touch upon the issues of privacy and equality, as do most of the 
LGBT cases, which are the basis of this research.
There is no concrete place within the Constitution that would directly refer to 
the right to privacy. However, the Justices conducted a broad interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights issues which led to the creation of such a right and its further protec-
tion. Among the first ten amendments to the Constitution, the most often cited 
source of the right to privacy is the Ninth Amendment which states: “the enumera-
tion in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or dispar-
age others retained by the people”2. The enigmatic meaning of this provision was 
considered by the Court a reference to so-called un-enumerated rights of the people 
thus addressing these rights which were not mentioned in the document. There were 
Justices who related the right to privacy to other constitutional provisions, such as 
the Third Amendment’s prohibition of quartering soldiers in houses without own-
ers’ consent or the Fourth Amendment’s ban on unreasonable searches and seizures. 
However, it was the Ninth Amendment that became the basis of the most crucial 
decisions concerning this right.
The first decision which directly confronted the issue of privacy was made by the 
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), when the Justices had to determine the 
constitutionality of the use of contraceptives. A very old law of the state of Con-
necticut established in 1879 prohibited the use of contraceptives, but it was hardly 
ever enforced until the beginning of the 1960s. Then, Estelle Griswold, the Execu-
tive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, began to give 
medical advice about birth control to spouses and was convicted on the basis of 
violation of the state law. The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion (7-2) written by 
Justice William Douglas, invalidated the Connecticut law and established the con-
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Ninth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution of 1787, adopted in the Bill of Rights of 1791.
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stitutional protection of the right to privacy. Despite the fact that there is no place 
in the Constitution mentioning such a right, Justices derived its existence from 
other constitutional principles and guarantees contained in the First, Third, Fourth, 
and Ninth Amendments made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Thus Griswold could legally conduct her medical advice because the 
right to privacy in marital affairs was constitutionally protected3. The use of contra-
ceptives was confirmed and even broadened in 1973 in Eisenstadt v. Baird, in which 
the Justices allowed the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried people4.
The Court’s decision in Griswold v. Connecticut made it possible to overturn 
some old precedents regarding the right to privacy which, before 1965, had not been 
protected. One of these cases, Loving v. Virginia, concerned the prohibition of race-
based marriage and was decided by the Court two years later. An African-American, 
Mildred Jeter, married a white-American, Richard Loving, in the District of Colum-
bia, but they later moved to Virginia where such marriages were banned by the 
Racial Integrity Act. Both spouses were convicted of violating the state law and 
sentenced to a year of prison or twenty-five years of exile out of Virginia. The Su-
preme Court in 1967 unanimously determined Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law 
unconstitutional thus protecting the Lovings’ right to marriage. Referring to the 
equal protection clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the Justices acknowledged the constitutional protection of mixed marriages, ending 
a long-lasting line of precedents prohibiting such relationships5. Similarly, as in Gris-
wold, the Loving decision encouraged sexual minority groups to more boldly ex-
press the constitutionality of their relationships.
There has been hardly any more significant or controversial decision in the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s history than in Roe v. Wade. After discovering the constitutional 
protection of the right to privacy, the Court decided to determine the proper laws 
concerning abortion, and thus found itself at the center of American political and 
social problems of the 1970s. Jane Roe (in fact Norma McCorvey) filed a suit against 
District Attorney Henry Wade, representing the state of Texas and protesting 
against the state ban on abortion, which was applied even in situations of pregnancy 
resulting from rape. Roe wanted to have an abortion but under Texas law (and also 
the law of most of the other states) it was illegal and punishable for both the doctor 
and patient. In 1973 the Justices, in a majority opinion presented by Justice Harry 
Blackmun, admitted that the right to abortion was fundamental and originated di-
rectly from the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause and indirectly from the 
Ninth Amendment to the Constitution. As a result, the state of pregnancy was di-
vided into trimesters and the Court determined the scope of governmental ability to 
influence a woman’s pregnancy in the second and third trimester. During the first 
3 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4 405 U.S. 438 (1973).
5 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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trimester abortion became legal, thus the previous state laws concerning abortion 
(including Texas provisions) were declared invalid6. Almost twenty years after Roe, 
the issue of abortion once again became the center of political and social tensions 
exciting nationwide attention, when in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court once 
again confirmed the legality of abortion and its constitutional protection7. All of the 
above-mentioned cases played, on one hand, an important role in the growth of 
awareness of LGBT groups, which believed in the possibility of winning major con-
stitutional cases in the highest judicial instance in the United States. On the other, 
however, these decisions set principles of “heteronormative supremacy”8 established 
by the Court, which were in contrary to homosexual values promoted by the LGBT 
movement.
3. LGBT and the Supreme Court - the first thirty years
As was mentioned earlier, the success of Brown v. Board of Education stimulated 
various minority groups to initiate legal claims which could be confronted by the 
courts. It is important to acknowledge, that most of these groups became active on 
the state level, since it was difficult to pursue their goals on the nationwide level, 
mainly because of a lack of adequate organization and communication. Such a situ-
ation also concerned gay and lesbian activists who started to raise important consti-
tutional questions before state courts in the late 1940s and early 1950s. On the 
other hand, many of the activists believed that state-by-state initiatives could finally 
lead to a success on the federal level. Such an approach did not guarantee quick 
effectiveness, as it usually took many decades to raise an issue from the state to the 
nationwide level. A good example of this is the suffrage movement, which gained 
strength in several states beginning in the 1870s, and achieved a full success in 1920 
with the establishment of the Twentieth Amendment. Gay and lesbian activists did 
not intend to wait long to pursue their goals, and very soon after the birth of the 
movement, the first case was brought to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The issue concerned the character of materials published in a homosexual maga-
zine, One, which consisted of articles and essays on the life of homosexuals, as well 
as fictional stories describing homosexual acts. In the 1950s not only the subject of 
gays and lesbians was controversial, but also any material which was obscene could 
not receive judicial protection, as it was not considered constitutional under the 
First Amendment’s freedom of speech. Therefore, it was simply a matter of time 
before someone attacked the content of the magazine. When Los Angeles postmas-
ter Otto Olesen refused to deliver one of the editions of the magazine, claiming that 
6 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
8 Marc Stein, Sexual Injustice: Supreme Court Decisions from Griswold to Roe (UNC Press 2005) 21.
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it promoted obscenity and was therefore “non-mailable” and inconsistent with fed-
eral law, the company filed a suit against him. Lower federal courts sided with the 
postmaster, but in 1958 it reached the highest judicial instance and was accepted for 
review as One, Inc. v. Olesen9. The Supreme Court did not write an opinion in the 
case, but the Justices decided in favor of the magazine, determining its content as 
non-obscene, based on the famous Roth v. United States decision reached a year 
earlier10. As a result, a first major LGBT case was won, and even though it did not 
raise the most important constitutional questions of the status of gay and lesbian 
rights, it enabled the community to have access to the magazine and protection of 
their freedom of speech.
A similar case was decided by the Supreme Court in 1962 in Manual Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Day. This time the “non-mailable” materials concerned pictures of near-nude 
men which were published in three different magazines, which were addressed not 
only to homosexuals. When the post office blocked delivery of the magazines due 
to their obscene content, the publisher brought the case to federal court seeking an 
injunction against the postmaster. When the issue came to the Supreme Court, its 
Justices decided it in favor of Manual Enterprises, Inc., applying the Roth standard 
and thus stating that the materials were not obscene, and thus could receive protec-
tion from the Constitution. The author of the majority opinion, Justice John Mar-
shall Harlan II, emphasized that the photos did not provoke any offensive conduct, 
and were not “so offensive on their face as to affront current community standards 
of decency”11. In a short period of time, the LGBT community won two major 
cases in the Supreme Court, both of which concerned freedom of speech issues, and 
these successes became a light in the tunnel for the movement, which aimed at gain-
ing wider constitutional protection, especially in the area of privacy.
These first, lesser successes were not followed by a major victory, when in 1967 
the Court gave an anti-LGBT decision in Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization 
Service. According to some of the interpretations of the then-existing federal law, 
among people excluded from the naturalization process were homosexuals, who 
were treated as “sex perverts” with psychopathic personalities12. When a Canadian 
native, Michael Boutilier, filed a petition for naturalization as a U.S. citizen, the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service not only refused, but decided to deport him 
based on documentation prepared by the Public Health Service. Boutilier was 
named a sexual deviate with a psychopathic personality because he engaged in 
sexual relations with numerous male partners. When his case was brought to the 
highest judicial department in the country, many activist groups were convinced that 
the Justices would follow the liberal pattern of increasing the rights of homosexuals. 
But in a 6-3 opinion, the Court confirmed the validity of the deportation of Boutil-
9 355 U.S. 371 (1958).
10 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
11 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
12 Stein (n 8).
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ier, claiming that the federal law treating homosexuals as psychopathic personalities 
was constitutional13. Despite the fact that the case mainly concerned immigration 
issues, it showed that LGBT groups may confront difficulties on their road to enjoy-
ing rights and freedoms equal to other social groups.
When the Court decided the Griswold case in 1965 which created the constitu-
tional right to privacy, many LGBT activists believed that it was only a matter of 
time before homosexuals would receive protection from laws which limited their 
possibility of entering into sexual acts with same-sex partners. In most states, engag-
ing in homosexual relations was referred to as “sodomy”. In the 1970s and early 
1980s the issue was raised a few times in lower courts, but not before the Supreme 
Court, since the Justices did not agree to challenge the constitutionality of certain 
state laws banning sodomy. Such failed attempts occurred in Buchanan v. Bachelor, 
Doe v. Commonwealth’s Attorney for City of Richmond, and Baker v. Wade14. How-
ever, in the same year as the last case, the Justices finally decided to confront the 
issue of sodomy in Bowers v. Hardwick.
Michael Hardwick was arrested for violating the Georgia sodomy laws by per-
forming oral sex with another man, which was observed by a police officer who 
entered Hardwick’s house. Although there was no formal accusation, Hardwick 
decided to challenge the state sodomy laws, which made it impossible for LGBT 
groups to engage in sexual relationships in private. After two different conclusions 
made by lower courts (the district court decided in favor of the state, the circuit 
court in favor of Hardwick), the case was brought to the Supreme Court, which, 
for the first time in history, agreed to hear it. The case was widely recognized in the 
whole country, as it concerned not only a Georgia statute, but the laws of many 
other American states where sodomy was a crime. A possible decision recognizing 
homosexuals’ right to privacy would, on one hand, change the laws of several 
states, and, on the other, give constitutional protection to LGBT groups. In a ma-
jority opinion written by Justice Byron White, the Supreme Court reversed the 
circuit court’s decision, and upheld Georgia sodomy laws, thus not providing con-
stitutional protection of the private sexual conduct of LGBT groups15. White ad-
ditionally declared that the sexual activities of same-sex partners would not be 
determined as a fundamental right protected by the Constitution, since such acts 
were not “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” (citing Palko v. Connecticut)16, 
nor were “rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition” (citing Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland)17.
The decision in Bowers was not only a major defeat for LGBT advocates, but it 
also meant that the Supreme Court was at that moment too conservative to change 
13 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
14 Respectively: 405 U.S. 930 (1972), 425 U.S. 901 (1976) and 478 U.S. 1022 (1986).
15 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
16 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
17 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
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its approach towards the rights of sexual minorities. Even though most of the deci-
sions of the 1960s and 1970s concerning the right to privacy were of a liberal char-
acter, the Justices were not ready to overrule state laws regarding sodomy. Only 
choices fundamental to heterosexual conduct warranted constitutional protection: 
marriage, procreation, child-rearing, and family relationships18. The positive aspect 
for homosexuals was that the Bowers majority gathered only five out of nine mem-
bers of the Court, which meant that a future change of approach from one of the 
Justices could establish a right to privacy for homosexuals. The negative aspect was 
connected with future presidential appointments to the Supreme Court, which 
could possibly be made by Republicans who aimed to turn the Court more conser-
vative. However, before the Court adjudicated in another dispute regarding the 
constitutionality of sodomy, most states abolished their laws that limited the privacy 
of homosexuals. Even the Georgia Supreme Court decided to invalidate the statute 
which was held constitutional by its U.S. counterpart19.
It is also worth mentioning that, two years before the Bowers decision, the Court 
refused to hear a case concerning the possibility of creating gay student organiza-
tions at university campuses. In Gay Student Services v. Texas A&M University, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the protection of homosexual 
students by the First Amendment to the Constitution, thus ordering recognition of 
LGBT organizations by University authorities20. The lack of a decision from the 
Supreme Court meant that the Justices agreed with the lower court’s ruling, and 
both the freedom of speech and of association served as a background for a pro-gay 
community decision.
4. LGBT and the Supreme Court - a change of approach?
After Bowers, LGBT groups did not lay down their arms, but continued to lobby 
cases which raised important constitutional matters concerning their rights. Before 
the issue of sodomy was once again faced by the Court, two different disputes con-
cerning LGBT matters were decided by the Justices. In 1996, in Romer v. Evans, 
they had to determine the constitutional status of a state law which excluded LGBT 
groups from any official protection. The state of Colorado adopted a constitutional 
amendment, approved by a state referendum (Amendment 2), which banned any 
legislative, executive or judicial actions aimed at protecting sexual minorities. The 
intent of the legislation was to reject the possibility of special treatment of the LGBT 
community within the state, but in practice it meant that anyone could discriminate 
against members of that community without legal boundaries. The Supreme Court, 
18 Jeffrey A. Segal, Harold J. Spaeth, Sara C. Benesh, The Supreme Court in the American Legal 
System (Cambridge University Press 2005) 64.
19 Powell v. Georgia, 270 Ga. 327 (1998).
20 737 F. 2d 1317 (1984).
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in a 6-3 opinion, decided in favor of LGBT groups, claiming that the Colorado law 
was unjust since it violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Accord-
ing to the majority opinion presented by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the state govern-
ment did not show legitimate interest in adopting the anti-LGBT amendment, 
therefore the law should be declared null and void. The Court criticized the way in 
which Colorado sought to promote equality, since the final result was the opposite 
– the lesbian, gay and bisexual community was excluded from the kind of protection 
which was provided for all other minority groups. As a result, Amendment 2 was a 
pure act of discrimination which denied protection under law to a certain category 
of people21. The decision in Romer became the first major victory of the homosexu-
al community in the Supreme Court since the late 1950s, and a basis for future deci-
sions which could broaden the constitutional protection of LGBT individuals.
The second dispute raising issues regarding the homosexual community was 
decided in 2000. Boy Scouts of America, et al. v. Dale addressed the scope of the 
constitutional right of association and to possibility of revoking membership in an 
organization due to sexual orientation. James Dale was removed from Boy Scouts 
of America when the association found out that he was homosexual. He sued the 
organization, claiming that it promoted discrimination. The Supreme Court, in a 
narrow-margin decision, decided in favor of Boy Scouts, stating that the freedom 
of association prevailed over the necessity of admitting minority groups to the 
organization, emphasizing its private character. Therefore, Boy Scouts could not 
only promote their own values (i.e. teaching that homosexuality is wrong), but 
also exclude from their membership anyone who did not share such values22. After 
Romer, the Court once again took a stance limiting gay and lesbian rights, though 
the reason behind it was the need to protect First Amendment guarantees. LGBT 
groups should not treat Boy Scouts as a decision expressly restricting their free-
dom, but as a precedent broadening the scope of freedom of association. Never-
theless, the division of the votes in the Court suggested that the rights of homo-
sexuals were also at stake: all five conservatives voted against Dale, with only four 
liberals supporting him.
There is no doubt that the most crucial precedent concerning the rights of gays 
and lesbians was created by the Court in Lawrence and Garner v. Texas. After twice 
rejecting the possibility of confronting the constitutionality of Texas’s sodomy laws 
(1970, 1986), finally in 2003 the Justices decided to arbitrate in a dispute between 
the state and two homosexuals, John Lawrence and Tyron Garner, who had a sexu-
al relationship in private and thus violated the Texas sodomy law. In 6-3 opinion 
delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court acknowledged the right of LGBTs 
to engage in sexual conduct without interference from the government, due to the 
right to privacy protected by the Constitution. The due process clause served as the 
21 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
22 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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main source for the liberty of individuals to decide about their private sexual rela-
tionships23. As a result, the Bowers v. Hardwick precedent was overruled, thus caus-
ing a change of laws in several other states and allowing same-sex relationships in 
private. Furthermore, the Court cited the European Court of Human Rights deci-
sion of 1981, Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, proving that Western civilization did not 
condemn homosexuality. It is important to acknowledge that, for the first time in its 
history, the U.S. Supreme Court not only cited the decision of an international court, 
but also decided to adopt its rules in the American legal system, thus not only chang-
ing the law but also influencing social relations in the United States. Not all of the 
Justices had the same approach to the issues presented in the case. Two conserva-
tives in particular, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, expressed their objection 
to the Court’s ruling in separate dissenting opinions. According to them, there was 
no general right of privacy, thus LGBT groups were not fully protected by the Con-
stitution, and the Court should not yield to the homosexual agenda24.
The Lawrence decision changed the constitutional status of homosexuals, and 
showed the willingness of the Court to include them in a wide array of groups pro-
tected under the supreme law of the land. Homosexual right to privacy has become 
a fundamental constitutional guarantee which had to be accepted by all U.S. states. 
The opinion of the Justices harmonized with the voice of the media, presented 
among others in Chicago Daily Herald: “What two consenting adults do sexually in 
the privacy of their bedroom is their business, not the government’s. Some may not 
agree with or understand gay people, but we all should agree on our country’s com-
mitment to a right to privacy for everyone, no matter their sexual orientation”25. 
Many legal scientists have praised the 2003 precedent as one of the most important 
in history, since it broke down the wall of homophobia built by various social and 
political groups in former years. Erwin Chemerinsky observed that “federal judges 
[we]re no longer persuaded that a moral condemnation of homosexuality justifies 
government discrimination”26. And Laurence Tribe even stated that Lawrence and 
Garner v Texas “may well be remembered as the Brown v. Board of Education of gay 
and lesbian America”27. If so, there is another ending to this story: it took years to 
fully implement the desegregation policy of Brown, as many states were unwilling to 
follow the orders of the Supreme Court. The LGBT community undoubtedly hopes 
that the effects of Lawrence will be observed sooner than later.
23 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
24 Ibid.
25 Gary Mucciaroni, Same Sex, Different Politics: Success and Failure in the Struggles over Gay 
Rights (University of Chicago Press 2008) 100.
26 ‘Federal Judges Embrace LGBT Equality’ (2010) 44 Contemporary Society 11.
27 Laurence H. Tribe, ‘Lawrence v. Texas: the “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its 
Name’ (2004) 117 Harvard Law Review 1893, 1894.
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5. It’s all about politics…
In order to understand the substance of specific Supreme Court decisions and the 
individual approach of particular Justices towards the right to privacy and LGBT 
rights, one must fully understand the role of the highest judicial tribunal in the 
United States, as well as its influence on American society and politics. Despite the 
mainly legal character of the institution, there is no doubt that many issues decided 
by the Court, as well as its structure and position in the U.S. governmental system, 
are highly political. Analyzing the political role of the institution, one must take into 
consideration three basic functions that the judiciary plays in the United States:
1. Judges are able to create the law by making individual decisions which may be 
binding in similar cases in the future. These so-called, “precedents” are becom-
ing an important part of the hierarchy of sources of law, when made by the 
Justices of the Supreme Court. The law-making ability locates the Court at the 
center of politics, since not only Congress, a typical political body, is respon-
sible for establishing important legal norms and regulations.
2. Federal judges, and especially the Justices of the Supreme Court, are able to 
interpret the Constitution and give a final word on the meaning of particular 
clauses and provisions of the supreme law of the land. Therefore, it is not the 
President, nor Congress, who shapes the final scope of particular social and 
political aspects of American statehood, but the Court, which is able to point 
out unconstitutional behavior on the part of the main political actors in the 
United States. There are, of course, some limitations to the exercise of judicial 
review, but nevertheless, an active Court may become an active interpreter of 
the Constitution and an active controller of the direction of U.S. politics.
3. The Justices must adjudicate in various criminal and civil disputes as the ulti-
mate instance in the country, and the Constitution provides for their indepen-
dence in that respect. However, the process of nominating the federal judges is 
highly politicized, as the President and Senate play a political game of choosing 
the best ideologically-fitting candidates. From the perspective of the Supreme 
Court nominations, every time there is a vacancy in the tribunal, the President 
is willing to fill it with a person who is not only a distinguished legal practitio-
ner, but above all a faithful follower of conservative or liberal ideology. And 
despite the fact that the Justices cannot be removed from the bench by the 
President, and that most of them adjudicate longer than the head of state who 
chooses them, research has proven that the vast majority of Justices continue 
to argue cases according to their earlier-established ideology. Therefore the 
President, as the main political actor of the state, is able to indirectly influence 
the decision-making process of the Supreme Court, adding to the legal proce-
dure a little bit of political scent28.
28 For more on the topic see: Pawel Laidler, ‘Friends of the Court or Friends of Their Own In-
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The above arguments explain why the Supreme Court, as a political actor, is an 
attractive addressee of various opinions and arguments given by those who would 
like to have a direct or indirect influence on the process of legal and political activ-
ity in America. Therefore, it is obvious that both LGBT and anti-LGBT approaches 
have been seen throughout the Court’s history, determining particular decisions and 
opinions made by the Justices. The problem of the ideological impact of various 
groups and individuals on Supreme Court’s decisions may be viewed from different 
perspectives.
On one hand, the process of appointment of the Justices may indirectly influence 
the future outcomes of various cases, especially those which confront controversial 
issues, such as the constitutional status of homosexuals. A careful analysis of all of 
the major LGBT cases decided by the Supreme Court between 1958 and 2003 may 
produce a visible pattern of the influence of Justices’ ideology on their decision-
making process. And this, furthermore, may lead to the assumption that Presidents 
and senators who choose members of the Court can shape the future direction of its 
adjudication. The table below indicates the ideology of Justices and their approach 
towards LGBT issues in seven major cases: One, Inc. v. Olesen, Manual Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Day, Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Bowers v. Hardwick, 
Romer v. Evans, Boy Scouts of America, et al. v. Dale and Lawrence and Garner v. 
Texas29.
Ideology of Supreme
Court Justices
Pro LGBTI decisions Anti LGBTI decisions
Liberal 29 7
Conservative 9 16
The table shows that liberal Justices have been proponents of broadening the 
constitutional scope of the right to privacy towards LGBT groups. Out of 36 liberal 
votes, the vast majority was in favor of homosexuals, whereas the majority of con-
servatives voted against gays and lesbians. A closer look at the 9 conservative votes 
in favor of LGBT groups shows that they were made mostly by Justices who are 
considered “swing voters” on the bench. In the last two decisions, Romer and Law-
rence, the important difference was made by Sandra Day O’Connor and Anthony 
Kennedy. Both Justices were chosen to the Supreme Court in the 1980s by President 
Ronald Reagan, who aimed at initiating a “conservative revolution” in the govern-
ment. However, not all of Reagan’s choices were successful in the area of providing 
a strong conservative legacy for the President and his political party. O’Connor and 
terests: Amicus Curiae as a Lobbying Tool of Groups of Interest in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Decision-Making Process’ (2010) 12 Ad Americam.
29 The table indicates 52 out of 54 possible votes in 6 cases made by the Justices of the Supreme 
Court. In Day, Justices Frankfurter and White did not take part in the decision-making process.
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Kennedy became very problematic for Republicans, as they served as swing-voters 
in major constitutional cases concerning the right to privacy. One of the main rea-
sons for the disappointment lay in the circumstances of their appointments – 
O’Connor was chosen primarily because she was a woman, and Kennedy was picked 
by the President after the failure of Reagan’s former candidate in the Senate, Robert 
Bork, who was viewed as ultraconservative30.
In disputes regarding the status of LGBT groups, O’Connor and Kennedy often 
joined the liberal wing of the Court, widely contributing to the final success of homo-
sexuals. Historically, conservative Justices have been rather reluctant in increasing 
constitutional protection of various minority groups, including LGBTs. Therefore, the 
ideological configuration of the Court may serve as a dominant factor in the direction 
of judicial decisions concerning the rights of gays and lesbians. In the 1950s and 1960s 
the highest judicial tribunal in the United States consisted mostly of liberal Justices 
appointed by Democratic Presidents. Later, Republican Presidents began to fill the 
Court with conservative Justices. However, not all of them proved conservative 
enough in order to prevent the “sexual revolution”. This revolution was initiated in 
the late 1950s, but it grew in strength in the last decade of the 20th century. The Law-
rence decision at the beginning of the new millennium reshaped the constitutional 
status of LGBT groups. The current composition of the tribunal assures the equal 
influence of liberal and conservative doctrines, with four Justices on each side of the 
political barricade, and with one Justice whose vote seems to count the most. Justice 
Anthony Kennedy seems to play a crucial role in the fight of homosexuals for equality 
and various freedoms. His judgments in Romer and Lawrence, as well as other right to 
privacy cases, indicates his strong conviction of the necessity to treat homosexuals as 
equally as heterosexual people. In this respect one may claim that Reagan’s choice of 
Kennedy was one of the conservatives’ greatest defeats in the last decades.
The political activity of the Supreme Court may not only be observed in the 
ideological trends of the Justices, but also in the lobbying of various interest groups 
which may influence the Court’s agenda and decision-making process. Lobbying 
may sometimes take place in the form of direct action of institutions, organizations 
or individuals highly interested in outcome of particular cases. Direct action may 
consist of sponsoring cases or filing an amicus brief as a third party of a dispute. A 
thorough analysis of the LGBT cases brought to the Supreme Court reveals signifi-
cant activity of various legal and social organizations aiming at achieving concrete 
outcomes from these cases. Anytime a dispute concerning the constitutional status 
of LGBT groups reached the highest judicial instance, supporters and opponents of 
the rights of homosexuals closed ranks in order to play a key role in convincing the 
Justices of their views and opinions. Among the most prominent and powerful pro-
LGBT groups there have been:
30 Herman Schwartz, Packing the Courts: The Conservative Campaign to Rewrite the Constitution 
(Charles Scribners’ Sons 1988) 103-149.
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– The American Civil Liberties Union - a nationwide organization promoting 
human and civil rights in the form of litigation, legislation and education. 
ACLU devoted a lot of effort to lobbying for the equality of homosexuals. For 
example, the organization helped in preparing an appeal in Boutillier, repre-
sented Michael Hardwick in Bowers v. Hardwick, and prepared important legal 
briefs in Boy Scouts and Lawrence31.
– The Human Rights Campaign - the largest American civil rights organization 
aiming at promotion of equality of LGBT groups. For several decades HRC 
activists have been lobbying for the abolishment of discriminating laws con-
cerning the right to privacy for homosexuals, as well as for the promotion of 
same-sex marriages on the state and federal level. Above all, they prepared an 
amicus brief supporting Lawrence and Garner in their fight for the right to 
privacy in the Supreme Court32.
– Lambda Legal - a civil rights organization primarily focusing on litigation and 
educational help concerning the rights of LGBT groups in the United States. 
Since its establishment at the beginning of the 1970s, Lambda Legal has initi-
ated most of the important homosexual rights’ cases in state and federal courts, 
including two major U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Romer and Lawrence33.
The above-mentioned organizations are merely the peak of the iceberg, as there 
are more than fifty national associations and groups supporting LGBT rights. Since 
most of them play important roles in increasing the awareness in the society of the 
rights of homosexuals, some decide to participate in the decision-making process in 
the Supreme Court by filing amicus curiae briefs. Such briefs may serve both as a 
support for the petition for writ of certiorari (initial stage), or as an additional argu-
mentation when the Court is deciding a case on its merits (main stage). There has 
hardly been any important constitutional decision undertaken by the Supreme 
Court in recent years which was not affected by one or more amicus curiae briefs34. 
Especially in cases raising issues connected with LGBT rights, there have always 
been several briefs prepared by supporters and opponents of a particular interpreta-
tion of the Constitution by the Court. For instance, in Lawrence and Garner v. Texas, 
petitioners were backed by 17 and respondents by 14 amici briefs35. Among them 
were legal associations and professors, religious organizations, civil rights defenders, 
sexual minority lobbying groups, political organizations, and gender associations. 
Seventeen years earlier in Bowers, there had been “only” 13 amici curiae briefs in 
total, with Catholic organizations that approved of upholding sodomy laws on one 
31 <www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights> accessed 17 April 2011.
32 <www.hrc.org> accessed 17 April 2011.
33 <www.lambdalegal.org> accessed 17 April 2011.
34 Joseph D. Kearney, Thomas W. Merrill, ‘The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Su-
preme Court’ (2000) 148 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 743.
35 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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side, and major LGBT groups claiming these laws unconstitutional on the other36. 
Such statistics show the willingness of various social groups and organizations to 
participate in the process of shaping the scope of LGBT rights, and they also allow 
the Justices to become acquainted with various approaches towards an important 
constitutional issue. Such statistics also prove that contemporary America is at the 
stage of social, political and legal discussion of the proper treatment of the gay and 
lesbian community.
6. The future in rainbow colors?
Since Lawrence and Garner v. Texas no major constitutional case has been brought 
to the Supreme Court regarding the rights of LGBT groups. However, from time to 
time the Justices confront disputes which indirectly concern the problem of dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation. For example, in 2010 the Court adjudi-
cated in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, a case which concerned the possibility 
of banning university funding of an officially recognized campus group (the Chris-
tian Legal Society) which promoted discrimination against LGBT students. The 
Justices determined, in a 5-4 decision, that universities could block official funding 
of various student and campus groups which favored a discriminatory policy against 
any minorities, including sexual minorities37. Not surprisingly, four liberal Justices 
were pro and four conservative Justices against, with Anthony Kennedy as the swing 
voter deciding the final outcome of the case. The defeat of the Christian Legal So-
ciety means that anywhere in the United States public funding of educational groups 
may be dependent on their approach towards equality, tolerance, and justice. The 
decision is perhaps not a milestone in the fight of LGBT groups for a better consti-
tutional status, but it proves that the contemporary Supreme Court has a more lib-
eral approach towards these issues. With Lawrence, the barricades have fallen and it 
is only a matter of time before homosexuals gain freedom in desired areas, such as 
marriage and adoption of children. On one hand it may be difficult, since, according 
to federal law, the Defense of Marriage Act, no state is obliged to recognize same-sex 
relationships established under the laws of other states38. However, as of 2011, Dis-
trict of Columbia and five states – Connecticut, Massachusetts, Iowa, New Hamp-
shire and Vermont – acknowledge the rights of gays and lesbians to marry while 
several other states have created various unions or domestic partnerships for gay and 
lesbian couples, and some recognize same-sex marriages performed elsewhere39. 
36 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
37 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
38 Federal Defense of Marriage Act 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
39 For further reading about same-sex marriage see: Sean Cahill, Sarah Tobias, Policy Issues Af-
fecting Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Families (University of Michigan Press, 2006); 
Nancy D. Polikoff, Beyond (Straight and Gay) Marriage: Valuing All Families Under the Law (Bea-
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One of the recent state cases concerning the issue of same-sex marriage may become 
the long-awaited turning point for LGBT groups in their fight for marital rights in 
the U.S. Supreme Court.
In 2010, in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California ruled that Proposition 8 of the California Marriage Protection 
Act, which stated that marriage was a relationship only between a man and a wom-
an, was unconstitutional. The state law, which was adopted in a referendum, has 
been determined null and void, thus granting same-sex couples in California the 
right to marry40. The final success, however, depends on the decision of the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit where the case is pending and, perhaps, on the 
Supreme Court of the United States, provided that the Justices agree to address the 
issue. Actually, more and more states are establishing liberal policies towards homo-
sexuals and, as in the case of sodomy, it may be just a matter of time before the 
highest judicial instance will decide in favor of sexual minorities. According to Matt 
Coles, a prominent ACLU activist on LGBT issues, “the California marriage deci-
sion doesn’t come out of nowhere… Thirty-one years of slowly but surely getting the 
people of California used to LGBT issues and relationships”41. From this perspec-
tive, other successes of the homosexual community in the Supreme Court may serve 
as important building blocks in their construction of a house of equality. Unless 
Republican Presidents have an opportunity to reshape the Court’s membership and 
move it away from a liberal approach to a more conservative one, the future of 
LGBT rights in the United States may soon be seen in rainbow colors.
con Press 2008); Vanessa A. Lavely, ‘The Path to Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage: Reconciling 
the Inconsistencies Between Marriage and Adoption Cases’ (2007) 55 UCLA Law Review 247;
40 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (2010).
41 Peter A. Newman, ‘“It’s Not About Marriage, It’s About Antidiscrimination”: the California 
Supreme Court Decision and the Future of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States. An Interview 
with Matt Coles, ACLU Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and AIDS Project’ (2010) 22 Journal 
of Gay and Lesbian Social Services 183, 186.
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Same-Gender coupleS

essere geniTori lgbTi*
Joëlle Long
Riassunto
Il tema dell’omogenitorialità, intesa come assunzione e svolgimento di funzioni genitoriali 
da parte di una persona omosessuale, costituisce il vero banco di prova per saggiare la por-
tata applicativa del principio di non discriminazione sulla base dell’orientamento sessuale e 
dell’identità di genere. Tale principio è accolto nell’ordinamento italiano per quanto con-
cerne i casi di “vecchia genitorialità”, in cui pre-esiste un rapporto giuridico di filiazione tra 
la persona omosessuale e la prole concepita o adottata in una precedente fase di vita etero-
sessuale. Dubbi possono invece essere avanzati sulla conformità al principio di non discri-
minazione, quantomeno nell’interpretazione datane oggi dalle corti di Strasburgo e del 
Lussemburgo, della scelta del legislatore italiano di negare in radice alle coppie dello stesso 
sesso la “nuova genitorialità” mediante adozione o procreazione medicalmente assistita.
Abstract
Same sex parenting, namely the assumption and exercise of parental responsibilities by 
homosexual persons, is a good test for assessing the effective implementation of the non 
discrimination principle based on the sexual orientation or gender identity. The analysis of 
Italian case law shows that this principle is commonly applied by Italian courts in cases of 
custody of children conceived or adopted in prior heterosexual relationships. However, 
doubts can be raised on whether the Italian legislator’s decision to exclude a priori same 
sex couples from adoption and medically assisted reproduction is consistent with the in-
terpretation of the above mentioned principle given by the European Court of Justice 
(Case C-267/06 Maruko and Case C-147/08 Römer) and the European Court of Human 
Rights (especially Karner v Austria and S. H. and oth. v Austria).
* * *
1. Un tema complesso
Il tema della genitorialità della persona lesbica, gay, bisessuale, transessuale, inter-
sessuale (in sigla LGBTI) è complesso in quanto le questioni giuridiche che si pon-
* Il presente testo costituisce una versione ridotta e parzialmente diversa dell’articolo ‘Omogeni-
torialità e principio di non discriminazione in base all’orientamento sessuale’, pubblicato in Bioe-
tica, 2011, n. 2, 211-227.
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gono variano secondo la specifica condizione dei soggetti coinvolti, secondo l’esi-
stenza o meno di un rapporto giuridico di filiazione tra le parti, secondo il quadro 
normativo di riferimento.
Nell’ordinamento italiano, anzitutto, ogni discussione sulla “nuova genitoriali-
tà”, cioè sul rilievo di una condizione personale, ivi compreso l’orientamento sessua-
le e l’identità di genere, ai fini dell’accesso alla genitorialità, concerne pressoché 
esclusivamente le coppie. Il nostro legislatore, infatti, ha tendenzialmente escluso 
dalla possibilità di diventare genitori le persone singole, indifferentemente dall’iden-
tità di genere, dall’orientamento sessuale e dalle modalità di attribuzione del sesso 
(alla nascita o a seguito di rettificazione degli atti dello stato civile disposta dall’au-
torità giudiziaria). La legge 19 febbraio 2004, n. 40 consente l’accesso alle tecniche 
alle sole “coppie di maggiorenni di sesso diverso, coniugate o conviventi” (art. 5, 
corsivo mio); la legge 4 maggio 1983 n. 184 ammette solo in casi limitati l’adozione 
da parte di una persona singola1.
Tale peculiarità della situazione italiana spiega peraltro perché sia in gran parte 
priva di impatto sul nostro ordinamento la sentenza della Corte europea dei diritti 
dell’uomo E. B. c. Francia2. In essa, infatti, i giudici europei affermano che viola il 
divieto di discriminazioni sulla base dell’orientamento sessuale lo Stato membro che 
consenta per legge al singolo di adottare ma escluda sistematicamente in concreto un 
soggetto dall’adozione a causa della mancanza nel potenziale nucleo di accoglienza 
di un riferimento genitoriale appartenente al sesso opposto a quello dell’aspirante 
genitore adottivo.
L’ordinamento italiano, inoltre, si caratterizza per l’esclusione delle coppie dello 
stesso sesso, indifferentemente formate da persone cui il sesso sia stato attribuito 
alla nascita o in cui per uno o entrambi vi sia stata successiva rettificazione degli 
atti dello stato civile3, da ogni possibilità di diventare genitori. Essendo il matrimo-
nio limitato ai partner di sesso diverso ed essendo il modello principale di adozione 
riservato ai coniugi (cfr. art. 6 legge n. 184/1983), infatti, le coppie omosessuali non 
possono adottare. La legge sulla procreazione medicalmente assistita, inoltre, con-
sente l’accesso alle tecniche di fecondazione solo ai partner coniugati o conviventi 
“di sesso diverso” (art. 5 n. 40/2004). L’esclusione delle coppie dello stesso sesso 
dalla “nuova genitorialità” non significa tuttavia che la condizione omosessuale 
1 La prima ipotesi è quella della separazione personale tra i coniugi affidatari intervenuta nel corso 
dell’affidamento preadottivo (art. 5 comma 5° legge n. 184/1983). La seconda è l’adozione disposta 
in un Paese straniero che consenta al singolo l’adozione, a istanza di un cittadino italiano che dimo-
stri al momento della pronuncia di aver soggiornato continuativamente e risieduto da almeno due 
anni in tale Paese (art. 36 comma 4° legge n. 184/1983). La terza è l’adozione di minori che non 
abbiano potuto essere adottati con adozione legittimante (art. 44, lett. c, d, legge n. 184/1983).
2 Corte EDU, 21 gennaio 2008, in Nuova giur. civ. comm., 2008, I, 667 con mia nota.
3 In forza della legge 14 aprile 1982, n. 164, la persona transessuale che, previamente autorizzata 
dal tribunale, si sia sottoposta a interventi chirurgici per rendere il proprio corpo “di nascita” 
conforme alla propria identità di genere può, com’è noto, ottenere una sentenza di rettificazione 
di attribuzione di sesso.
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escluda di per sé la genitorialità: i rapporti giuridici e di fatto con un figlio minore 
concepito o adottato in una precedente fase di vita eterosessuale o bisessuale non 
vengono certamente meno per effetto del coming out del genitore (sul tema cfr. 
infra par. 3).
In conseguenza della modifica degli atti dello stato civile, la persona transessua-
le di orientamento eterosessuale potrà – su un piano di completa parità con i sog-
getti il cui sesso biologico corrispondesse già alla nascita con l’identità di genere – 
contrarre matrimonio con un individuo di sesso opposto al proprio e, con esso, 
presentare poi domanda di adozione di un bambino abbandonato (cfr. art. 6 legge 
n. 184/1983)4. Il divieto di impiego di tecniche di procreazione medicalmente assi-
stita di tipo eterologo (art. 4 comma 3° legge n. 40/2004) preclude invece, com’è 
evidente, l’accesso alla fecondazione assistita alle coppie in cui uno dei componen-
ti sia persona transessuale. Con riferimento a una relazione di filiazione già esisten-
te, la condizione di transessualità del genitore è formalmente irrilevante, ma può 
assumere rilievo sostanziale se e in quanto pregiudichi in concreto l’interesse della 
prole5.
Sostanzialmente analoga alla condizione di transessualità è, dal punto di vista 
della genitorialità, la situazione del soggetto intersessuale. Il soddisfacimento del 
desiderio di genitorialità è di per sé precluso nel caso in cui la persona intersessua-
le abbia una relazione di coppia con un soggetto che abbia lo stesso sesso attribu-
itole alla nascita nei registri dello stato civile. In tale eventualità, infatti, il matri-
monio e dunque l’adozione sono esclusi e lo è anche la procreazione medicalmen-
te assistita.
4 La giurisprudenza ha avuto molto di chiarire che ai fini dell’adozione la condizione di transes-
sualità di uno dei membri della coppia che chiede l’adozione è formalmente irrilevante: il compi-
to del giudice, infatti, è valutare l’attitudine genitoriale dei partner (“la loro capacità di amore e 
di altruismo verso un bambino straniero in stato di abbandono”) e non “riscontrare una sessuali-
tà normale e adeguata dei coniugi” (Trib. min. Perugia, decreto 22 luglio 1997, in Dir. fam. e pers., 
1998, 593). Per un approfondimento si consenta il rinvio a J. Long, ‘Essere genitori transessuali’ 
(2008) Nuova giur. civ. comm. II, 236.
5 Corte EDU, sentenza 30 novembre 2010, P. V. c. Spagna, in Dr. famille, 2011, alerte 3 obs. M. 
Bruggeman e Trib. min. Torino, 20 luglio 1982, Giur. it., 1982, 2, 625. Nel primo caso i giudici 
europei riconoscono che la limitazione del diritto di visita paterno si fonda sul cambiamento di 
sesso di quest’ultimo, ma affermano che non c’è violazione del diritto di questi al rispetto della 
vita familiare perché la decisione delle autorità nazionali appare motivata sulla base del fatto che 
l’instabilità emotiva della ricorrente conseguente al suo cambiamento di sesso pone in concreto a 
rischio l’integrità psico-fisica e lo sviluppo della personalità della prole. In senso sostanzialmente 
analogo si erano già espressi negli anni Ottanta i giudici torinesi che avevano vietato, ex art. 333 
cod. civ., i contatti tra il figlio minore e un padre che, dopo anni di separazione dalla famiglia, era 
ricomparso nella vita del figlio di dieci anni dopo aver assunto identità femminile causando un 
grave turbamento al figlio che non accettava una così sconcertante figura di padre-madre con fi-
sico e abbigliamento femminili e dedito alla professione di spogliarellista.
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2. Il ruolo del principio del superiore interesse del minore nella battaglia per il 
riconoscimento di rilevanza giuridica alla relazione di coppia omosessuale
Il tema dell’omogenitorialità, intesa come assunzione e svolgimento di funzioni ge-
nitoriali da parte di una persona omosessuale, costituisce a mio parere il vero banco 
di prova per saggiare la portata applicativa del principio di non discriminazione 
sulla base dell’orientamento sessuale e dell’identità di genere6.
Perfino con riferimento alla regolazione della relazione di coppia tra persone 
dello stesso sesso (e dunque con riferimento a rapporti tra adulti), infatti, si invoca 
l’argomento del superiore interesse del minore per giustificare l’ingerenza nel diritto 
degli omosessuali al rispetto della vita familiare. Secondo un’opinione abbastanza 
diffusa, la limitazione dei diritti delle coppie dello stesso sesso sarebbe necessaria 
per la tutela dei diritti dell’eventuale prole alla corretta formazione dell’identità 
anche sessuale, nonché a un doppio riferimento genitoriale.
Attenta dottrina ha tuttavia evidenziato che occorre separare le questioni relative 
ai rapporti tra genitore omosessuale e figlio minore da quelle interne alla relazione 
di coppia, cioè concernenti la regolazione di rapporti giuridici tra adulti7. La que-
stione dell’ammissibilità di una tutela giuridica si pone infatti solo per le relazioni 
“orizzontali” tra i membri della coppia; le relazioni tra genitori e minori invece sono 
ispirate al principio del superiore interesse del minore, con la conseguenza che l’in-
gerenza dello Stato nella vita familiare del nucleo familiare è legittima solo se e in 
quanto necessaria a proteggere il minore stesso.
Mi pare evidente che il diritto dei minori a crescere in un ambiente idoneo non 
risulterebbe leso dall’apertura del matrimonio alle persone omosessuali in quanto 
l’ordinamento prevede meccanismi di controllo sull’idoneità all’esercizio delle fun-
zioni genitoriali. Le coppie che desiderino adottare un minore sono sottoposte a una 
valutazione dell’idoneità “affettiva” e della capacità “di educare, istruire e mantenere 
i minori che intendono adottare” (art. 6 comma 1° l. n. 184/1983) prima dell’abbina-
mento con il minore e del suo inserimento nel loro nucleo familiare, con la conse-
guenza che ove il giudice ritenesse che l’orientamento sessuale degli aspiranti genito-
ri adottivi possa in concreto costituire pregiudizio per l’adottando, dovrebbe ritenere 
la coppia non idonea all’adozione. La procreazione medicalmente assistita è espres-
samente preclusa alle coppie che non siano “di sesso diverso” (art. 5 l. n. 40/2004).
6 La dottrina italiana che si è occupata specificamente del tema è ancora scarsa: cfr. G. Oberto, ‘Pro-
blemi di coppia, omosessuali e filiazione’, in Dir. fam. e pers., 2010, 802; E. Falletti, ‘Genitore omoses-
suale e affidamento condiviso’ (2009) Giur. it. 1164; J. Long, ‘Omogenitorialità e principio di non di-
scriminazione sulla base dell’orientamento sessuale’ (2011) Bioetica, n. 2, 211. Per una prospettiva 
comparata v. F. Caggia, ‘Convivenze omosessuali e genitorialità: tendenze, conflitti e soluzioni nell’espe-
rienza statunitense’, in Moscati e Zoppini (eds.), I contratti di convivenza (Giappichielli 2002), 243.
7 In questo senso B. Pezzini, ‘Dentro il mestiere di vivere: uguali in natura o uguali in diritto?’, in 
R. Bin et al. (eds.) La “società naturale” e i suoi “nemici” (Giappichelli 2010), 16; A. Lorenzetti, 
Matrimonio e filiazione: legame indissolubile?, ivi, 225.
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3. “Vecchia genitorialità”
Nella sentenza Salgueiro da Silva Mouta c. Portogallo, la Corte europea dei diritti 
dell’uomo condanna lo Stato convenuto per violazione del combinato disposto degli 
artt. 8 e 14 della Convenzione europea dei diritti dell’uomo (CEDU) con riferimento 
al peso determinante attribuito dai giudici nazionali alla condizione di omosessualità 
del padre nella determinazione, in sede di rottura della relazione coniugale dei genito-
ri, delle modalità di affidamento della prole avuta durante una precedente fase di vita 
eterosessuale8. Secondo i giudici europei, infatti, non si poteva ritenere ragionevole il 
rapporto di proporzionalità esistente tra la scelta di affidamento esclusivo della figlia 
alla madre e il fine legittimo perseguito, cioè il superiore interesse della figlia stessa.
Nell’ordinamento italiano, il divieto di discriminazioni sulla base dell’orienta-
mento sessuale appare sostanzialmente accolto nel caso di relazioni con minori 
specificamente individuati e già legati all’adulto omosessuale da un rapporto giuri-
dico di filiazione. Il riferimento, com’è evidente, è a figli concepiti o adottati duran-
te una precedente fase di vita eterosessuale.
Essendo il criterio guida l’interesse morale e materiale della prole (art. 155 com-
ma 2° cod. civ.), l’autorità giudiziaria dovrà valutare in concreto se le caratteristiche 
soggettive del genitore (ivi compreso l’orientamento omosessuale) pregiudichino o 
rischino di pregiudicare l’interesse della prole. Solo qualora l’omosessualità di un 
genitore si rivelasse in concreto pregiudizievole per il minore, dunque, il giudice non 
solo potrebbe ma dovrebbe attribuire rilievo sostanziale a tale condizione dell’adul-
to, limitandone o addirittura escludendone i poteri e le facoltà genitoriali.
Proprio in applicazione di tale principio di diritto, il Tribunale di Bologna ha 
accolto il ricorso di un padre omosessuale che chiedeva la modifica in affidamento 
condiviso del provvedimento di affidamento esclusivo alla madre emesso nel vigore 
del diritto previgente, affermando che “nel caso di specie non si ravvisano elementi 
ostativi all’applicazione del regime ordinario di affidamento stabilito dal legislatore 
a tutela dell’interesse del minore… il semplice fatto che uno dei genitori sia omoses-
suale… non giustifica e non consente di motivare la scelta restrittiva dell’affidamen-
to esclusivo”9. In senso conforme si è recentemente espresso il Tribunale di Nicosia, 
secondo cui “l’eventuale relazione omosessuale della madre, laddove non comporti 
un pregiudizio per la prole, non costituisce ostacolo all’affidamento condiviso dei 
minori e alla individuazione della dimora degli stessi presso l’abitazione della geni-
trice, stante la tenera età dei bambini”10.
8 Corte EDU, sentenza 21 dicembre 1999, Salgueiro da Silva Mouta c. Portogallo. Si tratta del primo 
caso in cui la Corte di Strasburgo affronta la questione dei diritti delle persone omosessuali dal punto 
di vista della vita familiare. Fino ad allora infatti la prospettiva scelta era sempre stata la “vita privata”.
9 Trib. Bologna, decr. 15 luglio 2008, in Giur. it., 2009, 1164, con nota di E. Falletti, ‘Genitore 
omosessuale e affidamento condiviso’.
10 Trib. Nicosia, ord. 14 dicembre 2010, in <www.minoriefamiglia.it>.
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4. Quale riconoscimento della genitorialità sociale?
Più rari sono invece, quantomeno in Italia, i casi di prole adottata dall’altro partner 
o da questi concepita mediante l’impiego di tecniche di procreazione medicalmente 
assistita nell’ambito di un progetto procreativo comune della coppia dello stesso 
sesso. Il fatto che dal 2004 l’impiego della fecondazione eterologa sia per legge vie-
tato e che l’adozione del bambino abbandonato sia di regola preclusa alle coppie 
dello stesso sesso, infatti, non impedisce che nella pratica tali nuclei familiari si for-
mino: non sono poche le coppie che scelgono di rivolgersi all’estero.
In questi casi, in applicazione delle norme del nostro codice civile, il rapporto 
giuridico di filiazione può esistere solo nei confronti di uno dei membri della coppia, 
quello biologico, cioè il padre gay che ha fornito il seme per la fecondazione della 
donna che ha ceduto gratuitamente o verso corrispettivo il proprio utero o la mam-
ma lesbica che è stata fecondata con lo sperma di un donatore anonimo o noto alla 
coppia e ha poi partorito il figlio.
La tutela della genitorialità sociale omosessuale, inoltre, è assicurata solo in casi 
molto limitati. In situazioni transnazionali (e dunque nei casi di residenza all’estero 
o almeno di cittadinanza straniera di uno dei soggetti coinvolti), anzitutto, le coppie 
dello stesso sesso potrebbero probabilmente ottenere il riconoscimento in Italia di 
un provvedimento straniero di adozione disposto, lege fori, a favore del partner11. 
Nel caso di contrasto tra i partner, inoltre, potrebbe essere chiesto al tribunale per i 
minorenni un provvedimento limitativo della potestà del genitore che con il suo 
comportamento pregiudichi l’interesse del figlio minore (cfr. art. 333 cod. civ.). Non 
essendo tuttavia il genitore “sociale” parente del minore, gli sarà preclusa la possi-
bilità di adire direttamente l’autorità giudiziaria, con la conseguenza che dovrà limi-
tarsi a segnalare la situazione al pubblico ministero minorile che deciderà se e quale 
provvedimento chiedere al giudice.
Un’interessante pronuncia milanese, che costituisce a oggi, a mia conoscenza, 
l’unico precedente giudiziario in materia, ha rigettato la richiesta del pubblico mini-
stero di un provvedimento ex art. 333 contro la madre biologica di due minori 
concepiti con procreazione medicalmente assistita di tipo eterologo a seguito di un 
11 Cfr. mutatis mutandis una recente sentenza della Cour de Cassation francese che ha riconosciu-
to l’efficacia in Francia di un’adozione statunitense pronunciata con riferimento a una coppia 
binazionale franco-statunitense e riguardante l’adozione del figlio biologico di uno dei partner 
della coppia dello stesso sesso, affermando espressamente che in questo modo si permetteva alle 
due donne di esercitare congiuntamente l’autorità parentale, cosa che risultava conforme all’inte-
resse del minore che costituisce uno dei principi fondamentali del diritto francese: Cour de cassa-
tion, arrêt n° 791 du 8 juillet 2010. È stata invece rifiutata per contrarietà all’ordine pubblico la 
trascrizione nei registri dello stato civile francese dell’atto di nascita californiano che indicava, 
conformemente alle legge di tale Paese, due uomini quali genitori di una minore da essi procreata 
con l’impiego della maternità surrogata: TGI Nantes, 10 févr. 2001, n. 10/06276, in Droit de la 
famille, 2011, n. 7-8, note C. Neirinck.
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progetto procreativo comune della donna e della sua ex compagna12. Secondo 
quest’ultima, cui viene consentito di partecipare al procedimento13, la madre biolo-
gica le precludeva dopo l’intervenuta rottura della relazione di coppia ogni contatto 
con i bambini con i quali essa aveva tuttavia durante la convivenza more uxorio svi-
luppato un rapporto affettivo significativo di tipo sostanzialmente paragenitoriale. Il 
procedimento viene tuttavia archiviato poiché, secondo i giudici, “non sono ravvisa-
bili comportamenti della madre tali da giustificare una limitazione della potestà ge-
nitoriale… in particolare non vi è l’insuperabile necessità di disporre oggi la ripresa 
della relazione tra X e X (i minori NdA) e X (l’ex partner della madre NdA) non 
essendo emerso che l’assenza di rapporti tra gli stessi sia causa di quel grave pregiu-
dizio che solo giustificherebbe l’intervento del TM ai sensi degli artt. 330 ss. c.c.”14.
5. “Nuova genitorialità”
Dubbi possono invece, a mio parere, essere avanzati sulla conformità al principio di 
non discriminazione, quantomeno nell’interpretazione datane oggi dalle corti di 
Strasburgo e del Lussemburgo, della scelta del legislatore italiano di negare in radi-
ce alle coppie dello stesso sesso la “nuova genitorialità”, mediante adozione o pro-
creazione medicalmente assistita.
In tali casi, a differenza della “vecchia genitorialità, la valutazione dell’idoneità affet-
tiva e della capacità di educare, istruire e mantenere i minori dell’aspirante genitore è 
astratta e preventiva rispetto ai contatti con il potenziale “figlio”, cioè precedente alla 
venuta a esistenza di quest’ultimo (procreazione medicalmente assistita) o all’abbina-
mento tra aspirante adottante e minore (adozione del minore abbandonato). Il termine 
di paragone utilizzato dai legislatori nazionali per individuare i requisiti legali per le 
genitorialità “artificiali” è un modello ideale e astratto di famiglia di accoglienza ritenu-
to idoneo a offrire a loro giudizio le migliori garanzie per la crescita del minore e stori-
camente informato al canone dell’imitatio naturae. Spesso i requisiti richiesti per l’ado-
zione sono più stringenti di quelli richiesti per l’accesso alle tecniche di procreazione 
medicalmente assistita: la ratio deve rinvenirsi nel fatto che i minori adottati vengono 
ritenuti meritevoli di una protezione speciale, e dunque si richiede un livello di capaci-
tà genitoriali più alto, poiché essi sono di per sé particolarmente vulnerabili avendo 
tutti, seppur con tempi e modalità diversi, sperimentato il trauma dell’abbandono.
La più recente giurisprudenza delle Corti di Strasburgo e del Lussemburgo in-
duce, a mio avviso, a dubitare che l’esclusione da parte del legislatore italiano delle 
coppie omosessuali dalla possibilità di presentare dichiarazione di disponibilità 
12 Trib. min. Milano, 20 novembre 2009, in <www.tribunaleminorimilano.it>.
13 Lo stesso Tribunale per i minorenni chiarisce di essere “consapevole del fatto che, dal punto di 
vista strettamente legale, non vi è alcuna possibilità di riconoscimento di una legitimatio ad causam 
di un soggetto non legato da vincolo alcuno al minore”: Trib. min. Milano, 20 novembre 2009, cit.
14 Ibid.
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all’adozione e dall’accesso alle tecniche di procreazione medicalmente assistita pos-
sa ritenersi conforme al divieto di discriminazione sulla base dell’orientamento ses-
suale e dell’identità di genere.
Il primo contributo in materia delle fonti di origine internazionale, e precisamen-
te della giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia, è la rimeditazione del termine di 
paragone alla luce del quale valutare l’esistenza di un trattamento discriminatorio 
della coppia dello stesso sesso. Nei casi Maruko e Römer la Corte di Giustizia ha 
affermato che tale termine di paragone non è costituito necessariamente dagli indi-
vidui di pari status (cioè i conviventi more uxorio di sesso diverso) bensì dalle coppie 
che si trovino in una situazione sostanzialmente analoga e quindi dalle coppie coniu-
gate eterosessuali qualora la situazione della coppia dello stesso sesso appaia, in 
concreto, assimilabile a quella dell’unione coniugale15.
Poiché non paiono esistere studi scientifici che indichino che lo svolgimento di 
funzioni genitoriali da parte di una persona omosessuale sia di per sé pregiudizievo-
le per la prole e anzi alcune ricerche, seppur a oggi condotte su scala ancora ridotta 
e con oggetti circoscritti, sembrano dimostrare che essere cresciuti da coppie dello 
stesso sesso non determina significative differenze nello sviluppo cognitivo, nei rap-
porti sociali e nella presa di coscienza e gestione della propria sessualità e dei propri 
sentimenti rispetto all’allevamento in contesti eterosessuali16, occorre a mio avviso 
concludere che l’orientamento sessuale dei partner di una coppia genitoriale debba 
essere, da un punto di vista formale, irrilevante. In conseguenza di tale ragionamen-
to, in un ordinamento quale quello italiano in cui i partner dello stesso sesso sono 
esclusi dal matrimonio, il termine di paragone alla luce del quale accertare l’esisten-
za di un differente trattamento con riferimento alle scelte procreative della coppia 
dello stesso sesso è l’unione coniugale eterosessuale.
Con riferimento all’ordinamento italiano, tale conclusione appare di grande rile-
vanza con riferimento all’adozione dei minori abbandonati che, come già evidenzia-
to, possono essere adottati dalle sole coppie coniugate (art. 6 legge n. 184/1983) e 
quindi, stante il divieto di matrimonio per le coppie dello stesso sesso, solo da ete-
rosessuali. Nel caso della procreazione medicalmente assistita, invece, la questione 
si pone in termini parzialmente diversi perché le coppie di sesso diverso possono 
15 Corte di Giustizia, Grande sezione, 1° aprile 2008, C 267/06, Maruko c. Versorgungsanstalt der 
deutschen Bühnen, in Fam. e dir., 2008, 653, con nota di M. Bonini Baraldi, Corte di Giustizia, 
Grande Sezione, 10 maggio 2011, C 147/08, Jürgen Römer c. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg.
16 Cfr. M. Rosenfeld, ‘Nontraditional Families and Childhood Progress through School’ (2010) 
47 Demography 755; N. Gartrell and H. Bos, ‘US National Longitudinal Lesbian Family Study: 
Psychological Adjustment of 17-Year-Old Adolescents’ (2010) 126 Pediatrics 28; S. Golombok 
and F. Tasker, ‘Do Parents Influence the Sexual Orientation of Their Children? Findings from a 
Longitudinal Study of Lesbian Families’ (1996) 32 Developmental Psychology 3. Per un’analisi 
secondaria cfr. N. Anderssen, C. Amlie, EA Ytterøy, ‘Outcomes for children with lesbian or gay 
parents. A review of studies from 1978 to 2000’, (2002) 43 Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 335; 
J. G. Pawelski and oth., ‘The Effects of Marriage, Civil Union, and Domestic Partnership Laws 
on the Health and Well-being of Children’ (2006) 118 Pediatrics 349.
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accedere alle tecniche sia se coniugate sia se conviventi, con la conseguenza le cop-
pie dello stesso sesso sono discriminate sia rispetto alle coppie coniugate eteroses-
suali sia rispetto alle coppie conviventi more uxorio eterosessuali.
Poiché è indubbio che l’ordinamento italiano si caratterizzi per la diversità di 
trattamento tra coppie conviventi more uxorio e unioni coniugali quanto alle scelte 
procreative, occorre accertare il carattere giustificato o meno di tale disuguaglianza.
Secondo i giudici di Strasburgo, le differenze di trattamento fondate sull’orien-
tamento sessuale sono conformi alla CEDU (Convenzione Europea per la salvaguar-
dia dei diritti dell’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali) solo se se ne dimostra la neces-
sità per il perseguimento di un fine legittimo, nonché la ragionevolezza rispetto al 
sistema considerato nel suo complesso.
Nel caso Karner c. Austria, per esempio, lo Stato convenuto è stato condannato 
per violazione degli artt. 8 (che garantisce tra l’altro il rispetto al proprio “domici-
lio”) e 14 CEDU, poiché non aveva dimostrato che l’esclusione dei conviventi more 
uxorio omosessuali dalla successione di diritto nel contratto di locazione dopo la 
morte del convivente conduttore fosse “necessaria” per raggiungere il fine legittimo 
della “protezione della famiglia intesa in senso tradizionale”17.
La recente sentenza S. H. e altri c. Austria, inoltre, ha riconosciuto il diritto della 
coppia a non subire ingiustificate ingerenze in ambito procreativo18. Secondo i giu-
dici europei, infatti, non vi è alcun obbligo per gli Stati di ammettere la procreazio-
ne medicalmente assistita19 ma, qualora decidano di farlo, essi potranno limitare 
l’uso delle tecniche eterologhe da parte della coppia solo se ciò sia necessario per il 
perseguimento di fini legittimi e solo nella misura in cui la restrizione risulti propor-
zionata a tali fini20.
In applicazione di tali principi se, come già detto, non paiono esservi studi che 
dimostrano che l’omogenitorialità sia di per sé pregiudizievole per il figlio minore, 
17 Karner c. Austria, cit., par. 41.
18 Corte EDU, sentenza 1° aprile 2010, S.H. e altri c. Austria, in Fam. e dir., 2010, 977. La vicen-
da riguardava due coppie che si erano viste negare l’accesso a tecniche di fecondazione assistita 
eterologa, segnatamente la fecondazione in vitro mediante sperma di un donatore e la donazione 
di ovulo. Non richiamo invece la sentenza E. B. c. Francia (sentenza 22 gennaio 2008), in cui la 
Corte EDU ha condannato lo Stato convenuto per aver considerato una persona single inidonea 
all’adozione in ragione della sua omosessualità, operando così un sostanziale revirement rispetto 
a quanto affermato sei anni prima nella sentenza Fretté c. Francia (sentenza 26 febbraio 2002), 
poiché il caso, come già accennato nel par. 1, pur riguardano l’accesso delle persone omosessuali 
all’adozione, non appare qui pertinente essendo riferito unicamente all’adozione da parte di per-
sona singola (sconosciuta nell’ordinamento italiano, salve limitate ipotesi). Secondo i giudici eu-
ropei, infatti, la consolidata opinione delle autorità amministrative francesi secondo cui la persona 
singola omosessuale sarebbe inidonea all’adozione in quanto impossibilitata a offrire al minore un 
nucleo familiare dotato di un riferimento genitoriale materno e paterno, sarebbe illegittima in 
quanto la scelta di uno Stato membro di consentire per legge al singolo di adottare presuppone 
l’idoneità del nucleo monogenitoriale all’accoglienza di un minore.
19 S. H. e altri c. Austria, cit., par. 74.
20 Ibid., par. 76.
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occorre a mio avviso concludere che, in un ordinamento quale quello italiano in cui 
alle persone dello stesso sesso è precluso il matrimonio, il principio di non discrimi-
nazione impone di equiparare le coppie conviventi more uxorio dello stesso sesso 
alle coppie coniugate eterosessuali riconoscendo loro la possibilità di essere sottopo-
ste a valutazione dell’idoneità all’adozione di minori.
Il diritto a essere valutati idonei all’adozione senza subire discriminazioni in ra-
gione della propria omosessualità, com’è evidente, non implica il diritto a ottenere 
un minore in adozione. Tutti i Paesi di matrice culturale europea prevedono infatti 
che l’abbinamento tra gli aspiranti adottanti e i minori adottabili debba avvenire 
nell’interesse di questi ultimi. In Italia è il tribunale per i minorenni a scegliere “tra 
le coppie che hanno presentato domanda quella maggiormente in grado di corri-
spondere alle esigenze” del minore (art. 22, comma 2°, l. n. 184/1983). Dovendo 
individuare la coppia “migliore” e considerando il (fortunatamente) basso numero 
di minori adottabili, occorrere dunque preferire in concreto l’aspirante adottante 
che abbia caratteristiche tali da garantire meglio il benessere di quel minore. In 
quest’ottica sarebbe probabilmente legittimo preferire un aspirante adottante sano 
rispetto a uno che, pur ritenuto idoneo all’adozione, sia portatore di un handicap 
fisico di rilievo tale da condizionare in modo determinante la vita familiare; ciò mal-
grado il divieto costituzionale di discriminazioni sulla base delle «condizioni perso-
nali». Sarebbe inoltre probabilmente legittimo preferire la coppia eterosessuale 
qualora per esempio l’adottando sia già grandicello e abbia in passato vivacemente 
rifiutato i contatti con un genitore omosessuale. Illegittimo sarebbe invece un dinie-
go di abbinamento sulla base della considerazione che per il minore adottato da un 
omosessuale l’integrazione sociale sarebbe più difficile.
Per quanto concerne l’adozione internazionale mi limito a osservare che l’interes-
se del minore all’abbinamento deve essere valutato dalle competenti autorità del 
Paese di origine secondo il diritto locale: in considerazione del fatto che la pressoché 
totalità dei Paesi di origine dei minori esclude gli omosessuali dall’adozione, l’aper-
tura di alcuni Paesi di accoglienza all’adozione da parte delle persone omosessuali è 
di fatto limitata alle sole adozioni nazionali.
Più complesso è l’esame dell’impatto dell’interpretazione europea del principio 
di non discriminazione sull’accesso alle tecniche di procreazione medicalmente assi-
stita. L’ordinamento italiano, in effetti, è coerente sul piano interno perché vieta ogni 
tipo di fecondazione eterologa (art. 4 comma 3° legge n. 40/2004). Dubbi potrebbe-
ro tuttavia, a mio parere, essere avanzati sulla necessarietà del divieto delle tecniche 
eterologhe per il perseguimento delle finalità pur astrattamente legittime perseguite 
dal legislatore. Proprio nella sentenza S. H. e al. c. Austria, per esempio, la Corte 
EDU afferma che la moltiplicazione delle figure genitoriali conseguente all’utilizzo 
di tecniche eterologhe non costituisce ragione sufficiente per giustificare l’esclusione 
di tali tecniche in quanto esistono strumenti giuridici che consentono di attribuire 
comunque al minore uno status familiare certo (per esempio, la presunzione di pa-
ternità del coniuge della madre per i figli da essa partoriti durante il matrimonio).
The righTs of The Care of The Child as well
as maTerniTy, paTerniTy and parenTal leave
in sTable lgbTi family uniTs
Marco Bracoloni
Abstract
The aim of this study is to investigate the legal solution that allows the members of stable 
LGBTI family units, who are not biological parents, the entitlement to maternity and pa-
ternity leave – parental leave in a broad sense. The attempt by the European legislature, 
aimed at reducing the discrimination which does not allow stable LGBTI family units to 
exercise their rights to use such leave, has not led to convincing results. A new approach 
is required, which is no longer based on disciplines aiming to eliminate gender discrimina-
tion: this will consider the parent as the person who takes a new member, the child, into 
his or her family and to whom he wants to give love, well-being and care, contributing this 
way both to the child’s growth and to the productive development of society. Shifting the 
discussion to the possibility of identifying provisions allowing for the care of the children 
remains the most easily usable tool to allow even non-biological parents of stable LGBTI 
units to obtain paid parental leave. In conclusion, we must recognize the child’s right to 
have a proper care regime, regardless of the parents’ gender. The child must be considered 
as a subject of law and not only the object of the parents’ rights.
* * *
1. Maternity and paternity leave: parental leave of stable LGBTI family units
1.1. Legal context: Community policy and the recognition of equal rights between tradi-
tional families and stable LGBTI family units regarding leave
The relationship between the members of stable LGBTI family units1 (also called 
LGBTI families) and their right to the care of the children who are part of those 
families, is one of the issues discussed in relation to sexual orientation and gender 
identity. This study examines the rights conferred to and exercised by the members 
1 Stable LGBTI family units are formed from family components LGBTI (Lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
trans and intersex) which last for over two years (in apparent contrast with “open” families), en-
visage mutual fidelity, represent a stable point family values based on values that transcend sexu-
al orientation, do not represent an obvious ostentation, and is not subjective based on personality 
rights (with the word gayfamily/omogenitoriale or Rainbow family is usually the family consists of 
parents of the same sex).
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of stable LGBTI family units in case of absence from work for maternity, paternity or 
parental leave. The objective is to investigate the feasibility of a legally valid way to 
allow couples who form stable LGBTI units to vindicate the right of the care of the 
child. In particular, this study focuses on a delicate and little explored aspect: the 
ability to care for the child which could be recognized to the parent who is not re-
lated to the child by a biological or adoptive filiation. The Member States of the 
European Union show significant differences in their respective employment and 
social policies. It is precisely the specifics of each State to determine the mixture of 
the elements that characterise the relationship between the labour market and the 
care of the child (i.e., the ratio between the hours dedicated to work and time de-
voted to the family). Therefore, the parents’ choice on how to take time off work and 
make use of maternity, paternity and parental leave – be it paid or not2 – to take care 
of their children, is dictated at the same time both by the general community rules 
and by the more detailed internal rules of their own country. The experience of a 
domestic policy that provides a flexible labour market, allowing part-time or the in-
terchangeability between parents to take leave, and therefore influential even in the 
parenting roles, showed a reduction in gender discrimination and a greater chance of 
access to employment for women with a high level of education. A positive impact 
was noted both on the labour market, consisting in a greater integration of gender, 
and on an easier accessibility to children’s care. Maternity, paternity and parental 
leave each followed their own historical and normative pattern of development, all 
characterized by a common goal: the elimination of gender discrimination. In fact, 
the community policy has included among its main objectives the reduction and 
elimination of discrimination through the introduction of the principle of equality3, 
pursued through the adoption of targeted actions to its achievement. In terms of 
employment, since the signing of the Treaty of Rome on the 25th March 19574 and its 
amendment with the Treaty of Amsterdam of the 2nd October 1997, it has been es-
tablished that each State should guarantee equal pay to each worker regardless of the 
worker’s sex. Starting from this pronouncement, it can be affirmed that it is up to 
each worker to recognize and exercise the rights arising from the employment rela-
tionship, with regards to both those arising from the synallagma performance/pay 
2 The discipline that regulates subjective situations giving rise to the worker that the continuation 
of employment in the absence of performance work, both paid and unpaid, which results in a 
temporary suspension of the provision of job, including maternity, paternity and parental leave for 
all to see Antonio Vallebona, Istituzioni di diritto del lavoro (sixth edn, CEDAM, 2008) 353 ff.
3 The reconstruction policies of inequality starting from the analysis of the conditions of legiti-
macy of differential treatments are contained in Stefania Scarponi, Eleonora Stenico, ‘Le azioni 
positive: le disposizioni comunitarie, le luci e le ombre della legislazione italiana’, in Marzia Bar-
bera (ed.), Il nuovo diritto antidiscriminatorio, il quadro nazionale e comunitario (Giuffrè 2007).
4 The art. 141 of the Treaty establishing the European Community stipulates that «each Member 
State shall ensure the application of the principle of equal pay between men and women …. with-
out discrimination».
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and those which can be exercised when5 a temporary suspension of the work occurs, 
be it paid or unpaid, and in any case contractually disciplined and planned. These 
rights include maternity, paternity and parental leave, which should be granted to 
working parents whether they are biological parents or adoptive parents. The consid-
erable diversity that characterizes the countries of the European Union, and the even 
more marked difference with non-European legislations, requires an approach that 
should be based on the combined provisions of the legislation governing maternity, 
paternity and parental leave, and the one which allows people living with the bio-
logical or adoptive parent to be recognized as “parents”, in the attempt to ensure an 
equal treatment between traditional families and stable LGBTI family units.
In order to talk about subjects entitled to make use of these rights of leave, it is 
necessary to clarify the relationship that binds the child, as the object of the right, 
to the leave assignable to a non-biological parent or adoptive parent, cohabitating 
with the parent who has the legal bond of legitimate or natural filiation. By virtue of 
such relationship, the non-biological or adoptive parent is entitled to use such leave. 
European regulations indicate some possible solutions in the rules that recognize the 
right to family reunification or that implement the principle of equal opportunities 
and equality between men and women in employment and occupation matters. 
Starting from the Community rules governing maternity, paternity and parental 
leave, it is appropriate to draw first, and without claiming to be exhaustive, the 
evolution that has undergone the compulsory maternity protection6. At the begin-
ning (reference is made to the Institution of the European Communities) the focus 
was on pursuing equality of treatment between men and women in accessing em-
ployment, remuneration, working conditions, social protection and professional 
development. The rules that allowed a working mother to use maternity leave were 
aimed at protecting the health of the mother: there were rules which specifically 
prohibited the employment of pregnant women for physically demanding and dan-
gerous jobs. Subsequently, the focus shifted to a policy aimed at solving the gender 
discrimination, discussing also the fact that gender discrimination policies can allow 
the protection of sexual orientation and gender identity. In the case of biological 
filiation, Community directives on compulsory maternity leave have reached a cer-
tain homogeneity among the internal regulations of individual States in Europe, 
guaranteeing to all working mothers a minimum period of paid absence (the only 
distinction found in the regulations of the Member States relates to the different 
economic treatment which favours permanent employees over temporary ones).
5 The article No. 142 of the Treaty establishing the European Community imposes «on Member 
States’ efforts to maintain the existing equivalence in paid leave schemes».
6 Directive 92/85/EEC obliges Member States to introduce into legislation a mandatory mater-
nity leave, aimed at improving worker safety and health at work. In Italy, the maternity leave is 
regulated in chapter III of the Legislative Decree No. 151 of 26 March 2001, Testo unico delle 
disposizioni legislative in materia di tutela e sostegno della maternità e della paternità, a norma 
dell’art. 15 della legge 8 March 2000, no. 53, dall’art. 16 all’art. 27.
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The situation is different when it comes to mandatory paternity leave7, since it 
has only been recently proposed8 that, in the case of biological parentage, an indi-
vidual, subjective right, should be attributed to and directly exercisable by the work-
ing father (and therefore no longer a surrogated, alternative right to the one in-
tended for the mother). The current legislation in case of adoption, both at Com-
munity level and at national level, for instance as in Italy9, includes a discipline that 
places the mother and the adoptive father on an equal level with respect to the pos-
sibility of resorting to mandatory maternity/paternity leave. The maternity and pa-
ternity leave, in case of adoptive filiation, has achieved a good level of homogeniza-
tion among the internal rules of the European countries. The turnover between a 
working father and a working mother in the exercise of the right to maternity or 
paternity leave acknowledged in the case of adoption is definitely the best example 
of how it should be also in the case of biological filiation10.
With regards to parental leave11, which is optional, the directive 2010/18/EU has 
sanctioned the attribution of the right to be absent from work for both parents for a 
defined period, which is exercisable alternately by both the mother and the father 
(each of them are entitled to a minimum period which is non-transferable to the other 
parent12). Parental leave has been rarely used by fathers in most European countries. 
Positive data come from some European countries where legislation to incentive its 
use has been put in place: in the Scandinavian countries, for example, and in particu-
lar in Sweden, where the change of mindset necessary to encourage greater participa-
tion of both parents to equal family responsibilities has already happened.
7 On October 21, 2010, a proposal for a directive of the European Parliament which provides for 
the establishment of compulsory paternity leave was approved. Up to now, paternity leave has 
only known the internal discipline of individual States, which have chosen differently from one 
another. In Italy, paternity leave is regulated in articles No. 28, 29, 30 and 31 of Legislative Decree 
No. 151 of 2001, Testo unico delle disposizioni legislative in materia di tutela e sostegno della ma-
ternità e della paternità, a norma dell’art. 15 della legge 8 marzo 2000, no. 53.
8 For an in-depth study, see Marco Bracoloni, ‘Il congedo di paternità’, in [2010] LPO, Lavoro e 
Previdenza Oggi 1249; and also Laura Cafalà, Sull’autonomia del congedo di paternità del lavoratore 
subordinato [2010] Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro 323.
9 The Italian legislation governing maternity and paternity is an autonomous law for each of the 
two parents to practice independently within the meaning of art. 26 (replaced by art. 2 paragraph 
452, of law No. 244 of December 24, 2007) and article No. 31 of Legislative Decree No. 151 of 
2001 and article No. 31.
10 For a brief commentary on the interpretation given by the jurisprudence in the judgments of 
the Italian Constitutional Court N.°385/2005, N.°285/2010, refer to Bracoloni (n 8) 1271-1275.
11 Covered by Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave 
concluded by UNICE, CEEP and the CES, OJ L 145 of 19 June 1996, the Directive repealed by 
Directive 2010/18/EU of 8 March 2010 implementing the revised framework agreement on pa-
rental leave concluded by BUSINESSEUROPE, UEAPME, CEEP and the CES.
12 The Italian legislation governing parental leave with the Legislative Decree No. 151 of 2001, 
Testo unico delle disposizioni legislative in materia di tutela e sostegno della maternità e della 
paternità, a norma dell’art. 15 della legge 8 March 2000, no. 53, artt. 32 and ss.
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Maternity, paternity and parental leave are perfectly usable by members of the 
stable LGBTI family units in States where there is legal recognition of LGBTI 
family, which binds with a legal obligation of civil marriage and its components as 
for example in the Netherlands since 2001, Belgium since 2003, Spain since 2005, 
Sweden since 2009. The situation is different in countries that offer a recording 
for same-sex couples (defined by each State in a different way, such as legal 
contract or civil solidarity pact) as only a few cases recognize the same treatment 
granted to civil marriages. Among these states are Denmark (which also allows 
adoptions), Iceland, Germany, and France (which recognizes economic rights but 
not recourse to adoptions). In States where there is not a provision13 to recognize 
the existence of a family that is not the traditional one, there is not the recognition 
of the rights connected with parentage for components of stable family units, 
which are usually recognized only for the LGBTI partners related to the child 
from a biological or adoptive filiation (often existing in the formation of stable 
LGBTI family units). Ultimately, it is difficult to obtain a legal forecast according 
to which components of stable LGBTI family units, which are not biological or 
adoptive parents of children forming part of the stable core (as biological or 
adoptive children of another component), may recur to the protection of the 
child’s care and time off from work because of the possible exercise of rights. 
Currently only a few European countries, including Spain, Belgium, Holland, 
Sweden and United Kingdom show more favorable policies in terms of family, 
including stable LGBTI family units, with positive impact on the world of work 
and on leave granted to parents for the care of their children. An opposite attitude 
is that of Italy, where it is not permitted to celebrate marriages between persons 
of the same sex, reinforced by the last amendment of the Ordinance No. 4 of 2011 
of the Constitutional Court which considers legitimate the prohibition (Art. No.29 
of the Constitution refers to the notion of civil code defined marriage as a Union 
between persons of different sex) on same-sex couples contracting civil marriage. 
Also the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia support the traditional family 
model, while Latvia supports the employment of women by facilitating services for 
the care of children paid by households rather than focus on parental leave. 
Understanding whether there is a chance to gain recognition in the exercise of the 
right to leave is necessary to investigate whether the rules are legally binding or 
non-legally binding instruments (coming from European institutions and bodies) 
of protection of LGBTI people and part of stable LGBTI family units. Standards 
and acts which express the need to adopt, by the Member States, legislation that 
protects from discriminatory conduct based on sexual orientation14 at work. 
13 Parliament adopted on 16 March 2000 a resolution urging the EU nation to grant same-sex 
couples a substantial and formal equality with traditional couples. Please note though that recom-
mendation, contained in a report on human rights, is not binding.
14 See art. No.8 of the European Convention on human rights and fundamental freedoms (CE-
DU/ECHR), which brings the case-law of the ECHR in case of infringement cases in which the 
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Article No. 13 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, as amended, 
gives the Council of Ministers, on a proposal from the Commission and after 
consulting the European Parliament, the ability to take appropriate action to 
combat all forms of discrimination, including those based on sex and sexual 
orientation. The Charter of Nice of 2000 introduces a prohibition against 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, taken from Art. No. 21 of the 
European Charter of fundamental rights in 2003, and the right of same-sex 
couples to the recognition and equality in comparison to traditional ones. This 
forecast seems to be willing to establish a uniform regulation of filiation 
relationships. The need to protect the full equality of the components of stable 
LGBTI family units compared to traditional household components has been 
repeatedly reaffirmed by the European Parliament through the adoption of 
numerous Resolutions15 aimed at recognizing and establishing civil Union contracts 
by suppressing discrimination suffered by homosexuals in matters of tax law, civil 
rights, labour law, insurance law, and matrimonial property regimes. An important 
role is recognized by the European Parliament’s Recommendations, which include 
those of 16th March 2000, which calls on European countries to ensure that same-
sex couples have equal rights with respect to traditional couples and families, and 
of January 2006, which sought to ensure that persons are protected from violence 
as well as LGBTI and homophobic hate. Among the binding acts, a major 
importance at Community level should be attributed to Directive 2000/43/EC of 
29th June 2000 which implements the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin and Directive 2000/78/EC of 27th 
November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, prohibiting the direct or indirect discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. Unfortunately such acts that involve and require the 
elimination of discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation are a limit to the 
possibility of obtaining the recognition of the rights related to motherhood and 
fatherhood in view of the lack of legal constraint that must bind the child’s 
biological or adoptive parent’s partner to another partner living together in the 
LGBTI family unit.
All the acts, both directives as well as recommendations, calling for equal rights 
between traditional and non-traditional families, foresee a long process for their 
implementation16. Notwithstanding specific references in the Treaty Establishing the 
guidelines are in relief or sexual identity of applicants, in particular in the case of respect for his 
private and family life rather than a reference to article No.14 relating to the prohibition on States 
to carry out discrimination of individuals in the enjoyment of rights and freedoms.
15 Remember: resolutions of 8 February 1994 “On equal rights for homosexuals in the communi-
ty”; of 17 September 1996 “on respect for human rights in the European Community”.
16 See the report of 17 January 2003 of the European Parliament calls on Member States to rec-
ognize the same rights to all cohabitating couples, including homosexuals. The final vote resulted 
in a non-binding nature for the Member States to adopt the proposal, but is still a legal reference 
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European Union to banning discrimination based on sexual orientation, some Eu-
ropean States still refuse to recognize not only the opportunity to celebrate civil 
marriages but also those celebrated in another European State.
Given the difficulty of finding in the short term an effective solution to enable 
the stable core component LGBTI tied to the biological or adoptive parent by a 
Union to take care of the child (Union not legally recognized by domestic law, even 
in cases of family reunification or of free movement and residence or settlement17), 
it is necessary to establish a new approach to the problem.
2. The right of the care of the child and the right to maternity, paternity and 
parental leave
2.1. From the attempt to eliminate gender discrimination to the detection of the holder 
of the right to maternity, paternity and parental leave
The efforts to eliminate discrimination based on both gender and sexual orientation 
undertaken so far by the Community legislature have proved to be scarcely effective 
in ensuring parents-components of stable LGBTI family units the possibility of ex-
ercising their rights to use maternity, paternity and parental leave. The results 
emerged by comparing experiences in countries where there is a large and full rec-
ognition of nontraditional households to those States which do not recognize the 
parental role, not even to people who are not biological or adoptive parents but part 
of a family and therefore core components of a stable unit, highlight a notable dif-
ference among the European States. This difference cannot be overcome by simply 
pursuing a “classical” anti-discrimination policy, also by virtue of the fact that the 
Europe Strategy 2020 shows a marked setback of the priorities pursued in previous 
strategic guidelines. In fact, equality and gender mainstreaming do not appear in the 
integrated guidelines of the strategic policy of Europe 202018 and it is foreseen that 
point. Also on 11 February 2003 the European Parliament was back on the subject, asking for the 
recognition of the rights for those who contracted marriage, the legalization of de facto unions 
between same-sex couples (recognition of a Union without there being a civil wedding). The 
process of adaptation of domestic legislation of individual States in Europe will be long, because 
the marriage between persons of the opposite sex is recognized throughout the European Union 
and the same sex is not recognized in all European countries.
17 Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of Union citizens and their family members to move and 
reside freely within the territory of the Member States, has been the subject of December 2005, a 
critical report adopted by the European Commission that assessed negatively the laws of the 
Member States to improve administrative practices in order to avoid harm to the rights of EU 
citizens. Member States should comply with the directive by the deadline of 30 April 2006. Cur-
rently only Cyprus, Greece, Finland, Portugal, Malta, Luxembourg and Spain have adopted the 
provisions of the directive correctly.
18 See CEC (2010°), “Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020. A strategy for smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth”. COM (2010) 2020. In <http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/
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their impact will be less significant in future policy Europe 2030. It is also for this 
reason that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted 
on the 29th April 2010 a resolution on discrimination based on sexual orientation 
and gender identity. A few weeks earlier, on the 31st of March 2010, the Committee 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe unanimously adopted a Recommendation 
aimed at combating discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. 
Its main points range over several violations including, for the purpose of this study, 
those involving the complete denial of LGBTI families’ rights, requiring Member 
States to tackle this issue through the legal recognition of these families. Unfortu-
nately, the resolution does not prescribe States that do not have legislation which 
recognizes LGBTI families to introduce one, but just to eliminate any barrier that 
discriminates against non-traditional families. Another point relates to parents and 
the ability to secure a shared responsibility between the partners, whether they are 
part of a traditional family or of a stable LGBTI family unit. The result should en-
sure the protection of the interests of children. This premise generates the alterna-
tive idea about who should be the subject entitled to maternity, paternity and paren-
tal leave. To further discuss this idea, we must shift the debate from discrimination 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity to parental responsibility. The Char-
ter of the rights of the child19 therefore becomes the instrument through which we 
can begin to assert that it is necessary to start discussing the parents’ responsibility. 
The Convention stipulates that all parents and responsible adults must know the 
document (the Charter of the rights of the child) in order to ensure that children are 
not only objects of protection but subjects of law. It is useful to recall some of the 
passages in the Charter: “the State must ensure the necessary care for the child’s well-
being”; “States must respect the people who look after the child”; “Member States must 
help the child grow”; “The child has the right to remain with its family”; “The child 
has the right to go to any State to join its parents”; “Parents or legal guardians must 
care for the upbringing and development of the child. The State must help them by 
making their task easier “; “The State must assist the child who cannot be with its fam-
ily by entrusting him/her to somebody else”; “Member States must permit the adoption 
in the interest of the child. The adoption must be authorized by the authorities with 
the consent of the child’s relatives. If the adoption cannot take place in the child’s 
original country, it can be done in another State”. These statements stimulate a further 
reflection which leads to the conclusion that the child should in effect be considered 
COMPLET%20en%20BARROSO%20%20%20007%20-%20Europe%202020%20
-%EN%20version.pdf>; e CEC (2010b), “Europe 2020. Integrated Guidelines for the economic 
and employment policy”, European Communities, Brussels. In <http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/
pdf/Brochure%20Integrated%20Guidelines.pdf>.
19 The Convention on the rights of childhood and adolescence has been approved by the Assem-
bly of the United Nations in New York on 20 November 1989 and was ratified by Italy and made 
enforceable on May 27, 1991 through the approval of law No. 176
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a citizen20 and as such entitled to legal rights. A brief analysis of the Italian Constitu-
tion allows the different provisions for the protection of the rights of the child (see 
articles 30, 31 and 34 of the Italian Constitution) to be translated into the rules of 
family law. We must, however, take an additional step: the concept of parental re-
sponsibility should be replaced by the community concept of “responsibility” at-
tributed to those who actually take care of the child and therefore give recognition 
to the cohabitant of the (biological or adoptive) father or mother those rights that 
would otherwise not be exercisable. In theory, non-attribution of maternity, pater-
nity and parental leave involves a double discriminatory violation. On the one hand, 
it is discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity, and on the 
other it is discrimination against the child, who is not guaranteed the protection 
required for its well-being. In a regulatory environment considered as a whole (both 
community and national), the legal solution is not simple, even if the Italian law 
could provide an example in the figure of the guardian (governed by article No. 357 
of the civil code). The guardian is the person who is entrusted with the care of the 
minor, represents the child in all civil acts and administers its assets. If this definition 
also included the responsibility to deal with the actual care of the child, its growth 
and its well-being, besides its economic interests, it could possibly streamline the 
development and subsequent implementation of the community’s process which 
aims to recognize the validity of non-traditional families. In conclusion, it seems 
necessary to locate a legal provision that will easily and directly allow people (who 
have the parental role for to all intents and purposes) to take care of the child. These 
people will then be able to properly love, look after and take care of the child, thus 
contributing to its growth and the productive development of our society. Recogniz-
ing the right of the child to have a proper care regime, independent of its parents’ 
gender or the adults looking after him/her, it will automatically lead to the recogni-
tion of the right of the stable core component of the LGBTI unit (including the 
partner of the biological or adoptive parent) to take maternity, paternity or parental 
leave from work. The child must be considered as a subject of law and not only the 
object of the parent’s right to take absence from work.
20 For an examination of rights, citizenship and minority see Luigi Fadiga, ‘Il bambino è un cit-
tadino: minore età e diritti di cittadinanza’, in Le Istituzioni del Federalismo (Supplemento n. 3, 
Maggioli 2008).

les droiTs suCCessoraux des Couples
homosexuels en europe : éTude ComparaTive
Anne-Laure Nachbaum-Schneider
Résumé
Les droits successoraux des couples homosexuels en Europe sont extrêmement variés, 
montrant ainsi qu’il existe, dans certains pays, des discriminations entre couples hétéro-
sexuels et couples homosexuels.
Dans de nombreux pays d’Europe, l’époux ou le partenaire enregistré homosexuel béné-
ficie des mêmes droits légaux, dans la succession de son conjoint ou partenaire décédé, 
que les époux hétérosexuels. Il s’agit des pays ayant ouvert le mariage aux couples de 
même sexe ou ayant créé un partenariat enregistré de type institutionnel.
Dans d’autres pays d’Europe, le partenaire enregistré ou le concubin homosexuels ne bé-
néficient d’aucuns droits successoraux légaux. Les concubins ou partenaires doivent alors 
rédiger un testament l’un en faveur de l’autre, afin de transmettre leur patrimoine au sur-
vivant d’entre eux. Cependant, ce testament se heurtera au décès à la réserve des descen-
dants et dans certains pays à la réserve des ascendants. Il s’agit des pays ayant institué des 
partenariats de type contractuel ou ne reconnaissant pas du tout le couple homosexuel.
Abstract
Inheritance rights of gay couples in Europe are extremely diverse, showing that there is, in 
some countries, discrimination between heterosexual and homosexual couples.
In many European countries, the spouse or the registered gay partner enjoys the same le-
gally protected rights in the succession to the assets of his deceased spouse or partner as 
heterosexual spouses. These are the countries that have opened marriage to same-sex 
couples or have created registered partnerships on an institutional level.
In other European countries, homosexual registered partners and cohabitants enjoy no 
legally protected rights of inheritance. There, cohabitants or partners must write a will for 
one another to transfer their wealth to the survivor of them. However, at death, this testa-
ment will face the forced heirship of the descendants and in some countries the forced 
heirship of the ascendants. These are the countries that have established partnerships 
based on a contract and the countries where gay couples are not legal recognized at all.
* * *
L’examen des droits successoraux des couples homosexuels, dans les différentes lé-
gislations européennes permet de mettre au jour les discriminations entre couples 
hétérosexuels et couples homosexuels.
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Le couple est l’union formée par deux personnes entre lesquelles existent des 
relations charnelles et en général une communauté de vie. Ces personnes peuvent 
être mariées, dans les liens d’un partenariat enregistré, ou vivre hors mariage1.
Avant les années soixante-dix, les couples homosexuels ne bénéficiaient d’aucune 
forme de reconnaissance légale. Puis, de nombreux pays européens ont pris en compte 
la cohabitation de ces couples et leurs ont progressivement reconnu des droits, grâce 
au partenariat enregistré. Ce partenariat enregistré est un acte d’enregistrement formel 
dont il résulte un certain nombre de droits et d’obligations légaux2. Selon les pays, ces 
partenariats enregistrés sont plus ou moins similaires au mariage. Ils sont ouverts soit 
aux couples hétérosexuels et homosexuels soit réservés aux couples homosexuels3.
Par la suite, la reconnaissance des couples homosexuels a connu une avancée 
significative dans les années 2000. Depuis 2001, sept pays d’Europe ont modifié leur 
législation pour autoriser le mariage entre deux personnes de même sexe.
Le mariage et le partenariat enregistré ont dans certains pays entraîné l’octroi de 
droits successoraux légaux entre leurs membres, tandis qu’auparavant, seule la suc-
cession testamentaire leur permettait de transmettre leur patrimoine à leur concubin 
de même sexe.
Il est important de rappeler la différence entre ces deux successions qui coexis-
tent dans chaque pays d’Europe. La succession légale ou ab intestat est la transmis-
sion du patrimoine du défunt aux successibles prévus par la loi. La succession légale 
est réglée par la loi et le patrimoine du défunt est transmis directement aux per-
sonnes que la loi désigne comme héritières. La succession légale a plusieurs fonde-
ments, variables selon les législations. Ainsi, ces personnes peuvent être celles pour 
lesquelles le défunt est présumé avoir eu le plus d’affection. Ou encore, la succession 
légale peut vouloir sauvegarder les droits de la famille. Dans toutes les législations 
européennes, le premier ordre d’héritier est constitué des descendants du défunt. 
En règle générale, le conjoint survivant fait également partie de cet ordre d’héritier 
ou vient en concours avec les descendants.
A l’inverse, la succession testamentaire est la dévolution choisie par le défunt dans 
son testament. Le patrimoine est attribué selon la volonté du défunt aux personnes 
qu’il aura nommées héritières dans son testament. Le défunt peut décider d’avantager 
ou de désavantager certains héritiers, ou de transmettre son patrimoine à un tiers. 
Néanmoins, la succession testamentaire n’est pas libre dans la grande majorité des 
pays d’Europe. Les règles de la réserve héréditaire limitent la liberté testamentaire et 
imposent au défunt de laisser une quote-part de son patrimoine à certains successibles.
1 Définition adaptée de M. Gérard Cornu dont la vision du couple est traditionnelle puisque 
composé d’un homme et d’une femme, Gérard Cornu (dir.), Association Henri Capitant, Vocabu-
laire juridique (8ème éd. P.U.F. coll. Quadrige, 2009).
2 Kees Waaldijk, Eric Fassin, Droit conjugal et union de même sexe - Mariage, partenariat et concu-
binage dans neuf pays européens (édition PUF, 2008) 16.
3 Kees Waaldijk, Eric Fassin, Droit conjugal et union de même sexe - Mariage, partenariat et concu-
binage dans neuf pays européens (édition PUF, 2008) 10.
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Les droits successoraux dans les couples homosexuels sont très variables d’un 
pays d’Europe à un autre. Nous allons tout d’abord nous intéresser à la succession 
ab intestat ou légale afin de vérifier si la loi prévoit des droits successoraux en faveur 
du survivant des membres du couple. Si le survivant ne bénéficie d’aucuns droits 
successoraux légaux dans la succession de son aimé, nous nous pencherons sur la 
succession testamentaire en nous demandant dans quelle mesure les membres du 
couple peuvent rédiger un testament en faveur l’un de l’autre et de quelle manière 
la loi restreint leur capacité de disposer.
Deux groupes de pays se détachent dans cette étude. Tout d’abord, certains pays 
européens réservent les mêmes droits successoraux légaux aux couples homosexuels 
qu’aux époux hétérosexuels, grâce au mariage et au partenariat enregistré. Tandis 
qu’il existe encore des pays dans lesquels les couples homosexuels ne bénéficient 
d’aucuns droits successoraux légaux ou de droits restreints. Nous analyserons alors 
la législation interne de ces pays pour déterminer quelle quotité du patrimoine peut 
être transmise par testament.
1. Les pays européens réservant les mêmes droits successoraux légaux aux couples 
homosexuels et hétérosexuels
Dans certains pays d’Europe, le conjoint ou partenaire survivant homosexuel béné-
ficie des mêmes droits successoraux légaux que le conjoint survivant hétérosexuel. 
C’est notamment le cas dans les pays autorisant le mariage homosexuel. Mais pas 
seulement. En effet, dans d’autres pays, le partenariat enregistré a été créé pour 
donner aux partenaires le statut du mariage avec ses droits et ses obligations, notam-
ment en matière successorale, sans toutefois leur accorder le droit au mariage4.
1.1. Les droits successoraux légaux découlant du mariage homosexuel
Le mariage homosexuel existe dans sept pays européens : les Pays-Bas5, la Belgique6, 
l’Espagne7, la Norvège8, la Suède9, le Portugal10 et l’Islande11. Ces pays ont, en règle 
4 Frédérique Granet-Lambrechts, ‘Les législations européennes relatives à l’enregistrement des 
couples hors-mariage’ [2005] Droit de la famille, étude 2.
5 Loi du 21 décembre 2000.
6 Loi du 13 février 2003.
7 La loi 13/2005 du 1er juillet 2005 modifie le Code civil sur les conditions du mariage et fait 
disparaître la condition de différence de sexe comme condition du mariage. L’article 44 du Code 
civil espagnol déclare dans son 1er alinéa que «  l’homme et la femme ont le droit de contracter 
mariage » et l’alinéa suivant : « le mariage sera soumis aux mêmes conditions et mêmes effets, que 
les époux soient de même sexe ou qu’ils soient de sexe différent » in Béatrice Jaluzot, ‘Le mariage 
entre personnes de même sexe - Etude pour la Cour de cassation’ (2008) RIDC, pages 418-431.
8 Loi du 27 juin 2008.
9 Loi d’avril 2009.
10 Loi du 1er mars 2010.
11 Loi du 26 juin 2010.
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générale, simplement supprimé la mention du sexe dans l’article de leur Code civil 
traitant du mariage. Ainsi, les droits civils découlant du mariage s’appliquent indif-
féremment à tous les époux, quel que soit leur sexe.
Les époux homosexuels ont ainsi strictement les mêmes droits en matière succes-
sorale ab intestat que les époux hétérosexuels.
Ces droits dépendent des héritiers en concours dans la succession. Le conjoint 
survivant peut ainsi venir en concours avec un enfant ou descendant commun12, un 
enfant ou descendant du défunt ou des ascendants du défunt.
Ainsi, au Portugal, la succession du défunt est dévolue à parts égales entre le 
conjoint et les descendants du défunt. Néanmoins, le conjoint reçoit toujours au 
minimum un quart de la succession, les trois quarts restants sont divisés entre les 
descendants du défunt13.
En Belgique, le conjoint survivant se voit attribuer toute la succession en usu-
fruit s’il vient en concours avec des descendants du défunt. A défaut de descen-
dants et en présence d’autres successibles, il recueille la pleine propriété de la part 
de communauté du défunt et l’usufruit de ses biens propres ainsi que le droit au 
bail de l’immeuble commun et l’usufruit des biens faisant l’objet d’un droit de 
retour14 légal15.
Aux Pays-Bas, la succession est dévolue à parts égales entre le conjoint et les 
enfants du défunt. Néanmoins, le conjoint reçoit tous les actifs de la succession. Les 
enfants ont droit à une certaine somme d’argent représentant leur part successorale 
12 L’adoption conjointe et/ou l’insémination artificielle pour les époux de même sexe est possible 
dans plusieurs pays d’Europe, notamment la Suède, l’Espagne, la Belgique, l’Islande, les Pays-Bas, 
la Norvège et la Suède. Seul le Portugal ne permet ni l’adoption par le second parent, ni l’insémi-
nation artificielle avec donneur.
13 ‘Droit des successions au Portugal : Qui hérite et de combien en cas d’absence de testament’ 
(Successions en Europe - Le droit des successions de 27 pays européens, 27 avril 2010) <http://www.
successions-europe.eu/fr/portugal/topics/in-the-absence-of-a-will_who-inherits-and-how-much/> 
accès le 19 avril 2011.
14 Le droit de retour est « un droit en vertu duquel une chose échappe au aux règles successorales 
ordinaires pour revenir à la personne de qui le de cujus la tenait, ou parfois aux descendants de cette 
personne » Gérard Cornu (dir.), Association Henri Capitant, Vocabulaire juridique (8ème éd. P.U.F. 
coll. Quadrige, 2009).
15 Article 745 bis du Code civil belge: « Lorsque le défunt laisse des descendants, des enfants adop-
tifs ou des descendants de ceux-ci, le conjoint survivant recueille l’usufruit de toute la succession.
Lorsque le défunt laisse d’autres successibles, le conjoint survivant recueille la pleine propriété de la 
part du prémourant dans le patrimoine commun et l’usufruit du patrimoine propre du défunt.
Lorsque le défunt ne laisse aucun successble, le conjoint survivant recueille la pleine propriété de 
toute la succession.
§2. le conjoint survivant a en outre l’usufruit des biens soumis au droit de retour légal, prévu aux 
articles 366, §1 et 2, 747 et 766, à mois qu’il n’en ait été décidé autrement dans l’acte de donation 
ou dans le testament.
§3. le conjoint survivant recueille seul, à l’exclusion de tous les autres héritiers, le droit au bail rela-
tif à l’immeuble affecté à la résidence commune au moment de l’ouverture de la succession ».
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mais elle ne peut leur être délivrée qu’en cas de faillite de l’époux, de règlement de 
ses dettes personnelles, ou à son décès16. Si le défunt n’a pas d’enfant, la loi prévoit 
que la succession soit entièrement attribuée au conjoint survivant17.
En Suède, le conjoint survivant, en concours avec les enfants communs18, re-
cueille la totalité de la succession comme héritier grevé, tandis que les enfants 
sont héritiers subséquents19. S’il existe un enfant d’un autre lit, l’enfant hérite de 
la totalité de sa part. S’il n’y a que des enfants d’un autre lit, les enfants héritent 
de tout et le conjoint ne recueille rien. Néanmoins, le conjoint a droit à une cer-
taine somme indexée chaque année qui correspond pour l’année 2011 à 18770 €. 
Il peut exiger d’avoir un patrimoine égal à cette somme. Pour calculer ce patri-
moine, on déduit ses biens propres.  Le reliquat est prelevé en  priorité sur la 
succession20. S’il n’y a pas de descendants, le conjoint se voit attribuer la totalité 
de la succession21.
Ainsi, dans ces pays, les époux homosexuels et hétérosexuels bénéficient d’une 
égalité parfaite en matière successorale. Il en est de même dans les pays ayant insti-
tué un partenariat de type institutionnel.
1.2. Les droits successoraux légaux découlant du partenariat enregistré institutionnel
Certains pays d’Europe n’ont pas souhaité modifier la condition de sexe différent 
dans le mariage, tout en reconnaissant la réalité des couples homosexuels. Ils ont 
alors créé des partenariats enregistrés de type institutionnel. Ces partenariats ont 
pour but de suppléer à l’interdit du mariage entre personnes du même sexe. Ils of-
frent un cadre institutionnel à leur couple, une sorte de quasi-mariage puisque ce 
partenariat a, à peu de chose près, les mêmes conséquences que le mariage.
En matière successorale, le partenariat enregistré prévoit des conséquences iden-
tiques à celles du mariage ou au moins équivalentes. Ainsi, les partenaires ont les 
mêmes droits successoraux légaux ou ab intestat que les époux. En outre, les règles 
fiscales s’imposant aux époux s’appliquent également aux partenaires. Le partenaire 
enregistré paie donc le même montant d’impôt sur les successions que l’époux, sur 
la part de succession qui lui revient ab intestat.
Ce type de partenariat enregistré existe notamment en Allemagne22, en Autriche23, 
16 Article 4:13 du Code civil néerlandais.
17 Article 4:10 du Code civil néerlandais.
18 L’adoption conjointe et l’insémination artificielle sont ouvertes aux couples homosexuels. Le 
conjoint qui a consenti à l’adoption ou à l’insémination sera reconnu comme parent de l’enfant.
19 Article ÄB 3 kap §1.
20 ÄB 4kap §1.
21 Le conjoint sera héritier subséquent, tandis que les ascendants et leurs descendants seront hé-
ritiers grevés.
22 Loi du 16 février 2001 relative au Lebenspartner-Schaftgesetz entrée en vigueur le 1er août 
2001.
23 Loi du 30 décembre 2009.
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au Danemark24, en Suisse25, en Hongrie26, en Irlande27, au Royaume-Uni28, en Répu-
blique Tchèque29 et en Slovénie30.
De manière étonnante, ce partenariat enregistré institutionnel existe toujours en 
Finlande31, en Islande32, en Norvège33 et aux Pays-Bas34 tandis qu’en Suède, il n’est 
plus permis d’en contracter un depuis la promulgation de la loi permettant le ma-
riage homosexuel.
Ainsi en Allemagne, la loi relative au partenariat enregistré précise que les par-
tenaires sont assimilés aux conjoints en matière de droits successoraux35. Les 
règles successorales ab intestat prévoient qu’en présence de descendants, le parte-
naire reçoit un quart de la succession. En l’absence de descendants et en présence 
d’ascendants ou de leurs enfants, le partenaire recueille la moitié de la succes-
sion36. En outre, si les partenaires ont adopté le régime légal du partenariat enre-
gistré37 équivalent au régime matrimonial légal de la participation aux acquêts, 
cette part est augmentée d’un quart38. Le partenaire a également droit, par préci-
put, aux objets mobiliers ainsi qu’aux cadeaux offerts à l’occasion de la célébra-
tion du partenariat. Néanmoins, s’il vient en concours avec les descendants, les 
objets mobiliers sont limités à ceux, nécessaires à la conduite du ménage39. Enfin, 
24 Lov om registered partnerskab (lov. nr. 372 af 7/ 6 / 1989, promulgué nr 938 du 10/10/2005).
25 La loi sur le partenariat enregistré suisse, le Lpart, est entrée en vigueur le 1er janvier 2007.
26 2009. évi XXIX. törveny a bejegyzett élettársi kapcsolatról, az ezzel összefüggő, valamint az 
élettársi viszony igazolásának megkönnyítéséhez szükséges egyes törvények módosításáról (en vi-
gueur depuis le 1er juillet 2009).
27 Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Bill 2009 du 26 juin 2009.
28 Civil Partnerships Act 2004 du 18 novembre 2004.
29 Loi du 26 janvier 2006.
30 Zakon o registraciji istospolne partnerske skupnosti (Ur.l. RS, št. 65/2005).
31 Laki rekisteröidystä parisuhteesta» 9.11.2001/950.
32 loi du 4 juin 1996 entrée en vigueur le 27 juin 1996.
33 Loi du 30 avril 1993 entrée en vigueur le 1er août 1995.
34 Loi instituant le partenariat: loi du 5 juillet 1997 entrée en vigueur le 1er janvier 1998.
35 Frédérique Granet-Lambrechts, ‘Les législations européennes relatives à l’enregistrement des 
couples hors-mariage’ [2005] Droit de la famille, étude 2.
36 § 1931 BGB : « Der überlebende Ehegatte des Erblassers ist neben Verwandten der ersten Ord-
nung zu einem Viertel, neben Verwandten der zweiten Ordnung odenr neben Grosseltern zur Hälf-
te der Erbschaft als gezetzlicher Erbe berufen. Treffen mit Grosseltern Abkömmlinge von Grossel-
tern zusammen, so erhält der Ehegatte auch von der anderen Hälfte den Anteil, der nach §1926 den 
Abkömmlingen zuffallen würde ».
37 Ausgleichsgemeinschaft.
38 § 1371 alinéa 1er du BGB : « Wird der Güterstand durch den Tod eines Ehegatten beendet, so 
wird der Ausgleich des Zugewinns dadurch verwirklicht, dass sich der gesetzliche Erbteil des überle-
benden Ehegatten um ein Viertel der Erbschaft erhöht ; hierbei ist unerheblich, ob die Ehegatten im 
einzelnen Falle einen Zugewinn erzielt haben ».
39 § 1932 du BGB : « Ist der überlebende Ehegatte neben Verwandten der zweiten Ordnung oder 
neben Großeltern gesetzlicher Erbe, so gebühren ihm außer dem Erbteil die zum ehelichen Haushalt 
gehörenden Gegenstände, soweit sie nicht Zubehör eines Grundstücks sind, und die Hochzeitsge-
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le partenaire survivant pourra prétendre à la continuation du bail portant sur le 
logement commun40.
L’Autriche offre également les mêmes droits successoraux aux époux qu’aux par-
tenaires41. Le partenaire recueille ainsi, en présence de descendants du défunt, le tiers 
de la succession. En l’absence de descendants et en présence d’ascendants et de frères 
et sœurs du défunt, il recueille les deux tiers de la succession42. Le partenaire bénéfi-
cie également, dans tous les cas, d’un droit de préciput légal portant sur le droit 
d’habitation du domicile conjugal ou les biens meubles faisant partie du ménage43.
Au Royaume-Uni, le Civil partnership Bill assimile le partenaire à l’époux survi-
vant. Ainsi, en Angleterre et au Pays de Galles, le partenaire recueille tous les biens 
mobiliers du défunt ainsi qu’un héritage prévu par la loi d’au maximum 250 000 
Livres. Le reliquat est détenu en trust au bénéfice du partenaire survivant, de son 
vivant.
En l’absence d’enfant mais en présence d’un autre successible, le partenaire re-
çoit tous les biens mobiliers, un héritage de 450 000 livres ainsi que la moitié du 
reliquat, détenu en trust, à son profit.
En Ecosse, il est attribué au partenaire du défunt, le domicile conjugal dans la 
limite d’une valeur de 300 000 livres, les meubles meublants le domicile conjugal 
dans la limite de 24 000 livres, une somme fixe de 42 000 livres ainsi qu’un tiers des 
biens mobiliers du défunt. En l’absence d’enfant, et en présence d’un parent ou 
frère et sœur ou leurs descendants, le partenaire rajoute au domicile conjugal et 
meubles meublants ce domicile, dans les limites précitées, la somme de 75 000 livres 
et la moitié des biens mobiliers.
En Irlande du Nord, le conjoint survivant reçoit les biens meubles, 250 000 livres 
et la moitié du reliquat si le défunt a un enfant ou le tiers s’il a plusieurs enfants. En 
schenke als Voraus. Ist der überlebende Ehegatte neben Verwandten der ersten Ordnung gesetzlicher 
Erbe, so gebühren ihm diese Gegenstände, soweit er sie zur Führung eines angemessenen Haushalts 
benötigt ».
40 Article 563 du BGB : « Der Ehegatte, der mit dem Mieter einen gemeinsamen Haushalt führt, 
tritt mit dem Tod des Mieters in das Mietverhältnis ein. Dasselbe gilt für den Lebenspartner ».
41 § 537a ABGB: « Die für Ehegatten maßgebenden und auf das Eherecht Bezug nehmenden Be-
stimmungen dieses Hauptstücks sowie des Neunten bis Fünfzehnten Hauptstücks sind auf eingetra-
gene Partner und eingetragene Partnerschaften sinngemäß anzuwenden ».
42 Article 757 ABGB : « Der Ehegatte des Erblassers ist neben Kindern des Erblassers und deren 
Nachkommen zu einem Drittel des Nachlasses, neben Eltern und Geschwistern des Erblassers oder 
neben Großeltern zu zwei Dritteln des Nachlasses gesetzlicher Erbe. Sind neben Großeltern Nach-
kommen verstorbener Großeltern vorhanden, so erhält überdies der Ehegatte von dem restlichen 
Drittel des Nachlasses den Teil, der den Nachkommen der verstorbenen Großeltern zufallen würde. 
Gleiches gilt für jene Erbteile, die den Nachkommen verstorbener Geschwister zufallen würden. In 
den übrigen Fällen erhält der Ehegatte den ganzen Nachlass ».
43 Article 758 ABGB : « Sofern der Ehegatte nicht rechtmäßig enterbt worden ist, gebühren ihm als 
gesetzliches Vorausvermächtnis das Recht, in der Ehewohnung weiter zu wohnen, und die zum ehe-
lichen Haushalt gehörenden beweglichen Sachen, soweit sie zu dessen Fortführung entsprechend den 
bisherigen Lebensverhältnissen erforderlich sind ».
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l’absence d’enfant, et en présence d’un parent ou frère et sœur ou leurs descendants, 
le partenaire reçoit les biens meubles et 450 000 livres44.
En Suisse, tout comme l’époux, le partenaire survivant a droit à la moitié de la 
succession s’il vient en concours avec les descendants, aux trois-quarts s’il vient en 
concours avec les ascendants et à la totalité à défaut de descendants ou d’ascen-
dants45.
En Espagne, de par la régionalisation de l’Etat espagnol, il existe plusieurs légis-
lations sur les partenariats enregistrés. En effet, chaque communauté autonome a 
légiféré sur le sujet et les partenariats sont très divers. La Navarre, le Pays Basque et 
la Catalogne ont mis en place un partenariat de type institutionnel dans lequel les 
partenaires bénéficient des mêmes droits successoraux ab intestat que les époux. Ces 
droits varient en fonction des législations des communautés autonomes46.
Les pays dont nous venons d’étudier les législations offrent, en matière successo-
rale, une parfaite égalité entre couples homosexuels et hétérosexuels. Il n’en est pas 
de même dans toute l’Europe.
2. Les pays déniant la reconnaissance de droits successoraux légaux aux membres 
du couple homosexuel
Il existe encore des pays en Europe, dans lesquels les couples homosexuels ne béné-
ficient d’aucuns droits successoraux ab intestat. Soit parce que le partenariat enre-
gistré ne prévoit pas de droits légaux en matière successorale. Ou alors parce qu’il 
n’y existe pas de partenariat enregistré.
Dans ces pays, seule la succession testamentaire permet aux couples homo-
sexuels de se transmettre une partie de leur succession.
2.1. L’absence de droits successoraux légaux découlant du partenariat enregistré contractuel
Dans ces pays, le partenariat n’est pas de type institutionnel mais contractuel. Les 
partenaires doivent rédiger une convention portant sur leurs relations pécuniaires, 
lors de la conclusion du partenariat. Mais, sont toujours exclus de cette convention 
les conséquences en matière successorale, qui ne peuvent être réglées que par la loi. 
44 ‘Successions au Royaume-Uni : qui hérite et de combien en cas de testament’ (Successions en 
Europe - Le droit des successions de 27 pays européens, 23 avril 2010) <http://www.successions-
europe.eu/fr/united-kingdom/topics/in-the-absence-of-a-will_who-inherits-and-how-much> ac-
cès le 19 avril 2011.
45 Article 462 du Code civil suisse : « Le conjoint ou le partenaire enregistré survivant a droit : 1. 
en concours avec les descendants, à la moitié de la succession ; 2. en concours avec le père, la mère 
ou leur postérité aux trois-quarts ; 3. à défaut du père, de la mère ou de leur postérité, à la succession 
toute entière ».
46 Frédérique Granet-Lambrechts, ‘Les législations européennes relatives à l’enregistrement des 
couples hors-mariage’ [2005] Droit de la famille, étude 2.
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Or, la loi de ces pays ne prévoit, en règle générale, aucuns droits successoraux lé-
gaux, ou alors, parfois, des droits très restreints. Les partenaires seront ainsi dans la 
même situation que des concubins lors de la succession de l’un d’eux.
Ces couples trouveront leur salut dans la succession testamentaire. Ils doivent 
veiller à rédiger un testament en faveur de leur partenaire afin de se laisser leur pa-
trimoine. Mais la succession testamentaire est toujours, dans ces pays, limitée par la 
réserve héréditaire réservée à certains héritiers. Seule la quotité disponible peut être 
transmise à la personne de son choix.
C’est notamment le cas en France47, au Luxembourg48, en Croatie49 et en Hon-
grie50. Un partenariat de type contractuel existe également en Belgique51 et au Por-
tugal52.
Ainsi, en France, la loi sur le pacte civil de solidarité ne prévoit pas de droits 
successoraux ab intestat. Le partenaire survivant bénéficie uniquement de la jouis-
sance gratuite pendant une année du logement qu’il occupe au moment du décès à 
titre d’habitation principale et appartenant au couple ou dépendant de la succession 
du défunt, ainsi que du mobilier garnissant ce logement. Si le logement est assuré au 
moyen d’un bail à loyer, la succession doit lui rembourser les loyers pendant un an53.
La succession testamentaire, quant à elle, est limitée par la réserve héréditaire. 
Celle-ci varie en fonction des héritiers présents et du nombre d’enfant. Si le parte-
naire défunt a des descendants, la quotité disponible sera limitée à la moitié de la 
succession lorsque le défunt a un enfant, un tiers, s’il en a deux et un quart s’il en a 
trois ou plus54. En revanche, en l’absence de descendant, les partenaires sont libres 
de se transmettre tout leur patrimoine. Ces règles s’appliquent également aux 
concubins. Le partenariat offre un avantage, celui de se voir appliquer les règles 
fiscales en matière de succession entre époux. Ainsi le partenaire sera exonéré de 
droits de succession sur la part qu’il reçoit de son partenaire, tandis que le concubin 
survivant se verra prélever une taxe de 60%55 de la valeur de la succession recueillie.
Le Luxembourg ne prévoit aucuns droits successoraux légaux entre partenaires 
47 Loi n° 99-944 du 15 novembre 1999 relative au pacte civil de solidarité.
48 Loi du 6 août 2004 relative aux effets légaux de certains partenariats.
49 Zakon o istospolnim zajednicama, Narodne Novine Nr. 166/2003. Ce partenariat est réservé 
aux homosexuels.
50 Entré en vigueur le 1er juillet 2009.
51 Loi du 23 novembre 1998 sur la cohabitation légale entrée en vigueur le 1er janvier 2000 (ar-
ticle 1475 à 1479 CC.).
52 União de Facto, Loi 7/2001», du 11.5.01.
53 Article 515-6 du Code civil français : « Lorsque le pacte civil de solidarité prend fin par le décès 
d’un des partenaires, le survivant peut se prévaloir des dispositions des deux premiers alinéas de 
l’article 763 ».
54 Article 913 du Code civil français : « Les libéralités, soit par actes entre vifs, soit par testament, 
ne pourront excéder la moitié des biens du disposant, s’il ne laisse à son décès qu’un enfant ; le tiers, 
s’il laisse deux enfants ; le quart, s’il en laisse trois ou un plus grand nombre ».
55 Article 777 du Code général des impôts.
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enregistrés. En revanche, l’article 11 de la loi dispose que les partenaires sont libres 
de se gratifier par acte entre vifs ou testamentaire mais dans les limites des disposi-
tions du titre II du livre 3ème du Code civil, soit de la réserve héréditaire. La quotité 
disponible est de la moitié des biens du disposant s’il laisse un enfant, le tiers s’il en 
laisse deux et le quart s’il en laisse trois ou plus. A défaut de descendant, le parte-
naire ou concubin est libre de transmettre tout son patrimoine à la personne de son 
choix.
En Belgique la loi sur la cohabitation légale interdit de contrevenir à l’ordre légal 
des successions ab intestat dans la convention. Mais le cohabitant survivant recueille 
tout de même l’usufruit de l’immeuble affecté durant la vie commune à la résidence 
de la famille, ainsi que des meubles qui le garnissent56. Si le logement est loué au 
moyen d’un bail, le cohabitant survivant recueille le droit au bail de l’immeuble af-
fecté à la résidence de la famille à l’ouverture de la succession ainsi que l’usufruit des 
meubles garnissant le logement.
La Belgique, le Portugal et certaines communautés autonomes d’Espagne offrent 
ainsi trois niveaux de conjugalité, le concubinage, le partenariat enregistré de type 
contractuel et le mariage, avec des effets croissants. Les couples, homosexuels ou 
hétérosexuels ont ainsi un véritable choix, sans discrimination aucune.
En revanche, les pays ayant institué un partenariat de type contractuel sont mi-
noritaires en Europe. En matière successorale, ils sont proches des pays dans les-
quels il n’existe aucune reconnaissance du couple homosexuel.
2.2. L’absence totale de reconnaissance du couple homosexuel
Il existe encore des pays européens dans lesquels les partenariats enregistrés n’exis-
tent pas ou sont réservés aux hétérosexuels. C’est ainsi le cas en Italie, en Grèce, à 
Malte, au Lichtenstein ainsi qu’à Chypre. En Europe de l’Est, le partenariat enregis-
tré homosexuel n’existe pas en Roumanie, Slovaquie, Pologne, Lituanie, Estonie, 
Lettonie, Biélorussie, Ukraine, Moldavie, Albanie, Arménie, Bulgarie, Bosnie et 
Monténégro.
Bien évidemment, en l’absence de reconnaissance du couple homosexuel, ses 
membres ne bénéficient d’aucuns droits successoraux légaux.
Les concubins devront veiller à rédiger un testament afin de transmettre une 
partie du patrimoine du défunt au survivant. Mais comme nous l’avons déjà vu, la 
réserve héréditaire limite leur capacité de disposer.
On peut remarquer que les pays n’offrant aucun mode de conjugalité aux homo-
sexuels sont également ceux dans lesquels la famille lignagère joue un rôle important 
56 Article 745 octies du Code civil belge: « Quels que soient les héritiers avec lesquels il vient à la 
succession, le cohabitant légal survivant recueille l’usufruit de l’immeuble affecté durant la vie com-
mune à la résidence commune de la famille ainsi que des meubles qui le garnissaient.
Le cohabitant légal survivant recueille seul, à l’exclusion de tous les autres héritiers, le droit au bail 
relatif à l’immeuble affecté à la résidence commune de la famille au moment de l’ouverture de la 
succession du cohabitant légal prédécédé et recueille l’usufruit des meubles qui le garnissent ».
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en matière successorale. En effet, tous les pays étudiés ci-après accordent une ré-
serve aux descendants et aux ascendants du défunt.
Ainsi, en Italie, le concubin ne peut disposer en faveur de son concubin survivant 
que de la moitié de sa succession s’il laisse un enfant et d’un tiers s’il laisse deux 
enfants ou plus57. Si le défunt ne laisse pas d’enfant mais des ascendants, il ne 
pourra pas disposer de plus de deux tiers de sa succession58.
En Grèce, le défunt ne peut disposer que de la moitié de sa succession s’il a des 
enfants ou des ascendants.
En Bulgarie, le défunt peut disposer de la moitié de sa succession s’il a un enfant 
et d’un tiers seulement s’il a deux enfants. S’il n’a pas d’enfant, ses ascendants ont 
une réserve d’un tiers59.
La situation en Europe est disparate, de l’égalité parfaite à la négation absolue. 
Même si la succession testamentaire permet de transmettre une partie de sa succes-
sion à son concubin ou son partenaire homosexuel, il est discriminatoire que les 
membres d’un couple homosexuel soient dans l’obligation d’effectuer un acte posi-
tif pour pouvoir hériter l’un de l’autre. Combien de couples se disent qu’ils sont 
jeunes, qu’ils ont le temps… et oublient de faire un testament? En outre, l’indivision 
créée entre le survivant du couple homosexuel et les héritiers réservataires est source 
de conflit.
On peut espérer que tous les pays reconnaîtront bientôt la réalité des couples 
homosexuels et leur accorderont a minima un partenariat enregistré institutionnel 
leur ouvrant des droits successoraux légaux.
57 Article 537 du Code civil italien : « Salvo quanto disposto dall’articolo 542, se il genitore lascia 
un figlio solo, legittimo o naturale, a questi è riservata la metà del patrimonio.
Se i figli sono più, è loro riservata la quota dei due terzi, da dividersi in parti uguali tra tutti i figli, 
legittimi e naturali.
I figli legittimi possono soddisfare in denaro o in beni immobili ereditari la porzione spettante ai figli 
naturali che non vi si oppongano. Nel caso di opposizione decide il giudice, valutate le circostanze 
personali e patrimoniali ».
58 Article 538 du Code civil italien : « Se chi muore non lascia figli legittimi né naturali, ma ascen-
denti legittimi, a favore di questi è riservato un terzo del patrimonio, salvo quanto disposto dall’arti-
colo 544.
In caso di pluralità di ascendenti, la riserva è ripartita tra i medesimi secondo i criteri previsti dall’ar-
ticolo 569 ».
59 ‘Successions en Bulgarie : Limites à la liberté de disposer de sa succession par testament (parts 
réservataires)’ (Successions en Europe - Le droit des successions de 27 pays européens, 23 avril 2010) 
<http://www.successions-europe.eu/fr/bulgaria/topics/restrictions-on-the-freedom-to-dispose-
of-ones-succession-by-will> accès le 19 avril 2011.
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Abstract
This essay considers the extent to which the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) can play a role in promoting the rights of persons who are gender 
diverse. Transgender persons experience discrimination in every aspect of life, including 
family law, health care, education, and employment. Given the lack of a specific human 
rights treaty in this field, it is essential that all of the existing treaty bodies pay close atten-
tion to the rights of persons who are gender diverse. The Yogyakarta Principles facilitate 
this process by providing guidance on how to apply international human rights law to is-
sues of sexual and gender diversity. However, the Yogyakarta principles were drafted be-
fore the CRPD came into force and states parties may neglect to provide information on 
minority communities when drafting their initial reports to the Committee on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities. Should NGOs ask governments to report on transgender is-
sues in the context of the CRPD? Should NGOs working for the rights of transgender 
persons prepare alternative reports and participate in the CRPD reporting process? These 
are difficult questions because of the damage done by misguided attempts to “cure” sex-
ual and gender diversity. Yet many transgender persons also experience disability dis-
crimination and some domestic laws include “gender dysphoria” as a covered disability. 
Moreover, the CRPD has soundly rejected the medical approach to disability in favor of 
the social and human rights models. Thus the CRPD does not seek to define “disability” 
in medical terms or to exclude persons from its protection. Rather, the CRPD focuses 
upon certain core principles, including respect for diversity, inclusion, reasonable accom-
modations, and substantive equality. Thus the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities could become an important ally in the movement to break away from medical 
discourses and to depathologize transgender identities.
* * *
* This is a revised version of a paper presented at the conference LGBTI Rights in the XXI Cen-
tury, Florence, Italy, May 2011. The author thanks the organizers of the conference, the European 
Network for the Legal Support of LGBTI Rights, and also the College of Social Sciences at the 
University of Hawaii at Manoa for supporting her participation in the conference.
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1. Introduction
In this essay, the term “transgender” refers to individuals who experience and may 
express their gender differently from stereotypical gender norms – including indi-
viduals who are transsexuals, cross-dressers, transitioning, or otherwise gender non-
conforming. The term can include a broad range of persons who express their 
gender identity in a way that differs from what was recorded on their birth certifi-
cates, regardless of whether they have taken steps to change their biological sex1. 
Transgender persons experience discrimination in virtually every field, including 
family law, access to health care, education, and employment. Researchers have also 
documented numerous cases of official torture and hate crimes against transgender 
persons2. These are not isolated incidents but rather reflect systemic patterns of 
discrimination3.
Although transgender individuals make a range of decisions regarding their bod-
ies and how to express their gender, a large percentage seek medical or surgical 
transition services as a means of facilitating gender expression. A 2010 study con-
ducted in the United States reported that 62% of respondents had obtained hor-
monal therapy and that 23% hoped to obtain it. Three quarters of the transgender 
women and a majority of the transgender men reported that they had also obtained 
or would like to obtain some form of transition surgery4. Thus, for a significant 
percentage of transgender individuals, full expression of gender will entail fairly 
regular interaction with the health-care system. Unfortunately, discrimination in the 
health-care system is rampant and severe. Indeed, many transgender persons are 
refused care due to their gender non-conforming status while others postpone care 
when injured or sick in order to avoid discrimination5.
Although some jurisdictions have enacted laws that prohibit discrimination on 
1 This definition is borrowed from the Human Rights Campaign Foundation, Transgender 
Americans: A Handbook for Understanding (2008) 5 <http://www.hrc.org/issues/1500.htm> ac-
cessed 10 April 2011.
2 Jeremy D. Kidd and Tarynn M. Witten, ‘Transgender and Transsexual Identities: The Next 
Strange Fruit - Hate Crimes, Violence and Genocide Against the Global Trans-Communities’ 
(2007) 6(1) Journal of Hate Studies 31-63; and Michael O’Flaherty and John Fisher, ‘Sexual Ori-
entation, Gender Identity and International Human Rights Law: Contextualizing the Yogyakarta 
Principles’ (2008) 8(2) Human Rights Law Review 207, 208-214.
3 Jaime M. Grant, Lisa A. Mottet, and Justin Tanis, ‘Injustice at Every Turn: A Report of the 
National Transgender Discrimination Survey’ (National Center for Transgender Equity and Na-
tional Gay and Lesbian Task Force, February 2011) <http://www.thetaskforce.org/reports_and_
research/ntds> accessed 20 April 2011.
4 Jaime M. Grant, Lisa A. Mottet, and Justin Tanis, ‘National Transgender Discrimination Survey 
Report on Health and Health Care: Findings of a Study by the National Center for Transgender 
Equality and the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force’ (October 2010) <http://transequality.
org/> accessed 20 April 2011.
5 Ibid. See also Tarynn M. Witten and Stephen Whittle, ‘TransPanthers: The Greying of Trans-
gender and the Law’ (2004) 9(2) Deakin Law Review 503, 512-15.
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the ground of gender identity6, there is still no binding international treaty that ex-
pressly requires states to enact such laws. To some extent, the nonbinding Yogya-
karta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation 
to Sexual Orientation and Gender (hereinafter the Yogyakarta Principles) help to 
fill this gap by providing guidance on how existing human rights treaties should be 
interpreted in relation to sexuality and gender identity7. However, the Yogyakarta 
Principles were drafted in 2006, before the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD) had opened for ratification8. As the CRPD is now in force 
and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is beginning to review 
the initial reports of state parties, it is an opportune time to assess the potential 
value of the treaty.
Part 2 of this essay briefly reviews the role of human rights treaty bodies and the 
importance of NGO reports, which can inform members of the treaty-monitoring 
committees of issues that governments may try to ignore in their official reports. Part 
3 reviews the movement to depathologize gender variation, which arguably raises 
concerns regarding the wisdom of using the CRPD as an advocacy tool. Part 4 then 
introduces the social model of disability and the “paradigm shift” that has been 
made by the CRPD9. I argue that transgender issues can be brought to the Commit-
tee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities without undermining efforts to de-
pathologize gender variation. Moreover, given that at least some domestic laws on 
disability discrimination can be interpreted to prohibit transgender discrimination, 
it would be unfortunate if the CRPD did not become an additional tool in the move-
ment to recognize and respect gender diversity.
2. Human Rights Treaty Bodies and the Reporting Process
There are currently nine “core” treaties in the UN human rights system, each of 
which requires states parties to report regularly on steps taken to comply with treaty 
obligations and barriers to implementation. Reports are submitted to the relevant 
6 For example, in the United States, numerous state and local laws have expressly included trans-
gender in the scope of their anti-discrimination legislation. For a summary of this legislation, see 
Scope of Explicitly Transgender-Inclusive Anti-Discrimination Laws (National Gay and Lesbian 
Task Force Transgender Law and Policy Institute 2008) <http://www.thetaskforce.org/reports_
and_research/transgender_inclusive_laws> accessed 21 April 2011.
7 For additional information, see Yogyakarta Principles <http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/> 
accessed 10 March 2011.
8 For the CRPD and the Optional Protocol (containing an individual complaints procedure and 
an inquiry procedure), see <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/Convention.
aspx#35> accessed 15 March 2011.
9 Tara J. Melish, ‘Perspectives on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The UN CRPD: His-
toric Process, Strong Prospects, and Why the U.S. Should Ratify’ (2007) 14 Human Rights Brief 
37 (Winter).
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treaty-monitoring body, a panel of experts who serve in their personal capacities. For 
example, the Human Rights Committee monitors the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights monitors the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR); the Committee Against Torture monitors the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); 
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination monitors the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD); 
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women monitors the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW); and the Committee on the Rights of the Child monitors the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Dis-
abilities is the newest committee to become operational. The monitoring body for the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Forced Disappear-
ance will be created after the first meeting of states parties in May 201110.
Once a treaty body receives a periodic report, it schedules a formal review ses-
sion (in some cases after requesting and receiving supplementary information). The 
treaty body then issues concluding observations advising the state party on how to 
better implement the treaty. Although this is fundamentally a non-coercive enforce-
ment process, it constitutes a significant departure from traditional views on state 
sovereignty. By binding itself to report to a monitoring body, each state party con-
cedes that the international community has a legitimate interest in ascertaining 
whether it respects and enforces international norms within its sovereign territory. 
The international reporting process also gives civil society an opportunity to par-
ticipate because NGOs present written reports on the implementation of the treaty 
and alleged violations. An NGO report is generally called a “shadow” or “alterna-
tive” report, because it shadows the government report and provides alternative 
points of view. NGO reports are more effective in states with a high degree of free-
dom of expression. However, even if local NGOs do not enjoy freedom of speech, 
international human rights organizations (such as Amnesty International) can sub-
mit alternative reports critiquing the government report. NGOs also sometimes 
present their information orally, either during pre-sessional working group meetings 
or formal sessions of the treaty-monitoring body. In some cases, members of a 
treaty monitoring body will also hold informal meetings with NGO representatives. 
Committee members can then ask the government delegation to respond to the is-
sues that have been raised by the NGO representatives. The information derived 
from these NGO submissions can also influence the content of treaty bodies’ con-
cluding recommendations.
10 For general information on the nine core treaties and the committees that monitor their imple-
mentation, see Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Monitoring 
the Core International Human Rights Treaties’ <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/treaty/
index.htm> accessed 20 March 2011.
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Given the evidence of discrimination against persons who are gender diverse, 
there should be an international treaty that expressly addresses their rights and a 
monitoring committee that is knowledgeable in the field. However, this is unlikely 
to occur any time soon, despite the growing support among certain members of the 
UN. In 2006, 55 member states joined a statement calling for dialogue on sexual 
orientation and gender identity within the UN Human Rights Council (HRC). In 
2008, 68 nations endorsed a statement affirming that human rights treaties apply to 
all persons, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity11. The United States 
was the only Western nation that did not endorse the latter statement (and it finally 
joined the statement in early 2009, after the Obama administration replaced the 
Bush administration). However, an opposing statement was signed by 57 member 
nations, including all 27 nations of the Arab League12. In 2011, more than 80 nations 
endorsed a resolution in the HRC that called upon states to take steps “to end acts 
of violence, criminal sanctions and related human rights violations committed 
against individuals because of their sexual orientation or gender identity”13. None-
theless, it is clear that the UN is still divided on these issues and it is unlikely to 
adopt a new treaty that expressly addresses the rights of persons who are sex and 
gender diverse. Even if such a treaty were adopted, it would not be ratified by the 
states where it is most urgently needed. The Convention on the Rights of Migrant 
Workers (CMW) illustrates the potential consequences of adopting a treaty that 
does not enjoy widespread support. Although admirable in its goals, the CMW has 
acquired only 44 states parties since it was adopted in 1990. Thus, the Committee 
on Migrant Workers only reviews a few state reports during each session and has 
limited impact on domestic laws and policies14. In contrast, the CRPD has acquired 
100 states parties in only four years, including many countries that have been unwill-
ing to expressly endorse sexual and gender diversity15.
11 See, for example, Letter dated 18 December 2008 from the Permanent Representatives of 
Argentina, Brazil, Croatia, France, Gabon, Japan, the Netherlands and Norway to the United 
Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly, Sixty-third session, Agenda item 
64 (b), A/63/635. For a summary of these initiatives, see the website of the French Permanent 
Mission to the United Nations <http://www.franceonu.org/spip.php?article4092> accessed 20 
March 2011.
12 For discussion, see Reuters US Edition, ‘In turnaround, U.S. signs U.N. gay rights document’ 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/18/us-rights-gay-usa-idUSTRE52H5CK20090318> 
accessed 20 March 2011.
13 For commentary, see LGBT Weekly, ‘UN gay rights resolution signed by 85 countries’ <http://
lgbtweekly.com/2011/03/31/un-gay-rights-resolution-signed-by-85-countries/> accessed 25 March 
2011.
14 For a list of state reports reviewed by the Committee on Migrant Workers since its inaugural 
session, see <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cmw/sessions.htm> accessed 23 May 2011.
15 For a list of states parties to the CRPD, see United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties, 
Ch IV(15) <http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-15& 
chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 24 May 2011.
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The lack of a specialist treaty makes it all the more important that existing inter-
national and regional human rights instruments are fully applied. This process has 
been facilitated by the Yogyakarta Principles, which moved beyond the right to 
private life and affirmed that persons who are sex and gender diverse enjoy the full 
range of human rights. Although not legally binding, they provide guidance on how 
international human rights treaties should be interpreted in relation to sex and gen-
der diversity. Even if a government does not expressly accept the Yogyakarta Prin-
ciples, the committees that monitor compliance with existing human rights treaties 
can refer to them when reviewing governments’ periodic reports, when drafting 
concluding observations, and when developing general recommendations interpret-
ing treaty obligations. In this manner, treaty-monitoring bodies can hopefully per-
suade governments to expand their understanding of human rights and be more 
respectful of sexual and gender diversity.
The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) facilitates this process by publish-
ing a regularly updated collection of relevant court decisions, general recommenda-
tions, and concluding observations by treaty bodies that are relevant to sex and 
gender diversity16. The ICJ also produces a practitioners’ guide to assist lawyers 
representing clients who are sex and gender diverse17. These collections indicate that 
the Human Rights Committee has had the most influence among the human rights 
treaty-monitoring bodies, in part because the ICCPR protects the right to privacy 
and because it prohibits discrimination on a broad range of grounds, including 
“other status”. It has also been argued that human rights advocates could make 
greater use of Article 19 of the ICCPR (freedom of expression) to advance the rights 
of persons who are sex and gender diverse. Framing sexual and gender diversity as 
a form of expression can shift the focus away “from fitting people into binary cate-
gories of sex and gender” and towards greater respect for choice18.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) also provides an interesting example of how a treaty body can 
apply existing law to issues of sex and gender diversity. On its face, CEDAW is inad-
equate for transgender persons because the main state obligation is to ensure equal 
treatment of women and men. However, the CEDAW Committee examines the full 
range of women’s human rights and is paying increased attention to the situations of 
lesbian and transgender women. In 2010 the Committee issued General Recommen-
16 International Commission of Jurists, ‘Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Human 
Rights Law: References to Jurisprudence and Doctrine of the United Nations Human Rights 
System’ (4th ed. 2010) <http://www.icj.org/default.asp?nodeID=423&langage=1&myPage=Othe
rs> accessed 10 April 2011.
17 International Commission of Jurists, ‘Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, and International 
Human Rights Law: Practitioners Guide No. 4’ (2010) <http://icj-usa.org/publications/> ac-
cessed 10 April 2011.
18 Sarah Winter, ‘Are Human Rights Capable of Liberation? The Case of Sex and Gender Diver-
sity’ (2009) 15(1) Australian Journal of Human Rights 151, 167.
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dation (GR) 28 on Article Two of CEDAW, noting, at paragraph 18, that discrimina-
tion against women is “inextricably linked with other factors that affect women, such 
as… sexual orientation and gender identity” and that states parties “must legally 
recognize such intersecting forms of discrimination and their compounded negative 
impact on the women concerned and prohibit them”. GR 28 essentially invites 
NGOs to submit alternative reports that inform the CEDAW Committee of viola-
tions of the rights of lesbians and transgender women. In 2010 the Committee re-
ceived an NGO report describing incidents of torture and extortion by the Uganda 
police19. The CEDAW Committee responded by urging the government of Uganda 
to “decriminalize homosexual behavior and to provide effective protection from vio-
lence and discrimination against women based on their sexual orientation and gender 
identity, in particular through the enactment of comprehensive antidiscrimination” 
laws20. This is but one example of the role of NGO reports in helping the treaty-
monitoring bodies to apply the Yogyakarta Principles to their respective treaties.
Clearly, the ability of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities to 
promote the rights of transgender persons will also depend on whether relevant is-
sues are raised in the reporting process under the CRPD. It is, however, possible 
that NGOs will not raise transgender issues in reports to this Committee, on the 
theory that doing so will undermine the movement to depathologize transgender 
identities. This issue is analyzed in the next two sections of the essay.
3. Depathologizing Gender Diversity
In 1973 the American Psychiatric Association (APA) removed homosexuality from 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and this was con-
sidered an important step in the campaign for the civil rights of gay and lesbian 
citizens. The DSM is widely used in North America and also influences the Interna-
tional Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems published 
by the World Health Organization. Virtually all major professional mental health 
organizations have since affirmed that homosexuality is not a mental disorder21.
In contrast, Gender Identity Disorder (GID) was added to the DSM in 1980. 
The diagnosis has been strongly criticized and there is a growing international cam-
19 Freedom and Roam Uganda and IGLHRC, ‘Shadow Report to the CEDAW Committee: Viola-
tion of the Rights of Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender (LBT) and Kuchu People in Uganda’ 
(September 2010) <http://www.iglhrc.org/cgi-bin/iowa/article/takeaction/resourcecenter/1241.
html> accessed 5 March 2011.
20 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Forty-seventh session, Con-
cluding Observations: Uganda, CEDAW/C/UGA/CO/7, 5 November 2010, para 44.
21 For a summary of events leading to the amendment, see American Psychiatric Association, 
‘Sexual Orientation’ <http://www.healthyminds.org/More-Info-For/GayLesbianBisexuals.aspx> 
accessed 18 March 2011.
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paign to persuade the APA and the WHO to remove or revise it. For example, the 
World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) maintains that 
gender variance is a common and culturally-diverse human phenomenon which 
should not be judged inherently pathological, as this renders transgender people 
“more vulnerable to social and legal marginalisation and exclusion” and increases 
risks to mental and physical well-being22. WPATH also criticizes governments that 
make surgery or sterilization a condition for changing one’s gender identity in legal 
documents23. Similarly, GID Reform Advocates (a group of medical professionals, 
caregivers, researchers, and activists) has argued that the DSM stigmatizes transgen-
der persons as “mentally deficient” and has urged the medical professions to affirm 
that “difference is not disease, nonconformity is not pathology, and uniqueness is 
not illness”24. It should be noted, however, that not everyone in the transgender 
rights movement wants the diagnosis to be removed entirely. It has been suggested, 
for example, that the medical professions could recognize the legitimacy of cross-
gender identity while distinguishing “gender dysphoria” as a serious condition that 
is treatable with medical procedures. Some advocates are lobbying for diagnostic 
criteria that will “serve a clear therapeutic purpose, are appropriately inclusive, and 
define disorder on the basis of distress or impairment and not upon social 
nonconformity”25.
Why not abandon the diagnosis entirely? For some activists this would be the 
logical continuation of the movement towards greater freedom of expression of 
sexuality and gender26. However, transgender persons do often seek medical and 
surgical transition services and there is concern that access to these services would 
become more limited in some countries if the diagnosis were removed. For example, 
insurance companies in the United States generally require a DSM-coded diagnosis. 
Without it, an insurance company (or public health care provider) may refuse to 
fund treatment on the ground that it is elective or cosmetic. Similarly, employers 
may refuse to provide medical leave or other accommodations to a transitioning 
employee unless there is a diagnosis demonstrating that the transition services are 
necessary for the employee’s health.
The debate on this issue has attracted increased attention recently because the 
APA is drafting the fifth edition of the DSM, to be completed in 2013. The pre-
22 World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH), Press Release, 26 May 2010 
<http://www.wpath.org/> accessed 10 March 2011.
23 World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH), Press Release, 16 June 
2011 <http://www.wpath.org/> accessed 10 March 2011.
24 GID Reform Advocates, ‘The Vision of GID Reform’ <http://www.transgender.org/gidr/> 
accessed 28 April 2011.
25 Ibid.
26 See, for example, Spanish Network for Depathologization of Trans Identities (ed.), ‘Best Prac-
tices Guide to Trans Health Care in the National Health Care System’ (2010) <http://www.
stp2012.info/old/en> accessed 12 April 2011.
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liminary draft revisions have been published for public comment27. Some activists 
believe that the revised diagnosis would only perpetuate discrimination and intoler-
ance28. Interestingly, WPATH described the draft as a “commendable attempt to 
depathologize” but noted that it was so broad that “almost any transgender person 
could meet the criteria for a mental disorder regardless of whether or not they ex-
perience clinically significant distress and desire or need intervention”29. This is 
particularly worrying for children who may be pressured to undergo “treatments” 
designed to make a child conform to a particular gender. On the other hand, it is 
also arguable that a broad diagnosis may benefit transgender youth who seek hor-
monal treatments to assist in expressing their gender identity.
The question of how to conceptualize transgender identities is also evident in the 
drafting and application of anti-discrimination laws. There is often disagreement, 
even within domestic legal systems, on whether transgender persons can (or should) 
seek to rely upon disability discrimination laws. This debate has been particularly 
controversial in the United States because a clause was inserted into the federal 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) that expressly excludes “gender identity 
disorders” not resulting from physical impairments from the scope of protection30. 
On the other hand, certain states in the United States have rejected the narrow 
scope of the federal ADA and deemed transgender persons eligible for protection 
under their state disability laws, although this is generally dependent upon a medical 
diagnosis31. While the ultimate goal is to enact laws expressly prohibiting transgen-
der discrimination (which some legislatures have done), in the absence of such leg-
islation a broadly interpreted disability discrimination law can also prove valuable.
Hong Kong is another example of a jurisdiction where the Disability Discrimina-
tion Ordinance (DDO) defines disability in broad language, which has been inter-
preted to include “gender dysphoria” as a covered disability32. However, it does not 
appear that Hong Kong’s transgender community is eager to rely upon the DDO, 
perhaps because they feel it would undermine the movement to depathologize trans-
27 American Psychiatric Association, ‘DSM-5 Development: Proposed Revisions/Gender Dys-
phoria’ <http://www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevision/Pages/GenderDysphoria.aspx> accessed 28 
March 2011.
28 See, for example, the International Network for Trans’ Depathologization <http://www.
stp2012.info/old/en/manifesto> accessed 20 April 2011.
29 World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH), ‘Response to the Proposed 
DSM 5 Criteria for Gender Incongruence’ <http://www.wpath.org/> accessed 10 March 2011.
30 42 U.S.C. 12211 (b)(1) (2006).
31 For a summary of cases in which transgender persons have successfully relied upon disability 
discrimination laws at the state level, see Abby Lloyd, ‘Defining the Human: Are Transgender 
People Strangers to the Law?’ 20 Berkeley Journal of Gender, Law & Justice 150, 182-86.
32 The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints Hong Kong Ltd v. Steward J.C. Park AKA 
Jessica Park, HKCA1167/2001 (8 November 2001) (interpreting the Hong Kong DDO to include 
gender dysphoria as a disability).
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gender identities33. For example, in one recent case, a post-operative transgender 
woman sought judicial review of a decision by the Hong Kong Registrar of Mar-
riages to deny her application to marry her male partner34. The plaintiff argued that 
the Registrar of Marriages had violated her right to privacy and her right to marry 
(both of which are protected by Hong Kong’s regional constitution) but she did not 
rely upon the DDO. Unfortunately, she lost in the Court of First Instance (and has 
since appealed to the Hong Kong Court of Appeal). While I disagree with the deci-
sion of the Court of First Instance and anticipate that it may be overturned on ap-
peal, I also believe that the plaintiff could have strengthened her case by relying 
upon the DDO and the right to equality35. At least one other commentator has made 
a similar argument36. Regardless of the final outcome, the case illustrates the choice 
that the transgender community faces. Hong Kong is bound by the CRPD (by virtue 
of China’s ratification) and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
will commence its review of the initial reports of Hong Kong and China in late 
201137. The Hong Kong government has ignored transgender issues in its initial re-
port to the Committee but discriminatory policies (including the policy applied by 
the Registrar of Marriages) could still be raised by Hong Kong NGOs in their 
shadow reports38. The question, which is addressed in the next section of this essay, 
is whether NGOs that support transgender rights will want to raise transgender is-
sues before this Committee.
33 See, for example, Robyn Emerton, ‘Finding a Voice, Fighting for Rights: The Emergence of the 
Transgender Movement in Hong Kong’ (2006) 7 Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 243, 255 (noting that 
bringing a case under the DDO would present a dilemma, because it “relies on the unpalatable 
argument that transgender persons have a disability”.
34 W v. Registrar of Marriages [2010] 6 HKC 359.
35 For an introduction the Hong Kong’s law on disability discrimination, see Carole J. Petersen, 
‘China’s Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities: The Implica-
tions for Kong Law’ (2008) 38 Hong Kong Law Journal 611; and Carole J. Petersen, ‘A Progres-
sive Law with Weak Enforcement? An Empirical Study of Hong Kong’s Disability Law, (2005) 
25(4) Disability Studies Quarterly (Fall).
36 Kelley Loper, ‘W v. Registrar of Marriages and the Right to Equality in Hong Kong Law’, forth-
coming in (2011) 41 Hong Kong Law Journal 89. (This issue of the Hong Kong Law Journal will 
also contain additional articles critiquing the decision of the Court of First Instance in W v. Reg-
istrar of Marriages.)
37 The Hong Kong government’s initial report has been published in Chinese and English and the 
list of issues for review will be adopted by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabili-
ties in its sixth session in September 2011 <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/
Session6.aspx> accessed 20 May 2011.
38 For a general analysis of issues faced by transgendered persons in Hong Kong, see Robyn 
Emerton, ‘Time for Change: A Call for the Legal Recognition of Transsexual and Other Transgen-
der Persons in Hong Kong’ (2004) 34 HKLJ 515.
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4. The CRPD and the Depathologization of Disability
4.1. The Drafting Process for the CRPD
The CRPD was drafted and brought into force with remarkable speed, largely due 
to the widespread support it enjoyed among governments and NGOs. Although 
previous instruments (such as the UN Standard Rules on the Equalization of Op-
portunities for Persons With Disabilities39) set useful standards they were not le-
gally binding. The human rights treaties discussed earlier in this paper are, of 
course, fully applicable to persons with disabilities. However, the monitoring com-
mittees did not always pay sufficient attention to disability issues and lacked exper-
tise40. A specialist treaty was also considered necessary because so many persons 
with disabilities still live in deplorable conditions, with extremely low rates of educa-
tion and employment.
The first World NGO Summit on Disability was held in Beijing in 2000, generat-
ing the Beijing Declaration on the Rights of People with Disabilities in the New 
Century. The Declaration called for the adoption of an international treaty to “pro-
mote and protect the rights of persons with disabilities, and enhance equal oppor-
tunities for participation in mainstream society”41. The UN later established an Ad 
Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, to consider pro-
posals for a treaty42. The Ad Hoc Committee held a total of eight sessions from 
2002-200643. The drafting process was considered historic in that it was highly in-
clusive and not dominated by diplomats. This was largely because the disability 
rights movement insisted on participating – thus living the slogan nothing about us 
without us. More than 400 NGO representatives registered for some of the Ad Hoc 
Committee meetings and many other NGOs submitted comments, which were 
widely publicized on the Ad Hoc Committee’s website44. Thus, the CRPD became 
39 Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities, adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly, 20 December 1993, 48th session, resolution 48/96, annex. 
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/dissre00.htm> accessed 15 April 2011.
40 Gerald Quinn and others, ‘Human Rights and Disability: The Current Use and Future Po-
tential of United Nations Human Rights Instruments in the Context of Disability’ (United Na-
tions 2003).
41 Beijing Declaration on the Rights of People with Disabilities in the New Century, adopted 12 
March 2000 at the World NGO Summit on Disability <www.icdri.org/News/beijing_declara-
tion_on_the_right.htm> accessed 1 April 2011.
42 General Assembly Resolution 56/168: Comprehensive and integral international convention to 
promote and protect the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities, adopted 19 December 
2001 <www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/disA56168e1.htm> accessed 1 April 2011.
43 See the website of UN Enable for drafts, submissions, lists of attendees, and other documents 
from the Ad Hoc Committee <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/adhoccom.htm> ac-
cessed 1 April 2011).
44 Don MacKay (Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee from 2005 onwards), ‘The United Nations 
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“the first [human rights treaty] to emerge from lobbying conducted extensively 
through the Internet”45.
The drafting was completed in less than five years, a short period given the large 
number of submissions and comments on the various drafts. By the end of 2006, the 
UN General Assembly had approved the text and the CRPD was opened for ratifi-
cation on 30 March 2007. Eighty-two nations immediately signed the treaty, which 
is probably the largest number ever recorded for a human rights treaty signing cer-
emony. However, the real test was whether governments were willing to ratify the 
treaty; the CRPD obtained its twentieth ratification (by Ecuador) in April 2008 and 
entered into force in May 2008. The CRPD now has 100 states parties, including 
many countries that are members of the Arab League (such as Algeria, Egypt, Jor-
dan, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudia Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Yeman). Thus, a significant number of countries that are unlikely to 
adopt legislation that expressly prohibits transgender discrimination will need to 
adopt and enforce laws prohibiting disability discrimination. The question is wheth-
er those disability laws might be used to help promote respect for gender diversity 
and to prevent discrimination against transgender persons. To a large extent, this 
depends upon whether the new domestic laws fully embrace the social model of 
disability, which is discussed in the next section of this essay.
4.2. Embracing the Social and Human Rights Models of Disability
In addition to its inclusive drafting process, the CRPD is also historic for rejecting 
the medical and welfare approaches to disability. The medical model focused on 
the “affliction” and the need for treatment, while the welfare model focused on the 
need to care for or protect “disabled” individuals. In contrast, the social model 
locates the experience of disability in the social environment46. It thus views dis-
ability as a form of social oppression that must be addressed by laws and policies 
that affirm and implement the principal goals of the treaty – capability, inclusion, 
and the removal of physical and attitudinal barriers. The human rights model is 
similar to the social model in that it views people who live with impairments as 
rights holders and recognizes that they are often more disabled by physical and 
attitudinal barriers than by any particular condition. In short, the CRPD seeks to 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2007) 34 Syracuse Journal of Interna-
tional Law and Commerce 323, 327-8.
45 Kofi Annan, ‘Secretary-General Hails Adoption of Landmark Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities’ (13 December 2006) <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2006/
sgsm10797.doc.htm> accessed 1 April 2011).
46 Rosemary Kayess and Phillip French, ‘Out of Darkness Into Light? Introducing the Conven-
tion on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 1, 5-8; and 
Arlene S. Kanter, ‘The Promise and Challenge of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities’ (2007) 34 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 287, 
291-292.
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depathologize disability and to demonstrate that it is an inherent part of the human 
condition. When the CRPD is seen in this light, it is highly arguable that the cam-
paign to depathologize transgender would not be undermined by participation in 
the CRPD reporting process.
Because of their commitment to the social model, the drafters of the CRPD 
struggled with the question of whether and how to define disability. Some delegates 
and NGO representatives wanted a detailed definition because they feared that 
governments would otherwise exclude people with certain types of disabilities from 
the protection of national laws. Others argued that any medical definition would 
undermine the treaty’s commitment to the social model of disability. Eventually the 
drafters agreed on a compromise, but one that is largely committed to the social 
model: there is no definition of “disability” in the definitions section of the treaty 
but Article One states that the purpose of the convention is to “promote, protect 
and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental free-
doms by all persons with disabilities…” and that “[p]ersons with disabilities include 
those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory impairments 
which, in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective par-
ticipation in society on an equal basis with others (emphasis added)”. Thus, the 
CRPD does not try to define the full scope of the term “persons with disabilities” 
but it does make it clear that certain groups of people must be protected by a na-
tional law implementing the treaty. It also articulates the principle that it is not 
simply “impairments” that hinder full participation but rather the manner in which 
socially constructed barriers tend to interact with our individual conditions.
The CRPD does define the discrimination that it seeks to redress, stating that 
“discrimination on the basis of disability” means any distinction, exclusion or re-
striction on the basis of disability which has the purpose or effect of impairing or 
nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of 
all human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cul-
tural, civil or any other field. This is comparable to the definitions of discrimination 
in the ICERD and CEDAW treaties, except that the CRPD goes on to state that 
discrimination includes “denial of reasonable accommodation” which it defines as 
“necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a dispro-
portionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons 
with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms”. A community’s understanding of what is neces-
sary and appropriate will evolve as the social model of disability exerts more influ-
ence. Thus wheelchair ramps and accessible bathrooms were once considered major 
“accommodations” but are now standard in many countries, enabling a greater 
number of persons to attend school, work, and participate in public life. Similarly, a 
transgender person who elects to pursue medical or surgical transition services 
might benefit from modifications to the standard “male” and “female” bathroom 
facilities and this could fall within the definition of a “reasonable accommodation”, 
the denial of which could constitute discrimination. Under the CRPD, the disability 
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created by that denial of accommodation would not be the condition of the trans-
gender person’s body but rather the interaction of the social environment with that 
individual.
4.3. A Holistic Approach to Rights, including Civil and Political Rights
People who are not familiar with the CRPD often assume that it primarily promotes 
economic and social rights, such as increased access to education and employment. 
In fact, the CRPD embraces the full range of rights. The CRPD also reveals the false 
dichotomy between “first” and “second” generation rights, which has tended to 
dominate international discourses on rights since the adoption of the ICCPR and 
the ICESCR (the two separate treaties that translated the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights into enforceable obligations when the international community 
failed to agree upon one unified treaty). The CRPD embraces a holistic view of what 
human rights mean for persons with disabilities, which typically involves a combina-
tion of rights that were previously set forth in separate treaties47. For example, Ar-
ticle 21 affirms that people with disabilities enjoy freedom of expression, which is 
sometimes categorized as a “negative right” on the theory that the state can fulfil the 
right simply by not interfering with citizens’ rights to express opinions and access 
information. However, in the CRPD, freedom of expression and access to informa-
tion are not simply “negative rights” because the state has an affirmative duty to 
promote sign language and accessible technologies.
The civil and political aspects of the CRPD may prove challenging for certain 
governments, especially those that have not ratified the ICCPR. China provides an 
interesting case study because it has filed its initial report to the Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities but does not appear to be paying much attention 
to the civil and political rights in the treaty48. China and some other states parties 
will likely attempt to interpret Article 21 as simply requiring accessible technologies 
to facilitate communication. However, the Committee will almost certainly interpret 
it more broadly and ask governments about general freedom of expression, which 
has all too often been denied to persons with disabilities49. As mentioned earlier in 
47 See generally, Frédéric Mégret, ‘The Disabilities Convention: Towards a Holistic Concept of 
Rights’ (2008) 12(2) International Journal of Human Rights 261; and Frédéric Mégret, ‘The Dis-
abilities Convention: Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities or Disability Rights?’ (2008) 30 
Human Rights Quarterly 494.
48 China’s initial report is available on the website of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CRPD/Pages/Session6.aspx> accessed 20 May 
2011.
49 China and Hong Kong submit separate reports to the treaty bodies under the one country two 
systems model and Hong Kong does a far better job of protecting freedom of expression than 
Mainland China. See generally Carole J. Petersen, ‘Embracing Universal Standards? The Role of 
International Human Rights Treaties in Hong Kong’s Constitutional Jurisprudence’ in Fu Hual-
ing, Lison Harris, and Simon N. M. Young (eds), Interpreting Hong Kong’s Basic Law: The 
Struggle for Coherence (Palgrave Macmillan 2007).
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this paper, freedom of expression also has special significance for transgender per-
sons because gender identity is such an important aspect of individual expression.
Article 29 of the CRPD provides that persons with disabilities have the right to 
participate in political and public life and thus the Committee may also ask about 
police harassment. For example, the Beijing Aizhixing Institute is a grassroots NGO 
working on AIDS issues in China, including AIDS prevention among vulnerable 
groups50. Another organization, the Beijing Yirenping Center assists persons with 
disabilities to litigate against unlawful discrimination51. Unfortunately, both organi-
zations have experienced official harassment, as do the lawyers who represent plain-
tiffs in disability discrimination and human rights cases in China52. For example, in 
2010, Wan Yanhia, an AIDS activist and head of the Beijing Aizhixing Institute, felt 
compelled to flee to the United States to escape persecution53. In many countries, 
transgender individuals experience extensive harassment from the authorities. 
Clearly, any official intimidation of individuals and groups seeking to exercise their 
rights under the CRPD would constitute a serious violation of the CRPD and should 
be investigated by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
Article 14 of the CRPD is also important because it protects liberty and security 
of the person. Persons with disabilities must not be arbitrarily deprived of their 
liberty and the existence of a disability alone must not be used to justify detention. 
This provision is potentially significant in countries that detain transgender persons 
on the ground that they require “corrective” treatment or counselling. Similarly, 
Article 13 of the CRPD provides that persons with disabilities must have access to 
justice. These provisions allow the Committee to question governments on a broad 
range of potential violations, including civil commitment proceedings, compulsory 
medical treatment, and conditions inside medical and detention facilities.
The CRPD is also very firm on the right to personal autonomy, particularly in 
matters relating to family law and it condemns any state-sponsored sterilization. For 
example, Article 23 provides that states parties shall “eliminate discrimination 
against persons with disabilities in all matters relating to marriage, family, parent-
hood and relationships”. This provision could be very useful for transgender per-
sons who are denied the right to marry or to form a family. It further states that all 
50 Beijing Aizhixing, ‘Open Letter to Global Fund’ (9 July 2010) <http://www.aizhi.net/en/> ac-
cessed 1 August 2010.
51 For information on Yirenping’s advocacy and reports of harassment, see its English language 
website, <http://www.yirenping.org/english/index.htm> accessed 1 August 2010.
52 See, for example, Human Rights Watch, ‘Walking on Thin Ice: Control, Intimidation and Ha-
rassment of Lawyers in China’, <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/04/28/walking-thin-ice-0 
accessed 1 April 2011, and Human Rights in China, HRIC Condemns Growing Harassment 
against HIV/AIDS Petitioners, <http://www.hrichina.org> accessed 1 August 2010.
53 For reports, see ‘AIDS Activist Leaves China for U.S., Citing Pressure’, The New York Times, 
11 May 2010 <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/11/world/asia/11beijing.html> accessed 1 Au-
gust 2010; and ‘China’s Crackdown on Nonprofit Groups Prompts New Fears Among Activists’, 
Washington Post, 11 May 11, 2010.
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persons with disabilities shall “retain their fertility on an equal basis with others” 
which means that governments have an obligation to reform laws and policies that 
impair the fertility of persons living with disabilities54. Thus the Committee would 
very likely object to any law that requires transgender persons to undergo surgery 
(which often includes sterilization) before being legally recognized in the gender of 
their choice. Transgender groups seeking to reform such laws and policies could 
obtain support from the Committee on the Rights of Disabilities if they submit 
shadow reports on this issue when their governments are being reviewed55.
4.4. Conclusion
This essay has highlighted only a few of the many provisions in the CRPD that may 
prove useful for the transgender movement, provided that it can escape the out-
dated notion that “persons with disabilities” represents yet another stigmatized 
category of persons who are not entitled to the full range of human rights. An ad-
ditional reason for engaging with the CRPD reporting process is that a certain 
number of persons who experience transgender discrimination will also experience 
disability discrimination, particularly as they age and are compelled to interact more 
frequently with health care systems. This discrimination is intersectional in that 
transgender persons with disabilities are more likely to experience mistreatment 
when they enter a hospital than persons with disabilities who easily fit within the 
traditional categories of male and female.
Many transgender individuals live in countries that are far from adopting laws 
that expressly prohibit discrimination on the ground of gender identity but have an 
obligation to enact laws prohibiting disability discrimination, in order to comply 
with the CRPD. By participating in the CRPD reporting process, NGOs can help to 
ensure that transgender persons are not denied the protection of these laws and not 
ignored when the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities reviews 
national laws and policies. Moreover, the transgender and disability rights move-
ments can hopefully support each other by simultaneously embracing the diversity 
of gender identities and the social model of disability. In this manner, we can fully 
acknowledge both the universality of gender variation and the experience of dis-
ability, as being inherent within the human condition.
54 I have previously analyzed this issue in the context of China. See Carole J. Petersen, ‘Popula-
tion Policy and Eugenic Theory: Implications of China’s Ratification of the United Nations Con-
vention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2010) 8 China: An International Journal 85.
55 It is not uncommon for national laws to require transgender persons to obtain a medical diag-
nosis and/or undergo transitional surgery in order to obtain legal recognition of their chosen 
gender. For a comparative analysis of the legal frameworks of various European states, see Euro-
pean Agency for Fundamental Rights, Lesbian, Gay Bisexual and Transgender Rights <http://fra.
europa.eu/fraWebsite/lgbt-rights/lgbt-rights_en.htm> accessed 20 May 2011.
The proTeCTion of Transsexual’s righTs
by The european CourT of human righTs:
a True breakThrough or a new risk?
Céline Husson-Rochcongar
Abstract
In 2002, the Strasbourg Court selected to change its position radically regarding the situ-
ation of the transsexuals, asserting that their “unsatisfactory situation […] is no longer 
sustainable”. This quite innovative solution is based on the use made by European judges 
of dignity and of freedom, values which they deem fundamental to democratic societies. 
This jurisprudence may present an obvious interest for the claims presented by the LGBTI 
community but, by replacing legal arguments with axiological considerations, characteris-
tic of a compassionate approach, it also entails certain risks. Direct reference to values it-
self raises an issue by introducing a particular rhetorical element in an already complex 
jurisprudence. Moreover, the selection of the aforementioned values proves just as prob-
lematic. Thus, querying the evolution of the recognition of the rights of the members of 
the LGBTI community imposes not to be limited to superficial examination of the juris-
prudential solutions, but far more to seek the true motivations thereof.
* * * 
Since its creation, the European Court of Human Rights – and, before, the Commis-
sion which had served as a filter up to 1998 for examining the admissibility of the 
requests – had to peruse several tens of cases regarding transsexuals’ rights. As it is 
often the case in Strasbourg – particularly when dealing with burning issues – the 
evolution of the jurisprudence was rather slow, progressing especially by a kind of 
sedimentation, several successive breakthroughs leading gradually to the elaboration 
of principled solutions. Thus, whether considering sexual conversion surgery, 
changing birth certificate, right to marriage or family relationships, the European 
authorities have gradually elaborated a jurisprudence around the quite specific situ-
ation of individuals who, although rejecting their belonging to their biological sex, 
find it hard to have their change of sexual identity legally recognised.
However, whereas the Commission was willing to accede to the request of trans-
sexuals in the early days, the Court, for its own part, has long shown a kind of prin-
cipled opposition to a disturbing situation. Indeed, as is frequently the case when 
the issues on which it has to rule are in debate within the Member States, the Court 
has long hummed and hawed before opting for a more radical approach, since of 
course a jurisdiction, especially a supra-state jurisdiction, is not entitled to set behav-
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ioural standards. Still, these issues are particularly tricky when involving, rightfully 
so or not, considerations associated with moral conceptions. Thus, with regard to 
transsexualism, control has been partially compromised since the Court has often 
neglected to seek whether the interference of the State in protected law was effec-
tively justified by a legitimate concern, whereas it would rather check whether the 
lack of State intervention was in violation of the Convention or not. This difficulty 
clearly shows that the aim of the Court which deals both with States and individuals 
was to determine the rights it intended to recognise to transsexuals.
In face of this tricky issue, it has sometimes elected to adopt a disputable argu-
mentation, wherein moral implications were only imperfectly masked by scientific 
arguments, simply emphasising that transsexualism raised “complex scientific, legal, 
moral and social issues”1 or that “the law appears to be in a transitional stage”2. 
However, in 2002, it embarked on a new approach and finally asserted that “the 
unsatisfactory situation [of post-operative transsexuals] is no longer sustainable”3. 
A thunderclap through which the Court seemed to discard twenty-five years of case-
law, this about turn still raises a few questions, both through its style and construc-
tion, and leads one to wonder whether the protection thus offered only provides a 
real breakthrough in the protection of transsexuals’ rights, or whether it also implies 
a new type of risk. Indeed, leaving aside its slow initial progression for a radical as-
sertion that the situation should be taken into consideration (1), the Strasbourg ju-
risprudence especially translates into the implementation of a compassionate rheto-
ric to the detriment of argumentation (2).
1. A slow progression up to radical assertion for dealing with a tricky situation
The European case-law relative to transsexualism may be viewed through a 
double relational dimension: the relation to oneself (1.1) and the relation to oth-
ers (1.2). Of course, the relevant criterion here is not to determine whether the 
transsexual is placed in a relation with others (she or he always is) but rather 
whether he or she is the only person directly affected by the right for which she 
or he demands recognition. On both these aspects, whereas the Court showed 
great distrust against the possibility of drawing all the consequences of recognis-
ing true rights to private life and marriage for transsexuals, the Commission im-
mediately proved more progressive.
1 X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom App no 21830/93 (ECHR GC, 22 April 1997, para. 52) and 
Sheffield and Horsham v. the United Kingdom App. no 22985/93 and no 23390/94 (ECHR GC, 
30 July 1998, para. 58).
2 Rees v. the United Kingdom App no 9532/81 (ECHR J, 17 Oct. 1986, para. 37).
3 Christine Goodwin and I. v. the United Kingdom resp. App no 28957/95 and no 35680/94 
(ECHR GC, 11 July 2002, para. 90 and para. 70).
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1.1. The relation to oneself
Here, both the sexual conversion and the recognition of marital status ought to be 
considered – which, by extension, also includes issues deriving from the absence of 
recognition4, regardless whether dealing with a differentiated treatment5 or a re-
duced refund of the medical costs associated with medical treatment for transsexu-
alism6. Globally, the issue hence lies in the possibility for an individual to claim a sex 
different from one’s biological sex and to have the authorities recognise the conse-
quences thereof.
In fact, for drawing consequences from the authorisation of surgical treatments, 
the control authorities have always ruled in consideration of actual physical modifi-
cations, i.e. only post-operative transsexuals could claim to exercise the fullness of 
their rights as belonging to their non-biological sex. Conversely, they ruled that the 
fact that an applicant may have benefited from treatments in a state hospital would 
not systematically imply a first form of State acceptance of the applicant’s condition. 
In reality, the Court even considered that it was protecting transsexuals by not tak-
ing on board “too widely” arguments concerning the State’s involvement in the 
medical treatment so that the public authorities would not be tempted to reject any 
treatment in order to evade any possible future complaints7. By introducing a di-
chotomy between taking into consideration the general interest and taking into 
consideration the individual interest of the applicant, such reasoning is undoubt-
edly problematic.
However, as the Court finally stated in 2002, at the end of a convoluted jurispru-
dential evolution, it was most concerned about the consequences of the transsexual 
condition, the strongest being the official recognition of this new condition, whereas 
the applicants agreed to consider social recognition as an essential element of the 
process of sexual conversion through the secret of intimacy, often challenged by 
administrative hassle. Thus, in terms of civil status8, as early as 1977, the Commis-
sion implicitly acknowledged that refusing to grant official recognition of the new 
sex of a transsexual was a private matter, just like the consequences thereof9. The 
4 In the Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium decision, the Commission mentioned “identity checks […] 
issuance of public records […] examination of candidacies for a public or private job” (App no 
7654/76, 9 May 1978).
5 See Goodwin, I. and Grant v. the United Kingdom App no 32570/03 (ECHR dc, 19 May 2005, 
J, 23 May 2006).
6 Van Kück v. Germany App no 35968/97 (ECHR dc, 18 Oct. 2001 and J, 12 June 2003).
7 Rees (ECHR J, para. 45) and Van Kück (ECHR J, para. 77).
8 As regards the duration of proceedings for changing civil status and first name, see D.P. v. 
France App no 24109/94 (ECHR dc, 18 May 1995, dc, 12 Apr. 1996, rep., 21 Jan. 1997, no viola-
tion due to the complexity of the facts) and Juchault v. France App no 25202/94 (ECHR dc, 12 
Apr. 1996, violation due to a five-year period).
9 X. V. R.F.A. App no 6699/74 (ECHR dc, 15 Dec. 1977): “[T]he refusal of the German au-
thorities to give formal recognition to the applicant’s situation causes her various problems which 
seriously affect her private life”. This “highly embarrassing and prejudicial” situation justified in 
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following year, it resorted to Article 810 to establish that in addition to an obligation 
of abstention, the State had to meet positive obligations, judging
hardly compatible with the obligation to respect private life, to impose upon a 
person who, further to medical recommendation and through law-abiding treat-
ment, has taken on the appearance and to a vast extent the features of the opposite 
sex to that mentioned on his/her birth certificate, to carry identity papers in blatant 
contradiction with his/her appearance (para. 46)11.
Emphasising that the State treated the applicant “as an ambiguous being, an “ap-
pearance”, [by] trapping him in a sex which was hardly his any longer”, it declared 
“that the respect for private life was truly undermined” (para. 52), in violation of 
Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention. 
In the same perspective, in 1984, in the Rees case, the Commission admitted, 
with the applicant, that “sex is one of the essential elements of human personality” 
and considered that 
medical recognition of the necessity to assist the applicant in the fulfilment of one’s 
identity also [ought] to be looked upon as an additional argument in favour of the 
legal recognition of the change of one’s sexual identity (para. 48).
Considering conversely that there was no actual community of views and that the 
“law appeared to be going through a transition phase”, the Court for its own part 
granted a wide margin of appreciation to the State. Acknowledging that most Euro-
pean States “did not offer (as yet) […] the transsexuals the faculty to change their 
civil status so as to adapt it to their newly acquired identity”, it refused to make the 
supposed interest of the applicant prevail over a kind of “public interest” (para. 44) 
while considering that “the condition of a fair balance [between general and indi-
vidual interests] will not compel the United Kingdom […] to revamp its civil status 
system from top to bottom” (para. 42), as if it rested its case here on the fact that 
the State and its citizens were adamant to have the present civil status maintained. 
However, it went on to add that it was “fully aware of the severity of the issues” and 
of the “feeling of helplessness” of transsexuals and, reminding that the Convention 
“always ought to be construed and applied in the light of the present conditions”, it 
asserted the necessity of a “constant examination in view of, in particular, the evolu-
tion of science and of society” (para. 47), seemingly opening the door to subsequent 
evolution of its position.
particular the applicant to be released from the obligation of exhausting domestic remedies (also 
see: report, 11 Oct. 1979).
10 It had declared it applicable while considering that “the undue disclosure or the dissemination 
by de facto third parties pertaining to physical condition, health, personality, [might] violate the 
applicant’s intimacy and jeopardise its private life” (Van Oosterwijck, ECHR dc, para. 44).
11 Van Oosterwijck ECHR rep. (1st March 1979, para. 60).
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As soon as 1989, the Commission attempted to harmonise the solutions at hand, 
but the Court did not go along, and asserted that to the best of its knowledge “no 
significant scientific developments […] have occurred” since the Rees judgment and 
emphasised that a sexual conversion surgery “does not result in the acquisition of all 
the biological characteristics of the other sex” (!), to again refuse to find a violation 
of the Convention, in spite of otherwise promising argumentation12. Indeed, blow-
ing hot and cold, it asserted first of all that, without being bound by its prior rulings, 
it “usually follows and applies its own precedents, such a course being in the inter-
ests of legal certainty and the orderly development of the Convention case-law”. It 
then stressed that “this would not prevent [it] from departing from an earlier deci-
sion if it was persuaded that there were cogent reasons for doing so”, especially to 
guarantee “that the interpretation of the Convention reflects societal changes and 
remains in line with the present-day conditions” (para. 35). Despite “certain devel-
opments […] in the law of some of the member States”, it nevertheless concluded 
to “the same diversity of practice as obtained at the time of the Rees judgment” 
(para. 40)13. Thus, it was only in 1992 that the Court ruled for the first time that 
Article 8 had been violated by a lack of recognition of a transsexual’s sex change, as 
the French system neither allowed the rectification of the civil status registers, nor 
the modification of first names14. However, this finding of a violation did not pre-
vent the Court from asserting paradoxically that “there is as yet no sufficiently broad 
consensus between the member States […] to persuade the Court to reach opposite 
conclusions to those in its Rees and Cossey judgments” (para. 48)15.
Until its disappearance, the Commission went on for its own part to defend a 
progressive position, declaring a violation of Article 8 by taking into account both 
the evolution of medical knowledge and a “clear tendency, within the contracting 
States, in favour of legal recognition of sexual conversion”16. In the Sheffield et Hor-
sham case, it even seemed prepared for jurisprudential evolution by asserting that 
“there is an increased social acceptance of transsexualism and an increased recogni-
tion of the problems which post-operative transsexuals encounter”.
12 Cossey v. the United Kingdom App no 10843/84 (ECHR rep., 9 May 1989 and J, 27 Sept. 1990).
13 Several judges emphasised that “[t]his negative attitude towards transsexuals is based on 
deeply rooted moral and ethical notions which, nevertheless, seem to be slowly changing in Eu-
ropean societies” (Diss. op. Palm, Foighel and Pekkanen, pt. 5).
14 B. V. France App no 13343/87 (ECHR dc, 13 Feb. 1990, rep., 6 Sept. 1990 and J, 25 March 1992).
15 The Commission had declared that Article 8 had been violated, with seventeen votes against one.
16 X, Y and Z. (ECHR rep., 27 June 1995, para. 67), Sheffield (ECHR rep., 21 Jan. 1997, para. 52) 
and Horsham (ECHR rep., 21 Jan. 1997, para. 53). In the Sheffield and Horsham case, it thus 
declared that Article 8 had been violated, contrary to the Court which considered that “the ap-
plicants have not shown that since the date of adoption of its Cossey judgement in 1990 there have 
been any findings in the area of medical science which settle conclusively the doubts concerning 
the causes of the condition of transsexualism” (ECHR GC, para. 56).
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1.2. The relation to others
As part of the relation to others, issues relating to couple and those regarding chil-
dren and family relationships ought to be mentioned here, two aspects which, for 
various reasons, have quite significant moral implications.
As soon as 1979, the Commission considered that internal law “shall not autho-
rise the States to deprive absolutely a person or a category of persons from the right 
to get married”17. It thus rejected the argument bearing upon the incapacity to pro-
create18, asserting that
by opposing aforehand to any marriage request an indirect objection based solely 
on the items of the birth certificate and of the general theory governing the rectifi-
cation of Civil status records, without further examination, the Government [had] 
underrated […] the applicant’s right to get married and to start a family (para. 60).
The Court, for its own part, chose a conservative approach as early as the Rees 
judgment: it emphasised that
by securing the right to get married Article 12 concerns traditional marriage be-
tween two people of different biological sex […] the aim being essentially to pro-
tect marriage as the keystone of family life (para. 49).
It asserted later on that “the traditional [marriage] concept provided sufficient 
grounds for applying biological criteria so as to determine the sex of a person for 
marriage purposes”19, such an argument would hardly open the way to possible 
evolution since one may wonder when the above-mentioned biological criteria could 
be disregarded. 
Besides, in addition to the requests bearing upon the prohibition for a transsexu-
al to marry someone of the same biological sex, some of them would pertain to the 
case of post-operative transsexuals seeking to remain married to the partner they had 
before their sexual conversion, a request frequently rejected by the national authori-
ties on the grounds that authorising the applicants to remain married would amount 
to the authorisation of homosexual marriage20. For the Court, the fact that certain 
17 Van Oosterwijck (ECHR rep., para. 56).
18 “If marriage and family are effectively associated in the Convention as in the national laws, 
nothing however enables to deduce therefrom that the ability to procreate would be a fundamen-
tal condition of marriage, nor even that the procreation is an essential aim in itself” (para. 59). It 
went on to say that “the evolution of medical knowledge leaves a few doubts on the absolute valid-
ity of the [morphological criterion noted at birth]”.
19 In the Cossey judgment, not taking into account the fact that request was nothing but hypo-
thetical since, contrary to M. Rees, the female applicant was engaged, the Court noted that “the 
developments which have occurred to date cannot be said to evidence any general abandonment 
of the traditional concept of marriage”.
20 R. and F. v. the United Kingdom and Parry v. the United Kingdom, resp. App no 35748/05 and 
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States authorised homosexual marriage did not mean nevertheless that such a right 
could be derived from the interpretation of the Convention. It hence rejected as 
paradoxical requests which it considered as on a par with claiming the benefit of 
advantages associated with both sexes, refusing to draw all the consequences of the 
solution described in the I. and Goodwin judgments: emphasising that “the historical 
and social value” of the institution of marriage and its “affective importance” ac-
counted for the applicants to wish to stay married, it noted that it was precisely that 
value, as recognised in national law, which excluded them from that institution, 
whereas such precision put in evidence that the central issue pertained to the function 
of marriage in European society and, consequently, to a moral conception of family21.
Such a conception can be also seen in the way the Court considers the relation-
ships of a post-operative transsexual towards children whom he or she might have 
had before his or her operation or towards those he or she might want to have after 
said operation since the interests of the children and of the social structures would 
overlap the interests of the transsexual, by preserving various aspects of civil law but 
also those of the family as the basic social unit. In this respect, it believed that 
“adopt[ing] or impos[ing] [a] single point of view” was not in its province22. How-
ever, instead of focusing directly on the right of the transsexual parent, it chose to 
query the adverse effects which might ensue for children with a transsexual parent.
Confronted with paternity recognition by a male transsexual of his concubine’s 
child conceived by artificial insemination with a sperm donor, the Commission de-
clared that Article 8 was violated whereas the Court, on the contrary, stated that said 
Article had not been violated, since a wide margin of appreciation prevailed23, con-
sidering once again that “the law appears to be in a transitional stage” and that “the 
community as a whole has an interest in maintaining a coherent system of family law 
which places the best interests of the child at the forefront” (para. 44).
Uncertainty favoured the preservation of the previous situation24 but, paradoxi-
42971/05 (ECHR dc, 28 Nov. 2006). Although Law had compelled the female applicant to chose 
to “sacrifice her gender or her marriage”, the Court considered that its effects had not been “dis-
proportionate”, since her relationship could be pursued “in all its current essential” and be 
granted a legal status which provided the same rights and obligations as marriage, thanks to the 
civil union contract. To declare that the right to marriage had not been violated, it put forward 
the protection of children and the safety of the family surrounding, which was rather surprising as 
it noted that the applicants did not have any children…
21 The Court seems to consider that each State should be responsible for determining the condi-
tions of validity of a marriage in relation to what the institution represents for its citizens.
22 X., Y. and Z. (ECHR GC, para. 51).
23 For want of a “common European standard with regard to the granting of parental rights to 
transsexuals” or of a “generally shared approach […] with regard to the manner in which the 
social relationship between a child conceived by AID and the person who performs the role of 
father should be reflected in law” (ibid.).
24 Refusing to authorise the same person to cumulate statutes associated with both sexes, it still did 
not query directly the possibility for a transsexual to start a family after his/her operation and did not 
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cally, it was hence precisely because the relationships they maintained were similar 
to those supposedly existing within a family deemed as “normal”, that the applicants 
found themselves deprived of the possibility of being legally considered as such… 
As for the issue of keeping the parental rights secured prior to the operation25, the 
Commission looked at it through a conventional proportionality control and the 
legitimate aims of “children’s health and rights protection”, simply asserting that “it 
is not its task to take the place of the competent national courts and make a fresh 
examination of all the facts and evidences”26.
However understandable it may be, the reinforced protection granted to the 
child on account of his/her particular vulnerability thus gives rise to difficulties, ei-
ther because his/her interests are “torn apart” between the child as applicant and as 
a potential victim or because they can rarely be protected in a similar way, depending 
on whether the change in their parent’s sexual identity took place before the child 
was born or when he or she was already a teenager.
These cases may regrettably not have opened a wide debate as to how to establish 
an optimal balance between a transsexual’s interest and his or her children’s. But it 
ought to be stressed that such a debate would undoubtedly thrown the Court into an 
undammable maelstrom of moral considerations, all the more so because it was dif-
ficult to reach a true consensus at the time, as testified by the reading of separate 
opinions27. Thus, from systematic refusal to assimilate transsexuals with individuals 
of the opposite biological sex to a converse stance, the radical change in stance ad-
opted by the Court may be explained by switching from a dissimulated moral to 
emphasising values corresponding to the implementation of a compassionate rhetoric.
2. The dangers of a compassionate rhetoric overriding the argumentation
Since there are no significant factors of public interest to weigh against the interest 
of th[e] applicant in obtaining legal recognition of her gender re-assignment, […] 
the fair balance that is inherent in the Convention now tilts decisively in favour of 
the applicant28.
take into account the attitude of the State (which had authorised the surgical treatment of X and the 
artificial insemination of Y). Foreboding the jurisprudential about turn of 2002, this intermediate 
position was heftily criticised by dissident judges. However, with the recent recognition of a true 
“right to respect for both the decisions to become and not to become a parent”, this perspective could 
eventually evolve. See Evans v. the United Kingdom App no 6339/05 (ECHR GC, 10 Apr. 2007, para. 
71) or Dickson v. the United Kingdom App no 44362/04 (ECHR GC, 4 Dec. 2007, para. 66).
25 Soon, undoubtedly, the issue of a possibility of adoption will also be on the agenda, as shown 
by the case-law relative to homosexuality.
26 L.F. v. Ireland App no 28154/95 (ECHR dc, 2 July 1997).
27 For instance, in the X., Y. and Z. case, see the opinions of judges Pettiti, de Meyer and Foighel.
28 Goodwin (ECHR GC, para. 93) and I. (ECHR GC, para. 73). Also see the Grant judgment 
regarding the right to pension.
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It is with these words that the European Court of Human Rights chose to disin-
tegrate the margin of appreciation it had acknowledged so far to the States in cases 
of transsexualism. After years of status quo, one can only be pleased to see that “the 
unsatisfactory situation in which post-operative transsexuals live in an intermediate 
zone as not quite one gender or the other is no longer sustainable” is clearly as-
serted29. However, enthusiasm has rapidly been replaced with the bitter impression 
that such evolution may not be as fully positive after all. Indeed, the sacrifice of the 
“traditional” juridical argument on the altar of the efficiency of the protection of-
fered undoubtedly raises problems (2.1), especially insofar as the Court seems to 
prefer a rhetoric based on axiology (2.2).
2.1. The juridical argument sacrificed on the altar of efficiency
The spectacular judgments of 11 July 2002 lead to query the argumentation imple-
mented as well as the vocabulary used, since what then springs to mind is first of all 
the tone adopted by the European Court of Human Rights, obviously desirous to as-
sert its willingness to come to grips with the problems of the transsexuals so as to put 
an end to their sufferings. So as to transform these judgments into principled procla-
mation, it then elected quite a compassionate vocabulary, with a sentimental rather 
than truly legal vision of the problem. Still, such an excess of compassion may reach 
beyond the purely legal scope towards the temptation of a kind of moral order. Indeed, 
in pointing to the “abnormal situation” of the transsexuals or to their “great personal 
cost”, noticing “dramatic changes […] in the field of transsexuality” or proclaiming 
that “this unsatisfactory situation […] is no longer sustainable”, the Court gives the 
impression of throwing a few home truths rather than demonstrating a state of fact, 
thereby projecting its own subjectivity into over-assertions, finally to prove pointless.
Indeed, such a style supports a modification of the argument itself, in which the 
Court forsakes all the criteria it hitherto deemed valid in favour of a previously re-
jected standard: far from any proportionality control, the traditional elements of 
European jurisprudence have seemingly been superseded with an argumentation 
based on a value judgment, the situation is no longer sustainable! Built on a succes-
sion of paradoxa, the judgments bear out the fact that the Court, with a view to 
modify its jurisprudence, has not built its judgment according to its usual logical 
progression but rather on a case-to-case basis, whereas it did not seek so much to 
back up a detailed argumentation but rather to undermine successively all the argu-
ments in its way. Still, although its approach is known for being purposeful, it is 
generally no less stringent which is quite far from being the case in this matter in 
judgments whose principle scope is nonetheless indisputable.
Thus, underscoring the existence of “a conflict between social reality and law 
aris[ing] which places the transsexual in an anomalous position” (resp. para. 77 and 
para. 57) and asserting that it is “not persuaded therefore that the state of medical 
29 Ibid., resp. para. 90 and para. 70.
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science or scientific knowledge provides any determining argument as regards the 
legal recognition of transsexuals” (para. 83 and para. 63), the Grand Chamber starts 
with ruling out specialist debates, skating on thin ice with medical tools so as to 
impose its solution. Then, in spite of the absence of “a common European ap-
proach” it readily emphasises, it chose to divest the Member States of their margin 
of appreciation, using strangely circular reasoning to assert that the absence of Eu-
ropean consensus was in fact “hardly surprising”, in view of the “widely diverse legal 
systems and traditions” (para. 85 and para. 65), and relying on the principle of sub-
sidiarity to suggest that it was its responsibility to twist the arms of those who had 
so far unacceptably refused to reach a consensus, although the prospect looked dif-
ficult enough. To that end, evoking a vague “international trend”, it maintained that 
“[a]lready at the time of the Sheffield and Horsham case, there was an emerging 
consensus within the Contracting States […] on providing legal recognition follow-
ing gender re-assignment” (para. 84 and para. 64). Still, why assert that a consensus 
“was coming to light” four years previously at European level (without drawing any 
consequence at the time) and rely here on a simple “trend” (what is more, an “in-
ternational trend”) in favour “not only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals 
but of legal recognition of th[eir post-operative] new sexual identity” (para. 85 and 
para. 65)? The argument is rather a cause for dismay. Considering that “there are no 
significant factors of public interest to weigh against the interest of th[e] applicant” 
any longer, it hence disregarded any search for conciliation between the transsexu-
al’s interests and that of the community, asserting that henceforth “the fair balance, 
that is inherent in the Convention now tilts decisively in favour of the applicant” 
(para. 93 and para. 73)30. Finally, noting that Article 12 “refers in express terms to 
the right of a man and woman to marry”, it again criticised the validity of the bio-
logical criterion so as to determine the sex of an individual, taking up the longstand-
ing argument put forward by transsexuals according to which it would be
artificial to assert that post-operative transsexuals have not been deprived of the 
right to marry as, according to law, they remain able to marry a person of their 
former opposite sex31.
30 Since then, the Court has asserted that “determining the medical necessity of gender reassign-
ment measures by their curative effects on a transsexual is not a matter of legal definition”, insist-
ing on the incompetence of the internal jurisdiction in medical terms whereas it had not even 
sought in 2002 to take into account the convergent advices of the specialists. Apparently, it did 
not realised that it was then imposing its own vision of transsexualism, relying on “most intimate 
feelings and experiences” (Van Kück, ECHR, paras 54 and 81). Evoking the “right to respect for 
[…] sexual self-determination as one of the aspects of [the] right to respect for [one’s] private 
life”, it declared that such right had been violated, after having curiously noted that the procedure 
had unfolded “at a time when the condition of transsexualism was generally known” (paras 78 
and 76), which was hardly disputable since the first sexual reassignment surgical operations date 
back to the beginning of the twentieth century.
31 Resp. paras 100-101 and paras 80-81. The Court also evoked Article 9 of the Charter of funda-
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Refusing to consider that a State might go as far as to prohibit in practice “any 
exercise of the right to marry” (para. 103 and para. 83), it also divested it of its mar-
gin of appreciation within the framework of Article 12 by confining it to a verifica-
tion role.
Consequently, with a view the better to protect transsexuals’ individual freedom 
through the principle of free disposition of the body, it is its entire case-law – pa-
tiently built hitherto (biological criterion, medical arguments, legal arguments…) – 
which the Court wilfully blew to pieces. Thus, whereas previously public order 
considerations had rather prevented the recognition of the transsexuals’ status by 
reason of the noticeable modifications it might bring about, the reference to the 
public order was here used a contrario, which contributed to further cloud the solu-
tion. Truthfully, this unusual reasoning process especially appeared to be the fruit of 
an axiological referential.
2.2. A doubly problematic choice of reference values
In the Goodwin and I. judgments, everything unfolds as if the evocation of the values 
enabled the Court to break free from the constraints of reasoning it had to cope 
with. Frequently employed by the Strasbourg authorities, resorting to values is a 
jurisprudential technique which enables them, by referring to the key notions in the 
preamble of the Convention, to impose a tricky solution, to strengthen its argumen-
tation or to highlight the symbolic character thereof in certain fields deemed espe-
cially important. Here, it seems that the Grand Chamber wanted to tackle all these 
objectives. Indeed, it’s the assertion according to which “the very essence of the 
Convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom”, which does not leave 
any room for counter-arguments, which enables it to assert without further ado that
[i]n the twenty first century, the right of transsexuals to personal development and 
to physical and moral security in the full sense enjoyed by others in society cannot 
be regarded as a matter of controversy requiring the lapse of time to cast clearer 
light on the issues involved (resp. para. 90 and para. 70).
However, although this technique obviously aims to assert the principle of a 
strengthened protection, it undoubtedly weakens the jurisprudential corpus in par-
allel.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been mentioned as a “burst of 
universal awareness for defending all the human values around the word ‘freedom’”32. 
mental rights of the European Union, which nevertheless ascribes States a wide margin of appre-
ciation.
32 A speech by Henri Laugier, former deputy-secretary general of the UNO, before the Commis-
sion of Human Rights during its first session in 1947, quoted in Éric Pateyron, La contribution 
française à la rédaction de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme. René Cassin et la Com-
mission consultative des droits de l’homme (La documentation française, 1998) 171.
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Along the same line, the European Court and the European Commission sometimes 
refer to the preamble of the Convention, in order to remind of the ideals which 
ruled over their elaboration and to seek how its interpretation could evolve harmo-
niously. This reference to values therefore essentially reflects the juridicalisation of 
the human rights concept, thereby concreting a philosophical ideal into a legal objec-
tive, from the 1948 Declaration (which claims itself to be “a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations”) to all the legally-binding International 
Conventions. Thus, quite often, the Court only employs values to reinforce the sym-
bolic aspect of a solution which has besides been established through more conven-
tional argumentation, touching for example upon dignity and freedom to assert that 
the rape of a woman by her husband is just as monstrous as a rape committed by a 
third party33.
Still, one may wonder why the Court chose to rely on dignity and freedom 
whereas it might have chosen apparently more suitable values such as equality and 
justice. Truthfully, if the notion of justice is sometimes directly mentioned in the 
case-law, it is only in combination with the notion of peace, so as to fight against the 
claims presented by authors of negationist speeches and to declare their requests 
inadmissible34. In parallel, international human rights law has little time for the con-
cept of equality, which freezes situations in a kind of origin fiction and only imper-
fectly enables one to take into account the inevitable differences among individuals. 
Indeed, the specificity of this law, which claims to be a reaction to Nazi crimes and, 
more widely speaking, a means to fight against intolerance, consists in paying heed 
(and indeed addressing) directly to the individual, as an individual, in his/her singu-
larity. In this ultimate perspective, the aim is, thus, to prevent everyone to be purely 
and simply “assimilable” to another, since it is precisely this attitude which led to 
total depersonalisation of individuals, to the tattooing of numbers of sinister mem-
ory. Difficult to handle, escaping legal argument too easily, the concept of equality 
is hence hardly employed in the jurisprudence, which grandly postulates the equal-
ity of all as the starting point of reflection but in reality claims to be the contrary of 
a happy medium since at the end of the day, the aim is to provide the best suitable 
answer to multiple situations.
As regards the non-legal concept of dignity, it obviously lends itself to various 
usages according to whether the individual is considered on his own or as an incar-
nation of Humanity. One of the rare examples combining its use to that of freedom, 
the I. et Goodwin judgments outline this paradoxical character: as a fundamental 
dignity, it constitutes a form of limitation, epitomizing what Society cannot tolerate 
and opposes the concept of freedom, but as an embodied dignity, it contributes on 
33 C.R. v. the United Kingdom and S.W. v. the United Kingdom App no 20190/92 and no 20166/92 
(ECHR J, 22 Nov. 1995).
34 For example, Remer v. Germany App no 25096/94 (ECHR dc, 6 Sept. 1995): “the applicant’s 
publications ran counter one of the basic ideas of the Convention, as expressed in its preamble, 
namely justice and peace”.
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the contrary to the reinforcement of this freedom, through the principle of free will. 
Here, invoking this principle alongside with freedom hence leads to reinforced in-
dividualism, based on “the notion of personal autonomy”35, which essentially cor-
responds to the principle of free disposition of one’s body, and allows to recognise 
the transsexuals’ status. Admittedly, the issue of transsexualism lends itself easily to 
the implementation of the principle emphasised by the Court according to which 
“[p]rivate life […] includes a person’s physical and psychological integrity and can 
sometimes embrace aspects of an individual’s physical and social identity”36. But 
such a use of values may also bring about a few less positive consequences. First of 
all, to what extent does this process really prove relevant? Then, what would happen 
if, all of a sudden, this protection were fulfilled on account of different values, values 
which wouldn’t be ours?
Indeed, who would seriously maintain that transsexuals should not be entitled, 
as well, to have their dignity and their freedom recognised? Stamped with the seal 
of hatred, the argument would simply be indefensible. Thus, such an assertion is not 
only hardly binding but, all the more so, it annihilates any other possibility of choice: 
relying on dignity and freedom as on an unstoppable argument, the Court therefore 
appears to be free to assert what it wishes. Evocation of these values instead of 
truly legal arguments may then bring about adverse consequences for the protection 
of transsexuals’ rights since, even if the principle proclamation by the Grand Cham-
ber appears to some as the just consecration of the unremitting efforts of the LG-
BTI community for the acknowledgement of the fundamental rights of its members, 
one may also notice that the way the Court chooses to assert such recognition does 
not show the same rigour as when backing up its most important statements.
Here, the use of values of course seems satisfactory in the sense that it refers to 
the roots of the Convention and to the spirit of tolerance and justice which suppos-
edly characterise the entire European protection system, thereby seemingly pro-
claiming the importance of the recognised rights. Conversely, such recourse to axiol-
ogy also contributes to undermine the implemented reasoning, by depriving it of a 
kind of “cold implacability” of legal rigour to the benefit of a “softer” rhetoric, 
which is more malleable… and, thus, easier to dispute: on the one hand, since it may 
be emphasised that the reasoning process of the European Court is highly wanting 
35 According to the Court, it enables “the personal sphere of each individual [to be protected], 
including the right to establish details of their identity as individual human beings”. See Goodwin 
(ECHR GC, para. 90) and I. v. the United Kingdom (ECHR GC, para. 70).
36 Mikulić v. Croatia App no 53176/99 (ECHR 7 Feb. 2002, para. 53). Judge Martens had already 
mentioned this aspect in the Cossey case: “The principle which is basic in human rights and which 
underlies the various specific rights spelled out in the Convention is respect for human dignity 
and human freedom. Human dignity and human freedom imply that a man should be free to 
shape himself and his fate in the way that he deems best fits his personality. A transsexual […] is 
prepared to shape himself and his fate. […] After these ordeals, as a post-operative transsexual, 
he turns to the law and asks it to admit the fait accompli he has created” (diss. op., 2.7).
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in the way its blatant enthusiasm attempts to make up for its weak argumentation; 
on the other hand, and even more seriously, since one may only query the type of 
protection which would be granted to the transsexuals’ rights if the inclination of 
the Court towards them eventually changes. Should we not fear that what it could 
do once so easily could be undone with the same flippancy? Thus, even if the protec-
tion offered by the Court entirely rests on its interpretation of fuzzy values such as 
dignity and freedom, what will happen if its interpretation changes? Is there not a 
risk of seeing the jurisprudence of the Court again evolve spectacularly, merely be-
cause it may believe that “the time is ripe”? Of course, one may say these statements 
are pointlessly alarmist… But, as long as the Court brushes aside its usual rigour to 
the benefit of a compassionate approach to problems, such risk does exist in numer-
ous domains with, obviously, the resurgence of the old ghost of the “government of 
judges”.
Although regarding in essence the most intimate sphere of one’s personality, 
transsexualism is however characterised for causing repercussions in the public 
space, especially because the recognition of post-operative sex has consequences on 
the civil status records, which represent a kind of memory and of collective “family 
tree”. Up to the 2002 jurisprudential about turn, any moral consideration was es-
sentially implicit. From now on, it seems to find a place in its own right at the heart 
of the reasoning process adopted by the Court, in the particular form of a recourse 
to the values of dignity and freedom. Thus, even if one can only be pleased to see 
that some criteria which were evidently obsolete and based upon second thoughts 
have at last been abandoned, one can conversely only deplore the fact that the un-
derlying reasoning is itself doubtful. Since, by departing from painstakingly earned 
neutrality and “scientificity”, the international human rights law runs the risk of los-
ing a portion of its legitimacy, which might have disastrous consequences for the 
protection of fundamental freedoms and rights throughout the world. From this 
perspective, the LGBTI community may hence simply be looked on as a sample of 
humanity.
Transgender disCriminaTion as sex
disCriminaTion: a ConTexTual and ComparaTive 
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Bruno Mestre
Abstract
The purpose of this paper consists in a contextual comparative analysis of American 
and European Courts’ case law on transgender discrimination. We focus on the legal 
techniques and difficulties that both jurisdictions have felt to integrate transgendered 
individuals under “sex” as a prohibited discrimination ground, the extension of the 
protection and the possible exemptions. We conclude that the integration of transgen-
dered individuals in “sex” was dictated by reasons of substantive equality, to afford 
protection in situations of blatant discrimination, but which has been accepted with 
hesitation, making its implementation more difficult. We argue that legislators should 
follow the example of the British Equality Act 2010 and create the category of “sexual 
identity” or “gender” as a suspect discrimination ground to protect all forms of gender 
expression.
* * *
1. Introduction
The German Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency has recently published an em-
pirical study on the discrimination of transgendered individuals; the international 
data gathered by the authors of this study led them to conclude that transgendered 
individuals suffered worldwide massive discriminations in nearly every aspect of 
their daily lives; their situation is particularly delicate in the labor market, where 
they suffer from several difficulties spanning from the entry into the labor market, 
career chances, rejection, harassment and lower wages1. This general awareness on 
the difficult situation of transgendered persons would suggest that they would have 
no difficulty finding protection in the courts under the cover of anti-discrimination 
statutes; the reality has – unfortunately – proven otherwise. The protection of 
1 J. Franzen and A. Sauer, ‘Benachteiligung Von Transpersonen Insbesondere Im Arbeitsleben’, 
(Antidiskriminierungsstelle des Bundes, 2010).
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transgendered individuals in courts has been a difficult struggle and albeit judges 
have increasingly been sensible to punish blatant cases of discrimination with the 
existing anti-discrimination statutes, their reasoning is far from linear and – in par-
ticular – remote from a general consensus. The main problem consists in knowing 
“where to fit” transgendered individuals in the generally accepted discrimination 
grounds – in particular sex. This becomes particularly evident if we compare the 
reasoning applied in European and American courts’ case law; whereas European 
courts do not seem to distinguish between sex and gender, using these words inter-
changeably, American courts appear to adopt the psychological construction of 
gender as something distinct from sex, in particular with the “sex stereotype” theo-
ry; recent legislative developments in Europe have tended to distinguish between 
“gender” and “sex” although the extension of the protection does not seem to be 
as far-fetched as American courts. The lessons from the case law are particularly 
important because the protection of this extremely vilified group has been mainly 
a judicial conquest, which has spun developments at the legislative levels. The pur-
pose of this article consists in a contextual and comparative analysis of the protec-
tion of transgendered individuals in North-American and European courts and the 
reasoning employed to extend the existing statutes in order to protect this group. 
We will begin by analyzing the problematic surrounding the protection within the 
existing discrimination statutes, proceed to examine the fundamental North-Amer-
ican and European case law, debate the politics of “sex” and “gender” in this case 
law, reflect on the difficult problem of finding an adequate comparator and finish 
with a reflection on the limits of the existing law; the final part will present the 
conclusion.
2. Introductory concepts: sex, gender and transgender and the limits of the law
If we want to understand the problematic concerning the protection of transgen-
dered individuals in Courts, it is necessary to take some fundamental concepts into 
consideration. Psychologists have tended to distinguish between “sex” and “gender” 
in the construction of the identity of an individual: “sex” refers to the biological 
conception of the term in the sense of the chromosomes that define a person as 
anatomically male or female; “gender” refers to a social construction of how a men 
or woman ought to behave; it may be best described as a constellation of physical, 
psychological, behavioral and social attributes; it corresponds to the construction of 
an identity, of a perception of oneself as a man or a woman within a given cultural 
context. The main difference between “sex” and “gender” arises from the fact that 
“sex” is an innate thing and “gender” results from the interaction with the social 
context; it is a mental construction heavily linked to the culture, the ways that a 
person is raised and the social expectations from the person; an individual gradu-
ally builds its identity in the process of growing up, which includes gender-identity 
in the sense of identifying oneself as a man or as a woman. As a last word, we must 
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say that “gender” does not exclude biological elements; it simply cannot be reduced 
to them2.
A transgendered individual consists in a person who has an intense identification 
with the opposite gender to the point of wanting to assume the role of that same 
gender3. It is important to distinguish between wanting to assume some tasks and 
roles usually associated with the opposite gender within a given context and being 
a transgender: it is perfectly possible for a biological male to want to assume the task 
of house-keeping and child-raising – tasks stereotypically associated with females 
within the Western cultural context – or a biological female to like football without 
being a transgender. A transgender does not simply want to assume the external 
characteristics stereotypical of the opposite gender (such as clothing, activities and 
behavioral patterns); it truly wants to be recognized in its full extension as a person 
of the opposite gender in every dimension of his/her life4.
Both US and EU Law prohibit discrimination on grounds of sex against an indi-
vidual: the protection in the US is afforded both at the federal level by Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act 1964 (42 U.S. Code §2000e) and at the State level by several 
anti-discrimination statutes; in the EU, the protection against discrimination on 
grounds of sex is afforded by art. 157 TFEU and Directive 2006/54 (Recast Direc-
tive); the latter provisions have been the object of an extensive and far-reaching in-
terpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union, which provided them 
with a reach that was not originally apparent in its wording. The problem with trans-
gender discrimination lays in the interpretation of the concept of “sex” that is used 
in both statutes. There are no difficulties of interpretation when “sex” and “gender” 
coincide, i.e.: when a biological male or female living in accordance with the gender 
roles that their particular social context assigned to them suffer detrimental action 
based – directly or indirectly – upon their sex. The fundamental problem lays in 
2 J.T. Weiss, ‘Transgender Indentity, Textualism and the Supreme Court: What Is The “Plain 
Meaning” Of “Sex” In Title Vii of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’, Temple Political and Civil Rights 
Review, 18/2 (2009), 573-649.
3 The DSM-IV, elaborated by the American Psychiatric Association and the International Clas-
sification of Diseases (ICD-10), classify transexualism as a disease/disorder. I would like to state 
that I do not endorse the classification of transgenderism as a disorder/disease and that my enun-
ciation of these characteristics had a sole didactic purpose of attempting to define transgenderism 
as a phenomenon. I would also like to make present that there has been intense pressure from 
prestigious Human Rights activists in the sense of eliminating transgenderism from the interna-
tional classification of disorders/diseases, as it occurred with homosexuality, in line with the 
Principles 3 and 18 of the Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human 
Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. Mr. Thomas Hammarberg, the 
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, has also denounced, in a statement dated 
from 31.08.2010, the persistence of the classification as a “disorder” of the act of wanting to live 
in accordance with one’s true gender as a possible violation of basic human rights.
4 Julian De Ajuriaguerra, Manuel De Psychiatrie De L’enfant (Paris: Masson et Compagnie, Edi-
teurs, 1970).
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determining if these provisions also protect those situations in which the biological 
sex and the assumed gender do not coincide: is discrimination based upon gender 
non-conformity also discrimination “because of sex”, is it because of “sexual orienta-
tion” or are transgendered individuals a distinct class worthy of their own protection 
ground? There is currently no debate on the need to protect transgender individuals 
from discrimination5: the brief for amici curiae of the New York Supreme Court 
stated exemplarily in the case Winn-Ritzenberg6 (concerning a requirement of a 
medical certificate to legally change one’s name to reflect one’s gender) that “gender 
identity classifications” bear all the hallmarks of suspect classifications because (1) 
there is a long history of transgender discrimination, (2) gender identity bears no 
relation to the ability to contribute to society, (3) transgender persons are a politi-
cally powerless minority and (4) gender identity is akin to an immutable trait. The 
problem lies not in the conclusion but in the paths to reach that conclusion.
3. The reasoning of the Courts: different approaches to the same problem
3.1. North-American Courts: the “sex stereotyping” hypothesis
The protection of transgendered individuals in North-American courts followed a 
curious evolution. North-American Anti-Discrimination Law is built upon an ex-
haustive number of suspect grounds of discrimination; this means that, unlike in 
many Continental European Constitutions, there is no “general principle of equality” 
to afford protection in grounds not directly provided for in the statutes. North-
American Courts initially construed the term “sex” strictly limiting the protection to 
the binary world of anatomical males and females. This became particularly evident 
in the ruling Grossmann v Bernards TWP Board of Education7 in which the court 
denied protection to a male-to-female transsexual teacher who was dismissed for 
having undergone sex-reassignment surgery because – in Judge Barlow’s view – the 
plaintiff had not been discharged “because of sex” but because of a “change of sex”; 
the dismissal had no connection to any stereotypical impressions on the ability of 
females to perform a certain job and if the legislator had wanted to protect transgen-
dered individuals as a class, it would have said so expressly; he concluded that the 
term “sex” contained in the federal statutes should be narrowly construed. These 
reasons were latter restated in different words but with the same meaning in the four 
most often quoted rulings that denied protection to transgendered individuals: 
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines Inc, Holloway v. Arthur Andersen, Sommers v. Budget Mar-
keting and Dobre v. Amtrak8. The common denominator of these rulings consists in 
5 See the groundbreaking book by Stephen Whittle, Respect and Equality. Transexual and Trans-
gender Rights (Cavendish 2002).
6 Matter of Winn-Ritzenberg [2009] NY Slip Op 29442.
7 Grossmann v Bernards TWP Board of Education [1976], 538 F2d 319.
8 Ulane v Eastern Airlines Inc [1985], 471 U.S 1017; Ramona Holloway v Arthur Andersen & 
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the fact that the Courts limited the protection to the biological sex and gender was 
protected simply when it was an emanation of the cultural patterns associated with 
the biological sex (protecting women because they are women). This is extremely 
important because common law countries usually place a great emphasis on the 
freedom of contract and do not see anything inherently wrong with discrimination 
unless it is expressly forbidden. This explains the strict interpretation of the statutes 
and why transsexuals were devoid of any protection even in blatant cases of dis-
crimination.
This line of cases suffered a great turn with a groundbreaking ruling, which – 
curiously – had nothing to do with transgendered individuals. In PriceWaterhouseC-
oopers v Hopkins9, a woman who had no transgender issues was denied partnership 
in a firm because she was not “feminine enough”: she was advised to “take courses 
in charm school”, walk and talk more femininely, have her hair styled and wear jew-
elry. The US Supreme Court stated that federal anti-discrimination statutes also 
protected against the so-called “sex stereotyping”, i.e.: when a person exhibited be-
haviors not corresponding to the traditional role expected of a person of that bio-
logical sex. The Court’s words are categorical:
…we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming 
or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with that group, for […] 
Congress intended to strike an entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and 
women resulting from sex stereotypes.
This ruling opened the doors for the protection of transsexuals under federal 
anti-discrimination statutes in courts based upon the “sex stereotype” theory. In Nich-
ols v Azteca Restaurants10, the court stated that an employee had been discriminated 
against on grounds of sex stereotypes by being subject to a relentless campaign of 
vulgarities during an extended period – which included referring to him as “fucking 
female whore” – because he allegedly walked, talked and carried his tray like a 
woman; in Schwenk v Hartford11, the court ruled that a male-to-female transsexual 
inmate who had been the victim of several sexual assaults from a prison guard had 
been discriminated on grounds of sex because – in the court’s words – “sex” and 
“gender” had become interchangeable terms after the decision in Hopkins12; in Oilver 
Company [1977] 566 F.2d 659; Audra Sommers v Budget Marketing Inc [1982] 667 F.2d 748; 
Andria Adams Dobre v Amtrak [1993] 850 F. Supt. 284.
9 Pricewaterhousecoopers v Hopkins [1989] 490 U.S. 228.
10 Nichols v Azteca Restaurant Entreprises Inc [2001] 256 F.3d 864.
11 Schwenk v Hartford [2000] 204 F.3d 1187.
12 This case deserves a more elaborate explanation; the plaintiff complained on the basis of Title 
VII and the Gender Motivated Violence Act; the problem lay in determining if the aggressor’s 
actions had been motivated because of sex; this is problematic because this was an act of violence 
exercised between biological males. The court’s emphasis on equating sex and gender demon-
strates that anti-discrimination statutes equally protect gender.
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v Winn-Dixie13, the court considered that a male employee had been discriminated 
against based upon sex stereotypes when he was dismissed for having been seen 
wearing women’s clothes off-duty on several occasions, although he made perfectly 
clear that he had been diagnosed with gender identity disorder and he had no inten-
tion of transitioning or dressing as a woman while working; in Schroer v Billington14, 
the Court concluded that there had been sex discrimination when a candidate, who 
passed all the requirements of the selection procedure, was refused employment (al-
leging that she would not “fit in”) after she informed her future employer that she 
intended to undergo sex-reassignment surgery to become a woman; finally, in Smith 
v. City of Salem15, the court concluded that a firefighter who had worked for seven 
years without incidents in his department had been discriminated on grounds of sex 
stereotypes when he was dismissed after informing his superiors of his intention to 
undergo sex-reassignment surgery to live his life in full as a female; it is important to 
stress that she was dismissed on the basis of insubordination for refusing to undergo 
a psychological exam with physicists chosen by the employer and that the process 
was coined by one his her co-workers as a “witch-hunt”16.
This short overview of the evolution of the case law in North-American courts 
reveals that Courts appear to distinguish between “sex” and “gender” and that both 
of them are protected under an expansive reading of the term “sex”; although it is 
customary that gender is an extension of a person’s biological sex, a person cannot 
suffer adverse actions for failure to conform with the gender that is expected of that 
sex. This appears to be true independently of any trans-issues by the person affect-
ed; Hopkins was not a transsexual yet she could not be discriminated for failing to 
act as a woman ought to act in that particular cultural context; Oilver, Schroer and 
Smith were transsexuals and they could not be discriminated for failing to act as 
biological men were expected to act (i.e.: not being transsexuals). The Court implic-
itly recognized the right to live in accordance with one’s gender independently of 
his/her biological sex. In Comparative Constitutional Law, this could be equated 
with the fundamental right to freely develop one’s personality recognized in many 
Constitutions17, which encompasses the right to live in accordance with one’s true 
gender. However, this approach is not without criticisms even from trans-advocates, 
as we’ll see further on.
13 Oilver v Win-Dixie Louisiana, Inc [2002], n.° 00-3114.
14 Diane J. Schroer v J. H. Billington [2007], n.° 05-1090.
15 Smith v City of Salem [2004] 378 F.3d 566.
16 Melinda Chow, ‘Smith V. The City of Salem: Transgendered Jurisprudence and an Expanded 
Meaning of Sex Discrimination under Title Vii’ (2005 ) 28 Harvard Journal of Law and Richard 
Bales, ‘Transgender Employment Discrimination’ (2008) 17 UCLA Women’s L. J. 243; Jillian T. 
Weiss, ‘Transgender Indentity, Textualism and the Supreme Court: What Is The “Plain Meaning” 
Of “Sex” In Title Vii of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’. 
17 Most notably recognised in §2 of the German Constitution and art.° 26 of the Portuguese 
Constitution.
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3.2. The CJEU - difficulties with comparators
The CJEU has had the opportunity to deal with the question of transsexuals on three 
distinct occasions; its reasoning was rather linear albeit not very clear, mainly due to 
a certain confusion on the concrete comparator used. In P. v S., a manager in an edu-
cational institution was dismissed after she informed her superior of the intention to 
undergo sex-reassignment surgery; the CJEU stated that that the protection of the 
right not to be discriminated on grounds of sex is not limited to Directive 76/207, it 
amounts to a fundamental human right and an expression of the principle of equal-
ity; consequently, the protection should not be limited to those situations in which a 
person is of one or the other sex, it should equally cover all discriminatory behaviors 
underpinned mainly in the sex of the person concerned, as it occurs when a person is 
treated less favorably on grounds of gender reassignment by comparison with persons 
of the sex that she was deemed to belong before the reassignment. In KB v. NHS Pen-
sions (a case heavily influenced by human rights case law), the NHS Pensions refused 
to recognize the partner of an employee as a widower based on the fact that the part-
ner was a transsexual female-to-male and consequently – at that time – was unable to 
fulfill the marriage requirement to become a widower because the new gender was 
not recognized under British Law (in breach of Human Rights law); the CJEU con-
sidered this to be direct discrimination on grounds of sex in breach of art.° 157 
TFEU because the protection afforded by the provision also covered situations in 
which the person changed sex. In R. v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, a 
transsexual male-to-female claimed discrimination because she was unable to retire 
at the normal age that women could retire (at that time 60) and was required to retire 
at the same age as men (65). The CJEU considered that the refusal to recognize a 
transgendered person as a woman for retirement age purposes amounted to dis-
crimination on grounds of sex, in contradiction with Directive 79/7 implementing 
the principle of equal treatment between men and women in Social Security18.
The reasoning employed by the CJEU in these cases reveals considerable differ-
ences in relation to the North-American case law briefly analyzed above. Firstly, the 
CJEU considers that the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex is simply an 
expression of the overarching principle of equality, which is a fundamental human 
right whose observance the court ensures. This means that the interpretation of the 
prohibition of discrimination was made in the light of the principle of equality and 
the intention of the legislator when it approved the provisions. This is hardly unex-
pected because the CJEU has consistently used teleological elements of interpreta-
tion in order to reach concrete objectives in its rulings; it appears to be more appro-
priate to read in the words of the CJEU that the principle of equality (as such) op-
18 Case 13/94 P. v S. and Cornwall City [1996]; Case 117/01 KB v NHS Pensions Agency [2004]; 
Case 423/04 R. v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006]. Dagmar Schiek, Lisa Wadding-
ton, and Mark Bell, Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supra-National and International Non-
Discrimination Law (Hart 2007), Aileen McColgan, Discrimination Law. Text, Cases and Materials 
(Hart 2005), Paul Craig and Grainne De Búrca, Eu Law. Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford 2007).
BRUNO MESTRE198
posed to such a degrading treatment of a human being and that the principle of 
prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex was simply a means to achieve that 
protection. Secondly, the CJEU does not seem to distinguish between “sex” and 
“gender” in its rulings: the court seems to simply state that adverse action undertaken 
against a transsexual is “because of” that persons’ sex due to the fact that if the person 
had not changed sex, it would not have suffered discrimination. This is an important 
statement because it quickly eliminates two cynical arguments that are often pointed 
out in transgender discrimination cases: the argument that the discriminator is not 
against men or women but simply against transgendered individuals as such (which 
would remove them from the protection of the discrimination ground) and the 
“equal misery” argument claiming that if it had been a woman transitioning to be-
come a man, it would have suffered the same adverse treatment. These formalistic 
arguments would render the protection afforded by anti-discrimination statutes void 
and endorse degrading treatments of human beings. The discriminatory behavior was 
clearly colored by the person’s sex (in the sense of sex reassignment) and not by the 
person’s ethnicity, belief or age. Thirdly, the CJEU still used the “but for” methodol-
ogy in its rulings but the comparator is not evident: the CJEU stated that the trans-
gendered person had been treated unfavorably in comparison with the persons of the 
sex that (s)he was deemed to belong before the surgery. This means that the com-
parison is not between men and women (in general or in particular) but between 
men/women who transition and those of the sex that they belonged to before transi-
tioning. This is a rather strange methodology because the correct comparison would 
be with a person whose sex was not the result of sex reassignment; the end result 
would have been the same because – in the court’s words – the person would still 
have been discriminated on “grounds of sex” read in the light of the principle of 
equality and human dignity. The reasoning seems to rely more of the protection of 
gender than sex; although the CJEU always referred to the plaintiffs in their assumed 
gender throughout the cases, it never referred to them as men or women; the CJEU 
appears to have been more concerned with the protection of “gender identity” as a 
component of “sex” in general than with a Community definition of sex, which 
would need to have a uniform interpretation in the national legal orders. The CJEU 
appears to have stated that a person’s “gender” would always be protected from dis-
criminatory treatments based upon sex even if the person’s gender does not corre-
spond to the anatomical sex assigned at birth.
4. The politics of Sex and Gender in the Courts
This brief description of the evolution in North-American and European case law 
reveals distinct approaches to the same problems and a divergent integration of the 
concept of “sex” and “gender” in Anti-discrimination statutes. The evolution of the 
American case law is exemplary in this concern because it went through a consider-
able evolution since Hopkins. The main idea behind the American case law seems to 
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be that a person is discriminated “because of” sex if the expression of his gender does 
not correspond his anatomical sex. This reliance on the concept of “sex stereotype” 
corresponds to a deeply individualistic perception of discrimination law that opposes 
to the classification of human beings in societal groups; it is heavily influenced by an 
individual justice model. This approach has precedents in other discrimination cases: 
the US Supreme Court famously stated in the ruling L.A Department of Water v Man-
hart that “[Title VII]’s focus on the individual is unambiguous. It precludes the treat-
ment of individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national 
class”19. Consequently, a person is discriminated against on the basis of sex if it re-
fuses to adopt the lifestyle and behavioral patterns usually associated with his/her 
anatomical sex within a given social context. The problem with this approach lays in 
the fact that it appears to have transformed a normative stereotype into a statistical 
stereotype and refuses to recognize the true nature of a transgendered individual. A 
normative stereotype is based on a general consensus about how members of a social 
group ought to behave to conform appropriately to the norms associated with the 
membership of a specific group (e.g.: women love children); a statistical stereotype 
consists in a characteristic associated with a certain group that is underpinned in 
figures but that may not be true for all members of the group (e.g.: women are 
weaker than men). The problem with the approach followed in the North-American 
Courts consists in the fact that they in fact have transformed transgendered individu-
als into men who like to wear dresses: although it is generally true that men ought not 
wear dresses (normative stereotype), if a man chooses to do so because it corresponds 
to its true gender, it may not be discriminated against because this would amount to 
discrimination because of sex against anatomical women who opted to wear dresses 
(statistical stereotype); if his anatomical sex (male) had not been considered, he 
wouldn’t have been discriminated because of his behavior. This “sex-flipping” analy-
sis transformed the normative stereotype into a statistical stereotype! Although it is 
undeniable that it has the merit of affording protection to a heavily discriminated 
group, it still falls short of the true purpose of discrimination law and transgender 
advocacy: to recognize a transgender as a woman for all purposes and not simply as 
a man who adopted a “female persona”. The former paragraphs revealed that a trans-
gender does not simply want to assume tasks stereotypically associated with the op-
posite sex: a transgender wants to become socially recognized as a person of the op-
posite sex in every domain of social life. On the other hand, the inclusion of trans-
gendered individuals in the “sex discrimination” ground also avoids creating a new 
category of discrimination that would politically empower a minority social group. 
Consequently this protection, no matter how worthy, still falls short of the true objec-
tives of protecting transgendered individuals against discrimination20.
19 L.A Depart. of Water v Manhart [1978] 435 U.S. 702.
20 Anna Kirkland, ‘What’s at Stake in Transgender Discrimination as Sex Discrimination?’, 
SIGNS, (2006), 83 ff, Elizabeth M. Glazer and Zachary A. Kramer, ‘Transitional Discrimina-
tion’, Legal Studies Research Paper Series (Hofstra University - School of Law, 2009), L. Camille 
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The approach in the CJEU appears to have been more expansive and this seems 
to have been so due to the concern to protect human dignity. The CJEU appears to 
have equated “sex” and “gender” considering that a discriminatory treatment was 
“because of” sex if the “change of sex” was a relevant element in the decision-making 
process of the discriminator. This approach avoids discussions about the role of ste-
reotypes and political minorities. The CJEU appears to have been heavily influenced 
by the principle of human dignity and Human Rights Law, in particular the protec-
tion of transgender rights in the ECHR. The CJEU’s constant reference to the prin-
ciple of equality in the light of which the principle of equal treatment of men and 
women should be read provides us with a hint that it was more concerned with the 
general principle of equality than with equal treatment of men and women as such. 
The problem lays in the fact that, at the time in which the decisions were taken, the 
number of suspect grounds of discrimination accepted in EU Law was very strict and 
the CJEU had to undertake a very expansive interpretation of the provisions in order 
to each substantive equality. Consequently it had to fit transgender discrimination 
into sex discrimination or transgendered individuals would be deprived of any pro-
tection under EU Law. One may reasonably ask if the decision would be the same 
today because art.° 21 Charter of Fundamental Rights EU expressly recognizes a 
general principle of equality, which would help punishing and dissuading these be-
haviors. There is also a considerable difference between the CJEU’s approach and 
North-American approach. Although the CJEU always referred to the plaintiffs in 
their preferred gender throughout the cases, it never expressly stated that they would 
be considered as women/men in the light of EU Law. Although this may be debated, 
we believe that one may infer from the reasoning of the CJEU that the CJEU consid-
ered these individuals in their true – as opposed to anatomical – gender. One may 
infer this from the comparator used and the solution provided for in the cases. In P. 
vs. S., the comparison was with the sex that the plaintiff was deemed to belong before 
the surgery therefore implying that the plaintiff no longer belongs to that sex; on the 
other hand, in KB v NHS Pensions and R. v Secretary of State, the plaintiffs were 
fully recognized as male/female under national law at least for the purposes of being 
considered as entitled to a pension under the same conditions as a person possessing 
the anatomical sex corresponding to the plaintiffs gender.
This short analysis reveals that the protection of transgenders in North-American 
and European case law goes well beyond formal methods of statutory interpretation 
and is heavily influenced by a political option on the integration of gender in sex. 
The European case law appears to be more protective and promotes human dignity 
because it is not limited to the protection of “men who wear dresses” and “women 
who act as men”; it rather extends to the social recognition of the person in its true 
gender independently of his/her anatomical sex.
Hébert, ‘Transforming Transexual and Transgender Rights’ (2009) 15 Wm & Mary J Women & 
L. 535.
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5. Discrimination in relation to whom? The comparator problem
The protection of transgendered individuals raises a distinct problem consisting in 
the identification of the appropriate comparator. As a preliminary word, it must be 
said that both the North-American courts and the CJEU used the “but for” meth-
odology in the identification of a discrimination. The difference lies in relation to 
whom the comparison was established. The comparison used by North-American 
courts was exemplarily described in Doe v City of Belleville21: this ruling – which 
concerns same-sex sexual harassment against an effeminate male employee stated 
that the harassment was “because of” sex because had the effeminate person not 
been a man, it would not have suffered the harassment: the harasser is not against 
effeminate people as such but simply against effeminate men. This means that the 
comparison was established between an effeminate man and an effeminate woman. 
This is the logical consequence of the “sex stereotype” concept adopted in Hopkins 
because the main idea seems to be to distinguish gender from sex and reprove vio-
lence against persons whose gender does not match the anatomical sex in compari-
son with persons whose gender matches the anatomical sex and are not subject to 
the same violence. This raises the formal argument that discrimination lawyers have 
frequently pointed out, which consists in the “equal misery” argument: one may 
argue that the treatment would have been the same if a person of the opposite sex 
exhibited behaviors not corresponding to their anatomical sex. North-American 
courts seem to cunningly avoid this question by establishing a comparison between 
effeminate/”macho” men and effeminate/”macho” women although this appears to 
be a rather fallacious argument: the discriminator is not against personality traits as 
such but against those that do not match the anatomical gender. This formal argu-
ment reveals that North-American courts appear to have had a very clear objective 
in mind, which is to outlaw discrimination against transgendered individuals inde-
pendently of the constraints of the law; this appears to be every aspect a judicial 
construction to overcome statutory and political limitations. The transposition of 
the argument into religious discrimination helps to understand the ridiculous results 
of a blind application of the subject: if a person were discriminated because (s)he 
converted from religion X to religion Y, would it be lawful to discriminate the per-
son claiming that the discriminator is not against religion X nor religion Y but 
simply against converts as such? This would completely empty the protection af-
forded by discrimination law22.
This “comparator problematic” becomes even more evident in the CJEU’s case 
law. The CJEU starts by putting aside the “equal misery” argument by stating that 
the discriminatory action was “because of” sex due to the fact that a “change of sex” 
21 Doe v City of Belleville [1997] n.° 94-3699.
22 Glazer and Kramer, ‘Transitional Discrimination’, Richard F. Storrow, ‘Gender Typing in Ste-
reo: The Transgender Dilemma in Employment Discrimination’ (2003) 55 Main e LR 117 ff., 
Whittle, Respect and Equality. Transexual and Transgender Rights.
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is still “sex” and – likewise in the religious discrimination argument against converts 
– one cannot reasonably say that hatred against transgendered individuals is not 
based upon their sex. This – in itself – could finish the discussion and spare the need 
for a comparator. But the Court then proceeds to compare the transgendered indi-
vidual, in order to establish a discrimination on grounds of sex, with persons of the 
sex that (s)he was deemed to belong before the surgery. If a person transitions from 
male to female and suffers discrimination, the comparison is not established with 
women who have not transitioned but with men who have not transitioned. This is 
precisely the opposite approach of the one followed in North-American Courts and 
becomes quite curious if we take into account identification between “sex” and 
“change of sex”. This is significant because we believe that it may truly entail the 
legal recognition of the person’s gender: P., KB and R. were legally recognized in 
their chosen gender because if they had remained in their previous gender/sex, they 
would not have suffered discrimination. If they had been compared with anatomical 
women/men then they would still be recognized as “men” and “women” with an-
other gender. The choice of the comparator is therefore significant23.
This discussion reveals that the choice of the appropriate comparator in dis-
crimination cases is not innocent and cannot be reduced to a simple formal opera-
tion: the particular case of transsexuals reveals that it may amount to a true political 
decision of the recognition of a person’s sex in their true gender. The approach of 
the CJEU appears to be more progressive than the North-American Courts; the in-
fluence of the principle of the protection of human dignity and the general principle 
of equality may have had an important role in this matter. This approach also ap-
pears to have had influence at the national level; in A. v. West Yorkshire Police24, a 
British case concerning the expulsion of a transsexual police officer from the body 
of constables on the basis that she would have to perform intimate searches, the 
House of Lords rejected the General Occupational Requirements defense and con-
sidered that, in the light of with human rights case law and the case law of the CJEU, 
a transsexual must be fully recognized as a person of the true gender in all circum-
stances.
6. The limits of the protection
The final question deals with the limits of the protection in transgender discrimina-
tion cases. This is a vexata quaestio dealing with the issue of transvestites and other 
gender non-conform behaviors, which do not go to the extreme point of transition-
ing in the sense of a sex-reassignment surgery. North-American Courts have been 
23 Mccolgan, Discrimination Law. Text, Cases and Materials, Schiek, Waddington, and Bell, Cases, 
Materials and Text on National, Supra-National and International Non-Discrimination Law.
24 A. v West Yorkshire Police [2004] UKHL 21.
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discussing the integration of these individuals in the “sex stereotype” theories. There 
are some rulings that denied protection to these individuals: in Oilver v Winn-Dixie 
Louisiana25, the Court denied protection under the “sex stereotype” theory to an 
employee who had been dismissed for wanting to cross-dress publicly as a woman 
and assume a female persona in her workplace after being diagnosed with “transves-
titic fetichism” and “gender identity disorder”. The Court distinguished these forms 
of “gender non-conform behavior” from situations of transsexuals who undergo sex-
reassignment surgery or when women/men are discriminated for not being suffi-
ciently “feminine/masculine” within a given social pattern. The Court stated that the 
“sex stereotype theory” did not protect men who wore women’s clothing. In James v 
Ranch Mart Hardware26, the Court denied protection to a male employee who 
wanted to begin wearing women’s clothes on the basis of an “equal misery” argu-
ment claiming that they would also discriminate against a woman who wore men’s 
clothes. These rulings reveal that the reach of the “sex stereotype” theory used at the 
North-American Courts is not so large as to expand to every type of gender non-
conform behavior: it simply seems to be more of a means of affording protection to 
a heavily vilified group – “full” transgendered individuals and effeminate men/ma-
cho women – then to all types of gender non-conforming behavior. This becomes 
particularly evident if we analyze the decisions applied to grooming standards: 
North-American courts have upheld different grooming standards for men and 
women, including the mandatory use of make-up for women and the prohibition of 
long hair and ostensive jewelry for men, as long as these requirements do not over-
burden one sex or place it in a degrading situation (such as requiring women to 
dress as Playboy bunnies) (Tavora v NY Mercantile Exchange and Carroll v Talman 
Fed. Sav. & Loan Associat.)27.
The CJEU has not had the opportunity to rule on these situations; consequently 
we may only hypothesize. We saw above that the CJEU seems to equate “sex” and 
“gender”; this equalization seems to be stretching to other areas of EU policy-mak-
ing in which the EU has increasingly been avoiding the use of the word “sex” to-
wards the use of “gender”(such as “gender mainstreaming”). These developments 
seem to have had reflexes at the national level: the new British Equality Act 2010 
classified “gender” as a specific discrimination ground distinct from sex and sub-
jected the justification of discriminatory treatments to the general occupational re-
quirements defense, removing them from the far stricter justifications for direct sex 
discrimination; the Constitutional revision that is being currently undertaken in 
Portugal plans to introduce “gender” as a specific prohibited discrimination ground 
in the Constitution, which implies that is something distinct from sex. Could this be 
25 Oilver v Win-Dixie Louisiana, Inc [2002], n.° 00-3114.
26 James v Ranch Mart Hardware [1994], n.° 94-2235.
27 Tavora v NY Mercantile Exchange [1996] 101 F.3d 907; Carroll v Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan As-
sociat. [1979], n.° 78-1458 and Marybeth Herald, ‘Transgender Theory: Reprogramming Our 
Automated Settings’, (Thomas Jefferson School of Law, 2006), 101.
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an indication that transvestites and other gender non-conform behaviors are unpro-
tected by EU Law? This is something that only the CJEU may answer and the direc-
tion of its rulings is not certain: although it is extremely progressive in some situa-
tions, in others it takes a more conservative position (as in Grant v Southwest 
Trains)28. In addition, grooming requirements have traditionally been dealt with at 
the national level in the light of employees’ fundamental rights instead of discrimina-
tion law; the only exception is the UK, where clothing and appearance rules have 
led to some judicial decisions. However, there is a surprising degree of convergence 
between both legal systems in the sense that it is considered as admissible that men 
and women may be subject to distinct clothing requirements in the workplace as 
long as the specific dress-code does not burden excessively one sex; the difficulty 
lies in the comparator because very few grooming requirements may be applied in-
distinctly to both sexes. Consequently, a transvestite or a woman who appreciates 
using a more masculine outfit does not seem to enjoy the protection of discrimina-
tion law or fundamental rights in the workplace because courts and lawmakers have 
tended to give prevalence to entrepreneurial needs and not the individuals’ gender 
preference unless the person is – in fact – a true transgender in the sense of wishing 
to assume the full role of the other sex29.
7. Conclusion
The analysis of the protection of transsexuals in North-American and European case 
law reveals that although both jurisdictions protect transgendered individuals under 
the ground of “sex”, there are substantial differences in terms of the reasoning em-
ployed and the political views underpinning them. Several conceptual doubts re-
main on the extension of the protection. We argue that it would be more appropri-
ate to create a separate suspect ground of discrimination on the basis of gender, 
likewise it has occurred in Germany and in the UK, which could adequately protect 
these individuals and determine its extent.
28 Case C-249/96 Grant v Southwest Trains [1998] ECR I-621.
29 Júlio Vieira Gomes, Direito Do Trabalho (Coimbra, 2007), Aileen McColgan, Discrimination 
Law. Text, Cases and Materials.
eTaT Civil eT TransidenTiTé en droiT français.
eTaT des lieux eT perspeCTives d’évoluTion
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Résumé
Le droit français relatif au changement d’état civil des personnes transidentitaires est d’ori-
gine prétorienne. La modification de la mention du sexe sur les registres d’état civil est 
subordonnée à la réunion de quatre conditions : un traitement médico-chirurgical, le dia-
gnostic du syndrome du transsexualisme, une apparence physique et un comportement 
social correspondant au sexe dont l’indication sur l’acte de naissance est sollicitée. Ce sont 
les deux premières conditions qui divisent aujourd’hui les juges du fond. Ceux-ci admet-
tent que la rectification des actes d’état civil peut être ordonnée dès lors que le traitement 
suivi a produit des effets irréversibles ; une réassignation sexuelle complète n’est plus exi-
gée. De même, la condition tirée du diagnostic du transsexualisme a été abandonnée par 
une cour d’appel, mais maintenue par une autre. Ces évolutions, encore inachevées, met-
tent-elles la France à l’abri d’une nouvelle condamnation par la Cour européenne des 
droits de l’homme ? L’affirmative ne s’impose pas avec évidence. Les conditions posées au 
changement d’état civil des personnes transidentitaires par le droit français peuvent, en 
effet, apparaître comme disproportionnées pour décider de l’appartenance d’une per-
sonne à un sexe ou à un autre.
Abstract
French law relating to the change in civil status of transgender persons originates from 
judge-made rules. Under these rules, four conditions must be met in order for a change to 
be made to the gender recorded on civil status records: medical and surgical treatment, 
diagnosis of transsexual syndrome, physical appearance and social behaviour corresponding 
to the gender to be recorded on the requested birth certificate. Trial court judges are 
currently divided on the first two conditions. They admit that the rectification of civil 
status records may be ordered if the treatment followed has led to irreversible effects; 
complete sex reassignment surgery is no longer required. Similarly, the condition based on 
the diagnosis of transsexualism has been abandoned by one Court of Appeal, but 
maintained by another. Would these changes, which have yet to be completed, protect 
France from any further adverse decision by the European Court of Human Rights? It is 
not evident that they would: The conditions laid down by French law for a change of civil 
status for transgender persons may indeed appear to be disproportionate in order to 
decide on whether a person belongs to one gender or another.
* * *
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Dans les années 1950, naissait aux Etats-Unis, des travaux de John Money, psycho-
logue attaché au Johns Hopkins Hospital de Baltimore, et de Robert Stoller, psy-
chiatre et psychanalyste, professeur à l’Université de Californie, la théorie du genre. 
Voici comment, en 1968, Stoller en exposait les linéaments :
Le genre est un terme qui a des connotations psychologiques ou culturelles, plus 
que biologiques. Si les termes appropriés pour sexe sont “ mâle ” et “ femelle ”, les 
termes correspondants pour le genre sont “ masculin ” et “ féminin ” ; ces derniers 
peuvent être totalement indépendants du sexe biologique. Le genre est la quantité 
de masculinité ou de féminité que l’on trouve dans une personne […] L’identité de 
genre commence avec la connaissance et la perception, conscientes ou incons-
cientes, que l’on appartient à un sexe et non à l’autre […] Le “ rôle ” de genre est le 
comportement manifeste que l’on révèle en société, le rôle que l’on joue, en parti-
culier avec d’autres personnes, pour établir sa position avec eux, dans la mesure où, 
en ce qui concerne le genre, leur appréciation et la sienne sont en jeu1.
Une personne transidentitaire – ou transgenre dans l’acception générale donnée à 
ce terme – est une personne dont l’identité de genre n’est pas en harmonie avec le 
genre qui lui a été assigné à la naissance d’après son sexe génital2. Afin de résoudre ce 
conflit, elle peut chercher à faire coïncider, plus ou moins complètement, ponctuelle-
ment ou continûment, son rôle de genre avec son identité de genre, voire refuser les 
catégories du genre, selon les circonstances et la perception qu’elle a d’elle-même.
Le droit français ne reconnaît cependant l’identité de genre des personnes 
transidentitaires – par la modification de la mention du sexe dans leur acte de 
naissance – qu’à travers le prisme du transsexualisme. Encore convient-il de relever 
que la Cour de cassation, avant comme après la condamnation de la France par la 
Cour européenne des droits de l’homme3, est restée attachée à la réalité biologique4, 
alors que la juridiction européenne, au contraire, interprétant l’article 12 de la 
Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés 
fondamentales, a déclaré n’être plus convaincue «  que l’on puisse aujourd’hui 
continuer d’admettre […] que le sexe doive être déterminé selon des critères 
purement biologiques  »  ; d’autres éléments sont à prendre en compte, tels que 
l’offre de traitements médicaux ou le comportement social de la personne5. Seul le 
1 Robert Stoller, Recherches sur l’identité sexuelle à partir du transsexualisme (Gallimard, 1978, 
trad. de Sex and Gender, vol. 1, Science House, New York, 1968) p. 28 et 29.
2 V. Thomas Hammarberg, Droits de l’homme et identité de genre (oct. 2009 pour la version fran-
çaise) p. 5 ; Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l’Europe, Discrimination sur la base de l’orien-
tation sexuelle et de l’identité de genre, résolution n° 1728 (2010) n° 1.
3 CEDH, 25 mars 1992, n° 3343/87, B. c. France, A232-C : JCP G 1992, II, 21955, note T. Garé ; 
D. 1993, jurispr. p. 101, note J.-P. Marguénaud.
4 V. Cass. 1re civ., 21 mai 1990 : J.C.P., éd. G, 1990, II, 21588, rapp. J. Massip, concl. F. Flipo (4 
arrêts) ; Cass. ass. plén., 11 déc. 1992 : JCP G 1993, II, 21991, concl. M. Jéol, note G. Mémeteau.
5 CEDH, 11 juill. 2002, n° 28957/95, Goodwin c. Royaume-Uni, § 100 : D. 2003, jurispr. p. 2032, 
note A.-S. Chavent-Leclère  ; Personnes et famille novembre 2002, p. 14, note A. Leborgne  ; 
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droit au respect de la vie privée permet à la Cour de cassation de concilier la 
possibilité du changement d’état civil et la conception biologique du sexe.
Les règles qui gouvernent la matière sont d’origine prétorienne. Après la 
condamnation de la France6, M. Michel Jéol, premier avocat général à la Cour de 
cassation, avait estimé qu’il n’était pas souhaitable d’attendre l’intervention du légis-
lateur aux motifs, d’une part, que le Parlement risquait d’être débordé par la com-
plexité et l’ampleur de cette question et, d’autre part, qu’une consécration légale 
contribuerait à développer « un phénomène qui doit rester marginal7 ». La Haute 
Juridiction, dans deux arrêts d’Assemblée plénière rendus le 11 décembre 19928, 
avait suivi cette suggestion et soumis la modification de la mention du sexe sur les 
registres de l’état civil, hors les cas d’erreur, à de strictes exigences :
Attendu que lorsque, à la suite d’un traitement médico-chirurgical, subi dans un 
but thérapeutique, une personne présentant le syndrome du transsexualisme ne 
possède plus tous les caractères de son sexe d’origine et a pris une apparence phy-
sique la rapprochant de l’autre sexe, auquel correspond son comportement social, 
le principe du respect dû à la vie privée justifie que son état civil indique désormais 
le sexe dont elle a l’apparence.
Quatre conditions sont ainsi posées, tirées, d’une part, du diagnostic et du trai-
tement du syndrome du transsexualisme et, d’autre part, de l’apparence physique et 
du comportement social, qui doivent correspondre au sexe dont l’indication sur 
l’acte de naissance est sollicitée.
Ces conditions doivent-elles être réunies lorsqu’un simple changement de pré-
nom est requis sur le fondement de l’article 60 du code civil ? La Cour de cassation 
n’a pas eu l’occasion de répondre précisément à cette question9 ; ce qui explique la 
diversité des solutions adoptées par les juges du fond. Pour les uns, le diagnostic du 
transsexualisme constitue l’intérêt légitime exigé par la loi10, la demande ne pouvant 
être accueillie en son absence11 ; pour d’autres, il faut que le prénom sollicité corres-
ponde à l’apparence extérieure actuelle12 ; pour d’autres encore, une transformation 
irréversible est nécessaire, sans que l’on sache clairement s’il s’agit d’une transfor-
mation physique ou psychique13.
CEDH, 11 juillet 2002, n° 25680/94, I. c. Royaume Uni, § 80 ; v. aussi CEDH, 24 juin 2010, n° 
30141/04, Schalk et Kopf c. Autriche, § 59.
6 CEDH, 25 mars 1992, préc.
7 Concl. JCP G 1993, II, 21991, p. 44.
8 Cass. ass. plén., 11 déc. 1992, préc. ; adde Cass. 1re civ., 18 oct. 1994, n° 93-10.730.
9 V. Isabelle Corpart-Oulerich, ‘Transsexualisme et prénom’ Petites Affiches 28 juill. 1993 p. 45 ; 
rappr. Cass. 1re civ., 16 déc. 1975 : D. 1976, jurispr. p. 397, note R. Lindon (2e esp.) ; Cass. 1re civ., 
21 mai 1990, préc. (4e esp.).
10 CA Toulouse, 3 août 2000 : JurisData n° 2000-128346.
11 CA Montpellier, 18 janv. 2010 : JurisData n° 2010-004283.
12 CA Aix-en-Provence, 20 févr. 2008 : JurisData n° 2008-365850.
13 CA Nancy, 14 nov. 2003 : JurisData n° 2003-234864.
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Selon les arrêts d’Assemblée plénière du 11 décembre 199214, la modification des 
actes de naissance des personnes transidentitaires est ordonnée à l’issue de la réassi-
gnation du sexe qui suit le diagnostic du transsexualisme. Il en résulte que le chan-
gement d’état civil est réservé à un faible nombre de personnes et intervient tardive-
ment. Ce régime est très rigoureux, voire dissuasif.
Ce constat autorise-t-il pour autant à conclure à la condamnation de la France 
par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme en cas de saisine de celle-ci ? Pour 
répondre à cette question, il convient de tenir compte de la possibilité, pour les 
Etats, de limiter l’exercice des droits garantis par la Convention européenne de 
sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales. Il faut aussi 
prendre en considération l’évolution récente du droit français qui affecte à la fois 
l’exigence juridique du diagnostic (1) et la condition tirée du traitement médical (2).
1. L’exigence du diagnostic du transsexualisme
Le changement d’état civil du chef du sexe suppose l’établissement d’un diagnostic 
du transsexualisme. Le décret n° 2010-125 du 8 février 2010 ayant retiré de la liste 
des affections psychiatriques de longue durée les troubles précoces de l’identité de 
genre, le transsexualisme n’est plus considéré, selon la réglementation française, 
comme une maladie mentale. Le diagnostic exigé par la jurisprudence n’est donc 
plus que « différentiel » ; il doit ainsi permettre « d’écarter d’éventuelles pathologies 
confondantes » comme « un trouble mental de type schizophrénie, avec idées déli-
rantes à thème de métamorphose sexuelle15 ».
Sans doute la direction des affaires civiles et du sceau du ministère de la justice 
autorise-t-elle, dans sa circulaire du 14 mai 2010, le ministère public à formuler un 
avis sur le fondement des « diverses pièces, notamment les attestations et comptes 
rendus médicaux fournis par le demandeur à l’appui de sa requête », sans exiger 
systématiquement une expertise judiciaire. Toutefois, en réservant le recours aux 
expertises pour le cas où «  les éléments fournis révèlent un doute sérieux sur la 
réalité du transsexualisme du demandeur », la Chancellerie maintient expressément 
la nécessité d’un diagnostic pour toute modification de la mention du sexe dans 
l’acte de naissance16.
Cette exigence n’était d’ailleurs pas discutée et le droit positif était fermement 
établi en ce sens jusqu’à deux arrêts rendus dans des espèces différentes par la cour 
14 Préc.
15 V. Haute Autorité de Santé, Situation actuelle et perspectives d’évolution de la prise en charge 
médicale du transsexualisme en France (nov. 2009) p. 94 et 97.
16 Circ. DACS, n° CIV/07/10, 14 mai 2010 relative aux demandes de changement de sexe à l’état 
civil : NOR : JUSC1012994C ; v. Philippe Roger, ‘L’avenir de l’expertise judiciaire en matière de 
transsexualisme’ Experts n° 89, avril 2010, p. 18.
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d’appel de Nancy le 11 octobre 2010 et le 3 janvier 201117. L’arrêt rendu le 11 oc-
tobre 2010 par la juridiction nancéienne est une décision avant dire droit ; la cour 
fait injonction à la demanderesse de justifier du « caractère irréversible du change-
ment de sexe ou de genre », mais n’exige pas la preuve de la réalité du transsexua-
lisme. De même, dans leur décision du 3 janvier 2011, les juges nancéiens rejettent 
la demande de changement d’état civil au seul motif que la requérante ne démontre 
pas « le caractère irréversible du processus de changement de sexe ». La condition 
tirée du diagnostic du transsexualisme n’est reprise dans aucun de ces arrêts.
En revanche, la cour d’appel de Paris souligne la nécessité du diagnostic dans 
une décision du 27 janvier 201118 ; il faut, selon la juridiction parisienne, qu’ « un 
transsexualisme authentique, syndrome médicalement reconnu, et insusceptible de 
traitement, [soit] rigoureusement diagnostiqué19 ».
Les demandes de changement d’état civil formulées par les personnes transiden-
titaires sont accueillies sur le fondement du droit au respect de la vie privée20. C’est 
sur ce fondement que la France a été condamnée par la Cour européenne des droits 
de l’homme21. Les changements d’état civil du chef du sexe sont encore aujourd’hui 
décidés par les juges du fond en application de ce principe22.
L’exigence d’un diagnostic du transsexualisme porte-t-il atteinte au droit au res-
pect de la vie privée garanti par l’article 8 de la Convention européenne de sauve-
garde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales ? Il faut rappeler que le 
second alinéa de cet article permet aux Etats de restreindre le droit au respect de la 
vie privée. Ces restrictions doivent être prévues par la loi, poursuivre l’un des buts 
légitimes énumérés au texte et être nécessaires dans une société démocratique. Dans 
l’exercice de son pouvoir de contrôle, le juge européen reconnaît cependant aux 
Etats une marge d’appréciation dont l’étendue varie principalement selon la nature 
du droit en cause, le but de l’ingérence et l’existence de principes communs aux 
systèmes juridiques des Etats. Ainsi, dans l’affaire Parry c. Royaume-Uni, la Cour 
considéra que la loi anglaise subordonnant au divorce la complète reconnaissance 
d’une nouvelle appartenance sexuelle n’était pas contraire au droit au respect de la 
vie privée et familiale ; l’existence d’un partenariat civil « emportant pratiquement 
les mêmes droits et obligations que le mariage  », sans condition de différence 
sexuelle, lui a permis de constater l’absence de démonstration, d’une part, d’une 
ingérence disproportionnée dans le droit au respect de la vie privée et familiale et, 
d’autre part, d’un déséquilibre entre l’intérêt général et les intérêts de l’individu23.
17 CA Nancy, 11 oct. 2010 : JCP G 2010, 1205, note Ph. Reigné ; CA Nancy, 3 janv. 2011 : JCP 
G 2011, 480, note Ph. Reigné (1re esp.).
18 CA Paris, 27 janvier 2011 : JCP G 2011, 480, note Ph. Reigné (2e esp.).
19 CA Paris, 27 janv. 2011, préc.
20 V. supra.
21 V. CEDH, 25 mars 1992, préc.
22 V. par exemple TGI Toulouse, 10 décembre 2010, inédit.
23 CEDH, 28 nov. 2006, n° 42971/05.
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Dans son rapport consacré à la situation des personnes transgenres au sein des 
pays membres du Conseil de l’Europe, M. Thomas Hammarberg, commissaire 
aux droits de l’homme près le Conseil de l’Europe, relève qu’un diagnostic de 
troubles mentaux peut devenir un obstacle à l’exercice des droits fondamentaux 
des personnes transidentitaires, « notamment lorsqu’il sert à limiter leur capacité 
juridique24  ». Cette observation conserve sa pertinence quoique le transsexua-
lisme ne fasse plus partie, en droit français, de la catégorie des affections psychia-
triques, puisque l’exigence juridique d’un  diagnostic «  différentiel  » subsiste. 
Cette exigence conduit en effet tribunaux et auteurs à décider qu’il faut réserver 
la possibilité d’obtenir la modification de la mention du sexe à l’état civil aux 
«  transsexuels vrais25  », par opposition, notamment, aux «  non-transsexuels  », 
personnes souvent décrites – dans des termes peu flatteurs – comme « des traves-
tis, des pervers sexuels ou des individus relevant vraisemblablement de la psy-
chiatrie26 ».
M. Hammarberg montre que cette solution ignore la diversité des personnes 
transgenres :
Bien que comptant peu de membres, la communauté transgenre est d’une grande 
diversité. En font partie des transsexuels déjà ou pas encore opérés, mais aussi des 
personnes qui choisissent de ne pas subir d’opération ou qui n’ont pas accès à la 
chirurgie. Il peut s’agir de personnes transgenres femme-vers-homme ou homme-
vers-femme, qui ont – ou non – subi une intervention chirurgicale ou un traitement 
hormonal, et aussi de travestis et d’autres personnes qui n’entrent pas strictement 
dans les catégories homme ou femme.  Il semble que dans de nombreux pays, le 
cadre juridique ne tienne compte que des transsexuels et laisse de côté une impor-
tante partie des personnes transgenres27.
On peut en effet se demander si l’exigence d’un diagnostic du transsexualisme, 
aussi étroitement entendue, ne constitue pas une ingérence disproportionnée dans 
l’exercice du droit au respect de la vie privée, comme le révèle l’arrêt rendu le 27 
janvier 2011 par la cour d’appel de Paris28. En l’espèce, la demanderesse produisait 
un certificat médical établissant qu’elle était suivie par un endocrinologue pour 
une dysphorie de genre. La juridiction parisienne ne tient cependant aucun compte 
de cette pièce, qui ne contient pas le diagnostic d’un «  transsexualisme authen-
24 Rapp. préc., p. 7 et 23.
25 V. par exemple CA Paris, 28 juin 2001 : JurisData n° 2001-149456 et, en dernier lieu, CA Paris, 
27 janv. 2011 : JCP G 2011, 480, note Ph. Reigné (2e esp.) ; Jean-Paul Branlard, Le sexe et l’état 
des personnes (LGDJ 1993) n° 1488.
26 Michèle Gobert, ‘Le transsexualisme ou de la difficulté d’exister’ JCP G 1990, I, 3475, n° 11 ; 
comp. Jean-Paul Branlard, op. cit., nos 1459 et s.
27 Rapp. préc., p. 5 ; rappr. Cristina Castagnoli, Les droits des personnes transgenres dans les Etats 
Membres de l’Union européenne (Parl. europ., Départ. thém. C, 2010) p. 5.
28 Préc.
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tique », la notion de dysphorie de genre étant plus large que celle de transsexua-
lisme. Le changement d’état civil est donc refusé.
Sans doute l’exigence d’un diagnostic médical peut-elle être considérée comme 
une mesure nécessaire à la protection de la santé au sens du second alinéa de l’article 
8 de la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés 
fondamentales dès lors qu’à ce diagnostic est associé un traitement. Toutefois, ce 
diagnostic, en « permettant de s’assurer de la volonté du patient à s’engager dans les 
étapes ultérieures de la prise en charge thérapeutique29 », peut présenter un carac-
tère dissuasif à l’égard des personnes transidentitaires qui ne souhaitent pas entrer 
dans la voie d’une conversion sexuelle complète. En outre, on peut se demander si 
la simple constatation, par un médecin ou un psychologue, d’une discordance entre 
l’identité de genre et le sexe biologique ne serait pas suffisante, sans qu’il fût néces-
saire de caractériser un quelconque syndrome.
A la condition tirée du diagnostic du transsexualisme s’ajoute celle de l’irréversi-
bilité de la conversion sexuelle entreprise, affirmée aussi bien par la juridiction pa-
risienne que par la juridiction nancéienne.
2. La condition du traitement du transsexualisme
Dans le système issu des arrêts d’Assemblée plénière du 11 décembre 199230, la 
modification des actes d’état civil est conçue comme l’aboutissement d’un processus 
de réassignation hormono-chirurgicale du sexe. Une décision rendue par la cour 
d’appel de Poitiers le 20 décembre 2006 illustre parfaitement les insuffisances d’un 
pareil système31. En l’espèce, la demanderesse sollicitait d’être désignée du sexe fé-
minin sur son acte de naissance, mais ne pouvait assumer le coût du traitement 
chirurgical sur ses organes génitaux en raison des « difficultés d’insertion sociale 
rendant difficile son accès à un emploi rémunérateur » et dues à « l’inadéquation de 
son apparence et de son état civil » ; elle fut ainsi empêchée de passer son permis de 
conduire, l’administration lui ayant demandé soit de « remplacer les photos d’iden-
tité du dossier par des photos de vous sous des traits masculins, de les faire tampon-
ner par la préfecture et de vous présenter aux examens en tenue masculine », soit 
« d’attendre que vous ayez changé officiellement votre état civil et modifié tous les 
documents vous concernant dont votre demande de permis ». Les juges poitevins 
considérèrent qu’il convenait de mettre fin à cette atteinte à la vie privée et ordon-
nèrent la modification de l’acte de naissance, en dépit de l’inachèvement de la 
conversion sexuelle entreprise32.
29 Haute Autorité de Santé, rapp. préc., p. 97.
30 Préc.
31 CA Poitiers, 20 déc. 2006 : JurisData n° 2006-330972.
32 V. aussi CA Rennes, 26 oct. 1998  : D. 1999, jurispr. p. 508, note M. Friant-Perrot  : état de 
santé – séropositivité – incompatible avec une intervention chirurgicale.
PHILIPPE REIGNÉ212
Consciente de ces difficultés, la direction des affaires civiles et du sceau du mi-
nistère de la justice, se fondant tant sur l’évolution de la jurisprudence des juges du 
fond que sur le rapport de la Haute Autorité de Santé33, invite, dans sa circulaire du 
14 mai 2010, le ministère public à :
donner un avis favorable à la demande de changement d’état civil lorsque les trai-
tements hormonaux ayant pour effet une transformation physique ou physiolo-
gique définitive, associés, le cas échéant, à des opérations de chirurgie plastique 
(prothèses ou ablation des glandes mammaires, chirurgie esthétique du visage…) 
ont entraîné un changement de sexe irréversible, sans exiger pour autant l’ablation 
des organes génitaux34.
Selon la direction des affaires civiles et du sceau, en effet, « certaines juridictions 
du fond considèrent que les exigences posées par la Cour de cassation visent essen-
tiellement à démontrer le caractère irréversible du processus de changement de 
sexe ». Or, la Haute Autorité de Santé souligne que les effets des traitements hor-
monaux, notamment sur la fertilité, sont susceptibles d’irréversibilité35. Il suffirait 
donc d’un traitement hormonal aux effets irréversibles pour que le juge ordonnât la 
modification de l’acte de naissance du chef du sexe ; le juge interviendrait ainsi plus 
tôt.
La lecture du rapport de la Haute Autorité de Santé révèle que cette solution est 
tirée d’une interprétation de la recommandation de l’Assemblée parlementaire du 
Conseil de l’Europe relative à la condition des transsexuels. D’après cette recom-
mandation, « dans le cas de transsexualisme irréversible […] la mention concernant 
le sexe de l’intéressé devrait être rectifiée dans le registre des naissances, ainsi que 
dans ses pièces d’identité36 ». La Haute Autorité de Santé relève que « la recomman-
dation invite les états signataires du traité à réglementer cette modification [des actes 
d’état civil] dans le cas de « transsexualisme irréversible ». A partir de ce constat, elle 
articule l’argumentation suivante :
Tout tourne autour de cette notion, laissée cependant à l’appréciation des Etats. 
Qu’entend-on par transsexualisme irréversible ? La réponse à cette question se situe 
ici sur un plan médical, et non plus juridique. Certains spécialistes parlent de trans-
sexualisme irréversible à partir de la mise en place de l’hormonosubstitution de dévi-
rilisation/déféminisation, ce traitement gommant certains aspects physiologiques, 
notamment la fécondité, d’une façon qui peut être irréversible. Une telle interpréta-
tion de la recommandation offrirait la possibilité d’obtenir le changement de la men-
tion du sexe dans l’état civil sans aller jusqu’à l’opération de réassignation sexuelle37.
33 Préc.
34 Préc.
35 Rapp. préc. p. 47 et 114 ; adde rép. min. n° 14524 : JO Sénat Q, 30 déc. 2010, p. 3373.
36 Recomm. n° 1117 (1989), n° 11.
37 Haute Autorité de Santé, rapp. préc., p. 47.
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Ce raisonnement suscite la perplexité. Ne repose-t-il pas sur une confusion entre 
le diagnostic et le traitement du transsexualisme ? La définition donnée de celui-ci 
par l’Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l’Europe prête peut-être à cette confu-
sion en faisant – selon une analyse répandue – de la demande de conversion sexuelle 
un des caractères du transsexualisme :
Considérant que le transsexualisme est un syndrome caractérisé par une personna-
lité double, l’une physique, l’autre psychique, la personne transsexuelle ayant la 
conviction profonde d’appartenir à l’autre sexe, ce qui l’entraîne à demander que 
son corps soit « corrigé » en conséquence38.
M. Jean-Paul Branlard, dans sa thèse sur le sexe et l’état des personnes, rattache 
cependant l’irréversibilité au diagnostic du transsexualisme, qui supposerait que la 
conviction transsexuelle fût irréversible39. Il remarque aussi que « l’irréversibilité est 
double »  : « Elle a trait à la conviction du sujet et à la modification du corps. La 
première conditionne la seconde et la réponse du juge40  ». Les juges du fond ne 
distinguent pas toujours entre l’irréversibilité psychique et l’irréversibilité physique, 
se bornant parfois à relever que « la situation est […] devenue irréversible » pour 
ordonner la modification de la mention du sexe à l’état civil41 ; ce qui est plutôt un 
indice d’une confusion entre le diagnostic et le traitement du transsexualisme.
Pour la cour d’appel de Nancy, la condition tirée de l’irréversibilité du « proces-
sus de changement de sexe » s’évince du principe de l’indisponibilité de l’état des 
personnes et a pour finalité d’assurer « la cohérence et la sécurité des actes de l’état 
civil42 ».
Toutefois, l’indisponibilité de l’état n’implique pas l’irréversibilité du change-
ment d’état. Le mariage n’interdit pas le divorce et le divorce le remariage, le cas 
échéant avec la même personne. On peut aussi changer de prénom plusieurs fois et 
même reprendre son prénom d’origine43. L’indisponibilité n’est pas l’immutabilité44 
et encore moins l’irréversibilité. Le principe d’indisponibilité n’interdit pas de 
prendre en compte les changements successifs affectant l’état d’une personne, eus-
sent-ils même pour origine la volonté de celle-ci ; « la volonté est bien présente en 
matière d’état des personnes », remarquent M. François Terré et Mme Dominique 
38 Recomm. préc., n° 1.
39 V. Jean-Paul Branlard, op. cit., n° 1489 et nos 1506 et s.
40 Jean-Paul Branlard, op. cit., n° 1506.
41 V. par exemple CA Agen, 2 févr. 1983 : Gaz. Pal. 1983, 2, jurispr. p. 603, note G. Sutton (1re 
esp.) ; TGI Thionville, 28 mai 1986 : Gaz. Pal. 1987, 1, somm. p. 105.
42 CA Nancy, 11 oct. 2010, préc. ; CA Nancy, 3 janv. 2011, préc. L’arrêt du 11 octobre 2010 n’in-
voque que le principe de l’indisponibilité de l’état des personnes ; l’arrêt du 3 janvier 2011 y ajoute 
la cohérence et la sécurité des actes de l’état civil.
43 V. Cass. 1re, 2 mars 1999 : JCP G, 1999, II, 10089, note T. Garé.
44 François Terré et Dominique Fenouillet, Droit civil. Les personnes. La famille. Les incapaci-
tés (7e éd., Dalloz, 2005) n° 128 ; CA Paris, 27 janvier 2011, préc.
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Fenouillet45, qui avancent même l’idée de mutabilité contrôlée de l’état des per-
sonnes46. En matière de transsexualisme, la Cour de cassation n’a expressément fait 
référence au principe de l’indisponibilité de l’état des personnes que dans trois dé-
cisions, l’une rendue en 1975 et les autres en 1992 ; dans la première, elle a décidé 
que ce principe interdisait le changement d’état civil47 ; dans les secondes, elle a jugé 
l’inverse48, après la condamnation de la France par la Cour européenne des droits 
de l’homme49. Dans l’intervalle, elle s’est abstenue d’invoquer ce principe50. Ce si-
lence révèle que la Haute Juridiction n’avait pas considéré l’indisponibilité de l’état 
des personnes comme un fondement suffisamment solide pour refuser la modifica-
tion de l’acte de naissance du chef du sexe.
Quant à la cohérence et la sécurité des actes de l’état civil, on voit mal comment 
l’irréversibilité de la conversion sexuelle est apte à les assurer, sauf à considérer que 
cette condition exprime la crainte de devoir reconnaître, un jour, qu’un enfant 
puisse naître de deux mères ou de deux pères, selon les indications portées sur l’acte 
de naissance des parents.
On peut difficilement soutenir que le droit français respecte les recommanda-
tions formulées en 2009 par M. Hammarberg51 et en 2010 par l’Assemblée parle-
mentaire du Conseil de l’Europe52. En effet, celle-ci appelle les Etats membres à 
garantir dans la législation et la pratique les droits des personnes transgenres « à des 
documents officiels reflétant l’identité de genre choisie, sans obligation préalable de 
subir une stérilisation ou d’autres procédures médicales comme une opération de 
conversion sexuelle ou une thérapie hormonale53 ». Cette préconisation fait écho, en 
la précisant, à la quatrième recommandation formulée par M. Hammarberg :
Les Etats membres du Conseil de l’Europe devraient […] dans les textes encadrant 
le processus de changement de nom et de sexe, cesser de subordonner la reconnais-
sance de l’identité de genre d’une personne à une obligation légale de stérilisation 
et de soumission à d’autres traitements médicaux54.
Ce n’est donc pas seulement l’irréversibilité des effets d’un traitement médical 
– chirurgical, hormonal ou autre – qu’il conviendrait d’éviter d’ériger en condition 
45 François Terré et Dominique Fenouillet, op. cit., n° 130.
46 Op. cit., n° 128.
47 Cass. 1re civ., 16 déc. 1975 : D. 1976, jurispr. p. 397, note R. Lindon (1re esp.).
48 Cass. ass. plén., 11 déc. 1992, préc.
49 CEDH, 25 mars 1992, préc.
50 V. Cass. 1re civ., 30 nov. 1983 : D. 1984, jurispr. p. 165, note B. Edelman ; Cass. 1re civ., 3 et 31 
mars 1987 : D. 1987, jurispr. p. 445, note P. Jourdain ; Cass. 1re civ., 7 juin 1988 : Bull. civ. I, n° 
176 ; Cass. 1re civ., 10 mai 1989 : Bull. civ. I, n° 189 ; Cass. 1re civ., 21 mai 1990, préc. (4 arrêts).
51 Droits de l’homme et identité de genre, préc.
52 Discrimination sur la base de l’orientation sexuelle et de l’identité de genre, résolution préc.
53 Résolution préc., n° 16.11.2.
54 Rapp. préc., p. 43.
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de modification de la mention du sexe sur les actes d’état civil ; c’est le traitement 
lui-même.
Le risque d’une condamnation par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme 
sur le fondement de l’article 8 de la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des 
droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales n’est pas négligeable. La Haute 
Autorité de Santé relève, en effet, que, parmi les principales conséquences irréver-
sibles d’un traitement hormonal, figure l’infertilité55. M. Hammarberg remarque à 
ce propos :
L’impossibilité d’accéder à la reconnaissance officielle de l’identité de genre sans 
ces traitements [chirurgicaux ou hormonaux] place les personnes transgenres dans 
une impasse. On ne peut que s’alarmer du fait que ces dernières semblent former 
le seul groupe en Europe soumis à une stérilisation prescrite légalement et imposée 
en pratique par l’Etat56.
Il faut rappeler, à cet égard, que la vie privée, au sens de l’article 8, « recouvre 
l’intégrité physique et morale de la personne57  ». La restriction ainsi apportée au 
droit au respect de la vie privée des personnes transidentitaires pourraient être 
considérée comme disproportionnée par rapport au but légitime poursuivi ; il est, 
en effet, douteux que la stérilité soit nécessaire pour décider de l’appartenance 
d’une personne à un sexe ou à un autre58, alors qu’il est possible de retenir d’autres 
critères, cumulativement ou alternativement (comportement social, opérations de 
chirurgie plastique, etc.). Il est, de surcroît, difficile d’expliquer comment le droit au 
respect de la vie privée peut dépendre, dans son application, du métabolisme de 
chacun.
L’évolution que connaît le droit français est inachevée. La Cour de cassation n’a 
pas eu l’occasion de se prononcer depuis un arrêt de sa première Chambre civile du 
18 octobre 199459 reprenant les principes posés par ses décisions d’Assemblée plé-
nière de 199260 ; elle interviendra tôt ou tard pour mettre fin à la division des juges 
du fond sur le diagnostic du transsexualisme et déterminer l’époque de la conver-
sion sexuelle à partir de laquelle le changement d’état civil pourra être accordé. Il 
faut espérer qu’à cette occasion, elle fixera un régime plus respectueux de la per-
sonne humaine.
55 Rapp. préc., p. 47 et 114.
56 Rapp. préc., p. 18.
57 CEDH, 26 mars 1985, X et Y c. Pays-Bas, série A, n° 91, § 22. Le droit de fonder une famille, 
garanti par l’article 12, pourrait aussi être invoqué (comp. Thomas Hammarberg, rapp. préc., p. 20).
58 V. Thomas Hammarberg, rapp. préc., p. 18.
59 Préc.
60 Préc.
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Abstract
More and more jurisdictions allow same-sex couples access to marriage, or at least a simi-
lar scheme. At the same time, adoption or access to artificial methods of procreation by 
same-sex couples is a reality in a growing number of States. At the same time, the fact that 
individuals enjoying a particular status; i.e., marriage, civil partnership, or parenthood, are 
able to move between States, can lead to questions when the recognition of this civil status 
differs amongst States. When States elect to favour the exchange of persons through a 
liberalization of the access to their labour markets, or even the free movement of their 
citizens, the necessity to harmonize respective standards increases, and/or a greater need 
arises to provide and implement specific rules on mutual recognition. Specific rules on 
mutual recognition may lead to reverse discrimination and increased movement to obtain 
a specific civil status in another country. Such problems are relatively well-known in the 
European Union and other groups of countries governed by the free movement of per-
sons, or within federal States where these questions are not completely harmonized at the 
federal level, such as the United States. To a lesser extent, such questions govern rights 
granted to individuals in the context of economic integration agreements. Economic inte-
gration agreements tend to fall short of free movement of persons in that they only favour 
the movement of persons in the context of the provision of services, to facilitate trade, or 
to promote investment, such as is the case in many modern BITs and FTAs.
* * *
1. Introduction
More and more States allow same-sex couples access to marriage, or at least a simi-
lar scheme. At the same time, adoption or access to artificial methods of procreation 
* I would like to thank Natasha Skupsky (BA, JD, LLM in International and European Eco-
nomic and Commercial Law, University of Lausanne) for her very valuable assistance in the writ-
ing of this contribution.
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by same-sex couples is a reality in a growing number of States. This leads to the 
question of whether this development could create regional standards that would 
serve to influence the legal system of other States – at least in a specific region.
LGBT rights continue to differ tremendously amongst nations worldwide. Those 
States providing access to marriage (or at least civil union) and adoption for same-
sex couples are still a very small minority of all States globally.
There are only very few international and regional instruments that address the 
treatment of LGBT persons in general, and deal directly with same-sex couples in 
particular The Yogyakarta Principles of 2006 are an example of the latter. Even less 
of these instruments include concrete obligations (e.g. prohibition on discriminate 
on the basis of to sexual orientation) or oblige States to legislate in a specific way 
(e.g. provide legal protection for same-sex relationships). A world-wide harmoniza-
tion in this area seems impossible and politically unwanted at this time1.
Each State may recognize and categorize the civil status of persons in different 
manners, and these differing perspectives lead to debates amongst governments on the 
acceptance of varying standards when it comes to the issue of the migration of per-
sons. With regard to the legal recognition of same-sex relationships, and adoption by 
homosexuals and/or gay couples, this absence of an international consensus has been 
a reality for decades. Normally, domestic immigration laws will only agree to consider 
the legality of same-sex relationships, and adoptions by the latter, once the domestic 
family laws allow for them. As there are very few accepted international obligations 
with regard to immigration, this leaves a lot of room for strong variation. This may 
even be the case within large federal systems in which divergences prevail2. The ques-
tion of refugees and immigration caused by political or economic hardship is closely 
related, but will not be treated in this context, as it is normally kept entirely separate 
from economic integration considerations in international agreements3.
1 For an overview and the development over time, see: Eric Heinze, Sexual Orientation: A Human 
Right, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1994); Douglas Sanders, ‘Human Rights and sexual orienta-
tion in international law’ [2002] 25:1 International Journal of Public Administration 13-44; Igna-
cio Saiz, ‘Bracketing Sexuality: Human Rights and Sexual Orientation - A Decade of Develop-
ment and Denial at the UN’ [2004] 7:2 Sexuality, Human Rights, and Health 48-80; Michael 
O’Flaherty and John Fisher, ‘Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human 
Rights Law: Contextualizing the Yogyakarta Principles’ [2008] 8:2 Human Rights Law Review 
207-248; Aeyal M. Gross, ‘Review Essay, Sex, Love, and Marriage: Questioning Gender and 
Sexuality Rights in International Law’ [2008] 21 Leiden Journal of International Law 235-253; 
Joke Swiebel, ‘Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender human rights: the search for an interna-
tional strategy’ [2009] 15:1 Contemporary Politics 19-35; Kelly Kollman and Matthew Waites, 
‘The Global politics of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender human rights: An introduction’, 
[2009] 15:1 Contemporary Politics 1-17.
2 For an interesting account regarding the situation in the United States see Human Rights Watch 
(ed.), Family Unvalued - Discrimination, Denial, and the Fate of Binational Same-Sex Couples under 
US Law (HRW 2006).
3 See, for example, the UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Sexual Orienta-
tion and Gender Identity (UNHCR, Geneva, 21 November 2008).
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Migration is an important reality in today’s world, and more and more regional 
agreements provide for specific rights for the citizens of their Member States to 
migrate between the territories of these States. Often, such rights are originally justi-
fied for economic reasons in order to attract skilled labourers, or to overcome any 
shortage that may arise in a domestic labour market. Immigration may also be im-
portant for investment flows and technology transfer, and the remittances sent home 
by immigrants can be a welcome factor in fostering economic development in their 
home country. Normally, such immigration rights will also have a political compo-
nent to create greater regional coherence, and overcome nationalist rivalries.
The differences with regard to the recognition of the civil status of persons be-
tween one State and another (e.g. same-sex couples and their adopted children) 
becomes particularly relevant when these differences impede on persons wishing to 
immigrate into a country with their family, in particular if individuals in a family-by-
marriage/adoption have no independent right to migrate because they are third 
country nationals. While taking human rights into consideration, specifically the 
right to a family life, may influence the respective legal assessment, most modern 
economic integration agreements will also allow for family reunification with regard 
to the movement of workers and self-employed individuals. Therefore, the most 
important remaining question in this regard revolves around the determination of 
“family member” for the purposes of immigration. While this issue was, for a long 
time, mostly discussed within the framework of the “ever closer union” among what 
today are most European States, it becomes of increasing relevance as more and 
more regional economic integration agreements are negotiated.
2. LGBT Rights in Multilateral Instruments
2.1. Overview
Of course, some international and regional legal instruments – in particular, the ones 
especially dedicated to a human rights instrument4 – have a direct impact on LGBT 
rights when it comes to discrimination, and the right to respect for a person’s private 
and family life. This process can be even stronger where international courts and 
other treaty bodies are available5. Here, international standards and their interpreta-
tion by international and domestic courts have led to striking changes in recent 
years, when it comes to the treatment of LGBT behaviour under criminal law, and 
with regard to their individual treatment compared to other individuals.
4 See Human Rights Watch, Important International Jurisprudence Concerning LGBT Rights, 
available at <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/05/25/jurisprudence-about-lgbt-human-rights#_
United_Nations>, accessed 6 April 2011.
5 For an overview see Phillip Tahmindjis, ‘Sexuality and International Human Rights Law’ [2005] 
48:3/4 Journal of Homosexuality 9-29, or Holning Lau, ‘Sexual Orientation: Testing the Univer-
sality of International Human Rights Law’ [2004] 71 University of Chicago Law Review 1689-720.
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At the same time, crucial questions relating to the right to a family, in particular 
the right to marriage and adoption remain controversial, although the existing cata-
logues of rights might lend themselves to an interpretation that would provide ac-
cess to these institutions for LGBT individuals.
2.2. The Yogyakarta Principles
On 26 March 2007, an informal group of human rights experts adopted the so-
called Yogyakarta Principles6. These Principles were developed in November 2006, 
in the Indonesian town of the same name, and represent what is likely today’s most 
comprehensive universal attempt to describe a standard of human rights protection 
relating to sexual orientation and gender identity. They can be interpreted as a con-
cretization of existing human rights obligations to this particular vulnerable group. 
The principles are accompanied by specific recommendations for implementation at 
the national level. In view of the global situation, the main focus lies on the fight 
against homophobic violence and criminal prosecution of homosexuals and trans-
sexuals. In view of the participating personalities, this document seems particularly 
likely to be taken into account by political bodies world-wide. Other statements, 
with a similar vocation to the Yogyakarta Principles, made by large groups of NGOs 
exist, however these statements lack the same acceptance in the political process7.
Principles 22 and 23 address Freedom of Movement and Asylum. In particular, with 
respect to the free movement of persons, Principle 23 states: “Everyone lawfully within 
a State has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of the 
State, regardless of sexual orientation or gender identity. Sexual orientation and gender 
identity may never be invoked to limit or impede a person’s entry, regress or return to 
or from any State, including that person’s own State. States shall: a) Take all necessary 
legislative, administrative and other measures to ensure that the right to freedom of 
movement and residence is guaranteed regardless of sexual orientation or gender iden-
tity”. According to the Principles 24-26 (Rights of Participation in Cultural and Family 
Life) – and by reference to a respective decision of the UN Human Rights Committee 
– States have an obligation not to discriminate between different-sex and same-sex re-
lationships in allocating partnership benefits, such as survivors’ pensions8.
6 See, for example, David Brown (2009), ‘Making Room for Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity in International Human Rights Law: An Introduction to the Yogyakarta Principles’, 
Michigan Journal of International Law, 31, 821-879, or Ryan Richard Thoreson (2009) ‘Queering 
Human Rights: The Yogyakarta Principles and the Norm That Dare Not Speak Its Name’, Journal 
of Human Rights, 8: 4, 323-339.
7 See, for example, the Declaration of Montreal, which is a set of principles adopted by an impor-
tant number of scholars and activists present at the 2006 Montreal OutGames, available at: http://
www.declarationofmontreal.org (last visited on 6 April 2011).
8 For details consult: <http://yogyakartaprinciples.org/> or the Activist’s Guide to the Yogya-
karta Principles as published by several NGOs and available online at <http://www.ypinaction.
org/content/activists_guide>, accessed 6 April 2011.
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The content of these Principles show a relatively cautious approach with respect 
to the question of migration. Migration is mainly addressed under the aspect of di-
rect discrimination against LGBT persons, and within the issue of a right to asylum. 
The question of the admittance of same-sex couples and (adopted) children as part 
of the family of a LGBT person, may possibly be derived from a combination of the 
right to participation in family life, and the right of non-discrimination of persons 
with regard to movement between States, however it is not as yet addressed as such.
2.3. United Nations
Within the United Nations, the discussion of LGBT rights remains controversial. 
France and the Netherlands coordinated an LGBT equality rights statement in the 
General Assembly in December 2008. It was delivered by a representative of Argen-
tina. Sixty-six States sponsored the statement. The initiative prompted a counter-
statement, presented by Syria, and sponsored by fifty-seven states. Sixty-nine States 
did not join either statement9. There was no vote. More recently in 2010, during the 
65th Session of the UN General Assembly, a report by the Special Rapporteur on 
the Right to education led to a heated debate on the right to sexual education. In 
the Third Commission of the GA, African and Arab States managed to delete a pas-
sage relating to the protection of LGBT persons in the draft Resolution against ar-
bitrary, summary, and extra-judicial killings in Autumn 2010. It was due to the in-
tensive lobbying by NGOs and the intervention of the Secretary General, as well as 
to the United States, which allowed the deleted passage to be reinstated.
In 2002, the Human Rights Commission addressed the issue for the first time. In 
2003, Brazil had tabled a resolution, within this governing body, supporting LGBT 
rights. The massive opposition of African and Islamic States led to Brazil’s dropping 
of the motion in 2005. Later, on the 1st of December 2006 in the new Human Rights 
Council, Norway made a statement that was supported by fifty-four States. This 
statement asked that the United Nations be more proactive with regard to the hu-
man rights relating to sexual orientation and gender identity, and create respective 
organs10. Further statements were made in the Human Rights Council by the Czech 
Republic, Switzerland, and Norway, on behalf of the Nordic States in March 2007, 
by the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands on 3 March 2008, and by Ireland and 
Slovenia on behalf of the European Union on 5 March 200811. The last such state-
9 See Douglas Sanders, The Role of the Yogyakarta Principles, available online at: <http://www.
ypinaction.org/files/70/Background_on_the_Principles__Sanders__Douglas__The_Role_of_
the_Yogyakarta_Principles.pdf>, accessed 6 April 2011.
10 Human Rights Council, 3rd Session (2006), Norway: Joint Statement on human rights viola-
tions based on sexual orientation and gender identity on behalf of the following 54 States, includ-
ing 18 members of the Human Rights Council, document available at <http://www.ilga-europe.
org>, accessed 6 April 2011.
11 See for the texts <http://www.ypinaction.org/content/human_rights_council_documents>, 
accessed 6 April 2011.
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ment was delivered to the Council on 16 March 2011 by Columbia, and co-spon-
sored by a total of 84 States.
Since 1994 (in its landmark decision Toonen v. Australia) the Human Rights 
Committee has regularly questioned countries on their laws and policies on sexual 
orientation discrimination. Other treaty bodies, including the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women, also question governments on this 
basis12. Several UN Agencies and experts have made respective statements. In 2010, 
the Special Rapporteur for the Right to health, Anand Grover, caused tensions when 
he addressed the effects of the criminalization of same-sex sexual intercourse, and 
homosexuality in general, and how this lifestyle choice relates to the incidence of 
HIV/AIDS. The groups of African States and Islamic States criticized the choice of 
this topic as lacking universal recognition. Similarly, the 2009 reports by the Special 
Rapporteurs on the Right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health, and the Protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, referred to the Yogyakarta Prin-
ciples13. The Universal Periodic Review Process was repeatedly used to address the 
compliance of States with the Yogyakarta Principles14.
Within the UN, the main focus of the debate remains upon the evaluation of the 
cause and level of violence against LGBT persons, and criminal prosecution for respec-
tive behaviour. The question of same-sex marriages, adoption, and migratory rights has 
so far not been treated in detail, in view of the strong resistance to more basic needs.
3. LGBT Rights in Regional Instruments in General
3.1. Council of Europe
Since the beginning, human rights have been at the core of the work of the Council 
of Europe. Since its’ inception in 1981, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe has passed a number of Recommendations, and a Resolution supporting 
LGBT rights15.
12 See Douglas Sanders, note 9.
13 See for references <http://www.ypinaction.org/content/special_procedures_documents>, ac-
cessed 6 April 2011.
14 See for references <http://www.ypinaction.org/content/universal_periodic_review_docume>, 
accessed 6 April 2011.
15 In particular: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Recommendation 924 (1981) 
- on discrimination against homosexuals; Opinion No. 216 (2000) - Draft Protocol No. 12 to the 
European Convention on Human Rights; Recommendation 1470 (2000) - Situation of gays and 
lesbians and their partners in respect of asylum and immigration in the member states of the 
Council of Europe; Recommendation 1474 (2000) - Situation of lesbians and gays in Council of 
Europe member states; Recommendation 1635 (2003) - Lesbians and gays in sport; Resolution 
1728(2010) - Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity; Recommenda-
tion 1915 (2010) - Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.
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The Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers adopted a Recommendation on 
31 March 2010 that supported the fight against discrimination relating to sexual 
orientation and gender identity16. This instrument is considered to be the first inter-
national legally binding instrument that explicitly addresses the discrimination of 
LGBT persons, although it is basically a concretization of the existing rights in the 
ECHR.
The Commissioner for Human Rights has made several contributions to LGBT 
rights17.
3.2. OSCE
Although not an international or regional organization whereby States take on legal 
obligations upon joining, the OSCE is a political organization that seeks to exercise 
authority through political pressure on those States whom fall short of a dedicated 
commitment to upholding respect for human rights and the rule of law. According 
to ILGA Europe, the OSCE’s relevance to LGBT rights has increased in the past 
years, as the OSCE has taken on an expanded mandate in the area of tolerance and 
non-discrimination. LGBT rights are normally addressed at the OSCE Human Di-
mension and Implementation Meetings (HDIM)18.
3.3. Organization of American States (OAS)
In Asia and Africa, the debate is more difficult. In (Latin) America however, the role 
played by human rights bodies and political organizations is slightly more encourag-
ing. On 3 June 2008, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States 
(OAS) adopted, by consensus, a Resolution that condemns any human rights viola-
tions based on sexual orientation and gender identity19. In parallel, the discussion of 
an Inter-American Convention against racism and any other form of discrimination 
continues20. The current proposal includes references to sexual orientation and gen-
der identity.
16 Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on mea-
sures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, adopted by 
the Committee of Ministers on 31 March 2010 at the 1081st meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies.
17 Such as by Thomas Hammarberg, Human Rights and Gender Identity, Issue Paper (Council 
of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 2009) available online at <https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/
ViewDoc.jsp?id=1476365>, accessed 6 April 2011.
18 For more details see: <http://www.ilga-europe.org/home/guide/osce>, accessed 6 April 2011.
19 General Assembly of the Organization of American States, AG/RES. 2435 (XXXVIII-O/08): 
Human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity, 3 June 2008, text presented originally by 
Brazil, available online at: www.oas.org/dil/AGRES_2435.doc (last visited on 6 April 2011).
20 Draft Inter-American Convention against Racism and All Forms of Discrimination and Intoler-
ance, available at <http://www.oas.org/OASpage/Events/default_ENG.asp?eve_code=2>, ac-
cessed 6 April 2011.
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4. Economic Movement of Persons and LGBT Rights in the EU
4.1. Introduction
In particular, the fact that individuals enjoying a particular civil status, such as mar-
riage, civil partnership, or parenthood, may move between States as a family unit 
with increasing regularity, creates an urgent need to answer questions with regard to 
differing recognitions of this civil status when it comes to LGBT relationships. Nor-
mally, such questions are addressed by the domestic laws that serve to regulate the 
admission and presence of foreigners onto the territory of a State21.
Generally, any elimination of barriers between various components of an economic 
integration area (including an internal market) must be based on both the progressive 
elimination of direct barriers, such as discriminatory treatment based on explicit access 
prohibitions or hindrances (quotas, import tariffs etc.), and, on the other side, the 
elimination of technical obstacles, such as differences in the applicable regulations. The 
latter is usually done through either harmonization or mutual recognition22.
These issues are well studied when it comes to trade in goods and services, but 
less so when applied to the movement of persons. Traditionally, most States have 
access limitations in place, such as quotas for foreigners entering the labour market. 
Also, the non-recognition of diplomas or terms and regulations within social secu-
rity systems may constitute technical barriers. In a similar way, the non-recognition 
of a person’s civil status, and thereby the non-recognition of certain persons as fam-
ily members that do constitute family members in the home State, may constitute a 
technical barrier to the (free) movement of persons. In cases where harmonization 
is not possible (or does not seem desirable), mutual recognition is often a preferred 
mechanism for creating a common economic integration area.
Normally, such an obligation to recognize legal decisions of another State are 
accompanied by an exception rule for a narrow number of cases where the goal of 
mutual recognition is balanced against the specific needs of each jurisdiction. Prob-
ably the most famous example of this balancing principle is the “mandatory require-
ments” contained in the Treaty of the European Union, with respect to the internal 
market. In the area of goods, this balancing principle is often referred to as “Cassis 
de Dijon” – a reference to the famous leading case establishing the obligation of 
mutual recognition, coupled with the possibility of preventing the market entry of a 
product that has been admitted in another Member State, by utilizing the safeguard 
of mandatory requirements of the importing State23.
21 For an example from Switzerland see: Alberto Achermann and Martina Caron, ‘Homosexuelle 
und heterosexuelle Konkubinatspaare im schweizerischen Ausländerrecht’ [2001] SZIER 125-
141, or Martin Bertschi and Thomas Gächter, ‘Der Anwesenheitsanspruch aufgrund der Garantie 
des Privat- und Familienlebens’ [2003] ZBl 225-271.
22 See e.g. Andreas R. Andreas Ziegler, Droit international économique de la Suisse - une intro-
duction (Stämpfli, 2009).
23 European Court of Justice, Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für 
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While this terminology normally applies to products and not to the movement of 
persons, the idea is that the differences in foreign regulations regarding admissibil-
ity into a domestic labour market ought to be analyzed in a similar manner as are 
regulations that govern the access of goods and services into a foreign market. Many 
international private law instruments provide for the mutual recognition of civil 
status decisions and documents24. Here, it is normally the notion of “public policy” 
or “public order” – often expressed by using the French “ordre public (interna-
tional)” – that allows States to depart from the general rules included in these trea-
ties or under domestic law25. In a certain way, these references to domestic values 
and considerations of morality have the same functions as mandatory requirements 
(Cassis-de-Dijon Principle), and/or exceptions in the area of trade. If these value 
judgments or differences in domestic perception do make the exchange of produc-
tion factors or goods and services too difficult, then there is an argument for harmo-
nization, assuming there is sufficient political will, and it is feasible for the Parties to 
overcome the obstacles that arise from differing values26.
In States that choose to favour the exchange of persons through a liberalization 
of the access to their labour markets, or even the free movement of their citizens, the 
necessity to harmonize the respective standards increases, and/or the State must 
provide specific rules on the mutual recognition of these standards. Moreover, any 
mutual recognition rules may lead to reverse discrimination and increased move-
ments to obtain a specific status in another country. The fact that many States prefer 
not to address human rights issues, or even general questions relating to migration 
in economic integration agreements, leads to a certain scarcity of rules relating to the 
movement of persons and their family status. However, future demographic devel-
opments and increased levels of economic integration will certainly increase the 
debate regarding these issues.
4.2. Protection against Homophobia and Non-Discrimination
In the European Union (EU) the issue of LGBT rights and, in particular, the treat-
ment of same-sex couples and (adopted) children, is very much characterized by the 
Branntwein [1979] ECR 649ff. But see also, Article XX GATT and Article XIV GATS in the 
framework of the WTO.
24 Most famously, the instruments elaborated by the Hague Conference on Private International 
Law – operating since 1893. For example, the Convention on Celebration and Recognition of the 
Validity of Marriages (concluded 14 March 1978) Article 5: “The application of a foreign law de-
clared applicable by this Chapter may be refused only if such application is manifestly incompat-
ible with the public policy (“ordre public”) of the State of celebration”. And Article 14: “A Con-
tracting State may refuse to recognise the validity of a marriage where such recognition is mani-
festly incompatible with its public policy (“ordre public”)”.
25 See, for an early explanation: Gerhart Husserl, ‘Public Policy and Ordre Public’ [1938-1939] 
25 Virginia Law Review, 37ff.
26 See, for example, Susanne K. Schmidt, ‘Mutual Recognition as a new mode of governance’ 
[2007] 14:5 Journal of European Public Policy, 667-681.
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general development of the EU’s approach to human rights in general, family law, 
and the free movement of persons27.
For a long time, the absence of a competence for the unification of family rights, 
and a lack of clear references to human rights in the treaties, led to no direct impli-
cation of the EU institutions in the debate. This was the time when the EU was 
mostly perceived as an internal market based on the idea that economic integration 
would eventually allow for more political integration. There was no EU Member 
whom allowed for civil unions or same-sex marriage until 1989, when civil unions 
were introduced in Denmark, and 2001, when the Netherlands opened marriage to 
same-sex couples. The absence of allowances for same-sex civil unions and mar-
riages in any EU Member State caused a delay to the debate. Even today, the situa-
tion regarding same-sex relationships and adoption rights remains strongly hetero-
geneous among EU Member States28.
Article 19.1 (ex Article 13 TEC) on the Functioning of the European Union sets 
out:
1. Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties and within the limits 
of the powers conferred by them upon the Union, the Council, acting unanimously 
in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of 
the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination 
based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orien-
tation [emphasis added].
The protection against discrimination and violence against LGBT persons was 
addressed as early as 1994 in the European Parliament, and continues to be ad-
dressed to the present29. Since 1994, various organs and institutions within the EU 
have made statements in this area. Besides the judgments of the European Court of 
Justice regarding human rights protection within the European Union, the existence 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 (incorporated 
into the treaties in 2009), and the creation of an EU Agency for Human Rights in 
2007, are important steps towards increasing the role of the EU in terms of how it 
protects the human rights of its’ citizens.
27 For an overview consult: Kees Waaldijk and Andrew Clapham (eds.), Homosexuality: A Euro-
pean Community Issue, Essays on Lesbian and Gay Rights in European Law and Policy, (Martinus 
Nijhoff 1993), or Anne Weyembergh and Sinziana Carstocea (eds.), The gays’ and lesbians’ rights 
in an enlarged European Union, (Editions Université de Bruxelles, 2006).
28 For an account of the developments see Katharina Boele-Woelki and Angelika Fuchs (eds.), 
Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples in Europe, (Intersentia 2003); Robert Wintemute and Mads 
Andenas (eds.), The Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships: A Study of National, European 
and International Law, (Hart Publishing 2001); Jürgen Basedow and others (eds.), Die Rechtsstel-
lung gleichgeschlechtlicher Lebensgemeinschaften, (Mohr Siebeck 2000).
29 See European Parliament: Resolution of 8 February 1994 on equal rights for homosexuals 
and lesbians in the EC (A3-0028/94, OJ C 61, 28 February 1994, 40-43); for later developments 
see <http://www.ilga-europe.org/home/guide/eu/lgbt_rights/european_parliament>, accessed 
6 April 2011.
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For example, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) has dedicated an 
important study to the topic of homophobia, and compared the situation in the 
twenty-seven Member States of the EU. The study took place during the first part 
of July 2008, and the second part of March 2009. The first section of the study led 
to a decision by the European Commission, on 2 July 2008, to adopt a new draft 
Resolution regarding non-discrimination. According to the study, the treatment of 
this group still differs tremendously amongst EU Member States. Also, EU law, as it 
currently stands, does not sufficiently address these issues. The FRA requested, in a 
press release of 30 June 2008, clarifications and amendments of existing law relating 
to same-sex relationships with regard to the free movement of persons, and recogni-
tion and family reunification according to international human rights standards.
Today, the focus within the European Union clearly lies with the general question 
of discrimination against LGBT persons. This is evident from the current debate on 
the Proposal for a Council Directive that was launched in 2008, implementing the 
principle of equal treatment between persons, irrespective of religion or belief, dis-
ability, age, or sexual orientation30.
4.3. (Economic) Migration within the EU
The relation of economic migration and economic integration, and how this rela-
tionship affects the rights of LGBT families, is best studied by using the EU as the 
subject of analysis31. Here, the existence of an “internal market”32, and with today’s 
30 COM/2008/0426 final available online at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu>, accessed 6 April 2011.
31 See, for example, Hans Ulrich Jessurun d’Oliveira ‘Lesbians and Gays and the Freedom of 
Movement of Persons’ in: Kees Waaldijk and Andrew Clapham (eds.), Homosexuality: A Euro-
pean Community Issue - Essays on Lesbian and Gay Rights in European Law and Policy, (Marti-
nus Nijhoff 1993) 289-316; Kees Waaldijk, ‘La libre circulation des partenaires de même sexe’ in: 
Daniel Borrillo (ed.), Homosexualités et Droit. De la tolérance sociale à la rteconnaissance ju-
ridique, (2nd edn., Presses Universitaires de France 1999) 210-30; Heather Hunt, ‘Diversity and 
the European Union: Grant v. SWT, the Treaty of Amsterdam, and the Free Movement of Per-
sons’ [1998-1999] 27 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 633ff.; Mark Bell, ‘We are 
Family? Same-Sex Partners and EU Migration Law’ (2002) 9 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 335-55; Andrew Stumer, ‘Homosexual Rights and the Free Movement of Per-
sons in the European Union’ [2002] 7 International Trade and Business Law 205 ff.; Helen 
Toner, ‘Partnership Rights, Free Movement, and EU Law’ (Oxford, 2004); Mark Bell, ‘Holding 
Back the Tide? Cross-Border Recognition of Same-Sex Partners within the European Union’ 
[2004] European Review of Private Law, 613ff.
32 It should be noted that LGBT discrimination, as such, may also affect other aspects of eco-
nomic integration, such as discrimination of workers or discriminatory rules with regard to the 
offering of services and goods, on this see: Mark Graham, ‘LGBT Rights in the European Union: 
a Queer Affair?’, in: Ellen Lewin and William L. Leap (eds.), Out in Public: Reinventing Lesbian/
Gay Anthropology in a Globalizing World (Wiley-Blackwell 2009), ch. 16; Kees Waaldijk and Mat-
teo Bonini Baraldi (eds.), Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the European Union: National 
Laws and the Employment Equality Directive, (TMC Asser Press 2006); for a particular emphasis 
on Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for 
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notion of an “area of freedom, security, and justice”, allows for differences between 
the family laws of individual Member States. The fact that the family laws of States 
can vary quite drastically leads to a situation that is, at least, comparable to that of 
federal States with important residual powers of the States relating to family law, 
such as the United States. Although it may be difficult to completely separate the 
questions of human rights protection and non-discrimination on one side, and eco-
nomic access and treatment guarantees on the other, there is clear evidence that the 
desire to promote migration, particularly for economic reasons, may lead to a need 
for mutual recognition and/or harmonization of the treatment of persons, including 
LGBT and their families33.
Already, the Treaty on European Union provides, in Article 3.2, that “The Union 
shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal fron-
tiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appro-
priate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and 
the prevention and combating of crime”. With regard to the free movement of per-
sons, in its’ current state EU law allows citizens of the European Union to basically 
move freely and reside within the territory of the Member States of the European 
Union. Exceptions based on public interest, such as protection against criminals, 
abuse of social security, or health dangers, are granted on a very restrictive basis; i.e., 
Article 21 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. With regard to 
third-country nationals, Article 79 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union provides a competence to establish measures that affect family reunification; 
i.e., Article 79, paragraph 2(a). Furthermore, according to Article 81.2, “[t]he 
Union shall develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border impli-
cations, based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgements and of decisions 
in extra-judicial cases”. However, according to Paragraph 3 of Article 81.2, “mea-
sures concerning family law with cross-border implications shall be established by 
the Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative procedure”.
The main source of EU law regarding the migration of EU citizens is currently 
Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004, on the right of citizens of the Union and 
their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States34. The Directive was borne through the long process of the creation of the 
equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16, see: Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Gay 
Rights in the EU: A Long Way Forward for the Union of 27’ [2007] 3 Croatian Yearbook of 
European Law and Policy, 469-490.
33 For a comparison, see: Adam Weiss, ‘Federalism and the Gay Family: Free Movement of Same-
Sex Couples in the United States and the European Union’ [2007] 41 Columbia Journal of Law 
and Social Problems, 81ff.
34 On the situation regarding closely associated States like Switzerland, see: Christine Kaddous, 
‘La situation des partenaires de même sexe en droit communautaire et dans le cadre de l’Accord 
sectoriel sur la libre circulation des personnes entre la Suisse et l’Union européenne’ [2001] 1 
Revue suisse de droit international et de droit européen (RSDIE), 143-172.
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“internal market” and the “area of freedom, security, and justice”35, by merging all 
of the important points in the previously existing legislation on the right of entry and 
residence for Union citizens into a single legal instrument.
The Directive governs the European citizen and his or her family members. The 
definition of the family member is the crucial issue when it comes to LGBT families 
– here the existing divergences in regulations (and values) had to be taken into ac-
count36. Therefore the definition of family members in Article 2.2 of the Directive 
reads as follows:
“Family member” means: (a) the spouse; (b) the partner with whom the Union 
citizen has contracted a registered partnership, on the basis of the legislation of a 
Member State, if the legislation of the host Member State treats registered partner-
ships as equivalent to marriage and in accordance with the conditions laid down in 
the relevant legislation of the host Member State; (c) the direct descendants who 
are under the age of 21 or are dependants and those of the spouse or partner as 
defined in point (b); (d) the dependent direct relatives in the ascending line and 
those of the spouse or partner as defined in point (b).
Two particular problems exist with regard to same-sex couples and adopted 
children (of same-sex couples or LGBT persons). Firstly, countries which do not 
(yet) know a form of same-sex marriage or registered partnership, or recognize the 
same in only a very limited form, are not required to recognize the civil status of 
immigrant people that is recognized in their country of former residence, and/or 
extend the same benefits as are related to that civil status37. Secondly, in order to be 
treated as family members, specific documents must be produced. Here, experience 
has shown that the recognition of such documents may cause difficulties. Both as-
pects are ultimately linked to the divergence of private law and related procedural 
law in the Member States. This divergence is technically a typical issue of private 
international law38, and thus ought to be addressed on this level in an attempt to 
35 For the details of this Directive and its relevance for LGBT issues, see: ILGA-Europe, EU 
Directive on Free Movement and Same-Sex Families: Guidelines on the Implementation Process, 
October 2005, available at <http://www.ilga-europe.org>, accessed 6 April 2011.
36 Under the former legislation, the European Court of Justice had found that that the term 
“spouse” only covered married partners. In this case the unmarried, opposite-sex partner of a 
British man working in the Netherlands argued that she was entitled to a residence permit be-
cause she should be treated as his ‘spouse’ (ECR, Case 59/85 Reed v Netherlands [1986] 1283).
37 This problem is widely discussed. With regard to the specific issue of social security see: Simon 
Roberts and Maija Sakslin, ‘Some are more equal than others: the impact of discrimination in 
social security on the right of same-sex partners to free movement in the European Union’ [2009] 
17:3 Benefits, 249-261.
38 See, in this respect, Mateusz Jozef Pilich, ‘The Problem of Recognition of the Same-Sex Rela-
tionships in Poland in the Light of the EU Law and the New Polish Act on Private International 
Law’, electronically available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1779289>, accessed 6 April 2011; Ian 
Curry-Sumner, All’s Well that Ends Registered? The Substantive and Private International Law 
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avoid the fundamental debate on the underlying values39. According to a recent 
green paper of the European Commission, civil status records raise a question of 
quite a different magnitude concerning, not the actual documents themselves, but 
their effects40. Although the European Commission accepts that the EU has no com-
petence to intervene in the substantive family law of Member States, this green pa-
per states that the Commission supports the usefulness of facilitating recognition of 
the effects of civil status records legally established in other EU Member States 
(page 13).
The easiest would be mutual recognition, but of course this is closely related to 
the variety of nationally accepted concepts, and how these concepts constitute the 
definition of a civil status. As a matter of fact, certain NGOs have already warned 
that:
However, the simplistic audit of the issues involved – as conducted by the Commis-
sion in its Green Paper – leads to an even greater issue: that of compelling EU 
Member States to recognize same-sex civil unions (or same-sex adoption) even 
when this goes against their national laws and public morality (and despite the fact 
that Member States are theoretically protected against such coercion by Article 81.3 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). Since family law is a 
competency of each Member State – and not of the EU – the imposition of a rec-
ognition of civil unions and other practices that contradict their domestic public 
morality would constitute a serious infringement of national sovereignty and a vio-
lation of the principle of subsidiarity. This is precisely the danger posed by the idea 
of “automatic mutual recognition” of public documents, as the European Commis-
sion seems to suggest41.
Therefore the Commission suggests:
Aspects of Non-Marital Registered Relationships in Europe, (Intersentia 2005); Dagmar Coester-
Waltjen, ‘Das Anerkennungsprinzip im Dornröschenschlaf?’, in Heinz-Peter. Mansel and others 
(eds.), Festschrift für Erik Jayme, Vol. 1 (Sellier 2004), 120ff; Dagmar Coester-Waltjen’, Anerken-
nung im Internationalen Personen-, Familien - und Erbrecht und das Europäische Kollisionsre-
cht’ [2006] 4 IPRax, 392-393; or Johan Meeusen, ‘The Grunkin and Paul Judgment of the ECJ, 
or How to Strike a Delicate Balance between Conflict of Laws, Union Citizenship and Freedom 
of Movement in the EC’ [2010] 1 ZEuP, 197ff.
39 For a comparative approach in this respect, looking at the United States and Europe, see: Van-
essa Abballe, ‘Comparative Perspectives of the Articulation of Horizontal Interjurisdictional Rela-
tions in the United States and the European Union: The Federalization of Civil Justice’ [2009], 15 
New England Journal of International and Comparative Law 1 or Curry-Sumner, (note 36).
40 See European Commission, Green Paper, Less bureaucracy for citizens: promoting free move-
ment of public documents and recognition of the effects of civil status records, Brussels, 
14.12.2010, COM(2010) 747 final, 1.
41 Statement by “European Dignity Watch” of 25 February 2011, available online at: <http://
www.europeandignitywatch.org/reports/detail/article/tell-the-european-commission-no-forced-
eu-wide-recognition-of-same-sex-marriage.html>, accessed 6 April 2011.
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This recognition would also have the advantage of providing the legal certainty 
which citizens can expect when they exercise their right to freedom of movement 
It can be argued that legal uncertainty and the various problems a citizen could 
encounter in terms of recognition of the legal situation established in the Member 
State the citizen is leaving should not act as a disincentive or constitute an obstacle 
preventing the exercise of European citizens’ rights
In this case, this possibility should, however, be accompanied by a series of com-
pensatory measures to prevent potential fraud and abuse and take due account of 
the public order rules of the Member States Moreover, automatic recognition 
might, where appropriate, be better suited to certain civil status situations such as 
the attribution or change of surnames This might prove to be more complicated in 
other civil status situations such as marriage42.
A related problem regarding the differences in civil status laws between the 
Member States is currently being discussed in the context of a Proposal for a Coun-
cil Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, and the recognition and enforcement 
of decisions regarding the property consequences of registered partnerships43. Here, 
again in the interest of an area of freedom, security and justice, the Commission 
proposes that, “the law of the Member State where the partnership was registered 
will apply to all the partners’ property, even if this law is not the law of a Member 
State” (Recital 18), but adds that, “the courts of the Member States should be al-
lowed to set aside the foreign law in a given case where its application would be 
manifestly incompatible with the public policy of the forum” (Recital 20). Recital 21 
concludes that, “the courts must not be able to invoke overriding mandatory provi-
sions or public policy as exceptions in order to set aside the law of another Member 
State or to refuse to recognise or enforce a decision… where application of such an 
exception would be contrary to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, and in particular Article 21, which prohibits all forms of discrimination. Nor 
may these courts set aside the law applicable to registered partnerships merely on 
the grounds that the public policy of the forum does not recognise registered part-
nerships”. Finally, one should notice that the importance of national “public order” 
considerations within the EU was recently confirmed by the Court in a judgment 
involving differing views among the Member States about titles of nobility44.
As an illustration of the insecurity prevailing in this field – especially with regard 
to public order concerns – it can be noted that on 24 February 2011, the Cour 
d’Appel de Paris (Paris Court of Appeal) has effectively legalized the adoption of 
a child by same-sex couples, through two different decisions; i.e., a joint adoption 
pronounced in Canada, and a joint adoption pronounced in the United Kingdom, 
both cases involving a male couple. These two decisions follow an earlier decision 
42 At page 13.
43 COM(2011) 127/2 presented on 16 March 2011.
44 ECJ, Case C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien, Judgment of the 
Court (Second Chamber) of 22 December 2010.
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of the Court of Cassation on 8 July 2010, which had recognized the validity of the 
adoption by the second parent, partner of the biological mother, pronounced in 
United States45. These decisions are surprising, as the French law on adoption of 
1966 is considered to prohibit the adoption of a child by a same-sex couple, and 
the recognition of foreign adoptions of this kind therefore leads to reverse dis-
crimination46. At the same time, the Paris Court of Appeal has refused to recognize 
surrogate mother contracts, and the registration of the parents recognized by for-
eign law47.
5. Lesser Forms of Economic Integration (FTAs, BITs etc.)
5.1. Introduction
Immigration rights granted to individuals in the context of economic integration 
agreements are less dynamic and complex than the immigration rights found in EU 
law, in that they simply favour the movement of persons in the context of the provi-
sion of services, the facilitation of trade, or the promotion of investment. Examples 
of these types of immigration rights are found in many modern Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs) and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).
Customary international law leaves States with complete freedom regarding the 
admission of foreigners, with the exception of certain humanitarian admissions (e.g. 
refugees). With regard to the admission of foreigners to the domestic labour market, 
most States have instituted important barriers to protect the domestic work force 
from competition. In times of economic growth, this can lead to shortages with re-
gard to certain types of (skilled) workers48.
Regionally, a certain integration of labour markets has been achieved by a num-
ber of countries49. Apart from very specific agreements regarding certain quotas in 
45 Arrêt n° 791 du 8 juillet 2010 (08-21.740) - Cour de cassation - Première chambre civile: “…
Attendu que le refus d’exequatur fondé sur la contrariété à l’ordre public international français 
de la décision étrangère suppose que celle-ci comporte des dispositions qui heurtent des principes 
essentiels du droit français; qu’il n’en est pas ainsi de la décision qui partage l’autorité parentale 
entre la mère et l’adoptante d’un enfant…”.
46 See also Stefania Ninatti, “Adjusting Differences and Accommodating Competences: Family 
Matters in the European Union” (Jean Monnet Working Paper no. 6/10), available online at 
<http://centers.law.nyu.edu/ jeanmonnet/papers/10/100601.html>, accessed 6 April 2011.
47 See Arrêts n° 369 (09-66.486), 370 (10-19.053) et 371 du 6 avril 2011 (09-17.130).
48 See Asif Qureshi and Andreas R. Ziegler, International Economic Law, (2nd edn. Sweet and 
Maxwell 2007), Para. 15-002.
49 See, for example, Aderanti Adepoju, ‘Fostering free movement of persons in West Africa’ 
[2002] 40 International Migration, 3-28; or Christopher J. Cassise, ‘The European Union v. the 
United States under the NAFTA: A Comparative Analysis of the Free Movement of Persons 
within the Regions’ [1995-1996] 46 Syracuse Law Review, 1343ff.
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specified professions50, these agreements, generally speaking, do not go very far. The 
reason for this stems from the general fears associated to opening labour markets, 
such as the threat this brings to the job security of the domestic population, as well 
as general concerns regarding cultural changes that increased immigration may 
bring. The discussions above have highlighted the most famous examples of how the 
European Union has managed the specific problems that have arisen in regards to 
differing recognitions of civil status amongst Member States.
5.2. WTO-GATS
In the context of the multilateral trading system, the issue of migration was first dis-
cussed within the context of the integration of services into the WTO. The provisions 
dealing specifically with trade in goods of the GATT of 1947, and later agreements, 
never included any rules relating to the trans-border movement of persons. While a 
comprehensive regulation of migratory flows is obviously politically impossible, the 
concept of service supply through the temporary presence of foreign workers on the 
territory of another Member State leads to the need to address the issue. Mode 4 of 
the GATS defines supply of a service, “as by a service supplier of one Member, 
through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other Mem-
ber” (Article I:2(d) GATS). A specific Annex51 makes clear that this particular aspect 
of the trade in services is intended to be of limited scope, especially limiting the ac-
cess to a market of temporary presence. It does not concern persons seeking access 
to the employment market in the host Member, nor does it affect measures regarding 
citizenship, residence, or employment on a permanent basis.
As it is for all services-commitments under the WTO, any opening for the pres-
ence of natural persons is subject to an explicit opening of the respective sector 
through commitments in the respective national schedule. In most instances, Mem-
bers have scheduled an initial “unbound” commitment; i.e., no binding of access 
conditions, and then qualified it by granting admission to selected categories of 
persons, with a marked bias towards persons linked to a commercial presence (e.g., 
intra-corporate transferees), and highly skilled persons (e.g., managers, executives, 
and specialists).
States are normally under an obligation to grant most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
treatment. They can, however, lodge specific exceptions, especially for regional in-
tegration arrangements, such as the EU. In addition, States can grant national treat-
ment (NT) when they grant specific market access commitments, but are not 
obliged to do so. The issues of civil status and sexual orientation are obviously not 
addressed in these provisions. However, when a WTO Member does not provide 
50 See, for example, the ‘Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Philippines and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE)’ on 11 April 11 2007; or the Japan-Philippines Economic Partner-
ship Agreement (JPEPA), including an important part on the movement of labour (Filipino 
nurses and other care-givers working in Japan’s welfare institutions), signed on 9 September 2006.
51 Annex on Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services Under the Agreement.
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for specific exceptions from the MFN status, and does grant NT in a specific sector, 
one could claim that he has to treat the natural persons providing a service in a 
specific sector in a non-discriminatory way, with regard to its own nationals and 
foreigners providing such services. One can interpret this as including the obligation 
to allow the entry of service providers without discrimination relating to their sexu-
al orientation or civil status, although for the time being the GATS does not provide 
for any rights of a service provider to bring along his or her family members.
The GATS further allows WTO Members to apply measures that are necessary 
to, inter alia, protect public morals or maintain public order as well as to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health (Article XIV). One cannot dismiss the possibil-
ity that such an exception may be invoked to exclude persons due to their sexual 
orientation, although this has not been reported so far, and it could be argued that 
such an exclusion should not be considered necessary or non-discriminatory, in view 
of the presence of a domestic LGBT population.
5.3. Mercosur
Probably among the regional integrations schemes that exist today world-wide, the 
Mercosur is the second most comprehensive (leaving aside the attempts in Africa to 
simulate the European Union). The founding Treaty dates from 1991, and a number 
of consecutive treaties have led to a continuous deepening of the “Common Market 
of the South”52. In this context, the four current full Members of Mercosur (Argen-
tina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay)53, as well as the associated Members (Bolivia 
and Chile), established, in 2002, an Area of Free Residence with the Right to Work 
(Área de Libre Residencia con derecho a trabajar). It is meant to allow all nationals of 
the countries involved to take up work in any other Member State. The only require-
ments with respect to this Area of Free Residence and the Right to Work are the 
proof of nationality, and the absence of a criminal record. A health certificate may 
be requested. The legal basis is found in the respective Agreement signed in Brasil-
ia on 6 December 2002 (Articles 1 and 4)54. All citizens of the Members of this area 
are initially entitled to a simplified residence permit procedure for a stay of up to 
two years (Article 4). This simplified residence permit is also available to naturalized 
persons five years after they obtain citizenship. Furthermore, the temporary resi-
dence permit can be exchanged for permanent residency upon proving sufficient 
means to support the petitioner and his family (Article 5). The permit gives a right 
to take up employment and be self-employed under the same conditions as nationals 
(Article 8). This is a major achievement with respect to the integration of labour 
markets, although it does not yet go as far as the free movement of persons within 
52 Treaty of Asunción of 26 March 1991.
53 Venezuela’s full accession (as signed in 2006) is still pending – due to the missing ratification 
by Paraguay – at the writing of this Chapter.
54 Spanish: Acuerdo sobre Residencia para Nacionales de los Estados Parte del Mercosur, Bolivia 
y Chile firmado el 6 de diciembre de 2002 / Portuguese.
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the European Union, which is an ultimate goal of the parties (found in the Preamble 
of the Agreement). At a summit in June 2008, the Members confirmed their willing-
ness to facilitate border crosses among the Members, as well as Columbia, Ecuador 
and Peru – very much like the original Schengen system in Europe.
Family reunification (even with non-nationals of a Mercosur Member State) is 
expressly provided for as a human rights component of the agreement (Article 9:2). 
Furthermore, the agreement expressly guarantees access to schools for a migrant’s 
children (Article 9:6). The Treaty speaks of the “Grupo familiar convivente/grupo 
familiar de convívio” (Article 5, Sub-paragraph d) and of the “familia” (Article 9) of 
a petitioner.
In Argentina, marriage and adoption has been open to same-sex couples since 22 
July 2010. Civil unions were recognized in four jurisdictions of Argentina, for the 
first time in Buenos Aires as of 2002. On 1 January 2008, Uruguay had become the 
first Latin American State to have a national civil union law (Ley de Unión Concubi-
naria). In September 2009, homosexual civil unions were given the right to adopt 
children in Uruguay, and finally, on 5 April 2011, the Uruguayan Parliament started 
the debate about following Argentina’s example by introducing a law legalizing 
same-sex marriage. In Brazil, adoption by same-sex couples – as practised since 
2005 – is legal according to a Supreme Federal Court decision of 27 October 2010, 
but no civil union or right to marriage exists so far for same-sex couples in Brazil55, 
as is the case in Chile, Bolivia, and Paraguay. The recognition of marriage and civil 
unions, as well as adoption by gay couples, thus varies widely amongst the Members 
of this economic integration area.
Article 2 of the Treaty of Asunción, provides that “[t]he common market shall 
be based on reciprocity of rights and obligations between the States Parties”56. Ac-
cording to Susana Vieas, a professor at the University of Brasilia, this should lead the 
authorities in the Member States of Mercosur to recognize marriage certificates (as 
well as adoption certificates) by other Mercosur Members57. This seems a rather 
55 On 5 May 2011 the Brazilian Constitutional Court has decided, unanimously, that same-sex 
couples, who live in a union that is continuous, public, and lasting, legally qualify as a family unit, 
in the same way as a different-sex couple living in the same kind of union qualify under Article 
1273 of the Brazilian Civil Code (2002). It remains to be seen whether this will also be used with 
regard to Mercosur residents applying for residence and work permits under the Mercosur sys-
tem.
56 Spanish: “El Mercado Común estará fundado en la reciprocidad de derechos e obligaciones 
entre les Estados Partes” / Portuguese: “O Mercado Comum estará fundado na reciprocidade de 
direitos e obrigações entre os Estados Partes”.
57 “Para um documento internacional ter validade no Brasil, é preciso que ele esteja dentro de 
parâmetros brasileiros, o que não ocorre com as uniões homoafetiva… De início pode haver 
problemas em situações onde a certidão de casamento é um documento obrigatório, como para 
solicitar residência permanente ou para viajar com crianças, mas com o tempo as autoridades 
brasileiras devem se adaptar e a situação se normalizar”, Interview reported on 27 July 2010 on-
line at <http://www.portalg.com.br/mostra_ultimas.php?id=461>, accessed 6 April 2011.
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daring interpretation of a standard clause in an international agreement that does 
not directly refer to the recognition of civil status documents in the Member States 
– especially when one remembers the complicated situation in the European Union 
as described above. In particular, it should be noted that the Mercosur Agreement 
in its Article 8 refers to any prior commitment made in the context of the Latin 
American Integration Association (ALADI). Article 50 Letter a of the Treaty Estab-
lishing the Latin American Integration Association (Treaty of Montevideo of 12 
August 1980) provides in its Article 50 explicitly that Member States may take mea-
sures that violate the agreement if these are taken in order to safeguard the public 
order58.
At least in Brazil, the report on same-sex marriage by the Federal Supreme 
Court, expected for April 2011, may make the mutual recognition easier. It should 
also be noted that there is more common ground between Mercosur countries when 
it comes to the issues of homophobia, and violence and discrimination against LG-
BT persons. Various working groups and conferences, established by the Mercosur 
Members, have addressed these issues and have called upon the Members to take 
appropriate action59.
5.4. BITs and FTAs
Some countries have also entered trade-related obligations with respect to certain 
types of temporary entry of foreigners, especially business visitors, in their bilateral 
agreements. These obligations are normally found in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
and/or Bilateral Investment Agreements (BITs), although today they are often lo-
cated in other documents in view of political goals, such as Association Agreements 
of Economic Partnership Agreements in the case of the EU.
Typical examples of migration-related rules contained in such agreements are the 
obligations entered into by NAFTA States, or by the members of other agreements 
modelled after NAFTA (e.g. the bilateral Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement 
CCFTA)60. Chapter Sixteen of NAFTA provides for temporary entry for business 
persons. According to Article 1601, these rules are based on the “desirability of fa-
cilitating temporary entry on a reciprocal basis and of establishing transparent crite-
ria and procedures for temporary entry, and the need to ensure border security and 
58 “Artículo 50: Ninguna disposición del presente Tratado será interpretada como impedimento 
para la adopción y el cumplimiento de medidas destinadas a la: a) Protección de la moralidad 
pública…” This coresponds of course to the system found in Article XX of the GATT.
59 See Ryan Richard Thoreson, ‘Queering Human Rights: The Yogyakarta Principles and the 
Norm That Dare Not Speak Its Name’ [2009] 8:4 Journal of Human Rights 323-339; David Brown, 
‘Making Room for Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in International Human Rights Law: 
An Introduction to the Yogyakarta Principles’ [2010] 31 Michigan Journal of International Law, 
276ff.; Pinar Ilkkaracan and Susie Jolly, Gender and Sexuality: Overview Report (2007), available 
at: www.bridge.ids.ac.uk/reports/CEP-Sexuality-OR.pdf (last visited on 6 April 2011).
60 See also Cassise (note 49).
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to protect the domestic labour force and permanent employment in their respective 
territories”. Under Article 1603, “[e]ach Party shall grant temporary entry to busi-
ness persons who are otherwise qualified for entry under applicable measures relat-
ing to public health and safety and national security…”.
With regard to business persons from Mexico, NAFTA originally limited the 
number of permits to 5500, and declared not to take into account, “the entry of a 
spouse or children accompanying or following to join the principal business per-
son”. This avoids the discussion on the term spouse, although in view of the current 
legislation in the United States it seems clear that this cannot be easily interpreted 
as covering same-sex partners. Some authors have tried to argue that at least a cross-
cultural influence; i.e., Canadian openness to same-sex marriage, may influence the 
United States, however this is certainly not due to the current legal rules on migra-
tion under NAFTA.
Similar provisions can be found in many bilateral investment treaties (BIT) of 
combined trade and investment agreements, where the temporary presence of inves-
tors and so-called ‘key personnel’ is a very common feature. A typical example would 
be the following provision from the BIT between Australia and Argentina of 199761:
Article 6 Entry and sojourn of personnel: 1. A Contracting Party shall, subject to 
its laws and regulations relating to the entry and sojourn of non-citizens, permit 
natural persons who are investors of the other Contracting Party and personnel 
employed by companies or legal persons of that other Contracting Party to enter 
and remain in its territory for the purpose of engaging in activities connected with 
investments. 2. A Contracting Party shall, subject to its laws and regulations, permit 
investors of the other Contracting Party who have made investments in the territory 
of the first Contracting Party to employ within its territory key technical and mana-
gerial personnel of their choice regardless of citizenship.
Here again, it is evident that it is not yet common to find any provisions to allow 
for the temporary immigration of family members of the key personnel. An interest-
ing exception can be found in certain newer agreements, like the FTA concluded 
between the EFTA States and Singapore in 200262:
Article 45:3. The Parties are encouraged to grant, subject to their laws and regu-
lations, temporary entry and stay to the spouse and minor children of an investor of 
another Party or of key personnel employed by such investors, who has been grant-
ed temporary entry, stay and authorization to work.
Again, neither the term “spouse”, nor the term “child”, of the investor or key 
personnel is defined. As the whole provision is merely hortatory, and additionally 
subjects the granting of permits to domestic laws and regulations, it does not go very 
far and remains of rather symbolic value.
61 Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Argentine Re-
public on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, and Protocol (Canberra, 23 August 
1995), Entry into force: 11 January 1997.
62 Agreement between the EFTA States and Singapore of 26 June 2002.
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6. Conclusion
This paper gives an overview of existing international instruments that address this 
field, and focuses on the new questions relating to the recognition of civil status 
rights granted to LGBT individuals and couples in other States. This paper also 
considers the question of how common institutions address these differences 
amongst States, and whether modern economic integration agreements can prop-
erly deal with these issues.
The above analysis shows that, normally, traditional agreements for the liberaliza-
tion of trade and investment; i.e., FTAs, BITs, or combinations thereof, do not in-
clude provisions allowing for extended or permanent movement of persons leading 
to a right of family reunification. This can be explained by the traditional caution to 
include migration and human rights aspects in these types of agreements. Therefore, 
the right of a person to be considered as “key personnel” in a BIT, will normally not 
allow him or her to take a spouse or children along and hence no rights can be de-
rived for civil partnerships and adopted children of same-sex couples.
At the same time, the above analysis shows that any agreement that attempts to 
achieve a common or internal market will most likely have to address these ques-
tions. If the internal market concept is designed to allow for longer or permanent 
residence of foreign workers and self-employed individuals, then it must address the 
issue of family reunification. In these circumstances, the existence of differing regu-
lations regarding the civil status of persons – and hence the definition of what con-
stitutes a family – will cause obstacles to the realization of the basic integration goal. 
The developments in the European Union (as well as its’ closely associated partner 
States such as Switzerland) and Mercosur, are typical examples. While the parties to 
agreements may not endeavour to harmonize their respective legislations, the politi-
cal pressure to either mutually recognize or have similar, if not identical standards, 
does normally increase.
muTual reCogniTion of same-sex marriages 
from an eu immigraTion law perspeCTive
Türkan Ertuna Lagrand
Abstract
The aim of this article is two-fold. Firstly, to explore the situation of same-sex married cou-
ples within European Union (EU) immigration rules; and secondly, to propose a way for-
ward for the development of European family law in order to ensure more equality for 
same-sex spouses, specifically in the area of immigration. For this purpose, the article begins 
with a section illuminating the relationship between the concept of family and immigration 
law. This section clarifies the relevance of scrutinizing the situation of same-sex spouses from 
an immigration law perspective. Then, this article focuses on the family reunification and 
European Union legislation on long-term residents1. The negative repercussions of the EU 
not taking enough notice of the issue of same-sex couples are investigated from an immigra-
tion law point of view. In this context, the extent to which immigration rights of same-sex 
spouses are hindered is considered. After having laid down the immigration-related prob-
lems which same-sex married couples face under the EU immigration legislation, and before 
making suggestions as to the recognition of same-sex marriages, the article describes the 
current state at the European level of the rights of same-sex couples to a family. This section 
will serve as the basis for the following section on mutual recognition of same-sex marriages 
as it will put this debate in a context. Finally, the article proposes a solution which entails the 
utilization of the principle of mutual recognition in family law issues within EU law. This 
section corresponds to the second aim of the article as indicated above. Recognizing that, 
even at national level, developments in family law have always occurred in numerous phases, 
the proposed solution represents a first step approach. Mutual recognition in family law 
matters therefore corresponds to the first step in achieving a regime where immigration 
rights and right to family life is not only safeguarded for heterosexual couples.
* * *
1. Immigration Law and the Family
Sooner or later every immigration lawyer arrives at a point where he/she has to ex-
plore the uncharted waters of family law. This exploration is always a challenging 
1 The ideas presented under the titles ‘family reunification’ and ‘long-term residents’ have previ-
ously been discussed in Türkan Ertuna Lagrand, Immigration Law and Policy: the EU Acquis and 
Its Impact on the Turkish Legal Order (Wolf Legal Publishers 2010).
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one as the textures of these two areas of law are as different as are their tools. The 
challenge becomes bigger when the subject matter is taken on at the European level 
due to the fact that the level of harmonization in immigration law and family law is 
not identical, to put it mildly. However, as challenging as it may be, in order to an-
swer the most basic question of ‘who can migrate’ in terms of EU law, family law 
needs to be investigated.
Due to rules on free movement, people and their families move from one EU 
Member State to the other. Indeed, the first time ‘family’ was defined under EU law 
was in Regulation 1612/682 that aimed at promoting and facilitating the ‘mobility of 
migrant workers which necessitated extending the right of residence and other valu-
able social rights to members of their family who would be accompanying them’3. 
Since the adoption of Regulation 1612/68, the scope of the ‘family’ concept has been 
the subject of alterations. Nevertheless, one category has always stayed the same, as 
the least controversial family member when it comes to immigration: the spouse. 
Obviously, when it comes to ‘who shall be given access to family reunification and 
who shall be able to make use of free movement rules within the EU’ at first sight 
no one seems to have objections that it should primarily be the ‘spouse’.
It is precisely at this point of ‘complete’ consensus where we witness how the 
‘absence of harmonized family law creates an obstacle to the free movement of per-
sons and the creation of a truly European identity and an integrated European legal 
space’4. The question as to what extent same-sex couples who have been married in 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Sweden or Portugal – the EU Member States cur-
rently recognizing same-sex marriage5 make use of free movement rules, very 
closely relates to the extent to which the EU actually is the area of justice, freedom 
and security that it claims to be.
Waaldijk explains that discrimination in the field of migration towards same-sex 
couples may take place in at least four categories: ‘1) to married (opposite-sex) 
spouses than to unmarried partners; 2) to married opposite-sex spouses than to 
registered same-sex partners; 3) to married opposite-sex spouses than to married 
same-sex spouses; 4) to unmarried opposite-sex partners than to unmarried same-
sex partners’6. Among all these possible levels in which same-sex couples are being 
discriminated within immigration rules, in this article emphasis is placed on the 3rd 
2 Regulation 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers 
within the Community, [1968] OJ L257/2, art 10.
3 Helen Stalford, ‘Concepts of Family Under EU Law - Lessons from the ECHR’ (2002)16 Inter-
national Journal of Law, Policy and the Family410-434.
4 Katharina Boele-Woelki, ‘The Principles of European Family Law: Its Aims and Prospects’ 
(2005) 1Utrecht Law Review160-168.
5 In addition to these Member States in which same-sex marriage is recognized, the list of Member 
States recognizing same-sex registered partnerships is as follows: Austria, Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovenia, the United Kingdom.
6 Kees Waaldijk, ‘After Amsterdam: Sexual Orientation and the European Union’, Guide pub-
lished by ILGA-Europe (September 1999).
243MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGES FROM AN EU LAW PERSPECTIVE
kind. Hence, the instances are examined where rights normally accorded to married 
couples under immigration laws are not extended to same-sex married couples. The 
reason is, as mentioned above, that throughout the development of European im-
migration law the position of the ‘spouse’ in having right to migrate as a family 
member has never been contested7.
2. Family Reunification
The existence of a right to family reunification for foreigners was, for a long time, 
not accepted under international law8. Even though, most European countries have 
acknowledged, in their national laws, the right to family reunification for third coun-
try nationals, this consensus was not reflected in international instruments9. The 
right to respect for family life which is covered by Article 8 of the ECHR does not 
go as far as to recognize the right to family reunification. In family reunification 
matters, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has traditionally taken the 
principle of state sovereignty as a starting point and has applied a wide margin of 
appreciation10. The European Union has adopted a similar view when it first em-
barked upon family reunification in 1993 with the adoption of the Resolution on the 
harmonization of national policies on family reunification11.
The groundbreaking step came from the Commission in 1999, as the Proposal 
for a Council Directive on the Right to Family Reunification12 defined family reuni-
fication as a right. Even though the Proposal was amended twice until the Council 
Directive on the Right to Family Reunification13 was adopted in 2003, Article 1 still 
stated that the purpose of the Directive is to determine the conditions for the exer-
cise of the ‘right’ to family reunification by third-country nationals residing lawfully 
in the territory of Member States. Nevertheless, the conditions of exercising family 
reunification, such as the ones explained below, create confusion as to whether the 
EU truly considers family reunification as a right. The discussion below principally 
7 I would hereby like to stress that this article does not intend to hamper the assertions for more 
rights for unmarried partners in general.
8 Kay Hailbronner, Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy of the European Union (Kluwer Law 
International 2000) 279.
9 Ryszard Cholewinski, ‘Family Reunification as a Constitutional Right?’ in Joanna Apap (ed.), 
Justice and Home Affairs in the EU: Liberty and Security Issues after Enlargement (Edward Elgar 
Publishing 2004) 260.
10 Sarah van Walsum, ‘Comment on the Sen Case. How Wide is the Margin of Appreciation Re-
garding the Admission of Children for Purposes of Family Reunification?’(2003) 4 European 
Journal of Migration and Law 511-520; Kees Groenendijk, ‘Family Reunification as a Right under 
Community Law’(2006) 8 European Journal of Migration and Law 215-230.
11 Document SN 282/1/93 WGI 1497 REV 1.
12 COM (1999) 638 final.
13 Council Directive 2003/86 of 22 September 2003 [2003] OJ L251/12.
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deals with Directive 2003/86. Where relevant, information is also provided concern-
ing Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members 
to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States14.
A much debated aspect of Directive 2003/86 involves the question of with whom 
the sponsor15 can be ‘reunified’, or, in other words, who are considered to be ‘fam-
ily’. The lack of a European definition of the ‘family’16 results in the adoption of a 
narrow scope for the concept by the Directive. The ‘spouse’ is the first category of 
family members that can be reunified with the sponsor17. The ‘spouse’ is also listed 
as the first category of family members in Directive 2004/38 who will reside and 
move freely within the Member States together with the Union citizen18.
The original Proposal for a family reunification directive and the first amended 
version of this Proposal did not differentiate between the spouse and unmarried part-
ner with whom the immigrant has a durable relationship provided that the relevant 
Member State treated unmarried couples as corresponding to married couples19. The 
regimes applying to married and unmarried partners have been separated in the third 
Proposal and it was made optional for Member States to admit unmarried partners20. 
According to the Directive, the Member States may authorize family reunification with 
the unmarried partner of the sponsor if the sponsor is in a duly attested stable long-
term relationship with him/her21. Any reliable means of proof shall be examined by the 
Member States in determining family relationship such as a common child, previous 
cohabitation and registration of the partnership22. The optional character of whether 
or not to allow reunification also applies in situations where the sponsor has a regis-
tered partnership with the person who applies to join him/her in the Member State23.
The fact that allowing for the entry and residence of unmarried partners is not 
obligatory for Member States has negative repercussions for same-sex couples. Hav-
14 Council Directive 2004/38 of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their fam-
ily members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, [2004] OJ 
L158/77.
15 The ‘sponsor’ is a concept which replaced the ‘applicant’ in the earlier versions of Directive 
2003/86 as proposed by the Commission. The preferred wording suggests economic and financial 
implications. See Joanna Apap and Sergio Carrera, ‘Towards a Proactive Immigration Policy for 
the EU?’, CEPS Working Document no198 (December 2003) 8.
16 Gisbert Brinkmann, ‘Family Reunion, Third Country Nationals and the Community’s New 
Powers’ in Elspeth Guild and Carol Harlow (eds.), Implementing Amsterdam: Immigration and 
Asylum Rights in EC Law (Hart Publishing 2001) 242.
17 Directive 2003/86, art 4(1)(a).
18 Directive 2004/38, art 2(2)(a).
19 Art 5(1)(a) of COM(1999) 638 final of 01.12.1999 and COM(2000) 624 final of 10.10.2000.
20 Art 4(3) of COM(2002)225 final of 02.05.2002 and Council Directive 2003/86.
21 Directive 2003/86, art 4(3)(1).
22 Directive 2003/86, art 5(2)(3).
23 Directive 2003/86, art 4(3)(2).
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ing said that, in the case of same-sex couples even a marriage tie does not guarantee 
family reunification24. There is no clarification as to whether same-sex spouses can 
also enjoy the right to family reunification. The same situation reoccurs concerning 
EU nationals in Directive 2004/38. Despite two years of negotiations on whether or 
not to include same-sex spouses within the definition of ‘family’ the question has 
also been overlooked in Directive 2004/3825. Ironically, this issue represents one of 
the few similarities concerning the approach towards family members of EU citizens 
and third-country nationals.
In any event, as confirmed by the Commission, the EU does not recognize that 
same-sex spouses have the same rights as ‘traditional’ spouses for the purposes of Com-
munity law26, as a result of which the Directive on family reunification does not see it 
necessary to clarify the situation of same-sex spouses in relation to family reunification 
demands with Member States which allow same sex marriages. Even if the granting of 
family reunification rights to same-sex spouses would proceed without problems in the 
Member States which do recognize same-sex marriages, the silence of the Community 
law on the issue27 creates immense problems for such couples when they would like to 
move to a Member State which does not recognize same-sex marriages or any form of 
recognition of same-sex couples for that matter28. The issue of same-sex marriages is 
simply being ignored by the EU concerning their immigration rights.
3. Long-Term Residents
For a long time, the residence rights of third-country nationals legally residing in the 
territory of Member States only had Community relevance as long as they had some 
type of connection to an EU citizen29. Otherwise it was the national law that regu-
24 It must be clarified that this same problem also exists for EU nationals due to the provision of art 
2(2)(b) of Directive 2004/38 of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, [2004] OJ L158/77.
25 Art 2(2) of the mentioned Directive defining a ‘family member’ lists ‘the spouse’ as the first 
group of family members, however does not mention whether this will include the same sex 
spouse. See Helen Toner, ‘Immigration Rights of Same-Sex Couples in EC Law’ in Katharina 
Boele-Woelki and Angelika Fuchs (eds.), Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Couples in Europe (In-
tersentia 2002) 178-193.
26 Communication from the Commission on free movement of workers - achieving the full ben-
efits and potential, COM(2002)694 final, 8.
27 Council Regulation 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation 
1347/2000, [2003] OJ L338/1, deals with mutual recognition of divorces but not of marriages.
28 See Mark Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (Oxford University Press 
2002) 88-120.
29 Kees Groenendijk, ‘Security of Residence and Access to Free Movement for Settled Third 
Country Nationals under Community Law’ in Elspeth Guild and Carol Harlow (eds.), Implement-
ing Amsterdam: Immigration and Asylum Rights in EC Law (Hart Publishing 2001) 228.
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lated the residence rights of third-country nationals. With respect to their rights, an 
important aspect is to grant special treatment for those who have resided legally in 
the territory of a state longer than a certain period.
This situation of rights of third-country nationals legally resident within the EU 
being left to the competence of Member States has changed following the adoption 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam. It is with the Treaty of Amsterdam that the Commu-
nity acquired competence in regulating the rights and conditions under which na-
tionals of third countries who are legally resident in a Member State may reside in 
other Member States30. The call of the Tampere European Council – to grant third-
country nationals holding a long-term residence permit a uniform set of rights which 
are as near as possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens31 – found its response in the 
Proposal for a Directive on the status of long-term residents of 200132.
The Directive on long-term residents33 adopted in 2003 as the watered down 
version of the original Proposal, regulates the terms for granting and withdrawing 
long-term residence status and the rights it entails in the Member State which 
granted the status and the terms of residence in Member States other than the one 
which granted the long-term resident status (the ‘second Member State’)34.
The highlight of Directive 2003/109 is without hesitation the fact that it intro-
duces certain rights which shall be enjoyed by the long-term resident in the ‘second 
Member State’35. The second Member State is described by the Directive as ‘any 
Member State other than the one which for the first time granted long-term resident 
status to a third-country national and which that long-term resident exercises the 
right of residence’36.
Before the Directive, third-country nationals holding a long-term residence per-
mit did not have the possibility to move to a second Member State as a right ensured 
by EU law. Consequently, if they wished to settle in another Member State they were 
not subject to any privileged treatment and had to go through all the formalities 
imposed on first time immigrants37. Directive 2003/109 grants the right of residence 
in another Member State to long-term residents under certain conditions38. Those 
30 EC Treaty ex art 63(4).
31 Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council of 15-16 October 1999, Section III, 
point 21.
32 Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the status of third country nationals who are long 
term residents, COM(2001) 127 final, 13.03.2001.
33 Council Directive 2003/109 of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country na-
tionals who are long-term residents, [2004] OJ L16/44.
34 Directive 2003/109, art 1.
35 As opposed to the first Member State ‘which for the first time granted long term resident status 
to a third-country national’. See Directive 2003/109, art 2(c).
36 Directive 2003/109, art 2(d).
37 Explanatory Memorandum of the Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the status of 
third country nationals who are long term residents, COM(2001)127 final, Section 5(7).
38 It must, however, be said that whereas the title of the relevant chapter in the Proposal referred 
247MUTUAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGES FROM AN EU LAW PERSPECTIVE
long-term residents who fulfill the conditions laid down in the Directive may reside 
in a second Member State for a period longer than three months in order to exercise 
an economic activity in an employed or self employed capacity; to pursue studies or 
vocational training; or for any other purpose39.
Provided that the family was already formed in the first Member State the fam-
ily members have the possibility to accompany the long-term resident to the second 
Member State. It is exactly at this point where a lacuna exists concerning the same-
sex spouse. A distinction is made between two different categories of family mem-
bers. The Directive secures the right to accompany the long-term resident for those 
‘family members’ who fulfill the conditions laid down in Article 4(1) of Directive 
2003/86 on family reunification40. Member States have no discretion concerning 
whether to accept such family members into their territory to reside with the long-
term resident. For ‘family members’ other than those referred to in Article 4(1) of 
Directive 2003/86, Member States maintain the capacity to decide whether to au-
thorize their accompanying the long term resident41. According to this categoriza-
tion, the ‘spouse’ should be allowed to accompany the long-term resident with no 
discretion permitted to the second Member State. This is because the ‘spouse’ is the 
first family member listed in Article 4(1) of Directive 2003/86.
However, the issue of family members accompanying the long-term resident 
takes another turn when it comes to same-sex couples. If the long-term resident has 
married a third-country national from the same-sex in the first Member State which 
recognizes same-sex marriage or if such a Member State has authorized the family 
reunification of a same-sex married couple and the very couple decide to move to a 
second Member State which does not recognize same-sex marriage, the issue of 
whether the second Member State will allow the same-sex spouse to accompany the 
long-term resident arises. The Community legal regime does not contain any safe-
guard as to making sure same-sex spouses enjoy the same immigration rights within 
the Union as opposite-sex spouses, while it is the same legal regime which grants the 
‘spouse’ the right to accompany the long-term resident to the second Member State 
to a ‘right of residence in the other Member States’ the reference to a right of residence was omit-
ted in the final version of the Directive. See Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the status 
of third country nationals who are long term residents, COM(2001)127 final, Chapter III.
39 Directive 2003/109, art 14(2). Nevertheless, concerning long term residents who wish to reside 
in a second Member State to exercise an economic activity, the Directive identifies some restric-
tive measures Member States can take. It follows that Member States are allowed to take the situ-
ation of their labor market and their labor market policies into consideration and consequently 
give preference to other groups of persons or apply their national procedures regarding require-
ments for exercising economic activity on an employed or self employed basis. See Directive 
2003/109, art 14(3). Additionally, according to art 14(4) Member States may continue to limit the 
total number of persons entitled to be granted right of residence as long as these limitations were 
already present in national legislation at the time of the adoption of the Directive.
40 Directive 2003/109, art 16(1).
41 Directive 2003/109, art 16(2).
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without conferring any discretion to this second Member State on whether or not to 
allow the spouse to reside in its territory by relying on Directive 2003/109.
4. Right of Same-Sex Couples to a Family
It would be possible for Member States which do recognize forms of same-sex reg-
istered partnership to allow the same-sex spouse by treating them as registered 
partners. But apart from the fact that this would be a solution which is limited to 
those Member States recognizing same-sex registered partnerships only, it is not re-
ally a solution which can wholeheartedly be embraced at this day and age and espe-
cially within the European Union, the self-proclaimed Area of Justice, Security and 
Freedom. If the Community right of family reunification cannot be secured for 
same-sex spouses, can we talk about their right to family under European Law?
Ever since the European Parliament took on the issue of equal rights for lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, trans and intersex(LGBTI) persons in the Resolution on equal rights 
for homosexuals and lesbians in the EC42, a lot has been achieved at the European 
level in fighting discrimination based on sexual orientation. These developments led 
eventually to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union that prohib-
its any discrimination based on sexual orientation43. However, when it comes to 
prohibition of sexual orientation discrimination in general, and rights of same-sex 
couples in specific, the first place to look in order to follow the full-range of develop-
ments in this area in Europe is the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). Even though the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does 
not specifically mention the prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation 
like the Charter does, the Court has been much more influential in this area, as well 
as in the family law arena44, compared to the organs of the European Union.
It is as important as much as it is relevant to study the case law of the ECtHR in 
order to draw conclusions as to the state of prohibition of discrimination on grounds 
of sexual orientation in Europe. Apart from the EU accession to the European Con-
vention of Human Rights and the fact that all EU Member States are signatories to 
the ECHR, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has referred on various occasions to 
the ECHR provisions, especially to Article 8, as a frame of reference in a number of 
cases before it in enhancing the status of family members under Community law45.
42 [1994] OJ C61/40.
43 Art 21(1).
44 Jens M. Scherpe, ‘Families in Europe - European Family Law?’, A discussion paper for the 
conference The Treaty of Rome (A Golden Anniversary - 50 Years On?), British Centre for Eng-
lish Legal Studies, Warsaw University March 9/10 <http://www.cels.law.cam.ac.uk/events/
Scherpe.pdf> accessed 24 May 2011.
45 Helen Stalford, ‘Concepts of Family Under EU Law - Lessons from the ECHR’(2002) 16 In-
ternational Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 410-434.
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As mentioned above, even though discrimination based on sexual orientation is 
not explicitly included within the scope of Article 14 of the ECHR on prohibition 
of discrimination, the ECtHR has held that discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion is covered by Article 14 and is not acceptable46. As for the situation of same-sex 
couples, after holding for many years that long-term same-sex relationships only 
constituted ‘private life’47 the Strasbourg Court has given a revolutionary judgment 
in Schalk and Kopf v. Austria by recognizing that same-sex couples can enjoy ‘family 
life’ for the purposes of Article 848. In the same judgment, the ECtHR furthermore 
quashed the main argument of those who oppose same-sex marriage, namely that 
marriage should be between a man and a woman. Those in opposition to same-sex 
marriage often cited ECHR Article 12 which secures the right to marry to ‘men and 
women of marriageable age’ and ECtHR’s confirming case law in demonstrating 
that only those of opposite sex were to marry49. However, the Court itself, in Schalk 
and Kopf v. Austria has ruled that it would no longer consider that the right to 
marry enshrined in Article 12 must in all circumstances be limited to marriage be-
tween two persons of the opposite sex50. The ECtHR based its decision mainly on 
two factors: first of all, the increasing number of Member States having granted 
same-sex couples equal access to marriage, and having passed some kind of legisla-
tion permitting same-sex couples to register their relationships; and secondly, Article 
9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union which deliberately 
dropped the reference to men and women concerning right to marry51.
For the time being, the ECtHR has left the question of whether or not to allow 
same-sex marriage to be answered by the national law of the Contracting States. The 
same approach is adopted by the European Union in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, as Article 9 affirms that the right to marry shall be guaranteed in accordance 
with the national laws of Member States. Consequently, it seems like both the EC-
tHR and the EU recognize the right for same-sex couples to marry, though not re-
ally. Both institutions, while recognizing that marriage can no longer be limited to 
persons of the opposite sex, propose to wait for the natural course of evolution of 
law to play its part until most of the Member States recognize same-sex marriage 
without contemplating at all on what to do with the injustices which will take place 
in the meantime. This approach of both institutions, hints at a change at the Euro-
pean level when more European states recognize same-sex marriage and seems to 
suggest that we are in a ‘transitional period’ in which the right of same-sex couples 
to marry is recognized at the European level, but cannot be safeguarded yet. There-
46 Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal ECHR 1999 no 33290/96.
47 Mata Estevez v. Spain ECHR 2001 no 56501/00.
48 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria ECHR 2010 no 30141/04.
49 Mata Estevez v. Spain ECHR 2001 no 56501/00.
50 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, para 61.
51 See the relevant part of the Commentary of the Charter as cited by the EctHR in Schalk and 
Kopf v. Austria, para 25.
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fore, there is need at the European level to safeguard the rights of same-sex couples 
who have married and who are seeking to make use of their community rights, such 
as free movement. It also seems like, with the acknowledgment displayed at Euro-
pean level as to the right to family of same-sex couples, the momentum is right to 
reach a solution for this transitional period in order to uphold the community rights 
of same-sex married couples.
5. Mutual Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages as a Solution in the Transitional 
Period
Owing to the lack of competence of the EU in the area of family law, the develop-
ment, albeit limited, has taken place within the framework of judicial co-operation 
in civil matters as provided for in Article 81 (ex Article 65 TEC) of the EU Treaty. 
According to this provision, in civil matters having cross-border implications, the 
Union shall develop judicial co-operation based on the principle of mutual recogni-
tion particularly when necessary for the proper functioning of the internal market. 
Indeed, Paragraph 3 of Article 81 indicates the specific procedure to be followed 
when adopting measures concerning family law with cross-border implications. An 
example to such a measure would be the Council Regulation commonly referred to 
as the Brussels II bis52, which applies in civil matters relating to divorce, legal separa-
tion or marriage annulment as well as to the attribution, exercise, delegation, restric-
tion or termination of parental responsibility53.
‘It is generally acknowledged that to date in cross-border situations people can-
not rely on the continuity of their family relationships when changing residence’54. 
Neither the Brussels II bis Regulation, nor any other regulation, regulates the mu-
tual recognition of marriages within the European Union. Thus the loss of legal 
status experienced by two women married in the Netherlands who wish to move to 
a Member State not recognizing same-sex relationships is left unsolved, even though 
this situation falls obviously under civil matters having cross-border implications 
which hinders the proper functioning of the internal market. It follows that the 
European Union does have competence to enact measures in this area55.
52 Council Regulation 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsi-
bility, repealing Regulation 1347/2000, [2003] OJ L338/1.
53 Regulation 2201/2003, art 1(1).
54 Katharina Boele-Woelki, ‘The Principles of European Family Law: Its Aims and Prospects’ 
(2005) 1 Utrecht Law Review 160-168.
55 Jens M. Scherpe, ‘Families in Europe - European Family Law?’, A discussion paper for the 
conference The Treaty of Rome (A Golden Anniversary - 50 Years On?), British Centre for Eng-
lish Legal Studies, Warsaw University March 9/10 <http://www.cels.law.cam.ac.uk/events/
Scherpe.pdf> accessed 24 May 2011.
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In the lack of harmonized rules concerning European family law, the principle of 
mutual recognition is the way forward in overcoming the barriers to free movement 
of persons due to the non-recognition of same-sex marriages in some EU Member 
States and thus ending the discrimination same-sex married couples are facing in 
this area. Emerging out of the ECJ Judgment of Cassis de Dijon, the principle of 
mutual recognition originally stipulated that there is no valid reason why goods law-
fully produced and marketed in one Member State should not be introduced into 
any other Member State56. Eventually, by the time the Lisbon Treaty came into ef-
fect, mutual recognition was already at the heart of what the EU is trying to achieve 
in the Area of Justice, Security and Freedom57. With the Treaty of Lisbon, the prin-
ciple of mutual recognition is even made the basis of judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters58. In this context, mutual recognition indicates that decisions lawfully made 
in one Member State are to be recognized in other Member States.
Adapted to the area of immigration law of the EU, the principle of mutual rec-
ognition would ensure that for the purposes of family reunification a marriage act 
lawfully entered into in one Member State is to be recognized in other Member 
States. While not entirely sufficient to overcome the discrimination same-sex cou-
ples face within the EU, the use of the principle of mutual recognition in the area 
of immigration law would be the appropriate first step to take. The first reason for 
this is that it will not oblige Member States to change their national family law, 
which for the time being EU does not have competence for59 and in any event could 
not be realistically expected from all EU Member States when it comes to granting 
equal rights to same-sex couples60. It will ‘simply’ require Member States to ob-
serve whether the act of marriage has been lawfully entered into according to the 
laws of the Member State in which the same-sex couple have married. Secondly, 
setting the scope of the use of the principle of mutual recognition as family reuni-
fication cases will maintain the debate primarily at the well-functioning of the in-
ternal market as it concerns the free movement of persons. Consequently, the resis-
56 Rewe-Zentral v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (‘Cassis de Dijon’) Case 120/78 
[1979] para14.
57 Johan Meeusen, ‘System Shopping in European Private International Law in Family Matters’ 
in Johan Meeusen, Marta Pertegás, Gert Straetmans and Frederik Swennen (eds.) International 
Family Law for the European Union (Intersentia 2007) 239-278; House of Commons Justice 
Committee, ‘Justice Issues in Europe’ <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/
cmselect/cmjust/162/16204.htm> accessed 24 May 2011.
58 Art 82(1) (ex art 31 TEU) of the EU Treaty.
59 Maarit Jänterä-Jareborg, ‘Unification of International Family Law in Europe - A Critical Per-
spective’ in Katharina Boele-Woelki (ed.), Perspectives for the Unification and Harmonisation of 
Family Law in Europe (Intersentia 2003) 194-216.
60 There is reluctance to harmonize European family law even concerning non-controversial as-
pects of family law. See: Masha Antokolskaia, ‘the ‘Better Law’ Approach and the Harmonisation 
of Family Law’ in Katharina Boele-Woelki (ed.) Perspectives for the Unification and Harmonisa-
tion of Family Law in Europe (Intersentia 2003) 159-182.
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tance cannot be as severe as would be the case if the subject matter had been di-
rectly set as anti-discrimination caused by the national laws of some Member 
States. Further, limiting the use of mutual recognition to immigration purposes will 
not scare off Member States at this stage in relation to further demands of equal 
rights for same-sex couples regarding social and economic benefits married couples 
receive in the respective Member State. Certainly, in order to reach results concern-
ing the marriage rights of same-sex couples, the debate should not be burdened 
with tangential issues such as tax revenues, the burdens of social security, the fi-
nances of pension funds etc61.
As a result of the principle of mutual recognition, the problems concerning same-
sex married couples arising out of Directive 2003/109 on long-term residents could 
be solved to a certain extent. The long-term resident third-country national and his/
her spouse of the same sex may make use of the possibility introduced in Directive 
2003/109 and move to a second Member State without the fear of their marriage not 
being recognized in the second Member State. Furthermore, the immigration rights 
of a same-sex couple who has married outside of the European Union and who has 
moved into a Member State recognizing same-sex marriage by making use of the 
family reunification Directive 2003/86 and subsequently wish to move to a second 
Member State making use of Directive 2003/109 may also be safeguarded by mu-
tual recognition as the second Member State would have to recognize the first 
Member State’s decision as to recognizing the same-sex marriage. Realizing this first 
step in achieving equality in immigration rights for same-sex couples will pave the 
way for further steps.
Indeed, the principle of mutual recognition does not solve the problem which 
same-sex couples face if they have been married in a country which is not a member 
of the EU and if they would like to make use of Directive 2003/86 on family reunifi-
cation. In this case, the Member State in which the third-country national would like 
to be united with his/her spouse will assess the application in accordance with its 
national laws. The problem remains unsolved if the married couple happens to be of 
the same-sex and if the Member State happens to be a state which does not recognize 
same-sex marriages. However, as stated above, the use of the mutual recognition 
principle as the first step will still be useful in paving the way for further steps in 
eliminating discrimination based on sexual orientation in other aspects of immigra-
tion law and in general within the EU. This assumption is based on Waaldijk’s ‘law 
of small change’ which dictates that ‘any legislative change advancing the recognition 
and acceptance of homosexuality will only be enacted, if that change is either per-
ceived as small, or if that change is sufficiently reduced in impact by some accompa-
nying legislative ‘small change’ that reinforces the condemnation of homosexuality’62. 
61 Kees Waaldijk, ‘Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the Neth-
erlands’ in Wintemute and Andenæs (eds.) Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships: A Study of 
National, European and International Law (Hart Publishing 2001) 437-464.
62 Kees Waaldijk, ‘Small Change: How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in the Neth-
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The ‘law of small change’ applies to both the introduction of the principle of mutual 
recognition as a means to get the Member States not recognizing same-sex marriage 
to afford immigration rights to such spouses and to the consequences of this princi-
ple. As noted above, the fact that the utilization of the mutual recognition principle 
will be limited to same-sex married couples wanting to make use of their immigration 
rights as provided by Directive 2003/109 will maintain the debate on the functioning 
of the internal market. By this way, resistance by non-progressive Member States will 
be kept at a minimum. This can be explained with the perception of the change as 
small. Once the principle of mutual recognition is put into effect, it will help set the 
standard of protection against sexual orientation discrimination higherby having the 
non-progressive Member States to respect the family life of same-sex spouses. This, 
in turn, will make it easier for other ‘small changes’ to be introduced in the national 
laws of such Member States. Such small changes may include the recognition of for-
eign same-sex marriages for the purposes of Directive 2003/86 on family reunifica-
tion. Since, due to the utilization of the principle of mutual recognition, there will 
already be same-sex married couples in the Member State the national legislation of 
which does not allow people of the same sex to marry, recognizing family reunifica-
tion demands of same-sex couples will only be a ‘small change’ to introduce. This 
approach is in line with the general development of family law as progress in family 
law has taken place in phases over the centuries in Europe63.
The expected positive outcomes of using the principle of mutual recognition 
concerning same-sex marriage are not limited to legislative amendments that will 
follow. The recognition of same-sex marriages by all Member States by means of the 
principle of mutual recognition will also have emancipatory effects on all residents. 
By introducing or respecting LGBTI-friendly legislation, the public authorities give 
strong signals to the general population that LGBTIs and their relationships are 
absolutely equal64.
Returning to the application of the principle of mutual recognition for marriages 
lawfully entered into in any Member State, it is of utmost importance that the rec-
ognizing Member State may not make use of the ‘public policy’ exception solely on 
the basis of the fact that the spouses are of the same sex. The public policy exception 
is a common stipulation regarding the application of mutual recognition65. When it 
erlands’ in Wintemute and Andenæs (eds.) Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships: A Study of 
National, European and International Law (Hart Publishing 2001) 437-464.
63 Jens M. Scherpe, ‘Families in Europe - European Family Law?’, A discussion paper for the 
conference The Treaty of Rome (A Golden Anniversary - 50 Years On?), British Centre for English 
Legal Studies, Warsaw University March 9/10 <http://www.cels.law.cam.ac.uk/events/Scherpe.
pdf> accessed 24 May 2011.
64 Paul Borghs and Bart Eeckhout, ‘LGB Rights in Belgium, 1999-2007: A Historical Survey of a 
Velvet Revolution(2010) 24 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 1-28.
65 Council Regulation 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation 
1347/2000, [2003] OJL338, art 22(1)(a).
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comes to mutual recognition of marriages, it should be ensured that Member States 
will not be able to present the same-sex character of a marriage as contrary to pub-
lic policy. In theory, public policy as grounds for non-recognition would be insuffi-
cient to uphold an obstacle to free movement as non-recognition still has to respect 
the proportionality principle66. Furthermore, concerning the public policy excep-
tion, the ‘Brussels IIbis Regulation […] also provides for a restrictive system, thus 
protecting the progressive countries’67. However, in the case of same-sex marriages 
the discussions as to the defiance of such marriages of public policy would also be 
in violation of Article 21(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU as it will 
constitute discrimination based on sexual orientation. Leaving the same-sex charac-
ter of such marriages aside, it is also clear that none of the recognized concerns in 
recognizing foreign marriages are applicable to same-sex marriages such as polyga-
mous unions, absence of genuine consent (in forced and arranged marriages), lack 
of proper formality or solemnity (in proxy marriages), the danger of one party sexu-
ally exploiting the other (in child marriages)68. In the face of these arguments, the 
legislation arranging the use of the principle of mutual recognition of marriages 
should clearly state that non-recognition cannot be based on sexual orientation of 
the spouses as this would constitute a violation of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU.
6. Conclusion
The struggle for equal rights for LGBTI has been continuing on many fronts for a 
long time. At the present moment, we are at a point where the momentum is opti-
mum for a leap forward. The recent judgments of the ECtHR, the wording of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, the setting of the Lisbon Treaty of mutual recogni-
tion as the primary tool in judicial cooperation, combined with the level of integra-
tion reached within the internal market, indicate that the leap should take the form 
of mutual recognition of same-sex marriages. The acknowledgment by the ECtHR 
and by the EU of the fact that it is a matter of time that the definition of marriage 
will change in a greater extent of European states to the advantage of same-sex 
couples indicates that we are in a ‘transitional period’. It is necessary to introduce 
the principle of mutual recognition rules concerning marriage to prevent discrimina-
66 Marc Fallon, ‘Contraints of Internal Market Law on Family Law’ in Johan Meeusen, Marta 
Pertegás, Gert Straetmans and Frederik Swennen (eds.) International Family Law for the Euro-
pean Union (Intersentia 2007) 149-181.
67 Frederik Swennen, ‘Atypical Families in EU (Private International) Family Law’ in Johan 
Meeusen, Marta Pertegás, Gert Straetmans and Frederik Swennen (eds.) International Family 
Law for the European Union (Intersentia 2007) 389-423.
68 John Murphy, ‘The Recognition of Same-Sex Families in Britain: the Role of Private Interna-
tional Law’(2002) 16 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 181-201.
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tory results under the current immigration rules. This approach is in harmony with 
the general development of family law in Europe which traditionally consists of 
phases. This first step will eliminate some discrimination directed against LGBTI, 
namely, in the area of free movement of persons within the EU. The achievement of 
this first step will be relatively non-controversial as the same-sex marriages that will 
be recognized will be those conducted or recognized by other Member States and 
the effects of recognition will be limited to immigration rights of third-country na-
tionals based on secondary legislation and not national laws. This step-by-step ap-
proach will pave the way for future legislation while simultaneously preparing the 
general population for more equality for LGBTIs in Europe. Ultimately, such a step 
is what the EU owes to LGBTIs when it promised to them, as to everyone living in 
the EU, an Area of Justice, Security and Freedom.
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Abstract
Whilst European Union rights such as free movement and family reunification are depen-
dent upon recognition as a family, the question “what is a family?” is generally answered 
by the Member States according to their own law. Whilst there are European citizens, 
there is no European family, no single unifying concept for a legal status upon which so 
many European and national law entitlements are based. This paper proposes that insofar 
as a definition of family exists in European law, it is strikingly formalist and offers no 
panacea for the recognition or protection of non-traditional families. The paper first ad-
dresses the concept of family with reference to two competing theories of family recogni-
tion; formalism and functionalism exemplified with reference firstly to the Irish legal sys-
tem and secondly to the European Court of Human Rights. Thirdly, the concept of family 
in European Law is then considered with particular reference to free movement. Finally, 
it is argued that the nascent European family bears far greater resemblance to the formal-
ist interpretation of the family by the Irish courts than the functional family recognised by 
the European Court of Human Rights. The paper concludes that protection of non-tradi-
tional families and in particular same-sex couples is contingent upon a greater convergence 
between the European Union law and the family as protected by the European Court of 
Human Rights.
* * *
1. Family life – Functionality or formalism
The European Court of Human Rights has developed a body of case law on de facto 
family ties, recognising and protecting a right to family life based upon the existence 
of family in fact even where none is recognised in law. The locus classicus of the 
functional family is explained by Jenni Millbank as follows:
Functional family claims hold that those who function as a committed interdepen-
dent relationship require – and implicitly deserve – legal protections, regardless of 
their sex, or restrictive formal indicia of status such as marriage, or ability to marry. 
In the context of relationships with children, functional family arguments posit that 
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those who act as, and are understood by children to be, parents, should be ac-
corded parental status irrespective of any biological connection1.
The functional family is thus, concerned with the lived experience of its members 
and not the presence or absence of two members, of the opposite sex and a marriage 
certificate2. It is not unique to any one court or jurisdiction and has been described 
as offering, “distinct advantages over a more formalistic approach which systemati-
cally excludes all but a specific form of relationship”3. By contrast formalist inter-
pretations of family, which will be exemplified by reference to the law in Ireland, are 
said to support “social institutions which are thought to serve desirable ends”4. 
Preferential treatment is given to the family based on marriage vis-à-vis a myriad of 
legal rights and duties from immigration to taxation and social protection which 
creates a concomitant disadvantage for other family forms. However, encouraging 
people to marry, presupposes that they have the capacity to do so, thereby excluding 
not only same-sex couples (in most countries) but also denying equal protection to 
children raised by any family other than that based on marriage5. Legal systems 
which adopt a formalist interpretation of family, such as Ireland or the European 
Union create legal vulnerability for non-traditional families by design justified by 
reference to the need to protect or promote marriage. Formalism assumes that mar-
riage can be promoted or coerced, an assumption which neglects the social meaning 
of marriage which may exist independently of any legal benefit. Indeed, one of the 
arguments advanced in favour of same-sex marriage is it should be permitted so that 
lesbian and gay relationships will be recognised as normatively valuable6.
2. The Irish family 
There is no constitutional ban on same-sex marriage in Ireland because although Ar-
ticle 41.3.1 of Bunreacht na hÉireann 1937 indicates that the family is based on mar-
riage, marriage is not defined. However, the interpretation of marriage by the Courts 
1 Jenni Millbank, ‘The Role of ‘Functional Family’ in Same-Sex Family Recognition Trends’ 
[2008] CFLQ 155, 156.
2 See Rebecca Bailey-Harris, ‘Third Stonewall Lecture – Lesbian and Gay Family Values and the 
Law’ (1999) 29 Family Law 560.
3 Attorney Geneeral v. Mossop [1993] SCR 554, 638.
4 Carl E. Schneider, ‘The Channelling Function in Family Law’ (1992) 20 Hofstra Law Review 495, 
498.
5 See Brenda Cossman and Bruce Ryder, ‘The Legal Regulation of Adult Personal Relationships: 
Evaluating Policy Objectives and Legal Options in Federal Legislation’ Research Paper prepared 
for the Law Commission of Canada, 1 May 2000 <http://www.samesexmarriage.ca/docs/coss-
man.pdf> accessed 28 July 2011.
6 Carlos Ball, ‘Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage: Looking Beyond Po-
litical Liberalism’ (1997) 85 Georgetown Law Journal 1871, 1875.
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has been consistently formalist. A statutory ban on same-sex marriage has been in 
place since 20047. The constitution provides that, “The State pledges itself to guard 
with special care the institution of Marriage, on which the Family is founded, and to 
protect it against attack”. As a result although recently enacted civil partnership legis-
lation8 provides for the rights and duties of same-sex partners and same-sex and dif-
ferent sex cohabitants neither partnership nor cohabitation create a constitutional 
family. The civil partnership legislation goes so far as to describe civil partners as hav-
ing a “shared home” rather than a “family home” a semantic difference indicative of 
the fact that civil partnerships do not create constitutionally protected family relation-
ships. The absence of jurisprudential protection for non-marital families under the 
constitution is conceptually linked to the prohibition of same-sex marriage9. Both 
represent an absence of the value pluralism associated with functionalist interpreta-
tions of the family which would require “that many alternative forms of family living, 
though different and perhaps incompatible, must be accorded equal respect”10. As a 
result, the only families which enjoy constitution protection in Ireland are those based 
on marriage which has been held to derive from the Christian concept of “…a partner-
ship based on an irrevocable personal consent given by both spouses which establishes 
a unique and very special life-long relationship”11. Tempting though it may be to dis-
miss the above precedent as dated12 more recent judicial pronouncements have been 
similarly under-inclusive. The Constitutional guarantee in Article 41.3.1 has in effect 
legitimated the unequal treatment of different families and consequently of children 
depending on their family status. Some members of the judiciary have opined that giv-
ing equal constitution protection… to ‘families’ founded on extra-marital union” 
would ipso facto constitute an attack on the family in breach of the Article 41.3.1 con-
stitutional pledge to “guard with special care the institution of marriage”13. If marriage 
does not convey exclusive access to the bundle of rights and duties offered by the State, 
then why get married? This is the essence of formalism. One might have thought that 
with such encouragement, there would be no non-marital families in Ireland however, 
quite the opposite is true and ever increasing numbers of families are non-marital14. 
Formalism has served not to promote one vision of the family but to penalise others.
7 Civil Registration Act 2004, s 2(2)(e) provides that there is an impediment to marriage if “both 
parties are of the same-sex”.
8 Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010.
9 See Grace Blumberg, ‘Legal Recognition of Same-sex Conjugal Relationships: The 2003 Cali-
fornia Domestic Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act in Comparative Civil Rights and Family 
Law Perspective’ (2004) 51 UCLA Law Review 1555, 1577.
10 Andrew Bainham, ‘Family Rights in the Next Millennium’ (2000) 53 Current Legal Problems 471.
11 The State (Nicolaou) v. An Bord Uchtála [1966] IR 567, 643.
12 Judicial separation and divorce were introduced in 1989 and 1969 respectively.
13 The State (Nicolaou) v. An Bord Uchtála [1966] I.R. 567, 622.
14 Approximately 18 per cent of all family units in the State consist of non-marital couples (one 
third of whom have children) and that Ireland has 190,000 one parent-families CSO, Census 
2006, Principal Demographic Results, (Dublin: CSO, 2007), 64. 
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Given the narrow, formalist approach adopted by the Irish courts, the rejection of a 
claim by a lesbian couple for recognition of their Canadian marriage for taxation pur-
poses by the High Court is highly unsurprising. The judgment of Justice Dunne in Zap-
pone & Gilligan v. Revenue Commissioners amounted to little more than the trite obser-
vation that marriage has always been interpreted by the courts as being between a man 
and a woman15. For Irish same-sex parented families, the legal relationship between a 
child and their non-genetic parent is nothing short of precarious. Ireland has not regu-
lated assisted human reproduction so in theory a donor could apply to be appointed as 
joint guardian with the child’s biological mother, while their social parent would remain 
a stranger in law16 and cannot be recognised as the child’s guardian while her spouse or 
partner is still alive17. Recently, in a case concerning dispute between a lesbian couple 
and their gay sperm donor over access to the child conceived by donor insemination, 
the Supreme Court categorically refused to recognise the couple and their child as a 
family18 and ruled that the concept of de facto family recognised by the European Court 
of Human Rights does not form part of Irish law. The dispute was thus, construed as 
concerning an unmarried couple (the donor and biological mother) and their child. The 
Supreme Court dismissed arguments based on Article 8 ECHR having concluded that 
in cases of conflict, Irish law must apply. Justice Susan Denham added that; “Under the 
Constitution it has been clearly established that the family in Irish law is based on a 
marriage between a man and a woman”. Interestingly, when the case returned to the 
High Court and order for access to the child was made conditional upon the applicant 
giving various undertakings to the court, which reflected in near exact terms the original 
and unenforceable written agreement between the parties by which he “accepts to play 
the role of ‘favourite uncle’ until the true nature of his relationship is revealed”, “he 
seeks no parental role” and “he acknowledges and will respect the family integrity of the 
respondents and H”. The language of the ultimate order drafted by the High Court very 
much tempers the impact of a Supreme Court which appeared unwilling to regard the 
couple and their child as a family at all. Whilst, the Supreme Court has adhered rigidly 
to the formal family, both the legislature and lower courts) demonstrated a willingness 
to protect a more diverse array of family relationships.
3. The ECHR and the de facto family
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights is not simply character-
ised by a happy functionalism, but has instead often relied upon a margin of appre-
ciation to uphold formalist interpretations of the family by the Member States and 
15 The case is now on appeal to the Supreme Court and is likely to be heard before the end of the year.
16 The Guardianship of Infants Act 1964, s. 6A (inserted by the Status of Children Act, 1987.
17 The Guardianship of Infants Act 1964, s. 7, a guardian may, by will, make any other person a 
guardian in case of her death. This is known as testamentary guardianship.
18 McD v. L & Anor [2007] IESC 81 (HC), [2009] IESC 81 (SC).
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has itself occasionally delivered judgments such as that in Rees19 of which even the 
strictest formalist would be proud. Nonetheless, the Court does protect de facto 
family ties under Article 8 the right to private and family life, irrespective of legal 
formalities. Even on a reading of the text of Article 8 itself the conceptual differ-
ences are clear, the term “family life” is broader than “the family based on marriage” 
in the Irish constitution and instead “Everyone has the right to respect for his pri-
vate and family life, his home and his correspondence”. The scope of the Article 8 
protection of the family is enhanced by the inclusion of privacy, a right imbued with 
a liberal or libertarian view, of the relationship between the subject and the State 
represented as a ‘right to be left alone’, and strengthened by the prohibition on 
sexual orientation discrimination20. Privacy as protected in the common law world 
has tended to be similarly amorphous and inclusive. In connexion with family life, 
the right implies that the State should recognise families as they are, not as the State 
considers they should be. Accordingly, the European Court of Human Rights has 
protected a wide variety of family relationships under Article 8 between unmarried 
parents, non-marital couples and finally same-sex couples and their children on the 
basis of the existence of a functional family relationship regardless of the presence 
or absence of formal legal recognition. The Court has repeatedly held that the fam-
ily protected by Article 8 “is not confined solely to marriage based relationships and 
may encompass other de facto family ties where the parties are living together out-
side marriage”21. In EB v. France22, the Court summarised its case law on the Article 
8 as follows;
…the notion of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention is 
a broad concept which encompasses, inter alia, the right to establish and develop 
relationships with other human beings … the right to “personal development” … 
or the right to self-determination as such. It encompasses elements such as names 
… gender identification, sexual orientation and sexual life, which fall within the 
personal sphere protected by Article 8 … and the right to respect for both the deci-
sions to have and not to have a child23.
The Wagner24, decision is a good example of recognition of the social reality of 
the family. The Court found a violation of Article 8 and of the positive obligations 
imposed on States by the Convention on the Rights of the Child where Luxembourg 
refused to recognise the Peruvian single parent adoption by the first applicant of the 
second. The Court concluded that the “Luxembourg courts could not reasonably 
refuse to recognise the family ties that pre-existed de facto between the applicants 
19 Rees v. United Kingdom (1985) Series A no 160, (1987) 9 EHRR 56.
20 See for example, Karner v. Austria (2004) 38 EHRR 528.
21 Johnston and Others v. Ireland (1986) Series A no 112, p. 25, para. 55.
22 EB. v. France App no 43546/02 (ECHR, 22 January 2008) [GC].
23 Ibid., para. 43.
24 Wagner and JMWL. v. Luxembourg App no 76240/01 (ECHR 28 June 2007).
JUSTINE QUINN262
and thus dispense with an actual examination of the situation”. The margin of ap-
preciation was small because “adoption by unmarried persons is permitted without 
restriction in most of the forty-six countries” and accordingly, the law “is at an ad-
vanced stage of harmonisation in Europe”. The relative dynamism of that decision 
is far less impressive when one considers the near unanimity amongst the States. The 
prohibition on sexual orientation discrimination has strengthened the family rights 
of same-sex couples. EB v. France also exemplifies the causal link between the grant 
of rights to non-marital and single parent families and same-sex couples. The Court 
considered that the French authorities could not refuse to allow single parent adop-
tion by a lesbian woman because in France it is possible to adopt a child as a single 
person and that it is impermissible to discriminate against a prospective adopter on 
the basis of sexual orientation, where the country in question permits single parent 
adoption. The more interesting question for the protection of same-sex parented 
family ties is whether there is a right to second-parent adoption – the ECtHR has 
recently ruled such an application admissible in Gas and Dubois v. France25.
Older authorities on transgender rights such as Rees26, demonstrate a capacity on 
the part of the Court for formalist thinking. In Rees, it was held that “the tradi-
tional [marriage] concept provided sufficient grounds for applying biological crite-
ria so as to determine the sex of a person for marriage purposes thereby excluding 
transgender people from marriage. The Court then considered that the right to 
marry refers to “the traditional marriage between persons of opposite biological 
sex” and that “Article 12… is mainly concerned to protect marriage as the basis of 
the family” and held unanimously that there was no violation of the right to marry 
in Article 1227. This line of authority was subsequently rejected in Goodwin v. 
United Kingdom28 and I v United Kingdom29 partly on the basis that at the time of 
Rees, “little common ground existed between States” and held that no circum-
stances justify excluding transgender people from marriage and that the right to 
marry cannot be confined to purely biological criteria. 
In Parry v The United Kingdom30. the Court considered the requirement that a 
couple divorce as a pre-requisite to the grant of a full gender recognition certificate 
to the first applicant. The applicants who had been married for fifty years and had 
three children together wished to remain married after the first-applicant’s gender 
reassignment. Although, the Court declined to find a violation of the Convention 
because the applicants could continue their relationship through a UK civil partner-
ship, described by the Court as “in all its current essentials… a legal status akin, if 
not identical to marriage… which carries with it almost all the same legal rights and 
25 Gas and Dubois v. France App. no 25951/07 (ECHR, 31 August 2010).
26 Rees v. United Kingdom (App. 9532/81), 17 October 1986.
27 A dissenting opinion was given by Judges Bindschedler-Robert, Russo and Gersing. 
28 Goodwin v United Kingdom App. no 28957/95 (ECHR, 11 July 2002) [GC], (2002) 35 EHRR 447.
29 I v United Kingdom App no 25680/94 (ECHR, 11 July 2002); (2003) 36 EHRR 967.
30 Parry v. United Kingdom App no 42971/05 (ECHR, 28 November 2006).
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obligations”31. This suggests that in States which either have no civil partnership 
legislation or where there is a greater disparity in the rights afforded to married cou-
ples and civil partners a violation of the Convention might be found to exist. With 
Schalk and Kopf v. Austria32, same-sex relationships have passed into the daylight, out 
of privacy and into family life. The ECtHR recognised that a male same-sex couple in 
a de facto relationship were entitled to be protected as a family under Article 8 in the 
same manner as a “different-sex couple in the same situation”. Whilst the ECtHR did 
not go so far as to rule in favour of same-sex marriage it did hold that the right to 
marry in Article 12 was not confined to opposite sex couples despite the fact that 
marriage had undergone “major social changes”, the question of whether to allow 
same-sex marriage was left to the States, because they are “best placed to assess the 
respond to the needs of society” and there is “no European consensus”.
4. The European Family and Free Movement
Jacques Delors is reputed to have said that, “no one falls in love with a common 
market”33 however, given the attention devoted to internal market law arguments for 
the cross-border recognition of same-sex relationships it appears at that at least 
some of us have34. Although the mobility rights dimension of the problem is clear, 
the question of competence is not. It is argued that even if the competence problem 
was solved, the interpretation of family in European law has thus far been strikingly 
formalist and far closer to Dublin than Strasbourg. McGlynn observes that at the 
root of the problem is the extent to which Union rights and entitlements are ex-
tended to families rather than to individuals. Indeed, had this been done, the ques-
tion what is a family, would have far less importance for European law. The problem 
goes deeper than merely having ascribed the rights to families, and left the definition 
of family to the Member States because the family structure suggested by European 
law is equally formalist and traditional; that of an economically active spouse and his 
dependent wife and children. In Baumbast, Advocate General Geelhoed noted that 
Regulation 1612/68 dated back to an era when ‘family relationships were relatively 
stable’ and accordingly, the regulation provides for ‘the traditional family’. Euro-
31 Ibid, 10.
32 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria App no 30141/04 (ECHR, 24 June 2010).
33 As stated by EU Commissioner Péter Balázs <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do? reference=SPEECH/04/421&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> 
accessed 28 July 2011.
34 See for example, Helen Toner, Partnership Rights, Free Movement, and EU Law (Oxford 2004); 
Mark Bell, ‘We are Family? Same-Sex Partners and EU Migration Law’ (2002) 9 Maastricht Jour-
nal of European and Comparative Law 335. Hans Ulrich Jessurun d’Oliveira ‘Lesbians and Gays 
and the Freedom of Movement of Persons’ in Kees Waaldijk and Andrew Clapham (eds), Homo-
sexuality: A European Community Issue – Essays on Lesbian and Gay Rights in European Law and 
Policy, (Martinus Nijhoff 1993), 289.
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pean Union law thus reproduces the ‘dominant ideology of the family’ so that 
‘other forms of family are treated less favourably, and thus rendered more difficult 
to sustain’35. The effect of the dominant ideology of family promulgated in Euro-
pean law on same-sex couples and their children is to render freedom of movement 
throughout the union largely illusory.
EU secondary legislation is either silent on the rights of same-sex partners or 
leaves the question of recognition to the member states. The Free Movement Direc-
tive only obligates Member States to recognise same-sex partners and their children 
as family if “the legislation of the host Member State treats registered partnerships 
as equivalent to marriage”36. The Free Movement Directive does not define ‘regis-
tered partnerships’. If the Member State recognises the same sex partner then the 
direct descendants under the age of 21 and dependents and dependent direct rela-
tives in the ascending line of the spouse and the partner are also regarded as part of 
the worker’s family. The Family Reunification Directive and Qualification Direc-
tive37 which apply to third country nationals and refugees respectively, similarly 
leave recognition of family relationships to the Member States. The main conse-
quences of the lack of mutual recognition of the civil status of same-sex parented 
families is a loss of civil status and secondly a loss of the parental status of the non-
biological parent. This can impact on the family in a myriad of different and com-
plex ways, for example a French couple with a pacte civil de solidarité38 would not 
be recognised as civil partners in Ireland. Irish civil partners are legal strangers in 
Poland and if a German couple, married in Spain and started a family in the United 
Kingdom before moving to Greece or to Ireland they not would not only cease to 
be married, they might also cease to be parents39. Further, if the couple travel to a 
Member State which recognises neither same-sex marriages nor civil partnerships 
they will lose not only their civil status but every attendant benefit across a spectrum 
35 Alison Diduck and Felicity Kaganas, Family Law, Gender and the State (Hart Publishing 1999), 10.
36 Article 2(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 
29, 2004 on the rights of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States, amending Regulation 1612/68, and repealing Directive 
64/221, 68/360, 73/148, 75/35, 90/365 and 93/96 [2004] OJ L158/77 (Citizen’s Rights Directive).
37 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification 
and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise 
need international protection and the content of the protection granted, OJ L304, 12 (Qualifica-
tion Directive). The Commission has proposed a recast of the Qualification Directive; ‘Proposal 
for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of interna-
tional protection and the content of the protection granted’ COM (2009) 551 final.
38 It is not yet clear whether France will recognise Irish civil partnerships.
39 See ILGA-Europe’s Contribution to the Green Paper, Less Bureaucracy for Citizens, Promot-
ing Free Movement of Public Documents and Recognition of the Effects of Civil Documents, 
COM(2010) 747 Final, April 2011 < http://www.ilga-europe.org/home/publications/policy_pa-
pers/green_paper_april_2011> accessed 28 July 2011.
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of rights from tax to pensions, inheritance, family law and immigration once they 
cross a frontier. That is of course, provided that the family are in a position to move 
to begin with. A non-economically active partner’s residence in a Member State can 
depend on recognition by the host state of their status a “family member” of the 
citizen exercising free movement rights40. Similarly, the entry of third country na-
tional (hereinafter ‘TCN’) same-sex partners and their children depends on recogni-
tion by the Member State of their family relationship with their sponsor. In this re-
spect, recognition of same-sex partners perpetuates the dominant ideology of family. 
Both the ‘new’ family and the old are dependent upon intimate relationships and 
formal legal ties which privileges the nuclear family.
Once the right of free movement is successfully invoked by a citizen, who is a 
worker in circumstances where there is a cross-border element, European law pro-
hibits not only direct and indirect discrimination on the basis of nationality41 but 
also domestic rules which have the effect of hindering the free movement of workers 
by impeding access to the labour market by making it less attractive42. What could 
be less attractive than ceasing to be a family? However, the concept of family in 
European law is formalist rather than functional, and entirely lacking the dynamism 
of the European Court of Human Rights and none too far removed than that of even 
the more conservative Member States. The mere existence of marital ties, are suffi-
cient to trigger mobility rights, thus privileging marriage over other forms of rela-
tionship. The Court of Justice as continually emphasises family form over function-
ality. For example, in Diatta v. Land Berlin43, the Court of Justice upheld the para-
sitic rights of the spouse of migrant worker even though they were in the middle of 
a divorce and no longer lived together because mere existence of a formal tie of 
marriage was enough. By contrast in Netherlands v. Reed, a couple who had cohab-
ited for five years were held not to be entitled to recognition as a family for the 
purposes of mobility rights. The Court concluded that a more inclusive interpreta-
tion ‘cannot be based on social or legal developments in only one or a few of the 
Member States’44. Of course, in so deciding the Court has chosen to adopt the in-
terpretation of family in the more conservative Member States.
In Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd45. The Court of Justice declined 
to treat the denial of a travel concession to an unmarried woman with a female part-
40 Directive 2004/38 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States, amending Regulation 1612/68/EC and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 
72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 73/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC 
[2004] OJ L158/77 (Citizen’s Rights Directive).
41 Article 18 TFEU Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union [2008] OJ C115/13.
42 See for example, Case C-415/93 Bosman [1995] ECR I-4821 and Case C-190/98, Graf [2000] 
ECR I-493.
43 Case 267/83 Diatta v. Land Berlin [1985] ECR 567.
44 Case 59/85 Netherlands v. Reed, [1986] ECR 2283, 1300.
45 Case C-249/96 Lisa Jacqueline Grant v. South-West Trains Ltd. [1998] ECR I-621.
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ner as sex discrimination (sexual orientation discrimination was not yet prohibited) 
where such a concession would have been granted to her if her partner was male and 
concluded that, employers are “not required by Community law to treat the situa-
tion of a person who has a stable relationship with a partner of the same sex as 
equivalent to that of a person who is married or who has a stable relationship out-
side marriage with a partner of the opposite sex”46. The Courts have upheld formal-
ist interpretations of the family even where the law in the Member State of origin 
did not. For example, in D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council of the European Un-
ion47 the Court of First Instance held that the concept of “marriage” must be under-
stood as a relationship based on civil marriage within the traditional sense and de-
clined to interpret the staff regulations with reference to the law of the Member 
States, thereby substituting its own more conservative interpretation in place of the 
plurality of relationships recognised by the Member States. The Court of Justice 
upheld the decision of the Court of First Instance and found that the refusal to grant 
the household allowance did not constitute discrimination on grounds of sex or 
sexual orientation. It was instead a distinction based upon, the “legal nature of the 
ties between the official and the partner”48. The Court indicated that the fact that, 
“in a limited number of member states, a registered partnership is assimilated, al-
though incompletely, to marriage cannot have the consequence that, by mere inter-
pretation, persons whose legal status is distinct from that of marriage can be covered 
by the term married official as used in the Staff Regulations”49. It was observed 
further that, while many states recognise same-sex relationships there is a “great 
diversity” between the schemes for recognition, and those which have been created 
are “regarded in the member states concerned as being distinct from marriage”. 
The Court of Justice made its first finding of sexual orientation discrimination in 
2009 in Maruko50 which concerned the effect of the Employment Equality Direc-
tive51 which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the context 
of employment or vocational training. However, although the Court found that in 
applying the Directive Member States “must comply with Community law and in 
particular, with the provisions relating to the principle of non-discrimination”52 the 
effect of the decision is limited and depends on a determination by the national 
courts that life partners and spouses are comparable: 
46 Ibid., para 17.
47 Joined Cases C-122/99 & C-125/99 D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council of the European 
Union ECR I-4319.
48 Ibid., para. 47.
49 Ibid., para. 38.
50 Case C-267/06 Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I-621.
51 Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in em-
ployment and occupation, OJ L 303, 2 December 2000, 16.
52 Ibid., para. 59.
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…if the referring Court decides that surviving spouses and surviving life partners 
are in a comparable situation so far as concerns that survivor’s benefit, legislation 
such as that at issue on the main proceedings must, as a consequence, be considered 
to constitute direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation, within the 
meaning of Articles 1 and 2(2)(a) of Directive 2000/7853.
Similarly, the ruling in Römer54 which found “direct discrimination on the 
ground of sexual orientation because, under national law, that life partner is in a 
legal and factual situation comparable to that of a married person as regards that 
pension” is applicable only to countries in which partnerships are reserved to per-
sons of the same gender and are comparable to marriage in fact and in law. Recital 
22 of the Employment Equality Directive provides that; “This Directive is without 
prejudice to national laws on marital status and the benefits dependent thereon” to 
which Maruko55 and Römer56 merely add the caveat, unless the Member State re-
gards life partners and spouses as legally comparable. As existing Court of Justice 
case law suggests, then the free movement argument is not enough on its own with-
out new facts on the ground, namely increased European consensus on the recogni-
tion of same-sex family relationships. It could be argued that the free movement 
question depends upon delimiting the boundaries of European and national law, 
and in simple terms, on who gets to answer the question what is a family but the 
problem is deeper. The interpretation of family offered in European law is formal-
ist not functionalist, and in its present state will not magically transform the legal 
situation of same-sex couples. As European law has chosen to privilege formal fam-
ily ties, protection of same-sex relationships depends either on a greater consensus 
amongst Member States or greater convergence between the European family and 
the ECHR.
The free movement debate is evolving rapidly against a backdrop of important 
Treaty changes such as the prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sexual ori-
entation and the competence of the Union to legislate against it57. The Lisbon Treaty 
gave the Charter of Fundamental Rights “the same legal status as the Treaties”58, and 
provides that the European Union can “accede to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, although accession will 
not “affect the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties”. The boundaries of 
Member State competence in private law and that of the European Union are also in 
transition, particularly as the later has been increasingly drawn into the regulation of 
private and family law in the context of jurisdiction and enforcement59. The Court of 
53 Ibid., para. 72.
54 Case C-147/08 Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, ECJ 10 May 2011.
55 Case C-267/06 Tadao Maruko v. Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I-621.
56 Case C-147/08 Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, ECJ 10 May 2011.
57 Article 19 TFEU.
58 Article 6(1) TEU.
59 Council Regulation 1259/2010 on co-operation in divorce and legal separation and the Regula-
JUSTINE QUINN268
Justice has already made it clear in Akrich60 that Member States are bound to con-
sider the right to respect for family life under Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights when applying European Union law, if the relationship is genuine 
even if the applicant does not fulfil the criteria for reliance on EU secondary legisla-
tion because that right is “among the fundamental rights which according to the 
Court’s settled case law… are protected in the Community legal order”. The Euro-
pean Charter protect “the right to respect for private family life” in terms which are 
nearly identical to Article 8 of the ECHR61. Article 52(3) of the Charter provides that 
in so far “as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same”. While both the Convention 
and the Charter refer to “a right to marry and found a family”, only the Charter pro-
vision is gender neutral, it “neither prohibits nor imposes the granting of the status 
of marriage to unions between people of the same sex”62. Article 21 of the Charter 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and Article 14 of the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights has been interpreted to do the same63 although 
the later can only be invoked in conjunction with Convention right, even if ulti-
mately no violation of that right is found to exist. In interpreting any regulation or 
European law enacted Member States are obliged to follow both the Charter and 
Treaty based prohibition on sexual orientation discrimination. Article 52(3) explains 
the relationship between Charter and Convention rights as follows:
In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the 
said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more exten-
sive protection.
The extent to which the de facto family of the ECHR will impact the European 
family is not yet known. However, if the effect is anything like that found in P v. S 
and Cornwall County Council64 and K.B. v NHS Pensions Agency65 and Richards v. 
tion on Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of 
Parental Responsibility (Brussels II-bis) (2003) OJ L 343.
60 C-109/01 Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607.
61 Article 7 of the Charter and Article 8 of the Convention respectively.
62 CHARTE 4473/00, Convent 49, 11 October 2000; 46 CONV 828/03, Updated Explanations Relat-
ing to the Text of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 9 July 2003, Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union [2007] OJ C303/1; Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
[2007] OJ 303/17. The Charter has been reissued with the Lisbon Treaty [2010] OJ C83/2.
63 See for example, EB v. France.
64 Case C-13/94 P v. S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR I-2143.
65 Case C-117/01 KB v NHS Pensions Agency [2004] ECR I-541.
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Secretary of State for Work and Pensions66 are anything to go by the future may be 
very bright indeed. In K.B. the Court of Justice in K.B. described the effect of the 
ruling by the European Court of Human Rights in Goodwin v. United Kingdom67 
and I v United Kingdom68 as follows, although it is for each state “to determine inter 
alia the conditions under which a person claiming legal recognition as a transsexual 
establishes that gender re-assignment has been properly effected or under which 
past marriages cease to be valid and the formalities applicable to future marriages”, 
there is “no justification for barring the transsexual from enjoying the right to 
marry under any circumstances”69. Recent legislative proposals could prove to be 
decisive. The Commission Green Paper, “Less Bureaucracy for Citizens, Promoting 
Free Movement of Public Documents and Recognition of the Effects of Civil Status 
Records”70 proposes to address administrative documents, notarial acts such as 
property deeds, contracts, court rulings and birth or marriage certificates. Among 
the proposals is a European civil status certificate, the example given is a child’s 
birth certificate. While the Green Paper emphasises that while;
…it is important to stress that the EU has no competence to intervene in the sub-
stantive family law of Member States. Therefore, the Commission has neither the 
power nor the intention to propose the drafting of substantive European rules on, 
for instance, the attribution of surnames in the case of adoption and marriage or to 
modify the national definition of marriage. The Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union does not provide any legal base for applying such a solution. 
One of the solutions proposed is, “automatic recognition, in a Member State, of 
civil status situations established in other Member States” on the basis of mutual 
trust. The Green Paper helpfully points out that such “recognition would not involve 
the harmonisation of existing rules and would leave Member States’ legal systems 
unchanged”. The other suggestion in the Green Paper, namely, harmonisation of 
conflict of law rules has already been the basis of European regulation of family law, 
for example the Brussels II-bis (2003)71. Two new regulations have been proposed on 
jurisdiction, applicable law and recognition and enforcement of decisions of matri-
monial property regimes and the similar proposal for the recognition and enforce-
66 Case C-423/04 Richards v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] ECR I-3585.
67 Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 18.
68 I v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 53.
69 Ibid., para. 104.
70 Green Paper: less bureaucracy for citizens promoting free movement of public documents and 
recognition of the effect of civil status records, COM (2010) 747 Final, April 2011 <http://eur-lex.
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0747:FIN:EN:PDF> accessed 29 July 2011.
71 Council Regulation 1259/2010 on co-operation in divorce and legal separation and the Regula-
tion on Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and in Matters of 
Parental Responsibility (Brussels II-bis) (2003) (2003) OJ L 343.
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ment of decisions regarding the property consequences of registered partnerships72. 
Again, each of the above proposals are very promising as Member States will bound 
by European law, including the prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation and fundamental rights protections when applying them.
5. Conclusion
The family in European Union law bears far greater resemblance to the formalist 
interpretation of the family by the Irish courts than the functional family recognised 
by the European Court of Human Rights. The protection of non-traditional families 
and in particular same-sex couples in European Union law is contingent upon a 
greater convergence between the European Union law and the family as protected by 
the European Court of Human Rights. Given the reiteration that recognition of the, 
“marital status of persons falls within the competence of the Member States” by the 
Court of Justice in the recently released Römer73, decision and the reference by the 
Court to the “great diversity” between the schemes for recognition in D and Kingdom 
of Sweden v. Council74 and bearing in mind also the cautious With this in mind the 
most important new contribution to the free movement of same-sex parented families 
may well arise not from the Courts but from the legislature. Recent developments 
such as the Commission Green Paper, Less Bureaucracy for Citizens, Promoting Free 
Movement of Public Documents and Recognition of the Effects of Civil Status 
Records75 are more promising than any recent court decision in this regard.
72 COM(2011) 126 final Proposal for a Council regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the 
recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regime and 
COM(2011) 127 final - Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the 
recognition and enforcement of decisions regarding the property consequences of registered 
partnerships.
73 Case C-147/08 Jürgen Römer v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, ECJ 10 May 2011.
74 Joined Cases C-122/99 & C-125/99 D and Kingdom of Sweden v. Council of the European 
Union ECR I-4319.
75 Green Paper: Less Bureaucracy for Citizens, Promoting Free Movement of Public Documents 
and Recognition of the Effects of Civil Documents, COM (2010) 747 Final, April 2011.
legal reCogniTion of same-sex marriages
in liThuania and The Ordre Public exCepTion
Laima Vaigė
Abstract
Although an increasing number of the European Union (EU) member states allow 
contracting of same-sex partnerships or marriages, national legal recognition has not 
been followed by cross-border mutual recognition of civil status. Considering the 
crucial effects of non-recognition, the EU is faced with the task of providing some 
kind of a solution. Meanwhile, the Lithuanian national legislation on recognition of 
marriages contracted abroad has been rather controversial. On the one hand, the 
Civil Code of Lithuania provides for a general rule on recognition of all marriages 
legally contracted abroad and the Supreme Court, as well as the commentators of 
the Civil Code in theory interpret these rules as allowing the recognition of polyga-
mous marriages. On the other hand, various implementing institutions and Lithua-
nian scholars have recently relied on the ordre public exception, claiming that same-
sex marriages cannot be recognized. The author analyses the content of the Lithu-
anian public policy clause and the substantive family law provisions to conclude that 
the ordre public exception cannot justify refusal to recognize same-sex marriages.
* * *
1. Introduction
The question of marriage validity may arise in various cases related to migration, 
inheritance, matrimonial property, divorce or custody rights. It is said that problems 
arise due to “limping legal relations”, but it is really the legal regime that limps when 
regulation of certain areas leads to the infringement of the principle of legal cer-
tainty. Though spouses may rarely understand the complicated issues of applicable 
law, should they expect anything of the legislators, at the very least it is the informa-
tion of whether they are married or not. However, the issue of cross-border recogni-
tion is seen as highly complex due to potential policy implications for “marriage” 
and “family” notions as such. Considering the crucial effects of non-recognition of 
civil status of marriage, the EU is charged with providing some kind of a solution. 
Notably, the EU has the competence to adopt regulations in the field of private in-
ternational law, although the restriction of unanimity applies in the field of family 
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law1. Quite recently, both the European Commission2 and the European Parliament3 
issued clear statements on mutual recognition of marriages and opened the gate for 
further legislation on the matters of matrimonial property rights4, recognition of 
civil status documents5 and recognition and enforcement of decisions on parental 
responsibility6. Meanwhile, the Lithuanian national legislation on recognition of 
marriages contracted abroad has been rather controversial. On the one hand, the 
Civil Code of Lithuania provides for a general rule on the recognition of marriages 
legally contracted abroad7. In theory, the Supreme Court8 as well as commentators 
of the Civil Code9 have interpreted the national rules as allowing the recognition of 
polygamous marriages legally concluded abroad. On the other hand, the rules on 
civil registration of foreign marriages establish the requirement of compliance with 
the substantive conditions of contracting marriage in Lithuania10 and Lithuanian 
substantive family law allows only different-sex marriage. Analysis of the relevant 
provisions raises the issue of arguable applicability of the ordre public exception.
2. Legal recognition of same sex marriages and the ordre public exception
The relevant section on private international law under the Civil Code of Lithuania 
provides the general rule that marriages legally concluded abroad must be recog-
nized:
1 Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union [2008] OJ 
C115/47 Article 81 (3).
2 Commission, ‘Communication on Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme’ 
COM(2010) 171.
3 European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2010 on civil law, commercial law, family law 
and private international law aspects of the Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme 
2010/2080(INI).
4 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recogni-
tion and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes’ COM(2011) 126 
final.
5 Commission, ‘Green Paper on promoting free movement of public documents and recognition 
of the effects of civil status records’ COM(2010) 747 final.
6 N 2.
7 Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, 2000, VIII-1864. Article 1.25 (4). Law applicable to 
the conditions to contract marriage.
8 Senate of the Supreme Court of Lithuania, Resolution No. 28 ‘On the overview of case-practice 
of the Republic of Lithuania on application of private international law norms’, Teismų praktika, 
2001-01-17, No. 14.
9 Valentinas Mikelėnas, Alfonsas Vileita, Algirdas Taminskas, Commentary to Book One of the 
Civil Code (Justitia, 2001) Commentary on article 1.25 (4).
10 Civil registry rules approved by the Minister of justice. Order No. 1R-294 (2008) On amend-
ment Order No 1R-160 (2006) ‘On approval of Civil registry rules’, Point 81.
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A marriage validly performed abroad shall be recognized in the Republic of Lithu-
ania, except in cases when both spouses domiciled in the Republic of Lithuania 
performed the marriage abroad with the purpose of evading grounds for nullity of 
their marriage under Lithuanian law11.
The sole exception to the general rule is provided in the second part of the sen-
tence: the scenario of evasion of Lithuanian law. The rule (here and further, the 
author uses the translation to English provided by the Parliament) refers to “grounds 
for nullity” of marriage but the formulation in Lithuanian repeats verbatim the 
wording of Article 3.37 (The grounds and procedures for declaring marriage null 
and void). Perhaps a better translation in this context would be not “evading 
grounds for nullity” but “evading declaration of marriage null and void”. The mar-
riage may be declared null and void by court in case of its non-compliance with the 
mandatory substantive requirements of contracting marriage in Lithuania (Articles 
3.12-3.17 of the Civil Code). The requirement of different sexes of spouses is one of 
these grounds, thus, same-sex marriages contracted in Lithuania would be voidable.
The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania provides: ‘Marriage shall be con-
tracted upon the free mutual consent of man and woman’12. The provision is obvi-
ously not gender-neutral and it has encouraged commentators to interpret it as a 
clear reservation of the institution of marriage to members of the different genders13 
and even to claim that the prohibition of same-sex marriage is of constitutional im-
portance14. However, linguistic interpretation also has its weaknesses. For example, 
the word “between” is not included in the formulation nor is there a clear prohibi-
tion or any provision on non-recognition. In 2005, a group of members of the 
Lithuanian Parliament wanted to amend the Constitution and include a clear prohi-
bition of same-sex marriage but this idea was never implemented. In comparison, 
the neighbouring Latvia’s constitution was amended in 2005 to include the defini-
tion of marriage as ‘a union between a man and a woman’15 subsequently making 
sure that if same-sex marriages were to be concluded in Latvia, a constitutional 
amendment would be needed. Thus it may be claimed that the wording of the 
Lithuanian Constitution per se does not prohibit marriages between man and man 
or woman and woman but rather, fails to address it. The Constitution, just like the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (ECHR), is a living instrument. These documents should be interpreted to-
11 N 7.
12 Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, adopted in the Referendum of 25 October 1992, 
article 38 (3).
13 Egidijus Jarašiūnas, Šeimos koncepcijos pagrindai 1992 m. Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucijoje 
(Constitutional Court, 2007) <http://www.lrkt.lt/APublikacijos_20071211a.html> accessed April 
20, 2011.
14 Inga Kudinavičiūtė-Michailovienė, Santuokos sąlygos ir jų įvykdymas (Justitia, 2007) 115.
15 Constitution of the Republic of Latvia, adopted by the Constitutional Assembly on 15 February 
1922, last amendment of the relevant section: 15 December 2005. Article 110.
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gether and the literal interpretation of either document ‘is not acceptable for the 
nature of the protection of human rights’16. Notably, the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) has recently found that the right to marry under Art. 12, that refers 
to ‘men and women’ as having the right to marry, is not always reserved to different-
sex couples17. The level of internal protection is still at the discretion of the states, 
but in the author’s opinion, there is no specific constitutional obstacle (i.e. a clear 
prohibition or reservation) to overcome in Lithuania if the state decided to open the 
doors to same-sex marriage.
The constitutional amendment in 2005 was in the end considered unnecessary be-
cause substantive family law provisions clearly establish prohibition at the level of 
the Civil Code. Article 3.7 (1) of the Civil Code of Lithuania (Concept of marriage) 
states explicitly: ‘Marriage is a voluntary agreement between a man and a woman to 
create legal family relations executed in the procedure provided for by law’. It is 
once again repeated under Article 3.12 (Prohibiting marriage of persons of the same 
gender): ‘Marriage may be contracted only with a person of the opposite gender’. 
The requirement of different genders is mandatory both for contracting of marriage 
and for registering a partnership in Lithuania under the Civil Code18. When the 
Civil Code was adopted, family law norms were intended to apply also to different-
sex partners who ‘after registering their partnership in the procedure laid down by 
the law, have been cohabiting at least for a year with the aim of creating family rela-
tions’19. There is no implementing law on partnership to this date, and the relevant 
provisions on heterosexual partnership are not directly applicable. Nevertheless, 
courts recognize factual cohabitation relations in practice20, e.g. property owned in 
the name of one of different-sex partners de facto leading family life is considered as 
“common”21. It is not clear whether the Lithuanian courts would apply the same 
approach in cases of same-sex de facto partners, although a discriminatory approach 
would not be compatible with the recent case law of the ECtHR22.
Relying on the mandatory character of the internal substantive requirement and 
its element of public interests, professor Mikelėnas in 2009 noted that recognition 
of same-sex marriages could be prevented by the public policy clause contained in 
16 Conclusion of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania on the compliance of the ECHR with the 
Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania (1995) No. 9-199.
17 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria App no 30141/04 (ECtHR 24 June 2010), para 61. P.B. and J.S. v 
Austria App no 18984/02 (ECtHR 22 July 2010), para 30.
18 Civil Code (n 7) article 3.229.
19 Ibid.
20 Vytautas Mizaras, ‘Tarptautinės privatinės teisės vienodinimo Europos Sąjungoje rezultatai: 
reglamentai Roma I ir Roma II’ (2008) Justitia 4(70), 14.
21 D. Z. v. R. A. I. [2006] 3K-7-332/2006 (Lithuanian Supreme Court).
22 N 17.
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the Civil Code23. The Ministry of justice (2009)24 and the Migration department 
(2008)25 in their responses to requests for clarification alleged that same-sex mar-
riages do not have legal effects in Lithuania. In the absence of thorough substantia-
tion of such claims, it is important to discuss whether this is indeed so.
2.1. The notion of ordre public and its contents
The public policy (ordre public) exception is the saving clause for various occasions 
where private relations move across the borders and relate to the norms of legal 
systems that are so dissimilar that application of the norms would cause great dis-
tress to authorities of another state. The ordre public exception under the Civil Code 
reads in the following way:
The provisions of foreign law shall not be applied where the application thereof 
might be inconsistent with the public order established by the Constitution of the 
Republic of Lithuania and other laws. In such instances, the civil laws of the Repub-
lic of Lithuania shall apply26.
It might be argued that in principle there is no need to apply the law at the stage 
of recognition and we can only speak about determination of applicable law to 
verify the existence of a lawful marriage contracted abroad. The ordre public excep-
tion above is shaped as the basis for refusal to apply foreign law. In comparison, the 
Hague Convention of 14 March 1978 on Celebration and Recognition of the Valid-
ity of Marriages (the Hague Marriage Recognition Convention) provides two sepa-
rate ordre public provisions: one with regards to applicable law at the stage of enter-
ing into marriage27, and one at the stage of determining the validity of marriage28. It 
seems from the formulation under the Civil Code and the explanation of the Su-
preme Court that applying the ordre public exception at the stage of recognition is 
belated. Nevertheless, the present ordre public exception should be interpreted as 
effective also at the stage of recognition in order to catch such marriages that are 
truly unacceptable and contradict the fundamental principles of national family law 
(e.g. forced marriages that are in breach of the fundamental principle of voluntari-
ness of marriage).
The Supreme Court of Lithuania on the basis of comparative analysis has ex-
plained the concept of ordre public as entailing the main principles that form the 
23 Valentinas Mikelėnas, Šeimos teisė (Justitia, 2009), 148.
24 Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Lithuania, Legal institutions department, Response of 5 
October 2009 No. (1.2.3.) 7R-7950.
25 Migration Department under the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania, Re-
sponse of 11 January 2008 No. (15/7-7) 10K - 1684.
26 Civil Code (n 7) article 1.11 (1).
27 Hague Convention No. 26 of 14 March 1978 on Celebration and Recognition of the Validity 
of Marriages (entered into force 1 May 1991) article 5.
28 Ibid., article 14.
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foundation for the legal system of the country, the functioning of the state and the 
society. However, countries base their legal systems on different legal principles. The 
Court indicated three aspects of the refusal to apply foreign law norms based on 
ordre public:
a) Application of foreign law might mean infringement of fundamental human 
rights and freedoms (e.g. it would entail discrimination on the basis of sex, or 
allow trafficking in human beings).
b) Application of foreign law would be contrary to justice, good customs, main 
moral rules that are consistently upheld in the society (e.g. prohibition to address 
the court, legitimizing prostitution).
c) Application of foreign law would infringe on state interests and impede good 
relations with a neighbouring foreign state (e.g. application of foreign law would 
lead to tax evasion)29.
In the recognition of same-sex marriage, as in any other case, the content of ordre 
public is not clear in advance – it is not fixed and unchanging, but may develop with 
changing tendencies in law. Obviously, it must be established separately in each case, 
and only after an analysis of the factual circumstances, the national law and the ap-
plicable law, the possible effects of applying the national law, the possible effects of 
applying the applicable law, and the effects of applying foreign law from the per-
spective of international law30. The effect of public policy is moderated in consider-
ation with the obligations under international law (l’effect atténué de l’ordre public 
international). The courts should be more cautious when applying the safeguard in 
cases with a foreign element, in contrast with domestic cases, and consider national 
public policy from the point of view of international law.
The national courts follow the explanation that public policy applies to infringe-
ments of those mandatory substantive norms that entrench the main and universally 
recognized principles of law31 and recognize that ordre public has an attenuated ef-
fect with consideration of Lithuania’s international obligations, in particular, the 
accession to the EU and ratification of the ECHR and its Protocols32. Moreover, 
despite the continuous development of European unification of private interna-
tional law, the concept of ‘public policy’ remains an internal matter for each member 
state of the EU, subject only to the control of the EU in certain circumstances. The 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is very cautious in the concretiza-
tion of the content of European public policy. In the decisions so far on ordre public 
the Court has limited its role to control the freedom of discretion of the member 
29 Notably, the Resolution No. 28 of the Supreme Court (n 9) is not a binding precedent but 
provides the guidelines on application of private international law in Lithuania.
30 Valentinas Mikelėnas, Tarptautinės privatinės teisės įvadas (Justitia, 2001) 129.
31 K. C. company Schwarz v. individual enterprise A. V. [2004] 3K-3-612/2004 (Lithuanian Su-
preme Court).
32 Belaja Rus v. Westintorg Corp. [2008] 3K-3-562/2008 (Lithuanian Supreme Court).
277LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGES IN LITHUANIA 
states by interpreting the fundamental principles of law33. Notably, the Lithuanian 
courts take due regard to the jurisprudence on ordre public under the EU Law and 
rely on the decisions of the CJEU34.
With regard to the application of ordre public in the sensitive area of family law, 
the exception must be used even more cautiously. The material ordre public can be 
used only where a manifest conflict would arise with the regulation in Lithuania, and 
provided that the effects of the recognition are closely related to Lithuania35. Hence 
the court of recognition must consider very precisely whether the conflict with its 
law is unacceptable to an absolutely intolerable extent and cannot refuse recognition 
solely because such decision would not be adopted in the requested state.
More specifically regarding ordre public and marriage recognition, the Supreme 
Court stressed that it is important to distinguish between the recognition of subjec-
tive rights (acquired under foreign law, however different it is) and the use of public 
policy clause to refuse the application of foreign law. According to the Court, a clear 
distinction must be drawn in marriages contracted abroad and marriages to be con-
tracted in Lithuania. The Supreme Court illustrates the reasoning by the following 
example:
For instance, a polygamous marriage contracted under the requirements of laws of 
the state that allows it must be recognized but when contracting of marriage in 
Lithuania, the norms of foreign law of the state that allows polygamous marriage 
must not be applied36.
It is remarkable that the legal consciousness of the Supreme Court and the com-
mentators of the Civil Code37 was as wide as to encompass cross-border recognition 
of polygamous marriages concluded under really dissimilar legal systems and in 
countries that cannot be called “neighbouring” (geographically or legally). The 
Court provided the same example on the recognition of polygamous marriages in 
Lithuania while explaining the public policy clause (point 3.5. of the Resolution) 
33 Case C-145/86 Martin Hoffmann v Adelheid Krieg [1988] ECR 645, Case C-78/95 Bernardus 
Hendrikman and Maria Feyen v Magenta Druck & Verlag GmbH [1996] ECR I-4943, Case 
C-38/98 Régie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Maxicar SpA i Orazio Formento [2000] ECR 
I-2974, Case C-7/98 Dieter Krombach v. André Bamberski [2000] ECR I-1935, Case C-394/07 
Marco Gambazzi v. Daimler Chrysler Canada Inc. CIBC Mellon Trust Company [2009] ECR I-2563, 
Case C-420/07 Meletis Apostolides v David Charles Orams i Linda Orams [2009] ECR I-3571, 
Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd [2006] ECR I-3813.
34 Belaja Rus (n 32).
35 Vytautas Nekrošius, Europos Sąjungos civilinio proceso teisė. Pirma dalis (Justitia, 2009) 130-131.
36 Resolution No. 28 (n 8), point 3.5 ‘on refusal to apply foreign law’.
37 Commentary on article 1.25 (4) (n 9). Commentary on article 3.3 of the Civil Code. Valentinas 
Mikelėnas, Šarūnas Keserauskas, Zita Smirnovienė, Vytautas Mizaras, Algimantas Bakanas, Com-
mentary to Book Three of the Civil Code (Justitia, 2002). Mikelėnas, Tarptautinės privatinės teisės 
įvadas (n 30) 130-131.
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and the material validity of marriages concluded abroad (point 6.3.1 of the Resolu-
tion). The subsequent question is whether a same-sex marriage under the Lithuanian 
ordre public can be seen as “less orderly” than a polygamous marriage.
2.2. The substantive condition on different sex of spouses and ordre public
The analysis of the norms of Book Three of the Civil Code (family law provisions) 
reveals that some of the substantive conditions under Articles 3.12-3.17 of the Civil 
Code are also the principles of the Lithuanian family law, while others are not. Prin-
ciples form the foundation of family law, as in any other branch of law38. The main 
principles of Lithuanian family law are: monogamy, voluntary marriage, equality of 
spouses, priority of protecting and safeguarding the rights and interests of children, 
the up-bringing of children in the family, and the comprehensive protection of 
motherhood (Art. 3.3). Adherence to these principles is reflected in other laws39, in 
constitutional40 and the Supreme Court’s41 case law. The article also refers to other 
‘principles of the legal regulation of civil relationships’. These general civil law prin-
ciples are additional: the principles of justice, reasonableness, good faith, inviolabil-
ity of property, freedom of contract, non-interference in private relations, legal cer-
tainty, proportionality, legitimate expectations, prohibition to abuse the right, and 
the principles of full judicial protection of civil rights42.
Notably, the commentary of Article 3.3 also stresses that the principle of mo-
nogamy only prevents the conclusion of such marriages in Lithuania but ‘is not an 
obstacle to recognize polygamous marriages that have been legally concluded by 
foreigners abroad’43. So even monogamy, although clearly entrenched as a principle 
of national substantive law, was at the time of the adoption of the Code considered 
not as utterly important from the point of view of private international law as to 
prevent implementation of subjective rights gained with marriage. The author con-
siders that a polygamous marriage could only face more difficulties in recognition 
because it might also raise the questions of equality of spouses and possible dis-
crimination on the basis of sex (both fundamental principles of law in Lithuania). 
Meanwhile, marriages of same-sex couples exhibit the same features as “Lithuanian 
classic” marriages: they are based on the principles of voluntariness, monogamy, and 
the equality of spouses. Consequently, the substantive prohibition of same-sex mar-
riage is one of the conditions of contracting marriage in the country (a negative re-
38 Mikelėnas, Šeimos teisė (n 23) 119.
39 Law on Sickness and Maternity Social Insurance, 2000, No IX-110. Labour Code, 2002, No 
IX-926.
40 Ruling of Constitutional Court on support of children of 7 June 2007.
41 E.g., decision on equality of spouses, No. 3K-3-207/2009; on interests of the child, No 3K-3-
203/2009.
42 Commentary on article 3.3 (n 37). Civil Code, article 1.2 on ‘principles of legal regulation of 
civil relationships’.
43 Commentary on article 3.3 (n 37) of the Civil Code.
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quirement) but it is not a fundamental principle of family law that may justify non-
recognition. It is up to the national courts to establish which principle is of such 
significance under specific factual circumstances but a failure to mirror the require-
ment that is not clearly enlisted as principle in laws or jurisprudence should not be 
seen as falling under the ordre public exception.
Moreover, if we presume that as an act of civil protest, a same-sex marriage is 
contracted in Lithuania despite the prohibition, it would be valid until the court 
annuls it based on the breach of a substantive condition. Marriages that are in 
breach of substantive conditions fall under the category of “rebuttable transactions”44 
and cannot be automatically void before a legal declaration on nullity by the court45. 
The presumed validity of marriage46 is one of the strongest presumptions in law, thus 
it should apply also in the context of the marriages concluded abroad.
Recognition of marriage is an acceptance of the legal reality formed in another 
country due to application of its valid and functioning legal norms. As the Supreme 
Court pointed out, one of the aspects of ordre public clause is not impeding ‘good 
relations with the neighbouring foreign state’47. It may be claimed that due to the 
very nature of the EU, member states can be considered as such “neighbouring 
foreign states” and a refusal to recognize marriages coming from another EU mem-
ber state may impede mutual relations.
Although the different-sex requirement in itself is not and has never been equat-
ed to a principle, it should be analysed whether other principles may be applicable. 
The Ministry of Justice in 2008 has relied on the principle of the protection of child 
interests to argue for the non-recognition of same-sex marriage48. It claimed in par-
ticular that ‘if the state allowed legal effects of same-sex marriages, it would infringe 
its obligation to take care of children and ensure their normal development’. This 
reasoning is based on a naive assumption that (same-sex) couples do not have chil-
dren before getting married and an outdated prejudice that same-sex parenting 
would result in other than “normal” development of a child. It should be enough to 
note that even before the increased possibilities for the formalization of same-sex 
relations, there have been millions of same-sex parents in Europe49 including un-
44 Article 178 (2) of the Civil Code: ‘Any transaction for the declaration of voidability of which a 
court judgement is necessary, shall be a voidable one’.
45 Mikelėnas, Šeimos teisė, n 23, 180.
46 Civil Code, article 3.286.
47 Resolution No. 28 (n 7).
48 Conclusion of the Legal affairs Committee of the Lithuanian Parliament on the Proposal for a 
Council, Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 as regards jurisdiction and intro-
ducing rules concerning applicable law in matrimonial matters. No. 13445/07 JUSTCIV 250 (16 
January 2008).
49 Leslie Ann Minnot, Scott Long (eds.), Conceiving parenthood. Parenting and the rights of Les-
bian, Gay, Bisexual, and transgender people and their children (International Gay and Lesbian 
Human Rights Commission, 2000) 5-7.
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counted numbers in Lithuania50. It is also more important to stress that both differ-
ent and same-sex couples from the point of law can be childless and nevertheless 
lead a family life51.
This issue should, in fact, be discussed from the point of view of children’s rights. 
Children parented by same-sex couples should be treated in the same way as the 
children parented by different-sex couples or single parents. Studies on Lithuania 
show a high level of homophobia and prevalent bullying at schools, which can be a 
deadly combination for homosexual or bisexual teenagers and children of same-sex 
parents. The automatic recognition of documents (birth certificate and surname that 
indicates both same-sex parents) and unified conflict of law provisions on child’s 
origin are crucial for subsequent exercise of rights. Whether a child is brought to 
life by artificial insemination or adopted, he or she should have adequate rights and 
interests protected in relation to maintenance and succession. Children should not 
be displaced from their parents during a (medical) crisis, or lose connection with a 
parent, or control over the family or vacation home solely because they are born or 
parented in a same-sex family.
Lithuania should consider the risk of becoming a haven for the evasion of matri-
monial and parental responsibilities. If same-sex marriage is not recognized in 
Lithuania, it would be possible to conclude another different-sex marriage in Lithu-
ania or avoid the duty to support children that were brought to life together with a 
former same-sex partner52. Thus, nonrecognition of same-sex marriages could actu-
ally infringe the fundamental principles of the substantive family law in Lithuania: 
the protection of child’s interests and the principle of monogamy.
As for the fear that same-sex couples might want to adopt children in Lithuania 
and this would impede the children’s interests, it must be rebutted by identifying it 
as a hidden phobia that homosexual parents somehow “train” their children to be 
homosexual or are otherwise incapable of parenting. There are now studies that 
negate such suggestions and it has also been recognized in the field of law by the 
ECtHR53. In addition, there is no reason to presume that the Lithuanian child pro-
tection authorities are not capable of choosing proper parents for a particular child 
or hearing out the opinion of a particular child. On the contrary, strongly disapprov-
ing views on homosexuality of the holders of parental responsibility might be more 
50 E.g., reported by Audra Telksnienė, ‘Moteris pasirenka moterį: lesbiečių šeimos istorija’ Lietu-
vos rytas (Vilnius, 16 December 1995) 295.
51 Schalk (n 17).
52 Although forum necessitatis clause is provided under the relevant Council Regulation (EC) No 
4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of 
decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations (Article 7), the outcome 
is still far from clear and it should not be the rule under the EU law to aid the ‘limping regime’ or 
an evading party.
53 Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal ECHR 1999-IX 309, E.B. v. France App no 43546/02 
(ECtHR 22 January 2008).
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threatening to child interests, because homosexual and bisexual teenagers are often 
rejected by their conservative families and are much more likely to become homeless 
or suicidal than their heterosexual peers. Notably, the precedence of equality regula-
tion and child interests over religious beliefs are increasingly recognized in Euro-
pean countries.
In addition, the common European family principles that the Commission of 
European family law (CEFL) has been attempting to draft since 2001 could be 
taken in consideration. The CEFL represents the European states, including Lithu-
ania, and is an independent scientific initiative. The principles are being prepared 
either on the basis of “common-core” principles of the European family or, where 
no such common-core is found, on the basis of the “better law” method54. The 
CEFL has already drafted principles related to divorce and maintenance of former 
spouses, parental responsibilities, and is working in the field of property relations 
between spouses. Regarding the right to marry for same-sex partners or cross-bor-
der recognition of marriage, no such common-core or better-law principle has been 
found yet. However, the analysis of European family law series reveals great devel-
opment in other closely related areas. For instance, a principle drafted on the better-
law approach (with the participation of a Lithuanian representative in the working 
group) establishes that all children must be treated equally, regardless of sexual 
orientation of persons holding parental responsibilities55.
Depending on the specific case circumstances, there may be other principles in-
volved. For example, denial of the recognition of the status of a spouse could result 
in the breach of the fundamental right to court in cases where marital status is 
needed to claim damages. Nonrecognition in cases of succession, divorce, entry to 
country might result in breaches of various principles under the Lithuanian law and 
raise issues under the EU law related to freedom of movement and EU citizenship. 
These questions are also closely related with the issues of jurisdiction and applicable 
law. However, under circumstances such as succession of immovable property or 
claim for damages after accident resulting in a spouse’s death, the connecting factors 
would point to Lithuania and decisions would need to be enforced in Lithuania.
2.3. The principle of non-discrimination and l’effect atténué
The next focus point of this paper is whether the legal protection of same-sex mar-
riage may be prevented because of any fundamental dissimilarity in regulation of 
sexual orientation in Lithuania. During the last few years, Lithuania received warn-
ings from the European Parliament and international organizations on various at-
tempts to restrict human rights on the basis of sexual orientation. However, despite 
54 Masha Antakolskaia, ‘The “better law” approach and the harmonization of family law’ In 
Katharina Boele Woelki (ed.), Perspectives for the unification and harmonization of family law in 
Europe (Intersentia 2003) 180-181.
55 Principles of European Family Law Regarding Parental Responsibilities, drafted by Commis-
sion on European Family Law, 2007. Principle 3.5 on ‘Non-discrimination of the child’.
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any possible political debates and legislative proposals, discrimination on the 
grounds of sexual orientation is prohibited in Lithuania.
Although sexual orientation is not mentioned under constitutional provisions on 
non-discrimination, the list is not exhaustive56. The constitutional provisions on 
basic human rights should be considered together with the provisions of the ECHR, 
which also does not include an explicit mention of sexual orientation. However, ac-
cording to the case law of the ECtHR, the margin of appreciation of states in this 
area is narrow and any difference in treatment based on sexual orientation requires 
particularly serious reasons of justification57. In a similar way, the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights has been interpreted as covering the basis of sex 
orientation under the prohibition of discrimination as to “sex”58.
Non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is also clearly established 
in the national laws. Article 169 of the Criminal Code provides responsibility for any 
person who carries out the actions aimed at hindering, on grounds of inter alia 
sexual orientation, a group of persons or a person from participating in political, 
economic, social, cultural, labour or other activities or at restricting their rights and 
freedoms. Hatred related to sexual orientation is an aggravated circumstance of 
crimes under Article 60 (12) of the Criminal Code59. Discrimination as to sexual 
orientation is also prohibited under Article 1(2) of the Law on equal opportunities60 
and under the Law on the protection of minors against the detrimental effect of 
public information61. Thus homosexuality as a sexual orientation per se is not against 
the public policy of the Lithuanian Republic. On the contrary, the sexual orientation 
of a person is protected under the principle of non-discrimination. The margin of 
protection increases, even though it does not currently extend to the substantive 
marriage conditions of national family law. This protection is nevertheless in clear 
contrast to polygamous relations, which are not awarded a comparable internal legal 
protection.
In consideration of the attenuated effect of the ordre public clause, it is important 
to mention that the right for same-sex partners to marry under Article 12 (the right 
to marry) of the ECHR was recently analysed in the case of Schalk and Kopf v. Aus-
tria. The ECtHR ruled that the Convention did not impose the obligation to grant 
same-sex couples access to marriage and due to the lack of sufficient consensus, states 
56 N 16.
57 L. and V. v. Austria App Nos 39392/98 and 39829/98 (ECtHR, 9 January 2003) para 45; S.L. v. 
Austria App No 45330/99 (ECtHR 9 January 2003) para 37; Karner v. Austria App No 40016/98 
(ECtHR 24 July 2003) para 37; Kozak v. Poland App No 13102/02 (ECtHR 2 March 2010) para 92.
58 Toonen v Australia UNHRC Communication No. 488/1992.
59 Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. VIII-1968, 2000.
60 Law on Equal Opportunities. IX-1826, 2003.
61 Law on the Protection of Minors against the Detrimental Effect of Public Information. 10 
September 2002. IX-1067, article 4 (12).
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still have a wide margin of appreciation with regard to Article 1262. However, a sig-
nificant thing to stress about this case is that the Court recognized Article 12 as ap-
plicable to the case of applicants63. Thus the Court has deviated from its former ex-
planation of marriage as only reserved to different-sex partners64 (including transgen-
der persons after gender reassignment). Deriving from the Court’s recognition that 
the right to marry is not restricted ‘in all circumstances’ to different-sex couples (i.e. 
it may come under Convention if the states allow such marriage), it is very reasonable 
to expect that the outcome in case of recognition of already-concluded marriage 
would be utterly different. The author is convinced that in case of nonrecognition, 
the Court could find a violation under Article 12 of the Convention, considering that 
the right to marry is provided ‘according to the national laws governing the exercise 
of this right’ and the Lithuanian law refers this question to lex loci celebrationis.
The EU Charter on Fundamental Rights also refers to the ‘national laws’ govern-
ing the exercise of the right to marry and find a family but Article 9 is notably gender 
neutral65. Moreover, the cases of Maruko66 and Römer67 prohibit discrimination on 
the ground of sexual orientation where same-sex partnerships are available and 
place partners in ‘comparable’ situation with different-sex spouses. Although the 
cases may not be directly applicable to the legal situation in Lithuania where no such 
partnerships are allowed, it may be argued that the CJEU should in the future con-
sider this situation as a case of indirect discrimination. Meanwhile, non-recognition 
of marriages solely on the basis of sexual orientation of spouses may be seen as a case 
of direct discrimination. In the author’s opinion, the cases of Maruko and Römer 
also give a clear understanding on the direction of the further development and in-
terpretation of fundamental principles of law.
The argumentation from the point of the EU law may be built on various dimen-
sions: it may rely on the EU citizenship, on the development of principle of mutual 
recognition, the freedom of movement, family reunification and asylum, and the free 
circulation of civil status documents. In any case, the concept of public policy that 
justifies derogation from a fundamental freedom must be interpreted strictly and 
cannot be determined unilaterally by each member state. Thus, it should only be 
reserved to exceptional circumstances.
Although same-sex couples do not have the right to marry under the substantive 
law, the recognition of such marriages in the territory of Lithuania cannot be reason-
ably claimed as capable of causing significant distress to Lithuanian authorities. 
Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is prohibited in Lithuania. In con-
62 Schalk (n 17) para 58.
63 Ibid., para 61.
64 Rees v United Kingdom (1986) 9 EHRR 56, para 49; Cossey v United Kingdom (1990) 13 EHRR 
622, paras 43 and 46; Sheffield and Horsham v United Kingdom (1998) 27 EHRR 163, para 66.
65 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C 364/1, article 9.
66 Case C-267/06 Tadao Maruko v Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Bühnen [2008] ECR I-1757.
67 Case C-147/08 Jürgen Römer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg (GC 10 May 2011).
LAIMA VAIGė284
sideration of international law developments, the attenuated effect of the public 
policy exception is such that cannot possibly justify nonrecognition. Quite the dif-
ferent, full-scale recognition of same-sex marriages (i.e. ‘marriage as marriage’) is 
completely compatible with the family law principles enshrined under substantive 
provisions and with the explanations of the Supreme Court.
2.4. Is nonrecognition of same sex marriages of Lithuanian nationals possible?
Article 1.25 (1) of the Civil Code establishes the general rule that matrimonial capac-
ity and marriage conditions are established by the Lithuanian law and Article 1.25 
(3) states that matrimonial capacity and other conditions to contract marriage in 
respect of foreign citizens and stateless persons without Lithuanian domicile may be 
determined by the law of the state of domicile of both persons intending to marry if 
such marriage is recognized in the state of domicile of either of them68. Moreover, 
point 81 of the Civil registry rules (the Rules) precludes registration not only of the 
same-sex marriages, but also of any marriages that fail to mirror the Lithuanian mar-
riage conditions:
Civil registry offices shall include into records only these marriages which have 
been registered without infringing of the conditions on concluding marriage set out 
under articles 3.12-3.17 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania69.
The previous version of the Rules also contained a similar and even narrower 
provision which read that only those marriages are recorded, which have been 
registered in foreign countries ‘without infringements of the laws of the Lithua-
nian Republic’. The amendment only specifies the substantive conditions on con-
tracting marriages and not the procedural norms. Noting that only foreign mar-
riages of nationals are included into registry data, these provisions reveal possibly 
different treatments of nationals and non-nationals and raise the issue of discrim-
ination of own citizens70. Such interpretation of the norms may be compared with 
the French approach of “distributive application”: French nationals who per-
formed a same-sex marriage abroad would not have their marriage recognized 
since their national law did not allow it, although same-sex marriages of foreign 
nationals are recognized71. Under the legal provisions applicable in Lithuania be-
fore the entry into force of the Civil Code, the Marriage and Family Code explic-
itly provided that without prejudice to lex loci celebrationis, the national marriage 
conditions had to apply “additionally” in determination of validity of marriages of 
Lithuanian nationals72.
68 Civil Code, article 1.25 (3).
69 N 10.
70 Having in mind that registration does not equate to recognition.
71 Reply of the French Minister of Justice to a parliamentary question No 41533 (2005), 7437.
72 Marriage and Family Code (1969) No. 21-186, repealed in 2000. Article 210 (2).
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The interpretation of “distributive recognition” under the currently valid Civil 
Code in the author’s opinion is wrong. Article 1.25 (3) on applicable law with regard 
to foreign nationals is explained as applicable to contracting of marriages in Lithua-
nia and reaffirming the lex loci celebrationis rule73. It is illustrated with the example 
of a Lithuanian national who wants to marry his 20 year old girlfriend in Lithuania, 
while according to the laws of their domicile, she is too young and lacks matrimonial 
capacity. It is explained that because of his nationality, the registry office would have 
the right to register this marriage and because such marriage would be valid in 
Lithuania, the marriage would be registered74. Consequently, it would not be reason-
able to demand for the Lithuanian conditions on marriage conclusion to apply to 
Lithuanian nationals wherever they may reside. Rather, the deletion of the provision 
that stated Lithuanian laws apply ‘additionally’ should be interpreted as now relying 
only to lex loci celebrationis. Article 1.25 (3) could thus be relevant only when foreign 
nationals (or national and foreigner national couples) want to contract marriages in 
Lithuania. Only in this case, as the Supreme Court explained, can the ordre public 
exception apply to prevent application of foreign law that allows polygamous mar-
riages. It is not clear whether the ordre public exception would be sufficient to pre-
vent conclusion (in Lithuania) of same-sex marriage however, considering that the 
different-sex requirement is arguably not as significant as the principle of monogamy.
In addition, in principle and from the perspective of EU law so far, it has not 
been forbidden to discriminate own citizens in purely internal situations. However, 
marriages concluded abroad arguably are beyond such purely internal situations 
and in its recent Zambrano case the CJEU can be seen as ‘reversing’ the reverse 
discrimination75. The argument that member states will have to recognise a same-sex 
marriage concluded elsewhere, ‘perhaps even in the hypothetical case that it con-
cerns two of its own citizens’76 can also be reinforced under Grunkin77 and Sayn-
Wittgenstein78 cases, where the CJEU admitted that the nonrecognition of surname 
results in an obstacle to freedom of movement. Such an obstacle may be justified 
only if it is based on objective considerations and is proportionate to the legitimate 
purpose of the national provisions. The author is convinced by the simple conclu-
sion that there are other means to protect different-sex families and marriages than 
measures to the detriment of same-sex partners and their families.
73 Commentary to Article 1.25 (3) of the Civil Code. Mikelėnas, Tarptautinės privatinės teisės 
įvadas, 216.
74 Commentary to Article 1.25 (3) of the Civil Code.
75 Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi [2011] OJ 130/2, para 42.
76 Veerle Van Den Eeckhout, ‘Promoting Human Rights within the Union: The Role of European 
Private International Law’ European Law Journal, 14 (1) 2008, 118.
77 Case C-94/04 Standesamt Niebüll (Grunkin Paul I) [2008] ECR I-7639.
78 Case C-208/09 Ilonka Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptmann von Wien [2010] OJ C 193.
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3. Conclusions
The author considers that non-recognition of same-sex marriages would cause unac-
ceptable effects and would actually be against the ordre public of Lithuania, as ex-
plained by the Supreme Court: 1. It would mean infringement of fundamental hu-
man rights and freedoms (e.g. it would entail discrimination, create an obstacle to 
freedom of movement and family life, and could infringe the rights of the child), 2. 
It would be contrary to justice, good customs, main moral rules that are consis-
tently upheld in the society (e.g. it would entail failure to provide legal remedy, le-
gitimize evasion of duties, and allow infringement of the monogamy principle), 3. It 
would infringe the interests of Lithuania and impede good relations with foreign 
states (especially the EU member states that may be seen as “neighbouring” states 
due to the nature of the EU).
The author insists that in the absence of a clear possibility to ‘adapt’ the legal 
relationship, full-scale recognition of a same-sex marriage is much more reasonable. 
The Supreme Court’s guidelines allow to argue for consideration of ‘marriage as 
marriage’ rather than downgrading to an unclear level of internal protection. Under 
the current Civil Code, distributive recognition that denies the recognition of mar-
riages of nationals is also not plausible and should not apply with regards to mar-
riages from the EU member states.
Although providing some unified standards of protection under substantive law 
of member states would be the best solution, the delay in the adoption of partner-
ship laws shows how difficult it is to introduce changes in this area. Meanwhile, 
recognition is merely an acceptance of the legal reality formed in another country 
due to application of its valid and functioning legal norms. The steps taken at the 
level of private international law would not really involve any dramatic judicial or 
legislative activism: tools for advancement of same-sex partners’ and their children’s 
rights are already available in Lithuania.
vi.
the role oF the Judiciary
and oF the equality BodieS

le rôle du juge en iTalie
Alessio Liberati
Résumé
Faute l’adoption des mesures législatives spécifiques en matière de droits LGTB, les enti-
tés juridictionnels italiennes doivent résoudre les controverses liées à l’exercice de tels 
droits sans le support normatif et avec un rôle substitutif du législateur.
La responsabilité qui accompagne la délégation de l’activité régleuse de la matière, de la 
part du législateur et à l’avantage des juges, comporte des risques aussi, concernant le 
contraste dans les solutions, selon le différentes sensibilités, et cela n’aide ni à la certitude 
du droit ni, conséquemment, une harmonisation rapide des ordres des Pays UE.
Dans cette perspective un instrument utile de référence est le droit de la CEDH, dans les 
limites dans lesquelles il a résolu des solutions spécifiques.
Abstract
Not having adopted specific legislative measures concerning LGTB rights, Italian jurisdic-
tional entities have to solve lawsuits related to the enforcement of those rights without the 
support of such norms.
The lawmakers’ delegation of regulating LGBT rights to judges is accompanied by respon-
sibilities and risks, concerning disputes in solutions, according to different sensibilities. 
This framework does not support certainty of law or the harmonization of EU countries’ 
legal systems.
In this perspective, the ECHR (European Court of Human Rights) operates as a useful 
instrument within the framework of specific LGBT resolutions promulgated by the same 
organization.
* * *
1. L’absence du pouvoir législatif
La fonction du juge dans le cadre de matières particulièrement sensibles à la morale 
publique a de plus en plus assumé un rôle important au cours des dernières années.
En effet, dans un Pays vivement connoté par des valeurs catholiques, comme la 
République italienne, il y a une timidité du législateur à intervenir dans les matières 
étroitement liées à ces valeurs, même si d’autres pays de l’Union Européenne ont 
adopté des solutions normatives en contraste avec la morale catholique.
Dans cette perspective il est en effet hors de doute que l’électorat catholique a 
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certainement le pouvoir de conditionner l’équilibre des majorités en Italie, étant la 
politique actuelle caractérisée par une dualité sensible à leurs votes.
En l’absence d’une législation propre à cette typologie de problèmes le juge a 
assumé donc ce rôle substitutif. En effet, le législateur a lui délégué la solution de 
nouveaux problèmes juridiques sans fournir le moindre instrument législatif néces-
saire pour leur solution.
On a ainsi une vraie et propre vacatio du législateur dont le rôle est délégué au 
pouvoir juridictionnel qui doit se faire charge, dans les controverses, de trouver une 
solution juridique appropriée.
1.1. La responsabilité des juges et les risques
Dans cette dynamique le juge devient le responsable de la solution de nouveaux 
problèmes concernant les droits de la personne.
Ceci constitue, à mon avis, un échange dangereux de rôles par rapport à la poli-
tique qui, en s’éloignant des problèmes, laisse toute responsabilité à l’autorité judi-
ciaire qui est appelée périodiquement à rendre compte de ses propres décisions aux 
hommes politiques.
Dans le cadre des débats publics et dans les sièges institutionnels, où, loin de 
s’assumer la responsabilité du vide normatif, l’on assiste de plus en plus aux cri-
tiques féroces vis-à-vis de l’interprète (le juge) qui a cherché à trouver une solution.
L’on a donc un juge-législateur, malgré lui, autrement dit un juge responsable 
devant la collectivité de la solution de problèmes normatifs qui devraient trouver 
une solution dans le siège législatif.
Ce mécanisme finit pour être préjudiciable de l’image du pouvoir juridictionnel, 
qui apparaît comme le responsable de ce choix, certainement délicat et difficile, 
dont le juge ne devrait pas être chargé sans le support d’une indication normative.
De telles considérations sont aggravées en raison de la distance entre la percep-
tion sociale de la Justice et la justice réelle. La difficulté des procédures et de l’ap-
plication des droits essentiels a comporté, en effet, une grande distance entre ce qui 
est perçu comme niveau social juste et ce que le juge est appelé à appliquer.
2. La jurisprudence de la CEDH en Italie
A ce sujet la Convention Européenne pour la Sauvegarde des Droits de l’Homme et 
les arrêts de la Cour de Strasbourg revêtent une importance particulière.
Si la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme a en effet laissé libre cours aux 
États de vérifier l’admissibilité des mariages entre gens du même sexe1, la même 
Cour de Strasbourg à certainement fourni d’importants éléments herméneutiques 
concernant la reconnaissance des droits LGTB.
1 Schalk et Kopf c. Autriche (CEDH - 30141/04).
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2.1. Les arrêts de la Cour Européenne : emploi, adoption, parentalité
En effet, la Cour a prononcé des arrêts soit en matière d’emploi, soit en matière de 
parentalité, soit en matière d’adoption.
Par exemple, dans l’arrêt Schalk et Kopf c. Autriche2, la CEDH a affirmé que la 
relation homosexuelle stable relève de la «  vie familiale  », au même titre qu’un 
couple hétérosexuel dans la même situation. Cependant, la Cour a affirmé que la 
Convention européenne des droits de l’homme n’oblige pas un Etat à ouvrir le droit 
au mariage à un couple homosexuel.
Dans l’arrêt Fretté c. France3, la Cour a jugé légitime le rejet d’une demande 
d’agrément préalable à l’adoption d’un enfant par un homosexuel. Selon la Cour, les 
autorités nationales ont légitimement et raisonnablement pu considérer que le droit 
de pouvoir adopter dont le requérant se prévalait trouvait sa limite dans l’intérêt des 
enfants susceptibles d’être adoptés, nonobstant les aspirations légitimes du requé-
rant et sans que soit remis en cause ses choix personnels.
Très important est l’arrêt Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta c. Portugal4, concernant le 
droit de garde partagée retirée à un père en raison de son homosexualité. La déci-
sion des juridictions portugaises reposait essentiellement sur le fait que le requérant 
était homosexuel et que «  l’enfant doit vivre au sein d’une famille traditionnelle 
portugaise  ». La Cour a jugé que cette distinction, dictée par des considérations 
tenant à l’orientation sexuelle, ne pouvait être tolérée d’après la Convention, étant 
en violation de l’article 14 (interdiction de la discrimination) combiné avec l’article 
8 (droit au respect de la vie privée et familiale).
De même façon, la Cour a jugé5 que la législation du Royaume Uni sur les pen-
sions alimentaires applicable avant l’entrée en vigueur de la loi sur le partenariat 
civil était discriminatoire à l’égard des partenaires de même sexe, en violation de 
l’article 14 (interdiction de discrimination) combiné avec l’article 1 du Protocole n° 
1 (protection de la propriété). Dans le cas d’espèce, après son divorce, la requérante 
n’obtint pas la garde de ses enfants et dut verser une pension alimentaire. En 1998, 
elle s’installa avec une autre femme. La loi applicable à l’époque – avant l’entrée en 
vigueur de la loi sur le partenariat civil – prévoyait que le parent non gardien qui 
avait noué une nouvelle relation (qu’il se soit remarié ou non) pouvait obtenir une 
réduction du montant de la pension dont il était débiteur, mais pas dans le cas où il 
vivait avec une personne de même sexe.
Par l’arrêt Perkins et R. c. Royaume Uni6 et Beck, Copp et Bazeley c. Royaume-
Uni7 la Cour a jugé en violation des de l’article 8 (droit au respect de la vie privée) 
le cas des requérants exclus de l’armée uniquement en raison de leur homosexualité, 
2 Schalk et Kopf c. Autriche, CEDH 30141/04.
3 Fretté c. France, CEDH 36515/97, 26.02.2002.
4 Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta c. Portugal, CEDH 33290/96, 21.12.1999.
5 J.M. c. Royaume-Uni, CEDH 37060/06, 28.09.2010.
6 Perkins et R. c. Royaume Uni, CEDH 43208/98 et 44875/98, 22.10.2002.
7 Beck, Copp et Bazeley c. Royaume-Uni, CEDH 48535/99, 48536/99 et 48537/99, 22.10.2002.
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suite aux enquêtes sur leur orientation sexuelle. Selon la Cour, les mesures prises 
contre les requérants constituent des ingérences particulièrement graves dans leur 
droit au respect de leur vie privée, et cela sans « raisons convaincantes et solides ».
2.2. La liberté de réunion et d’association
La Cour a reconnu la violation des articles 11 (liberté de réunion et d’association), 
13 (droit à un recours effectif) et 14 (interdiction de la discrimination) dans l’affaire 
Baczkowski et autres c. Pologne8 et dans l’affaire Alekseyev c. Russie9.
Dans le premier cas, les autorités locales refusèrent de laisser organiser un défilé 
dans les rues de Varsovie afin de sensibiliser l’opinion à la discrimination envers les 
minorités, les femmes et les handicapés. La manifestation s’est finalement tenue 
quand même, mais la Cour a souligné que les requérants ont pris un risque 
puisqu’elle n’était alors pas officiellement autorisée. Ils ne disposaient que de re-
cours a posteriori contre les décisions de refus et il était de plus raisonnable de 
supposer que les motivations réelles du refus étaient une opposition des autorités 
locales à l’homosexualité.
Dans l’affaire Alekseyev c. Russie, il s’agissait d’interdictions répétées (2006, 
2007, 2008) d’organiser des défilés de la Gay Pride opposés par les autorités mosco-
vites à un militant russe pour les droits des homosexuels. La Cour a jugé que les 
interdictions d’organiser les manifestations litigieuses n’étaient pas nécessaires dans 
une société démocratique. De plus, le requérant n’avait pas disposé d’un recours 
effectif pour contester ces interdictions, et avait été victime d’une discrimination 
fondée sur l’orientation sexuelle.
La Cour n’a pas encore décidé l’affaire Genderdoc-M c. Moldova10, concernant 
le refus d’autoriser une manifestation à Chişinău, et l’affaire Zhdanov et Rainbow 
House c. Russie11, concernant le refus d’enregistrer une association lesbienne, gay, 
bisexuelle and transsexuelle.
2.3. Les droits sociaux
La Cour a affirmé que la législation espagnole en matière de droit aux prestations 
de survivants avait un but légitime (la protection de la famille fondée sur les liens du 
mariage) et la différence de traitement constatée pouvait être considérée comme 
relevant de la marge d’appréciation de l’Etat, en déclarant irrecevable la requête 
Antonio Mata Estevez c. Espagne12.
Par contre, la CEDH a jugé qu’avant un amendement législatif intervenu en juillet 
2007, il y a eu en Autriche violation de l’article 14 (interdiction de la discrimination) 
8 Baczkowski et autres c. Pologne, CEDH 1543/06, 3.05.2007.
9 Alekseyev c. Russie, CEDH 4916/07, 25924/08 et 14599/09, 21.10.2010.
10 Genderdoc-M c. Moldova, 9106/06.
11 Zhdanov et Rainbow House c. Russie, CEDH 12200/08.
12 Antonio Mata Estevez c. Espagne, CEDH 56501/00, 10.05.2001.
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combiné avec l’article 8 (droit au respect de la vie privée et familiale) P.B. et J.S. c. 
Autriche13, étant donné le refus d’étendre la couverture d’une assurance maladie au 
compagnon homosexuel d’un assuré, puisque la loi autrichienne disposait que seuls 
un proche parent du titulaire de l’assurance maladie ou une personne du sexe op-
posé cohabitant avec celui-ci pouvaient être considérés comme personnes à charge.
Enfin, la Cour a souligné la violation de l’article 14 (interdiction de la discrimi-
nation) combiné avec l’article 8 (droit au respect de son domicile) dans les affaires 
Kozak c. Pologne14 et Karner c. Autriche15 concernant le refus de reconnaître à un 
homosexuel le droit à la transmission d’un bail après le décès de son compagnon : 
la Cour n’a pas pu admettre qu’il soit nécessaire, aux fins de la protection de la fa-
mille, de refuser de manière générale la transmission d’un bail aux personnes vivant 
une relation homosexuelle.
2.4. L’homophobie et mauvais traitements en prison et le risque lié au renvoi d’homosexuels 
dans leur pays d’origine
Ils sont encore pendants les affaires Vincent Stasi c. France16, concernant les mau-
vais traitements allégués en prison en raison de l’homosexualité et l’affaire X. c. 
Turquie17, dont le requérant se plaint notamment d’une discrimination en raison de 
son homosexualité, ayant été incarcéré seul dans une cellule de cinq mètres carrés, 
privé de tout contact avec d’autres détenus et d’accès à la promenade en plein air.
Pareillement pour l’affaire D.B.N. c. Royaume-Uni18, dont le requérant a allégué 
le risque de décès, de mauvais traitements et d’atteinte au droit au respect de la vie 
privée en cas de renvoi d’une femme lesbienne au Zimbabwe, et l’affaire K.N. c. 
France19, concernant le risque allégué de décès et de mauvais traitements en cas de 
renvoi d’un homme homosexuel en Iran.
2.5. Le droit italien et l’application de la jurisprudence CEDH
Il se pose à ce point le problème de l’application des arrêts de la Cour et de la 
Convention Européenne pour la Sauvegarde des Droits de l’Homme dans l’ordre 
juridique italien.
La Cour Constitutionnelle s’est exprimée récemment20 au sujet de l’admissibilité 
de l’entrée des précepte de la Convention EDH dans l’ordre juridique intérieur, en 
précisant qu’il appartient à la Cour Constitutionnelle même le rôle de vérification 
de la compatibilité avec les valeurs fondamentales de la Constitution.
13 P.B. et J.S. c. Autriche, CEDH 18984/02, 22.07.2010.
14 Kozak c. Pologne, CEDH 13102/02, 2.03.2010.
15 Karner c. Autriche, CEDH 40016/98, 24.07.2003.
16 Vincent Stasi c. France, CEDH 25001/07.
17 X. c. Turquie, CEDH 24626/09.
18 D.B.N. c. Royaume-Uni, CEDH 26550/10.
19 K.N. c. France, CEDH 47129/09.
20 Corte Costituzionale, n. 80/2011.
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Les juges, surtout les juges administratifs, ont affirmé un mécanisme plus direct.
Ils ont affirmé, en particulier, que la capacité opérationnelle de la Convention 
Européenne pour la Sauvegarde des Droits de l’Homme, comme interprétée par la 
cour de Strasbourg, est dirigée directement aux citoyens.
En substance, le Conseil d’État et les tribunaux administratifs régionaux ont 
précisé que la Convention européenne trouve application directe des jugements in-
térieurs21.
Sous un autre profil, les décisions de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme 
constituent un modèle fondamental pour une interprétation correcte des règles in-
térieures.
L’on assiste donc à une réception en voie jurisprudentielle particulièrement incisive.
Mais une solution semblable comporte des avantages et des inconvénients, évi-
demment.
Il est certainement positif que le juge, même en absence d’intervention législa-
tive, puisse trouver dans la Convention européenne pour la sauvegarde des droits la 
solution pour défendre les droits LGTB en voie directe. L’on doit cependant avoir 
pleine conscience et perception de cette délégation de pouvoirs de la part de la loi 
et des effets que cela comporte.
En particulier, l’on ne peut pas cacher le risque d’orientations contrastantes, 
déterminées par la différente sensibilité des juges qui pourraient être conditionnés 
par leur propre formation dans la réception des décisions de la Cour de Strasbourg.
3. Le pouvoir discrétionnaire du juge
Il reste à vérifier les limites que l’ordre italien attribue au pouvoir discrétionnaire du 
juge.
Le syndicat de légitimité constitutionnelle n’a pas un caractère diffus dans l’ordre 
italien, mais il se concentre dans la Cour constitutionnelle.
Les jugements de légitimité constitutionnelle peuvent être soulevés par le juge 
quand il croie le problème de constitutionnalité en tant que décisif et pas manifes-
tement injustifié, afin de prononcer sa propre décision.
21 TAR du Latium 11984/2010, selon le quel la Convention Européenne des Droit de l’Homme a une 
application directe par le biais de l’article 117, première alinéa, de la Constitution, étant donné que 
les lois doivent respecter « les obligations de l’ordre judiciaire communautaire », et puisque l’article 
6 (F) du Traitée de Maastricht (modifié par le Traitée d’Amsterdam), « l’Union ne respecte les droits 
fondamentaux comme assurés par la Convention Européenne des Droit de l’Homme, comme prin-
cipes généraux du droit communautaire » et la jurisprudence de la CEDH a établi un conflit direct 
entre la Convention et l’expropriation indirecte (CEDU; Sez. l - 17 may 2005; Sez. l - 15 novembre 
2005, ric. 56578/00; Sez, l - 20 avril 2006). Conseil d’état italien, qui a affirmé qu’en raison d’un 
principe déjà applicable avant l’entrée en vigueur du Traité de Lisbonne, le juge National doit éviter 
la violation de la Convention du 1950 (CEDU, 29-2-2006, Cherginets c. Ucraina, § 25) en adoptant 
la solution qui on en assure le respect (CEDU, 20-12-2005, Trykhlib c. Ucraina, §§ 38 e 50).
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Mais le pouvoir du juge est plus immédiat aussi.
En effet, dans les cas où une règle nationale soit évaluée en conflit avec la nor-
mative communautaire, le juge est tenu à la désapplication de la règle, en faveur de 
la règle transnationale.
Les arrêts les plus récents, comme déjà vu, ont affirmé que la Convention Euro-
péenne pour la Sauvegarde des Droit de l’Homme doit assumer un rôle direct dans 
l’ordre judiciaire italien, consentant ainsi au juge d’en utiliser les préceptes soit comme 
modèle herméneutique, soit comme règle en cas de conflits avec le droit national.
Il est donc évident que le rôle du juge, singulièrement considéré, est déterminant 
dans les problèmes que nous sommes en train d’affronter.
3.1. Justice juridique et justice essentielle
L’accueil de la jurisprudence CEDH peut devenir pour le juge italien une occasion 
pour un rapprochement possible de la justice « juridique » à l’essentiel, à travers une 
activité herméneutique sensible aux instances transnationales et à l’évolution de 
l’éthique.
Sur le juge cependant continue à s’accabler un risque disciplinaire et juridique 
qui, d’une façon ou de l’autre, peut limiter la liberté des choix herméneutiques.
En effet, malgré la liberté reconnue, le juge subit de cette manière des liens “en-
vironnementaux” qui peuvent le porter vers une limitation de l’ouverture hermé-
neutique.
Dans cette perspective le juge risque aussi de nuire considérablement à sa propre 
image et à sa carrière.
Mais le risque le plus grand est d’assister à une tentative constante de décharger 
les responsabilités sur d’autres organes (Cour Constitutionnelle, Cour de Justice), en 
évitant ainsi de prendre la responsabilité des décisions qui ne sont pas soutenues par 
la normative spécifique.
4. Considérations finales
Le problème n’a pas une solution facile.
En effet le sujet est lié à la sensibilité éthique et culturelle, soit du juge soit du 
législateur.
Dans l’application pratique il est réel certainement le risque d’une dichotomie 
d’application entre juges de générations différentes. Sur le point, il y a une étude 
intéressante dell’ANM sur les effets liés au “renouvellement” de la Cour de Cassa-
tion, même si avec référence aux décisions de caractère général.
à mon avis il est donc opportun d’avoir une intervention législative en matière 
ou une indication politique claire, qui permettent aux juges d’appliquer une règle et 
de vérifier dans les sièges institutionnels internes et transnationaux le contraste entre 
les débuts concernant l’appartenance à l’Union Européenne et la Convention pour 
la Sauvegarde des Droits de l’Homme.
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Il est certainement nécessaire d’offrir une formation adéquate aux magistrats. Le 
problème est très délicat parce que la formation peut involontairement conditionner 
la liberté du juge, et, donc, il est certainement préférable de charger les juges de 
l’organisation de leur propre formation.
réflexions sur l’offiCe du juge
Julien Henninger
Abstract
This article discusses the role of the judicial branch regarding LGBT rights, drawing on 
the broader question of equality. It seems that there should be a necessary self-restraint 
from the judiciary on politically or socially charged questions. Societal choices ought to be 
made by a public debate and not by a secret judicial conference in which votes are tallied. 
The French “Conseil constitutionnel” leaves a margin of discretion to the legislative 
power, as the ECHR sometimes does to the States. Judges, whose decisions are subject to 
appeal, have to be even more careful. If courts and tribunals must strike down any provi-
sion that is discriminatory, judges should keep in mind that there is a thin difference be-
tween political and judicial judgments.
* * *
L’égalité peut recevoir plusieurs définitions, et puisqu’il faut choisir un point de 
départ, voilà le considérant type du Conseil constitutionnel français sur la question : 
« le principe d’égalité ne s’oppose ni à ce que le législateur règle de façon différente 
des situations différentes ni à ce qu’il déroge à l’égalité pour des raisons d’intérêt 
général pourvu que, dans l’un et l’autre cas, la différence de traitement qui en résulte 
soit en rapport avec l’objet de la loi qui l’établit »1. Le principe d’égalité ne signifie 
donc nullement une stricte et universelle égalité juridique ; toutefois, les différences 
de traitement doivent être justifiées, sous peine de devenir des discriminations et 
d’être sanctionnées par le juge.
L’office du juge peut sembler aisé à définir : il lui appartient de sanctionner une 
pratique discriminatoire, et de faire respecter le principe d’égalité. C’est donc lui 
qui, in fine, va tracer la frontière entre ce qui est une différence de situation – lé-
gale2 –, et ce qui constitue une discrimination – illégale –. Il n’est pas ici question de 
se demander où doit se situer cette frontière, mais de s’interroger sur la place du 
juge dans ce contrôle. L’office du juge est de trancher le litige, de donner une solu-
tion au différend présenté par les parties. Mais son office « reste lié aux fonctions 
1 Rédaction constante, voir notamment Conseil constitutionnel, 7 janvier 1988, n° 87-232 DC.
2 Dans un sens large de la légalité, soit la conformité aux normes supérieures.
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que lui reconnaît le système juridique et aux missions qui lui sont dévolues. Certes, 
cela implique une certaine marge de liberté et d’initiative. Mais cela suppose surtout 
que le juge soit encadré par des normes qu’il doit mettre en œuvre, interpréter et 
appliquer, ainsi que par les limites du litige, essentiellement sinon uniquement tra-
cées par les prétentions des parties »3. La question de sa marge de liberté et d’initia-
tive reste posée en doctrine, et les points de vue sont très opposés entre le point de 
vue selon lequel la puissance « de juger est en quelque façon nulle »4 et celui qui fait 
du juge le véritable créateur de la norme5. Ces quelques pages n’ont certainement 
pas pour objectif de trancher ce débat, mais de proposer un rapide état des lieux 
(très franco-français) du traitement judiciaire des questions LGBT et de soumettre 
quelques réflexions sur l’office du juge.
1. Le Conseil constitutionnel français
Le Conseil constitutionnel reste prudent dans son contrôle de constitutionnalité des 
lois, cherchant à ne pas substituer son appréciation à celle du législateur. Il refuse 
parfois de procéder à un réel contrôle de proportionnalité et lui préfère un contrôle 
dit de l’erreur manifeste d’appréciation.
Deux décisions récentes liées aux questions LGBT illustrent cela. Tout d’abord, 
sur la question de l’adoption réservée aux seuls couples mariés, il a jugé qu’«  en 
maintenant le principe selon lequel la faculté d’une adoption au sein du couple est 
réservée aux conjoints, le législateur a, dans l’exercice de la compétence que lui at-
tribue l’article 34 de la Constitution, estimé que la différence de situation entre les 
couples mariés et ceux qui ne le sont pas pouvait justifier, dans l’intérêt de l’enfant, 
une différence de traitement quant à l’établissement de la filiation adoptive à l’égard 
des enfants mineurs ; qu’il n’appartient pas au Conseil constitutionnel de substituer 
son appréciation à celle du législateur sur les conséquences qu’il convient de tirer, 
en l’espèce, de la situation particulière des enfants élevés par deux personnes de 
même sexe »6. Puis, à propos de l’interdiction du mariage entre personnes de même 
sexe, qu’« en maintenant le principe selon lequel le mariage est l’union d’un homme 
et d’une femme, le législateur a, dans l’exercice de la compétence que lui attribue 
l’article 34 de la Constitution, estimé que la différence de situation entre les couples 
de même sexe et les couples composés d’un homme et d’une femme peut justifier 
3 Jean-Louis Bergel, « Introduction générale », colloque sur L’office du juge, organisé au Sénat les 29 
et 30 septembre 2006, <http://www.senat.fr/colloques/office_du_juge/office_du_juge1.html>.
4 Montesquieu, L’Esprit des lois, Livre XI, chapitre VI, p. 50,
<http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/montesquieu/de_esprit_des_lois/partie_2/esprit_des_lois_
Livre_2.pdf>.
5 Voir par exemple la théorie réaliste de l’interprétation de Michel Troper, voir notamment « Le 
positivisme juridique », Pour une théorie juridique de l’État (PUF, 1994), p. 35.
6 Conseil constitutionnel, 6 octobre 2010, n° 2010-39 QPC.
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une différence de traitement quant aux règles du droit de la famille ; qu’il n’appar-
tient pas au Conseil constitutionnel de substituer son appréciation à celle du légis-
lateur sur la prise en compte, en cette matière, de cette différence de situation »7.
Le législateur et le Conseil constitutionnel n’ont donc pas le même rôle, puisque, 
selon la formulation constante, il « n’appartient pas au Conseil constitutionnel de 
substituer son appréciation à celle du législateur ».
Le contrôle doit toutefois se diviser en deux temps : il faut tout d’abord vérifier 
la présence d’une différence de situation, puis que le traitement de cette différence 
est légal. Dans les deux décisions précitées, le Conseil ne conteste pas qu’il existe 
une différence de situation (ici entre couples mariés et non-mariés, et entre couples 
de même sexe et couples composés d’un homme et d’une femme), et l’on doit en 
déduire qu’il estime qu’elle existe bien. Il est pourtant de son office de vérifier que 
la différence de situation est réelle et il a déjà pu censurer un texte fiscal qui « abou-
tit à traiter différemment […] des contribuables qui peuvent être placés dans des 
conditions quasiment identiques »8. Cette appréciation de l’existence de situations 
différentes a été effectuée dans plusieurs décisions, sur des questions diverses, et 
sans qu’il apparaisse que le Conseil constitutionnel procède à autre chose qu’un 
contrôle de proportionnalité9.
Une fois cette différence de situation constatée, il reste à apprécier les consé-
quences à tirer de celle-ci, puisque rien « n’oblige à traiter différemment des per-
sonnes se trouvant dans des situations différentes »10. C’est ici que l’office du juge 
est particulier, et le conduit à accepter que le législateur conserve une marge de 
manœuvre sur les conséquences juridiques à tirer de cette différence. Ce raisonne-
ment est constant, et est notamment repris, depuis une décision de 1974 sur l’inter-
ruption volontaire de grossesse, par la formule « l’article 61 de la Constitution ne 
confère pas au Conseil constitutionnel un pouvoir général d’appréciation et de dé-
cision identique à celui du Parlement, mais lui donne seulement compétence pour 
se prononcer sur la conformité à la Constitution des lois déférées à son examen »11. 
Celle-ci fut complétée par la formulation « il n’appartient pas au Conseil constitu-
tionnel de substituer sa propre appréciation à celle du législateur » dans une déci-
sion de 198112. Cette retenue apparait dans des domaines variés, tels que la défini-
tion des peines et délits13 ou en matière électorale14, et la démarche suivie par le 
7 Conseil constitutionnel, 28 janvier 2011, n° 2010-92 QPC.
8 Conseil constitutionnel, 3 juillet 1986, n° 86-209 DC.
9 Sur la différence de situations entre cadres selon la taille des entreprises, Conseil constitution-
nel, 20 juillet 1983, n° 83-162 DC ; ou sur la nature juridiques des banques, Conseil constitution-
nel, 16 janvier 1982, n° 81-132 DC.
10 Conseil constitutionnel, 29 décembre 2003, n° 2003-489 DC.
11 Conseil constitutionnel, 15 janvier 1975, n° 74-54 DC.
12 Conseil constitutionnel, 20 janvier 1981, n° 80-127 DC.
13 Ibid.
14 Voir par exemple, Conseil constitutionnel, 18 novembre 1986, n° 86-218 DC.
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Conseil constitutionnel dans les décisions récentes liées aux questions LGBT s’ins-
crit dans une jurisprudence classique.
Notons enfin que si le Conseil constitutionnel laisse toute liberté au législateur 
pour estimer que le mariage est l’union d’un homme et d’une femme, il ressort d’une 
lecture a contrario de sa décision du 28 janvier 2011, puis « qu’il n’appartient pas au 
Conseil constitutionnel de substituer son appréciation à celle du législateur sur la prise 
en compte, en cette matière, de cette différence de situation »15, que si le législateur 
français décidait d’autoriser le mariage entre personnes de même sexe, la loi qui pro-
céderait à cette modification du Code civil serait conforme à la Constitution. Rien 
dans la Constitution ne semble ni interdire ni autoriser le mariage homosexuel et c’est 
au législateur (et non au juge) de procéder à ce choix. L’office du juge n’est donc pas 
infini, et il faut admettre qu’il existe des domaines précis où il ne peut apporter aucune 
réponse juridique. Cette marge de manœuvre laissée au législateur peut sûrement se 
rapprocher de la doctrine des political questions développée aux États-Unis par la 
Cour suprême16. Il est des questions qui « par leur nature politique, ou qui, par la 
Constitution ou par les lois, sont soumises à la branche exécutive, ne peuvent être 
soumises »17 aux tribunaux. Un des critères développés par la Cour suprême lui per-
met de refuser de trancher au fond une question si elle ne peut être décidée sans un 
choix initial de politique qui ne peut dépendre de l’appréciation du juge18.
2. Le juge ordinaire
Cette retenue existe également pour le juge ordinaire, qui doit lui aussi apprécier ce 
qui est de son office. La retenue semble nécessairement devoir être plus importante 
pour les juges du fond. En effet, une décision de justice qui déclarerait pour la pre-
mière fois illégale une différence de situation doit de manière préférentielle venir des 
juridictions placées au sommet de la hiérarchie judiciaire. En tout cas, il semble op-
portun qu’un revirement de jurisprudence ou qu’une création jurisprudentielle impor-
tante provienne de la juridiction qui a la compétence de cassation19. Cela nous semble 
d’autant plus vrai quand la question est sensible, politiquement ou socialement. Le 
juge de première instance doit être particulièrement prudent et se demander s’il est 
bien de son office de juger dans un sens qui ne sera peut-être pas celui retenu par un 
15 Voir Conseil constitutionnel, 27 janvier 2011, op. cit.
16 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-219 (1962).
17 « Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to 
the executive, can never be made in this court »? Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803);
18 « The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion », Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
19 Prudence de langage liée au fait que le Conseil d’État, juge de cassation de l’ordre administra-
tif, a également des compétences de première instance et d’appel. Peu importante qu’il procède à 
une nouveauté jurisprudentielle en cassation ou en première instance.
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autre juge, les divergences de jurisprudence entre tribunaux entrainant de sérieuses 
questions de sécurité juridique, de prévisibilité et d’uniformité de la règle.
La question de l’adoption illustre ces difficultés. Pour pouvoir adopter un enfant 
en France, une personne ou un couple doit se voir délivrer un agrément par l’admi-
nistration. Le parcours contentieux de Mlle B. est topique. Celle-ci souhaite adop-
ter, mais l’agrément nécessaire lui a été refusé en 1998 et 1999 à raison de son ho-
mosexualité (explicitement ici, la décision se fondait sur « l’absence d’image ou de 
référent paternels susceptibles de favoriser le développement harmonieux d’un en-
fant adopté, et, d’autre part, sur la place qu’occuperait [son] amie dans la vie de 
l’enfant »20). Ce motif fut considéré comme illégal, et le refus d’agrément annulé par 
le tribunal administratif de Besançon, juridiction de première instance, en 200021. La 
cour administrative de Nancy, sur appel de l’autorité administrative, a tranché cette 
question dans un sens contraire, dans une formulation prudente. Le refus pouvait 
légalement être opposé à la requérante, « eu égard à ses conditions de vie et malgré 
des qualités humaines et éducatives certaines, ne présentait pas des garanties suffi-
santes sur les plans familial, éducatif et psychologique pour accueillir un enfant 
adopté »22. Il convient d’ailleurs de noter que cet arrêt a été rendu non seulement 
dans un délai particulièrement court, mais également par la formation plénière de la 
cour, qui est la plus solennelle prévue par les textes. Cet arrêt fut confirmé en cassa-
tion par le Conseil d’État23, et les conclusions du commissaire du gouvernement 
rappelaient à cette occasion que « c’est au législateur qu’il revient en premier lieu de 
se prononcer  »24. Les décisions de la cour administrative d’appel et du Conseil 
d’État étaient conformes à ce qui était alors la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne 
des droits de l’homme25.
Mlle B. décida toutefois de poursuivre son action en justice devant la Cour de 
Strasbourg, qui décida en sa faveur, en retenant que « si les raisons avancées pour une 
telle distinction se rapportaient uniquement à des considérations sur l’orientation 
sexuelle de la requérante, la différence de traitement constituerait une discrimination 
au regard de la Convention »26. Mlle B. demanda alors une nouvelle fois que lui soit 
délivré un agrément, demande rejetée en 2009, mais non pour des motifs liées à son 
orientation sexuelle, mais pour des «  divergences conséquentes  »27 sur le projet 
d’adoption entre elle et sa compagne. Ce refus fut annulé par le tribunal administra-
tif de Besançon, qui a enjoint que soit délivré à Mlle B. l’agrément demandé28.
20 Voir la décision TA Besançon, 24 février 2000, Mlle B., n° 990541.
21 Ibid.
22 CAA Nancy, 21 décembre 2000, Mlle B., n° 00NC00375.
23 CE, 5 juin 2002, Mlle B., n° 250333.
24 Pascale Fombeur, conclusions sous CE, 5 juin 2002, op. cit.
25 CEDH, 26 février 2002, Fretté c/ France, n° 36515/97.
26 CEDH, 22 janvier 2008, E.B. c/ France, n° 43546/02.
27 TA Besançon, 10 novembre 2009, Mme B, n° 0900299.
28 Ibid.
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Ce long récit n’a pas pour unique but de détailler la vie contentieuse d’un dossier 
qui a conduit la Cour européenne à une importante décision et à un revirement de 
sa propre jurisprudence. Il vise surtout à rappeler que si l’on parle d’office du juge, 
il nous semble que les juges ne peuvent avoir le même comportement en fonction 
du degré de juridiction. L’on peut saluer l’audace du tribunal administratif de Be-
sançon, qui dès 2000 a anticipé la solution définitive qui sera la sienne neuf ans plus 
tard. Mais était-il de son office de juge de première instance de décider que l’homo-
sexualité de Mlle B. ne pouvait fonder un refus d’agrément, et ce en contradiction 
avec la jurisprudence contemporaine ? Il était plus prudent, d’un strict point de vue 
de cohérence juridique, (et de sécurité juridique !) d’attendre que le Conseil d’État, 
et après la décision Fretté de 2002 la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, se 
prononcent sur la question.
Pour atténuer cette règle de prudence, il faut dire que les juges de première ins-
tance peuvent (doivent ?) parfois servir d’aiguillon aux infléchissements de jurispru-
dence. Toutefois, les conséquences d’une création jurisprudentielle en premier res-
sort ne doivent pas être sous-estimées. Tout d’abord, elle fait entrer les requérants 
dans un jeu de roulette géographique : ceux qui habitent dans le ressort du tribunal 
audacieux obtiendront gain de cause, leurs voisins auront une fortune différente. 
Ensuite, elle soulève au dessus du requérant qui obtient gain de cause l’épée de 
Damoclès de l’appel ou de la cassation. Mlle B. n’a obtenu qu’une victoire très tem-
poraire en 2000, et l’agrément obtenu devant le juge de première instance29 a dis-
paru quelques mois plus tard quand cette décision a été annulée en appel. S’il est 
parfois nécessaire et salutaire que les juges du fond fassent preuve d’audace, il ne 
faut pas sous-estimer le risque d’incertitude juridique qui pèse sur le requérant qui 
en bénéficie.
3. La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme
La Cour se trouve dans une situation comparable30 avec la marge d’appréciation 
laissée aux États membres. Cette marge est même souvent au cœur de son contrôle, 
et les exemples contentieux déjà cités sur l’adoption par une personne célibataire 
homosexuelle le rappellent. Dans sa décision Fretté c/ France de 2002, la Cour 
« avait accepté que les autorités nationales disposent d’une large marge d’apprécia-
tion lorsqu’elles sont appelées à se prononcer dans un tel domaine »31. Les opinions 
dissidentes dans la décision E.B. c/ France de 2008, qui infirme cette position, rap-
pellent à plusieurs occasions que cette question devait, au sens de certains juges, 
29 Le tribunal administratif de Besançon avait déjà enjoint à l’autorité administrative de délivrer 
sous quinze jours l’agrément demandé.
30 Voir notamment Mireille Delmas-Marty et Marie-Laure Izorche, « Marge nationale d’apprécia-
tion et internationalisation du droit » (2000) Revue internationale de droit comparé, p. 754.
31 CEDH, 22 janvier 2008, E.B. c/ France, n° 43546/02, point 70.
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continuer à relever de la marge d’appréciation des États32. La question de la marge 
d’appréciation est classique et a pu par exemple jouer récemment dans les deux 
décisions Lautsi sur la présence de crucifix dans les écoles italiennes33  : elle n’est 
donc pas propre aux questions LGBT.
4. En conclusion
La frontière entre le droit et la politique est certainement poreuse et fluctuante dans 
le temps, mais il faut rappeler que le juge n’a pas la même marge de manœuvre que 
le législateur34. Il est d’ailleurs préférable que cela ne soit pas le cas : les choix de 
société doivent être faits non dans le secret d’un délibéré, mais par un débat et un 
choix publics. Si certaines questions relèvent en priorité de la décision politique, 
cela ne signifie en rien qu’elles échappent au contrôle du juge35, mais simplement 
que les normes supérieures qui s’imposent à celui qui édicte la règle ne lui comman-
dent pas la solution. Dans certaines limites toujours présentes, il est donc légal 
d’interdire comme il est légal d’autoriser. L’office du juge s’arrête donc là où com-
mence le choix politique. Cette frontière, certes fixée de manière définitive par le 
juge, ne lui appartient pas entièrement, et il ne peut ici faire abstraction de la teneur, 
au moment où il statue, du débat politique.
32 Idem, voir les opinions dissidentes, explicitement des Juges Loucaides et Mularoni.
33 « Le choix de la présence de crucifix dans les salles de classe des écoles publiques relève en 
principe de la marge d’appréciation de l’Etat défendeur », CEDH, Grande chambre, 18 mars 
2011, Lautsi c/ Italie, n° 30814/06 ; voir également dans la même affaire la décision de la deu-
xième section du 3 novembre 2009.
34 Dans un sens strict, ou dans le sens plus large de celui qui fait les règles générales et imperson-
nelles.
35 Cela est rappelé explicitement tant par la Cour suprême des États-Unis que par la CEDH.

médiaTion eT ConCiliaTion dans les liTiges 
en maTière de disCriminaTion
Chrysoula Malisianou
Résumé
Les modes alternatifs de règlement des conflits connaissent un véritable essor en France. 
Outre la médiation décidée par certains juges ou autorités du secteur public, il existe 
parmi les modes alternatifs de résolution des différends, ceux qui ont été mis en œuvre par 
la haute autorité de lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité (ci-après la HALDE), 
pendant ses six années et demi d’existence. Il s’agit de la médiation, du règlement amiable 
et de la mission de bons offices. Ces procédures, qui n’appellent aucune participation fi-
nancière des parties, ont permis la résolution amiable des conflits, en instaurant ou en 
restaurant un dialogue entre les parties, tout en dégageant une solution tenant compte des 
intérêts de chacun.
Depuis le 1er mai 2011, le Défenseur des droits, qui a notamment succédé à la HALDE, 
poursuit la mise en œuvre de ces procédures. Le règlement des différends par ses délé-
gués est désormais inscrit dans la loi (article 37 de la loi organique n° 2011-333 du 29 
mars 2011 relative au Défenseur des droits) et il peut proposer une médiation (article 26 
de cette loi). Il reste toutefois à déterminer les modalités d’intervention de ce nouveau 
médiateur défenseur.
Abstract
Alternative dispute resolutions are booming in France. In addition to mediation decided 
by some judges or public sector authorities, there are other alternative dispute resolutions 
that were implemented by the High Authority against Discrimination and for Equality 
(hereinafter HALDE) during its six and a half years of existence. One is mediation, the 
amicable settlement and the mission of good offices. These procedures, which require no 
financial contribution of the parties, allow the amicable resolution of conflicts by establish-
ing or restoring a dialogue between the parties, while generating a solution taking into 
account the interests of everyone.
Since May 1st 2011, the Defender of rights, which notably succeeded HALDE, continues 
the implementation of these procedures. The settlement of disputes by its delegates is now 
enshrined in the law (article 37 of organic law No. 2011-333 of 29 March 2011 on the 
Defender of rights) and the Defender may propose mediation (article 26 of that act). How-
ever the modalities of intervention of the new mediator defender remain to be determine.
* * *
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L’essor en France des modes alternatifs de règlement des conflits1, depuis les années 
1980-1990, est lié au constat des limites du système judiciaire lui-même. Il s’agit, par 
leur biais, de répondre à certains des dysfonctionnements de la justice (encombre-
ment, lenteur, coût, complexité et distance).
Parmi ces modes alternatifs de résolution des différends, il existe en France la 
procédure de médiation qui peut être décidée par certains juges (pénal, civil) ou par 
d’autres autorités du secteur public (par exemple : le médiateur de l’éducation na-
tionale, le médiateur de la Poste, le médiateur des ministères de l’économie et du 
budget…). Ainsi, on constate une multiplication des acteurs principalement publics, 
à qui sont confiées, à titre bénévole ou non, des missions de médiation, conciliation 
ou de règlement amiable.
Concernant plus particulièrement, les litiges dans lesquels la violation du prin-
cipe de non-discrimination est soulevée, c’est la HALDE, qui pendant ses six années 
et demi d’existence a été l’initiatrice et, donc au cœur, des modes alternatifs de rè-
glement des conflits en cette matière.
L’intégration de la médiation notamment dans les missions de la HALDE vient 
de l’observation de ce qu’une structure comparable existant au Canada (la Commis-
sion des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse du Québec) traite 85 % 
des dossiers de discrimination par voie de médiation2.
Jusqu’au 1er mai 2011, date de sa fusion au sein du Défenseur des droits (ci-après 
le Défenseur), la HALDE a mis en œuvre la médiation, le règlement amiable et les 
bons offices.
Ainsi, au niveau de la HALDE, il convient de distinguer les missions de bons 
offices, conduites par ses 130 correspondants locaux ou ses 6 délégués régio-
naux3, qui interviennent localement sur toute l’étendue du territoire français4, en 
amont de toute instruction, des règlements amiables confiés à ses chargés d’en-
quête ou juristes au siège de l’institution à Paris. Il faut également distinguer ces 
deux procédures, des médiations confiées à des tiers par le Collège de la HALDE 
après une instruction ayant mis en évidence au moins une forte présomption de 
discrimination.
L’esprit de ces procédures, qui n’appellent aucune participation financière des 
parties, est le même et l’objectif poursuivi commun : trouver une solution de ma-
nière amiable en instaurant ou en restaurant un dialogue entre les parties, suscep-
tible de dégager une solution tenant compte des intérêts de chacun. Dans les trois 
1 Il s’agit d’alternatives à une procédure contentieuse dans un différend portant sur des droits 
dont les parties ont la libre disposition.
2 En outre, la Grande-Bretagne, les Etats-Unis, la Suède, l’Irlande et la Belgique ont également 
une expérience importante en matière de médiation menée soit par des organismes indépendants 
de lutte contre les discriminations, soit par des organismes spécialisés dans la médiation.
3 Au 31 décembre 2010.
4 Au 31 décembre 2010, il existait 203 lieux de permanences des correspondants locaux dans 78 
départements.
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cas, il s’agit de l’action d’un agent de la HALDE ou d’un professionnel extérieur à 
celle-ci ayant pour finalité de contribuer à résoudre à l’amiable un différend.
La majorité de ces procédures visent à permettre aux victimes de rester dans leur 
emploi tout en assurant la réparation du préjudice subi. Elles ne sont proposées que 
s’il s’agit de la solution la plus efficace pour faire cesser le différend dans l’intérêt 
des parties.
Il existe ainsi un proverbe selon lequel « un mauvais arrangement vaux mieux 
qu’un bon procès », dans la mesure où d’aucuns estiment que la conciliation entre les 
parties est toujours plus profitable que le conflit. Ainsi, considérés par certains 
comme le vrai remède à tous les différends, ils suscitent également méfiance et hos-
tilité. Au-delà de ce débat, c’est au travers de l’examen de leur efficacité qu’il 
convient d’apprécier les modes alternatifs de règlement des conflits.
Il est vrai que les procès ou les recommandations générales émises par le Collège 
de la HALDE sont très importants en termes de pédagogie et d’exemplarité, néces-
saires au changement des mentalités en matière de discrimination, car leur retentis-
sement est souvent considérable. Toutefois, outre que les procédures de médiation, 
de règlement amiable ou de bons offices pratiquées par la HALDE revêtent parfois 
également ce caractère pédagogique (cf. infra), il s’agit de procédures très efficaces 
qui permettent aux victimes, tant de recouvrer leur dignité, que d’obtenir des répa-
rations morales et matérielles importantes.
Ainsi, sur les 12 467 réclamations enregistrées en 2010 par la HALDE, plus de 
450 dossiers ont trouvé une solution grâce aux bons offices et règlements amiables 
mis en œuvre par ses correspondants locaux ou ses chargés d’enquête et juristes. De 
telles procédures sont réellement montées en puissance ces dernières années.
En outre, depuis sa création, 63,5 % des médiations décidées par le Collège de 
la HALDE ont abouti à un accord satisfaisant pour les parties. En 2010, sur 279 
dossiers présentés au Collège, 19 médiations ont été décidées par ce dernier.
Par suite, c’est de l’expérience de la HALDE dont il sera principalement fait état 
dans la présente contribution. Nous verrons que, s’agissant de procédures juridique-
ment encadrées répondant à des conditions précises (1), dont la mise en œuvre re-
quiert des modalités particulières  (2), elles ont permis la résolution efficace de 
nombreux conflits dont la HALDE a été saisie (3).
1. Des procédures juridiquement encadrées répondant à des conditions précises
La médiation, le règlement amiable ou les bons offices pratiqués par la HALDE, 
pendant ses six années et demi d’existence, tant dans le secteur public, que le sec-
teur privé, sont des procédures encadrées par le droit (1.1), qui ne sont ni un mar-
chandage, ni une négociation entre les parties pour régler un différend. Ces procé-
dures se poursuivent au sein du Défenseur (1.2).
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1.1. Au sein de la HALDE
a. Missions et pouvoirs
Il convient de faire un point sur les missions et pouvoirs qui étaient dévolus à la 
HALDE et qui se retrouvent aujourd’hui au sein du Défenseur.
La HALDE, autorité administrative indépendante, a été crée par la loi n° 2004-
1486 du 30 décembre 2004. Elle était «  compétente pour connaître de toutes les 
discriminations, directes ou indirectes, prohibées par la loi ou par un engagement 
international auquel la France est partie » (article 1er de la loi n° 2004-1486 du 30 
décembre 2004 portant création de la HALDE). Ainsi, chargée de lutter contre 
toutes les formes de discriminations en France, il lui incombait de traiter les récla-
mations individuelles dont elle était saisie et de celles dont elle se saisissait d’office.
Elle avait ainsi pour tâche d’accompagner les victimes de discrimination dans la 
constitution de leur dossier, ainsi que d’identifier les procédures adaptées à leur cas 
et de promouvoir les bonnes pratiques afin de passer d’une égalité formelle à une 
égalité réelle.
Pour ce faire, des pouvoirs d’investigation importants lui ont été attribués, qu’elle 
a mis en œuvre pour instruire les réclamations dont elle a été saisie. La HALDE avait 
ainsi autorité sur les personnes publiques et privées pour obtenir toute information et 
tout document qu’elle jugeait nécessaire (pouvoir de vérification sur place ; d’entendre 
toute personne dont elle juge l’audition nécessaire  ; de demander à toute personne 
physique ou morale et aux personnes publique des explications et la communication 
d’informations ou de documents utiles au dossier ; de mettre en demeure le mis en 
cause de lui répondre dans le délai qu’elle fixe et de saisir le juge des référés afin qu’il 
ordonne toute mesure d’instruction qu’il juge utile).
Si, à l’issue de cette enquête, la personne mise en cause n’arrivait pas à faire échec à 
la présomption de discrimination résultant du dossier, le Collège de la HALDE pouvait 
décider entre plusieurs solutions envisageables : émettre des recommandations géné-
rales ou particulières qui pouvaient être rendues publiques par le bais de rapports 
spéciaux ; présenter des observations devant les juridictions civiles, pénales ou adminis-
tratives en qualité d’expert du droit de la discrimination, de sa propre initiative (dans 
ce cas son audition était de droit), ou à la demande des parties ; s’agissant des faits 
constitutifs d’une discrimination au sens pénal  : le dossier pouvait être transmis au 
Procureur de la République, une transaction pénale pouvait être proposée ou, encore, 
le mis en cause pouvait directement être cité devant le tribunal. Enfin, une médiation 
pouvait être proposée afin de permettre la résolution amiable des différends.
Ses correspondants locaux, délégués régionaux, ou les agents de sa cellule du 
règlement amiable à Paris pouvaient quant à eux mettre en œuvre des règlements 
amiables ou des missions de bons offices.
b. Le pouvoir de proposer des médiations, des bons offices ou des règlements amiables
L’article 7 de la loi n° 2004-1486 du 30 décembre 2004 précitée disposait que « la 
haute autorité peut procéder ou faire procéder à la résolution amiable des différends 
portés à sa connaissance, par voie de médiation ». Toutefois, les actions de média-
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tion de la HALDE devaient être portées à la connaissance du Procureur de la Répu-
blique lorsque les faits discriminatoires pouvaient constituer un crime ou un délit 
(article 12 de la loi du 30 décembre 2004).
Concernant les modalités de cette médiation et les exigences requises du média-
teur, elles sont fixées par l’article 28 du décret n° 2005-215 du 4 mars 2005 relatif à 
la HALDE5.
S’agissant des bons offices et des règlements amiables, ils trouvaient leur source 
dans une délibération du Collège de la HALDE du 23 avril 2007, qui précisait 
qu’une des missions du correspondant local notamment était de « contribuer à trou-
ver toute solution permettant de traiter une réclamation, fondée sur une discrimina-
tion alléguée lorsque celle-ci ne paraît pas, selon la Direction des affaires juridiques 
de la HALDE, justifier une instruction préalable ».
Des conditions précisent encadrent toutes ces procédures.
c. Les conditions de la médiation
Posées par l’article 28 du décret n° 2005-215 du 4 mars 2005 susmentionné, elles 
résultent également de la pratique de cette procédure au sein de la HALDE :
– la mise en œuvre d’une médiation nécessite l’accord écrit du réclamant et du 
mis en cause ;
– la médiation n’intervient, qu’après une instruction plus ou moins approfondie 
selon les situations à l’égard du réclamant et/ou du mis en cause, menée par le 
Direction des affaires juridiques (DAJ) de la HALDE (par ses chargés d’en-
quête ou ses juristes). Cette instruction permet au minimum de mettre en évi-
dence une présomption de discrimination (des éléments laissant supposer 
l’existence d’une discrimination) ;
– l’existence d’une procédure contentieuse pendante ne fait pas nécessairement 
obstacle à la médiation ;
– la médiation ne peut être décidée que par le Collège de la HALDE, qui invite 
son Président à désigner un médiateur  : un tiers spécialiste extérieur à la 
HALDE. Il s’agit d’avocats-médiateurs formés par la HALDE, qui rencontrent 
les parties. Les médiateurs peuvent ainsi entendre, convoquer et confronter les 
points de vue des parties en vue de parvenir à une résolution amiable ;
– la procédure ne peut en principe excéder 6 mois ;
– enfin, elle se termine par la rédaction d’un protocole d’accord (qui comporte 
les prétentions des deux parties, le cadre juridique et les points d’accord 
conformes à ce cadre juridique) ou d’un procès-verbal de désaccord, dont le 
médiateur est partie et donc signataire. Une copie est laissée aux parties, une 
autre est gardée par la HALDE.
5 En vigueur à la date de la présente contribution.
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d. Les conditions des bons offices et des règlements amiables
Leur mise en oeuvre nécessite :
– l’accord écrit préalable du réclamant ;
– en principe, l’absence de procédure contentieuse pendante ;
– l’absence d’instruction conduite par la DAJ, sauf dans le cas où celle-ci réo-
riente un dossier vers le correspondant  local ou le délégué régional (ainsi, 
l’instruction préalable du dossier n’est pas une condition préalable à leur mise 
en œuvre) ;
– les missions de bons offices sont dévolues aux agents de la HALDE localement 
: ses 130 correspondants locaux ou ses 6 délégués régionaux, qui interviennent 
sur toute l’étendue du territoire français. Dans le cadre de leurs missions de 
bons offices, les correspondants locaux et les délégués régionaux peuvent di-
rectement rencontrer les parties à un différend ;
– le règlement amiable est également exercé par les agents de la HALDE, mais 
seulement au siège de cette institution à Paris. Au sein de sa DAJ, il existe la 
cellule du règlement amiable qui procède à de tels règlements. Cette cellule est 
placée sous la responsabilité d’un juriste spécialiste en la matière, qui dispose 
d’une assistante. Elle comprend également des chargés d’enquête. Toutefois, 
dans ce cadre, les agents de la HALDE ne peuvent rencontrer les parties. Les 
échanges se passent uniquement par courrier ou téléphone ;
– enfin, qu’il s’agisse du règlement amiable ou des bons offices, si les agents de 
la HALDE peuvent inciter les parties à rédiger un accord afin de consacrer 
leurs engagements, ils ne peuvent être partie à cet accord ou en être les signa-
taires.
1.2. Au sein du Défenseur des droits
Le 1er mai 2011, le Défenseur a succédé à la HALDE, ainsi qu’à trois autres autori-
tés administratives indépendantes (le Médiateur de la République, le Défenseur des 
Enfants et la Commission Nationale de Déontologie de la Sécurité).
Considéré comme «  l’Ombudsman le plus puissant d’Europe  »6, ou encore 
comme un « super médiateur »7, il s’agit d’une autorité constitutionnelle indépen-
dante qui reçoit les missions susmentionnées, précédemment dévolues à la HALDE, 
en ce qu’il est chargé « de lutter contre les discriminations, directes ou indirectes, 
prohibées par la loi ou par un engagement international, régulièrement ratifié ou 
approuvé par la France ainsi que de promouvoir l’égalité » (article 4 de la loi orga-
nique n° 2011-333 du 29 mars 2011 relative au Défenseur).
6 Selon le Garde des Sceaux, Ministre de la justice, M. Michel Mercier.
7 H. Portelli, « Le futur Défenseur des droits concentrera des missions dont il ne pourra s’acquit-
ter », entretien publié sur Public Sénat, 12 février 2001, www.publicsenat.fr
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a. Des pouvoirs renforcés et la mission de médiation poursuivie
Les pouvoirs d’enquêtes précités, attribués à la HALDE, sont renforcés au sein du 
Défenseur qui assiste la personne qui s’estime victime dans la constitution de son 
dossier et « l’aide à identifier les procédures adaptées à son cas ».
Ainsi, à titre d’illustration, outre que le caractère secret ou confidentiel notam-
ment des informations ne peut lui être opposé sauf en matière de défense nationale, 
de sûreté de l’Etat ou de politique extérieure, pas plus que le secret de l’enquête ou 
de l’instruction, le fait de ne pas déférer aux convocations du Défenseur, de ne pas 
lui communiquer les informations et pièces utiles à l’exercice de sa mission ou de 
l’empêcher d’accéder à des locaux administratifs ou privés est puni d’un an de pri-
son et de 15 000 € d’amende. Un délit d’entrave à l’exercice de ses missions a ainsi 
été créé. Par ailleurs, un droit de visite étendu au sein des locaux privés notamment 
est prévu. En effet, lorsque l’urgence, la gravité des faits, ou le risque de destruction 
de documents le justifient, la visite du Défenseur pourra se faire sans que le respon-
sable des locaux en ait été informé, sur simple autorisation préalable du juge des 
libertés et de la détention.
Des modalités de règlement des litiges étendues sont également inscrites dans la 
loi. Ainsi, le Défenseur peut notamment recommander de régler en équité le diffé-
rend dont il est saisi (article 25 de la loi organique n° 2011-333 du 29 mars 2011) et 
il poursuit la mission de médiation. Il « peut procéder à la résolution amiable des 
différends portés à sa connaissance, par voie de médiation » (article 26 de cette loi). 
Comme au sein de la HALDE, les actions de médiation du Défenseur doivent être 
portées à la connaissance du Procureur de la République, lorsque les faits discrimi-
natoires peuvent constituer un crime ou un délit (article 33 de la loi organique n° 
2011-333 du 29 mars 2011).
Il reste toutefois à déterminer, les modalités d’intervention de ce nouveau média-
teur défenseur, qui pourra se faire soit, par la voie de la nomination d’un profession-
nel extérieur à ses services (comme au sein de la HALDE) soit, par ses services 
eux-mêmes (à l’instar de la procédure appliquée par l’ancien Médiateur de la Répu-
blique), ou encore par le maintien de ces deux options.
b. Les missions de bons offices et de règlements amiables inscrits dans la loi
Le Défenseur peut désigner, sur l’ensemble du territoire ainsi que pour les Français de 
l’étranger, des délégués, placés sous son autorité, qui peuvent, dans leur ressort géo-
graphique, instruire des réclamations et participer au règlement des difficultés signa-
lées ainsi qu’aux actions mentionnées au premier alinéa de l’article 34. Afin de per-
mettre aux personnes détenues de bénéficier des dispositions de la présente loi orga-
nique, il désigne un ou plusieurs délégués pour chaque établissement pénitentiaire8.
Ainsi, ces procédures, désormais inscrites dans la loi, se poursuivent au sein du 
Défenseur. En outre, à la différence de la HALDE, la loi organique relative au Dé-
8 Article 37 de la loi organique relative au Défenseur des droits.
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fenseur, prévoit que ses délégués, compétents pour intervenir sur tout le territoire, 
pourront exercer des pouvoirs d’enquête, ce qui n’était pas le cas des correspon-
dants locaux de la HALDE, mais seulement de ses délégués régionaux et de certains 
de ses agents du siège, à Paris.
Toutefois, au sein du Défenseur, les missions de bons offices et de règlement 
amiable devront se coordonner, principalement, avec l’action des délégués de l’an-
cien Médiateur de la République et des correspondants territoriaux de l’ex Défen-
seur des enfants, également présents sur le territoire français, en vue d’une interven-
tion tout aussi efficace.
Les modalités de ces interventions dépendront des décrets ou des circulaires 
d’application de la loi organique n°  2011-333 du 29 mars 20119. Nous pouvons, 
toutefois, légitimement supposer que les bonnes pratiques, issues des procédures 
mises en œuvre par la HALDE seront reprises au sein du Défenseur.
2. Les modalités de leur mise en œuvre
Il s’agit de préciser les garanties requises des professionnels chargés de la mise en 
œuvre des médiations, bons offices et règlement amiable (2.1), leurs formations 
(2.2), ainsi que les principales étapes de déroulement de ces procédures au sein de 
la HALDE (2.3).
2.1. Les garanties requises des médiateurs extérieurs et agents de la HALDE
Trois principales garanties peuvent être identifiées :
– la neutralité, l’impartialité et l’indépendance par rapport aux parties10. Les 
agents en charge de ces procédures ne sont pas les avocats ou les conseils juri-
diques des réclamants, ou des arbitres. S’agissant plus particulièrement du 
médiateur, celui-ci n’est toutefois pas neutre par rapport au principe de non-
discrimination et doit veiller à ce que l’accord qui est adopté soit conforme à 
ce principe ;
– la confidentialité de la procédure et le respect du secret professionnel. Ainsi, 
une clause de confidentialité accompagne celle du consentement et permet 
ainsi de favoriser un véritable dialogue ;
– enfin, la formation ou l’expérience adaptée à la pratique de la médiation ou du 
règlement amiable et des bons offices dans les litiges en matière de discrimina-
tion.
9 Ils n’ont pas été adoptés à la date de la présente contribution.
10 Pour la médiation, cf. article 29 décret n° 2005-215 du 4 mars 2005 relatif à la HALDE, qui 
précise les conditions auxquelles doit satisfaire le professionnel qui assure l’exécution de cette 
procédure.
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2.2. La formation des médiateurs et agents en charge des bons offices et des règlements 
amiables
Concernant, en premier lieu, la procédure de médiation, des médiateurs compétents 
et formés au droit des discriminations offrant des garanties nécessaires aux usagers 
étaient désignés11.
La HALDE a ainsi formalisé la médiation en matière de discrimination, en vue 
d’assurer l’homogénéité du service offert aux réclamants. Ella a ainsi mis en place 
un réseau de médiateurs sur l’ensemble du territoire français (réseau divisé en sept 
zones géographiques)12.
Elle a également élaboré avec le concours du centre de formation IFOMENE 
(Institut de Formation à la Médiation et à la Négociation), un module de formation 
spécifique à la médiation en matière de discrimination pour les médiateurs qui agis-
sent en son nom sur l’ensemble du territoire (plus d’une cinquantaine d’avocats ont 
été formés dans ce cadre de 2007 à 2009). C’est principalement parmi ces média-
teurs formés, que le Collège de la HALDE invitait son Président à désigner un 
médiateur.
S’agissant, en second lieu, des missions de bons offices ou des règlements 
amiables, ils étaient mis en œuvre par des agents de la HALDE ayant également 
bénéficié d’une formation professionnelle assurée par des médiateurs extérieurs, 
ainsi que par le juriste senior de sa DAJ en charge des correspondants locaux.
2.3. Les étapes du déroulement de la médiation, des bons offices et du règlement amiable
a. La médiation
- Avant la délibération du Collège
Lorsqu’au terme de l’enquête menée, les faits qui permettent de présumer l’exis-
tence d’une discrimination n’ont pas pu être justifiés par le mis en cause par des 
éléments objectifs étrangers à toute discrimination, une médiation pouvait être pro-
posée aux parties par la DAJ de la HALDE ou par ses délégués régionaux.
L’accord de la partie mise en cause était sollicité par le biais d’un courrier qui lui 
était adressé exposant la situation, ainsi que le fait que la médiation proposée per-
mettrait d’établir un dialogue susceptible de dégager un accord tenant compte des 
intérêts de chacun.
Si les parties étaient d’accord pour procéder par voie de médiation, un projet de 
délibération-médiation était préparé par le juriste en charge du dossier. Ce projet 
était présenté au Collège qui, s’il l’adoptait, invitait son Président à nommer un 
médiateur.
11 Cf. article 29 décret n° 2005-215 du 4 mars 2005 relatif à la HALDE.
12 cf. notamment, convention conclue, dès 2005, entre la HALDE et le Conseil National des 
Barreaux en vue de former les avocats médiateurs au droit des discriminations.
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- Après la délibération du Collège
La HALDE a élaboré une procédure spécifique à la médiation en matière de discri-
mination, qui permet notamment de réunir les parties. Même si, à tout moment, 
l’une ou l’autre des parties peut se retirer de la médiation, le déroulement de la 
médiation HALDE comporte des étapes biens définies :
– tout d’abord, un ou plusieurs entretiens individuels avec chacune d’elles (le 
médiateur rencontre d’abord séparément le réclamant et la personne privée ou 
publique mise en cause). Ces entretiens individuels sont déterminants (explica-
tion du déroulement de la médiation, détermination des prétentions des par-
ties, faire prendre conscience au mis en cause du problème, enjeux et prépara-
tion des parties à aller de l’avant vers un accord, rappel des termes de la déli-
bération du Collège et du droit applicable. Par exemple : il expliquera au mis 
en cause que la sélection de candidats en fonction de leur âge constitue une 
discrimination prohibée par la loi) ;
– ensuite, une ou plusieurs réunions plénières avec les parties interviennent, afin 
de dégager l’accord préparé durant le travail préalable. Le rôle du médiateur 
est alors d’aider les parties à trouver un accord équitable sur les bases du droit 
de la non-discrimination ;
– enfin, en cas de succès, il y a signature d’un protocole d’accord de médiation 
ou, à défaut, signature d’un procès-verbal de désaccord.
b. Les bons offices et le règlement amiable
En dehors même de tout cadre formel de règlement amiable ou de bons offices, il 
arrivait souvent que les affaires se règlent à l’amiable du seul fait que les services de 
la HALDE aient fait savoir au mis en cause qu’ils étaient saisis. En effet, la saisine 
de la HALDE, eu égard à son autorité morale, et les premières mesures d’instruc-
tion, voire la simple invocation d’une de ses délibérations pouvait contribuer à inci-
ter les parties à réexaminer leurs positions et aider à une prise de conscience, certes 
tardive, mais efficace13.
Il convient ainsi de se référer à la situation d’un réclamant sourd à 80%, reconnu 
travailleur handicapé, employé par une entreprise de téléphonie en qualité de tech-
nicien qui a saisi la HALDE de son affectation, à la suite de la restructuration de 
l’entreprise, au sein du service hotline de «  relation clientèle ». Dès réception de 
cette réclamation, la HALDE a adressé un courrier de demande d’explications à 
l’entreprise, tout en lui rappelant ses obligations en matière d’aménagement du 
poste de travail d’un travailleur reconnu handicapé. En réponse, l’entreprise a indi-
qué à la HALDE, que conformément aux obligations lui incombant, elle allait très 
prochainement proposer un poste adapté au handicap du réclamant. C’est ainsi, que 
grâce à un simple courrier adressé par la HALDE au mis en cause, la situation du 
réclamant s’est rapidement réglée. Ce dernier ne souhaitant pas aller plus avant dans 
13 Cf. rapport annuel de la HALDE de 2006 sur ce point.
315MÉDIATION ET CONCILIATION DANS LES LITIGES EN MATIÈRE DE DISCRIMINATION
le différend a fait savoir à la HALDE, qu’ayant obtenu un poste correspondant à ses 
attributions et adapté à son handicap, il s’estimait rempli de ses droits.
Dans le cadre de la mise en œuvre formelle des bons offices ou des règlements 
amiables, le correspondant local ou le délégué régional devait tenter d’aller au-delà 
des simples allégations du réclamant. Ainsi, il pouvait l’aider à rassembler des élé-
ments de preuve à sa portée (tels que : contrat de travail, bulletins de paie, dossier 
administratif, attestations…) et prendre contact avec les personnes intervenues en 
faveur du réclamant (telles que les délégués du personnel, les délégués syndicaux). 
Le correspondant ou le délégué devait également : - se rapprocher du mis en cause 
sans être accusateur ; - veiller à demeurer impartial afin de faciliter la restauration 
du dialogue  ; - et, inviter les intéressés à rédiger un accord pour consacrer leurs 
engagements.
Enfin, de telles procédures pouvaient aussi donner lieu à une délibération du 
Collège de la HALDE, par laquelle, il prenait acte de l’accord intervenu entre les 
parties, afin notamment d’en appuyer le caractère pédagogique (cf. infra).
3. L’efficacité de ces procédures
Elle se mesure au travers des avantages liés à ces procédures (3.1), des situations 
spécifiques dans lesquelles elles sont privilégiées (3.2), du suivi assuré en cas d’échec 
(3.3), ainsi que par des illustrations de différends qui ont été résolus par leurs biais 
(3.4 et 3.5).
3.1. Leurs avantages
Il s’agit principalement :
– d’éviter un contentieux lourd ;
– de procédures économiques, dont la mise en œuvre ne requière aucun frais de 
la part des parties ;
– de procédures rapides : surtout s’agissant de la mission de bons offices, dont 
l’intérêt réside notamment dans les délais plus rapides dans lesquelles elle peut 
être entreprise ;
– de permettre aux parties d’être auteurs de la solution ;
– de tenir compte des intérêts de chacun ;
– de ne pas envenimer ou cristalliser un conflit (prévention des tensions, apaise-
ment des parties et responsabilisation des acteurs) ;
– et d’aboutir à une meilleure résolution des conflits, par le biais de solutions 
concrètes et efficaces au profit de la victime afin qu’elle retrouve sa dignité 
(réparations importantes du préjudice tant matériel que moral ; reconnaissance 
de la faute commise et du préjudice subi ; proposition d’un poste adapté à sa 
situation ; faire reconnaître ses droits ; présentation d’excuses…).
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3.2. Situations dans lesquelles elles sont privilégiées
Outre qu’elles peuvent correspondre à une attente du réclamant, de telles procé-
dures sont privilégiées dans des situations où celui-ci est toujours en poste et concer-
nant lesquelles il paraît plus opportun de ne pas attiser un conflit, tout en essayant 
de concilier les parties.
Il peut également s’agir de situations de discriminations non intentionnelles, 
lorsque le mis en cause ne semble pas de mauvaise foi et que le différend paraît ré-
sulter : - d’une difficulté de communication entre les parties ; - ou d’une méconnais-
sance des textes législatifs ou réglementaires (ex : dispositif en faveur des personnes 
handicapées relatif à l’aménagement raisonnable des postes de travail, à l’accessibi-
lité de la voirie et des lieux ouverts au public, à la priorité d’attribution des loge-
ments sociaux…).
3.3. Le suivi en cas d’échec de ces procédures
Si ces procédures échouaient et n’aboutissaient pas à un accord satisfaisant pour les 
victimes, la HALDE épaulait ces dernières afin d’aboutir à la résolution la plus effi-
cace du conflit encore en suspend.
En effet, en cas d’échec de la médiation, des bons offices, ou du règlement 
amiable une instruction approfondie pouvait être initiée ou poursuivie. Des obser-
vations pouvaient également être présentées devant la juridiction qui avait pu être 
saisie par le réclamant. Les services de la HALDE examinaient alors si cette éven-
tualité était opportune et présentaient, le cas-échéant, un nouveau projet de délibé-
ration-observations au Collège.
Toutefois, il était prévu que lorsqu’il était procédé à une médiation, « les consta-
tations et les déclarations recueillies au cours de celle-ci ne peuvent être ni produites 
ni invoquées ultérieurement dans les instances civiles ou administratives, sans l’ac-
cord des personnes intéressées » (article 7 de la loi n° 2004-1486 du 30 décembre 
2004, susmentionnée).
La loi organique du 29 mars 2011 relative au Défenseur, va plus loin sur ce point. 
Elle dispose que « les constatations effectuées et les déclarations recueillies au cours 
de la médiation ne peuvent être ni produites, ni invoquées ultérieurement dans les 
instances civiles ou administratives sans le consentement des personnes intéressées, 
sauf si la divulgation de l’accord est nécessaire à sa mise en œuvre ou si des raisons 
d’ordre public l’imposent » (par exemple : afin d’assurer l’intégrité physique d’une 
personne, s’agissant du dernier élément de cet article). Les deux derniers points de 
ces dispositions sont repris de la Directive communautaire 2008/52/CE du Parle-
ment Européen et du Conseil du 21 mai 2008 relative à certains aspects de la média-
tion en matière civile et commerciale.
Il convient de se reporter à certains exemples d’échecs de médiations proposées 
par la HALDE, ayant notamment conduit à la présentation d’observations devant le 
juge saisi par le réclamant.
En premier lieu, nous pouvons mentionner la délibération n° 2008-31 du 18 fé-
317MÉDIATION ET CONCILIATION DANS LES LITIGES EN MATIÈRE DE DISCRIMINATION
vrier 2008 relative à une discrimination salariale, dans le secteur de privé, fondée sur 
le sexe. La réclamante avait saisi la HALDE d’une réclamation relative au litige qui 
l’opposait à son employeur, en considérant que sa rémunération était inférieure à 
celle de son collègue placé dans une situation comparable. L’enquête de la HALDE 
a révélé l’existence d’une discrimination salariale fondée sur le sexe et une procé-
dure de médiation a été décidée. Toutefois, après l’échec de cette médiation, la 
HALDE a décidé de présenter ses observations devant le Conseil des Prud’hommes 
saisi, ainsi que devant toute autre juridiction compétente.
Cette affaire est allée jusqu’en cassation et la Cour de cassation a considéré que la 
HALDE était légitime à présenter ses observations dans ce cadre (les observations de 
la HALDE ne méconnaissent pas en elles-mêmes les exigences du procès équitable 
consacré par l’article 6§1 de la Convention Européenne de Sauvegarde des Droits de 
l’Homme et des Libertés Fondamentales, ni le principe de l’égalité des armes ou celui 
du contradictoire notamment). En outre, sur le fond de l’affaire, conformément aux 
observations de la HALDE, la discrimination a été retenue par la Cour14. Celle-ci a 
confirmé son analyse selon laquelle « le principe de l’égalité de rémunération entre 
hommes et femmes pour un même travail ou un travail de valeur égale » devait être 
assuré entre salariés de sexe différent, occupant des fonctions de valeur égale15, sans 
qu’il soit nécessaire que le travail accompli par les salariés soit identique.
On peut également se référer à une autre affaire, dans le secteur public, concer-
nant le rejet discriminatoire d’une candidature à raison de l’âge du candidat, qui 
était en poste lors de la mise en œuvre de la médiation (délibération n° 2010-25 du 
1er février 2010). Le réclamant, infirmier psychiatrique au sein d’un centre hospita-
lier se plaignait des refus successifs d’inscription à la formation de «  cadre», qui 
auraient porté préjudice au déroulement de sa carrière. Il estimait que ces refus 
étaient discriminatoires, car fondés sur son origine et son âge (58 ans à la date du 
dernier refus). Les éléments de l’enquête n’ont pas permis de retenir la discrimina-
tion à raison de l’origine de l’intéressé, une candidate d’origine étrangère ayant ob-
tenu, l’année précédente, la promotion professionnelle pour le diplôme de cadre de 
santé. Toutefois, l’âge du réclamant a été retenu pour refuser l’inscription à cette 
formation, en méconnaissance du principe de non-discrimination, alors que cette 
condition ne répondait pas à une exigence professionnelle essentielle et détermi-
nante et que l’objectif poursuivi n’était pas légitime et l’exigence proportionnée. 
Dans le cadre de la médiation, l’hôpital a reconnu la faute commise à l’égard du 
réclamant et lui a proposé la formation « cadre » souhaitée, ainsi qu’une indemnisa-
tion financière (près de 5000 €). Le réclamant n’a toutefois pas accepté ces proposi-
tions estimant que ses préjudices étaient plus importants. Dans l’éventualité d’un 
recours contentieux initié par le réclamant, le Défenseur pourrait être amené à pro-
duire ses observations.
14 Arrêt du 16 novembre 2010, n° C 09-42.956.
15 Arrêt du 6 juillet 2010, n° 09-40.021.
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Il convient enfin de mentionner, une affaire dans laquelle la première procédure 
de médiation ayant échoué, la nomination d’un nouveau médiateur a été sollicitée 
par les parties, qui a conduit à une indemnisation très importante des préjudices 
subis par le réclamant.
La HALDE avait été saisie par un réclamant, cadre supérieur au sein d’une entre-
prise privée, qui s’estimait victime de discrimination en raison de son orientation 
sexuelle, dans le déroulement de sa carrière. Or, il est apparu, qu’à partir de la révé-
lation de son homosexualité, l’évolution de la carrière du réclamant a été entravée par 
des mesures pouvant s’apparenter à du harcèlement discriminatoire (éviction de la 
direction, périodes sans affectations précises, attribution de fonctions aux responsa-
bilités moindres…). Afin de favoriser la résolution amiable de ce litige, un médiateur 
avait été désigné, dont le mandat avait été renouvelé (délibération n° 2007-151 du 04 
juin 2007). Toutefois, la première médiation décidée s’était soldée par un échec.
La HALDE avait alors poursuivi l’instruction du dossier. Parallèlement à cette 
instruction, les parties avaient poursuivi la recherche d’un accord amiable. C’est 
ainsi, qu’elles ont indiqué à la HALDE qu’elles étaient parvenues à un rapproche-
ment de leurs positions et ont manifesté leur attachement à la présence de la 
HALDE pour concrétiser la conclusion de l’accord transactionnel. Par sa délibéra-
tion n° 2009-309 du 7 septembre 2009, le Collège de la HALDE a décidé de nom-
mer un médiateur. L’accord conclu entre les parties dans ce cadre a conduit à une 
indemnisation très importante des préjudices subis par le réclamant de 100 000 €.
Ainsi, nous allons voir que la procédure de médiation notamment est particulière-
ment efficiente dans le domaine de l’emploi, lorsque l’agent est toujours en fonction.
3.4. Quelques illustrations de médiations réussies
a. L’efficacité de la médiation dans le domaine de l’emploi public lorsque l’agent est en 
poste
C’est au travers des exemples qui suivent, que cette efficacité peut être appréciée.
- Délibération relative aux refus d’accorder la priorité légale prévue pour les muta-
tions au profit d’un agent public handicapé (n° 2010-146 du 14 juin 2010) :
La réclamante, conseillère principale d’éducation, se plaint de refus opposés à ses 
demandes de mutation intra-académique et d’affectation définitive au sein d’un 
établissement scolaire situé dans une ville où se trouvent ses médecins traitant, ainsi 
que d’un défaut d’aménagement de son poste de travail. Elle estime que cette situa-
tion est discriminatoire car elle ne tient pas compte de son handicap.
L’ensemble des éléments du dossier recueillis au cours de l’enquête ne sont pas 
paru suffisants pour écarter la présomption de discrimination à raison de son han-
dicap. Dans le cadre de la médiation décidée par le Collège, les parties sont ainsi 
parvenues à un accord très satisfaisant sur les principaux points débattus. Ainsi, un 
accord a été retenu sur les points suivants : - affectation définitive de la réclamante 
au Lycée qu’elle souhaitait ; - indemnisation des préjudices subis (4800 €) ; - un ac-
cord a également été trouvé s’agissant de son logement de fonction.
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- Délibération relative au rejet d’une candidature à un recrutement sans concours 
d’agents des services hospitaliers qualifiés que la réclamante, déjà en poste au sein 
de l’hôpital, estime fondé sur son âge (n° 2009-296 du 07 septembre 2009) :
La HALDE a été saisie d’une réclamation relative au rejet d’une candidature à un 
recrutement sans concours d’agents des services hospitaliers qualifiés, par le Direc-
teur du centre hospitalier mis en cause. Il s’agissait d’un poste qui lui permettait de 
devenir agent titulaire de la fonction publique hospitalière et de bénéficier de tous 
les avantages induits (par exemple  : accéder à des échelons supérieurs, profiter 
d’une évolution de son traitement, bénéficier notamment de la prime annuelle de 
service…). La réclamante soutenait que le rejet de sa candidature était fondé sur son 
âge (49 ans à la date de sa candidature).
L’instruction menée par la HALDE a permis de retenir que l’âge a été un critère 
de sélection des candidats. Ainsi, l’avis de recrutement à la suite duquel la récla-
mante a présenté sa candidature, comportait une limite d’âge alors que le texte ap-
plicable n’en prévoyait plus.
Dans le cadre de la médiation décidée par le Collège, les parties sont parvenues 
à un accord satisfaisant, sur la réparation du préjudice subi (2000 €). Mais, surtout, 
la réclamante a pu intégrer l’hôpital en qualité d’agent des services hospitaliers qua-
lifiés titulaire, ce qui lui avait été refusé et qui était la cause de la saisine de la 
HALDE.
- Délibération relative à des faits de harcèlement moral discriminatoire à raison des 
convictions d’un fonctionnaire territorial (n° 2009-124 du 2 mars 2009) :
Le réclamant, agent de maîtrise territorial, se plaint d’avoir fait l’objet, de la part de 
l’ancien et du nouveau maire d’une commune, de faits de harcèlement moral en lien 
avec ses convictions. Ces faits tenaient principalement à des brimades, des suppres-
sions de primes, d’indemnités et à des successions de sanctions injustifiées, à une 
procédure de licenciement illégale, ainsi qu’à une réintégration dans des fonctions 
subalternes qui ne correspondaient pas à son grade et ses qualifications. Le récla-
mant soutenait que les faits critiqués étaient liés à ses convictions, qui ont pu le faire 
regarder comme un opposant à l’équipe municipale en place (notamment refus 
d’aider l’ancien maire lors d’une de ses campagnes électorales).
Les éléments du dossier ont permis de retenir que la dégradation de la situation 
professionnelle du réclamant pouvait être regardée comme la conséquence de la si-
tuation de harcèlement discriminatoire critiquée.
Dans le cadre de la médiation décidée par le Collège, les parties sont parvenues 
à un accord sur les principaux points débattus au cours de la médiation, alors que 
tout dialogue était rompu entre elles depuis de nombreuses années  : - la mairie a 
accepté l’indemnisation du réclamant au titre des primes et indemnités qui avaient 
été indûment supprimées, ainsi qu’au titre de certains rappels de salaires (17 700 €, 
ce qui correspondait à peu près un an de salaire pour le réclamant) ; - un accord a 
également été trouvé s’agissant de la position administrative du réclamant au sein de 
la mairie (proposition d’un poste correspondant à son grade et ses compétences).
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- Délibération relative à des refus successifs de transformation d’un emploi à temps 
non complet en un emploi à temps plein en raison de l’origine et de l’état de san-
té (n° 2008-156 du 7 juillet 2008) :
La réclamante, agent d’entretien territorial, se plaint de faire l’objet d’une inégalité 
de traitement dans l’attribution du temps de travail, à raison de son origine et de son 
état de santé, qui tiendrait principalement aux refus répétés de son employeur, le 
Maire, de faire droit à ses demandes de transformation de son emploi à temps non 
complet au sein de la commune en un emploi à temps plein. Elle estimait avoir fait 
l’objet d’un traitement moins favorable que ses collègues en raison de ses origines et 
de son état de santé. Elle alléguait l’absence de prise en compte de la pathologie 
dont elle souffre, l’insuffisance du montant de sa rémunération et se plaignait de son 
régime de sécurité sociale.
Les raisons avancées par la commune n’ont pas pu être considérées comme suf-
fisantes pour justifier la différence de traitement subie par la réclamante.
Dans le cadre de la médiation décidée par le Collège, les parties sont ainsi parve-
nues à un accord très satisfaisant : - concernant sa situation passée, la commune a 
proposé de réparer le préjudice subi par la réclamante en lui allouant une indem-
nité de 10 900 €. - un dossier de maladie professionnelle a également été constitué. 
La réclamante a ainsi donné acte au Maire de ce qu’elle se considérait remplie de ses 
droits, son préjudice ayant étant réparé.
- Délibération relative à des faits de harcèlement moral discriminatoire à raison des 
activités syndicales d’un fonctionnaire territorial (n° 2010-168 du 5 juillet 2010) :
Le réclamant fonctionnaire territorial a saisi la HALDE d’une réclamation relative 
à l’absence d’évolution de sa carrière, qu’il estime discriminatoire en raison de ses 
activités syndicales (délégué syndical pendant de très nombreuses années). Il n’a 
bénéficié d’aucune promotion depuis plusieurs années. Après enquête, le Collège a 
considéré que l’absence de promotion du réclamant pouvait être regardée comme 
susceptible de constituer une différence de traitement à raison de ses activités syn-
dicales et qu’une médiation permettrait d’établir un dialogue entre les parties, qui 
étaient dans une situation conflictuelle depuis des années.
Si les parties ne sont pas parvenues à la signature d’un protocole d’accord formel 
de médiation, le Maire mis en cause a procédé, au cours de la médiation décidée par 
le Collège, à la régularisation de la situation administrative du réclamant, par son 
avancement d’échelon et de grade, qui constituaient les points contestés dans ce 
dossier.
Des exemples topiques permettent également d’appréhender la portée de l’effi-
cacité de la médiation dans le domaine du fonctionnement des services publics.
b. L’efficacité de la médiation dans le domaine du fonctionnement des services publics
- Délibération relative au refus d’un Maire d’accorder à une association l’accès à 
une salle municipale (n° 2009-398 du 14 décembre 2009) :
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La HALDE a été saisie par une association d’une réclamation relative à différentes 
décisions adoptées par une mairie (principalement suppression d’accès à une salle 
municipale pendant plus de deux ans), intervenues pendant et postérieurement à 
une campagne électorale opposant notamment le Maire sortant et certains représen-
tants de l’association. Cette dernière considérait que les décisions critiquées, et le 
comportement du Maire et de son équipe, constituaient une atteinte au principe de 
non-discrimination à raison des convictions religieuses, des origines et des opinions 
politiques de certains de ses membres.
Suite à l’enquête menée par la HALDE, une médiation a été décidée par son 
Collège, qui a permis d’aboutir à un accord satisfaisant sur les principaux points 
débattus, alors que les parties étaient dans une situation de conflit depuis des an-
nées : - le Maire a accepté le principe du rétablissement du droit, de l’association à 
bénéficier d’un local communal ; - ce local communal a été mis à disposition, à titre 
gratuit, afin que l’association puisse y exercer ses activités culturelles ; - afin de per-
mettre à l’association de faire connaître ses activités, elle a bénéficié d’un article dans 
un bulletin périodique d’information de la ville ; - et l’association a renoncé à l’in-
demnisation des préjudices subis.
- Délibération relative au refus d’un rectorat d’agréer une association de défense et 
de protection des personnes homosexuelles pour intervenir en milieu scolaire en 
matière de lutte contre l’homophobie (n° 2008-151 du 7 juillet 2008) :
A quatre reprises, un rectorat a refusé à une association de défense et de protection 
des personnes homosexuelles l’agrément lui permettant d’intervenir en milieu sco-
laire en matière de lutte contre l’homophobie en appui aux activités d’enseignement 
dans les établissements scolaires conformément au décret n°92-1200 du 6 novembre 
1992. En réponse à l’enquête de la HALDE, le recteur a expliqué son dernier refus 
en relevant que « cette question relève de l’espace privé alors que la réglementation 
applicable à l’éducation à la sexualité suppose une éthique dont la règle essentielle 
porte sur la délimitation entre l’espace privé et l’espace public afin que soit garanti 
le respect des consciences, du droit à l’intimité et de la vie privée de chacun ».
Or, dans une affaire similaire, dans le cadre de laquelle la HALDE a présenté ses 
observations devant le juge saisi, la Cour administrative d’appel (CAA) de Nancy a 
jugé que la lutte contre les discriminations fondées sur l’orientation sexuelle et l’ho-
mophobie poursuivait un objectif d’intérêt général et que c’était à la suite d’une 
erreur manifeste d’appréciation que le recteur concerné avait estimé, le projet d’une 
autre association fondé sur la mallette pédagogique « Vivre ses différences, com-
ment parler de l’homophobie  », comme ne satisfaisant pas au critère de qualité 
exigé par les textes applicables (CAA Nancy, 14 février 2008, Association C.G. ; 
délibération de la HALDE, n° 2008-14 du 14 janvier 2008).
En l’espèce, l’association et le rectorat ont néanmoins continué à rechercher un 
accord amiable et une médiation a été décidée par le Collège de la HALDE. Cette 
procédure a conduit à un accord très satisfaisant entre l’association et le rectorat, 
ayant pour objet de créer un projet pilote sur toutes formes de discrimination por-
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tant notamment sur la sexualité et le physique dans certains établissements scolaires 
qui, d’après l’association, « dépasse largement celle de l’agrément ».
3.5. Des illustrations de bons offices et de règlements amiables réussis
a. Des procédures entérinées par délibération du Collège pour l’exemplarité
- Délibération relative au refus opposé par un Préfet de convier officiellement à 
une cérémonie de commémoration de la déportation une association représentant 
les déportés homosexuels (délibération n° 2007-126 14 mai 2007) :
Une association ayant pour objet d’honorer le souvenir des personnes homosexuelles 
qui ont été déportées au titre de leur orientation sexuelle pendant la deuxième guerre 
mondiale a saisi la HALDE du refus opposé par un Préfet, de les convier officielle-
ment à la cérémonie de commémoration de la déportation organisée le dernier di-
manche d’avril, au même titre que les autres associations de déportés.
La HALDE a estimé que non seulement ce refus est illégal (contraire notamment 
à une loi d’avril 1954 qui dispose que « La Nation honore la mémoire de tous les 
déportés sans distinction »), mais qu’il est de surcroît discriminatoire car il ne vise 
qu’à exclure les associations en raison de l’orientation sexuelle de ses membres et 
des déportés qu’ils représentent.
En l’espèce, les premiers actes d’instruction diligentés par la HALDE ont permis 
aux parties de se rapprocher, et le Préfet lui a indiqué que des invitations officielles 
avaient été adressées aux membres de l’association réclamante permettant ainsi à 
ceux-ci de prendre place, pendant la cérémonie, dans le carré des officiels.
L’association ayant informé la HALDE de ce que la cérémonie s’était déroulée 
en tous points sans discrimination, le Collège a pris acte dans sa délibération de 
l’issue favorable de ce dossier.
- Délibération relative à des faits de harcèlement moral discriminatoire à raison de 
l’origine d’un fonctionnaire territorial (n° 2006-198 du 2 octobre 2006) :
Le réclamant agent de salubrité titulaire au sein d’une commune a indiqué avoir été 
l’objet de comportements discriminatoires depuis son arrivée au sein de cette com-
mune, qui se seraient traduits par des faits de harcèlement discriminatoire de la part 
de ses collègues qui l’auraient quotidiennement insulté. Il est le dernier agent d’ori-
gine étrangère de son secteur d’activité, plusieurs de ses collègues ayant successive-
ment démissionné du fait de l’attitude discriminatoire des personnels à leur égard.
Peu après la saisine de la HALDE, une médiation a été proposée au Maire. Tou-
tefois, avant que la médiation ne soit mise en œuvre, le Maire a, d’une part, nommé 
le réclamant sur un nouveau poste conforme à ses souhaits et, d’autre part, fait pro-
céder à la publication, dans le journal interne de la ville, d’un article portant sur les 
droits et devoirs des agents publics, notamment sur le thème de la discrimination 
raciale.
Dans sa délibération, le Collège de la HALDE a pris acte de l’issue positive de 
ce dossier, mais a tenu a rappelé au Maire ses obligations, tenant au fait qu’il in-
combe à l’employeur d’assurer un environnement de travail exempt de toute discri-
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mination et, qu’à ce titre, il devra veiller, ainsi qu’il s’y est engagé, à sanctionner les 
auteurs de comportements racistes et de rendre compte à la HALDE des mesures 
prises à l’encontre des agents impliqués dans le harcèlement dont le réclamant a été 
victime.
- Délibération relative à un déroulement de carrière entravé à raison des activités 
syndicales d’un fonctionnaire territoriale (n° 2006-188 du 18 septembre 2006) 
La HALDE a été saisie par un fonctionnaire territorial de catégorie C employé par 
une commune, au sein de laquelle il est également représentant syndical. En 2003, 
ayant réussi un concours de catégorie B, il a été inscrit sur la liste d’aptitude de ré-
dacteur. Il indique qu’il n’a pas été nommé à ce grade en raison de ses activités 
syndicales et que les droits attachés à son concours risquaient d’être perdus si une 
nomination n’intervenait pas avant juin 2006.
Bien qu’aucun texte légal ou règlementaire n’impose à une collectivité territoriale 
de nommer un fonctionnaire ayant réussi un concours interne, les éléments du dos-
sier laissaient présumer que le réclamant avait été victime d’une discrimination à 
raison de ses activités syndicales.
Alors que la HALDE envisageait de faire procéder à une médiation, le réclamant 
s’est vu proposé un poste de rédacteur. C’est pourquoi, par sa délibération, le Col-
lège a pris acte de l’issue positive de ce dossier, tout en rappelant au Maire ses obli-
gations.
Dans d’autres situations, les règlements amiables ou bons offices ne sont pas 
entérinés par une délibération du Collège.
b. Des procédures mises en œuvre sans délibération du Collège dans d’autres situations
Les exemples qui suivent permettent d’appréhender l’efficacité des missions de 
bons offices, tant dans le domaine de l’emploi, que celui de l’accès à des biens et 
services ou du fonctionnement des services publics16.
- Entrave au déroulement de carrière d’une salariée en raison de son origine :
Une réclamante s’estimait discriminée dans le déroulement de sa carrière en raison 
de son origine. Elle soutenait qu’elle n’avait bénéficié d’aucun avancement depuis 9 
ans alors qu’elle justifiait régulièrement de bonnes évaluations et qu’une de ses col-
lègues, d’origine européenne, moins experte et moins diplômée qu’elle, venait d’être 
promue.
L’intervention du correspondant local a permis qu’un entretien soit consenti à la 
réclamante par son responsable de service, et qu’une proposition de changement de 
poste satisfaisante lui soit présentée.
16 Ces exemples sont tirés d’une note élaborée par Mme Sophie PISK, juriste sénior, en charge 
des correspondants locaux de la HALDE, devenus les délégués du Défenseur des droits.
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- Inégalité de traitement dans les conditions de travail d’un salarié en lien avec son 
origine et son état de santé :
Le réclamant estimait subir une inégalité de traitement en raison de son origine et 
de son état de santé, notamment dans l’aménagement de ses horaires de travail et 
des tâches qui lui étaient confiées.
Le correspondant local a sollicité un entretien avec le directeur général des ser-
vices. Ce dernier l’a reçu avec le directeur des moyens généraux pour évoquer le 
statut du réclamant, les plannings, les fonctions exercées, ainsi que l’accès aux for-
mations. Au terme de cet entretien, le directeur général a accepté de recevoir le ré-
clamant en vue de la recherche d’un règlement amiable. Un compte-rendu écrit de 
la réunion a été adressé au correspondant local prenant acte de l’élaboration d’un 
nouveau planning et du bénéfice de 30 heures de formation en français en faveur du 
réclamant afin de lui permettre de progresser par la suite.
- Inégalité de traitement dans les conditions de travail d’un salarié en lien avec son 
état de santé :
A la suite d’un accident, en septembre 2009, le médecin du travail a reconnu le ré-
clamant inapte aux fonctions occupées (agent technique dans une grande entre-
prise) et a préconisé son repositionnement sur des tâches administratives. Or, en 
mars 2010, aucune proposition ne lui avait été faite, sa hiérarchie lui suggérant de 
rechercher un poste dans une des filiales du groupe.
Le réclamant, placé en arrêt maladie, à demi-traitement, toujours dans l’attente 
d’un poste de reclassement, a sollicité l’intervention de la HALDE.
Le correspondant local a rencontré le directeur des ressources humaines pour lui 
rappeler qu’il incombe à l’employeur, et non au salarié, de rechercher les possibilités 
de reclassement et que l’absence de recherches sérieuses s’interprète en une discri-
mination en raison du handicap. Par la suite, le réclamant a reçu une proposition de 
reclassement.
- Inaccessibilité d’une personne handicapée à l’immeuble où elle réside :
Un des correspondants de la HALDE a été alerté par une personne handicapée en 
difficultés dans sa vie quotidienne en raison de l’inaccessibilité de l’immeuble où elle 
réside. La réclamante souffrant d’un handicap moteur a dénoncé l’état de la voirie 
l’empêchant d’accéder sans aide à son immeuble. Elle a souligné les multiples dé-
marches effectuées, en vain, auprès de la mairie afin que soit pris en compte son 
handicap.
L’intervention du correspondant de la HALDE auprès des services municipaux 
a permis de les sensibiliser aux obligations leur incombant en matière d’accessibilité 
de la voirie en faveur des personnes handicapées, notamment à l’occasion de la réa-
lisation de travaux. Une rampe d’accès a donc été réalisée par la commune conférant 
ainsi à la réclamante une plus grande autonomie dans ses déplacements.
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- Absence d’aménagement raisonnable d’examens au profit d’un candidat handi-
capé :
Un étudiant sourd et muet, ne pouvant passer son oral d’allemand de BTS, est venu 
rencontrer avec son éducateur le correspondant local pour lui faire part des difficul-
tés qu’il rencontre pour obtenir l’aménagement de ses examens.
L’intervention du correspondant a contribué à ce que le réclamant bénéficie 
d’une dispense d’épreuve.
- Scolarisation d’un enfant handicapé :
La réclamante est mère d’un enfant handicapé, qu’elle souhaite inscrire dans l’école 
la plus proche de son domicile. Elle a obtenu l’aide d’une auxiliaire de vie scolaire. 
Mais le maire a tardé à inscrire l’enfant. L’adjoint au maire chargé de l’enfance et de 
l’éducation s’était borné à promettre l’étude du dossier, sans prendre le moindre 
engagement.
L’intervention du correspondant local a permis l’inscription sans délai de l’en-
fant.
- Inaccessibilité à un spectacle public d’une personne handicapée :
A l’occasion d’un spectacle public, la réclamante s’est présentée avec un enfant en 
fauteuil roulant. Aucune place ne leur a été attribuée, les organisateurs du spectacle 
invoquant qu’ils auraient du être informés avant la soirée. La correspondante locale 
a pris contact avec ces derniers, lesquels ont admis qu’ils n’avaient pas su gérer cette 
situation.
Ayant reconnu leur erreur, ils ont consenti à présenter leurs excuses à la récla-
mante et lui ont offert des places pour de nouveaux spectacles. La réclamante s’est 
estimée satisfaite de cette issue.
En conclusion de tout ce qui précède, nous pouvons souhaiter que dans le cadre du 
Défenseur, la mise en œuvre de telles procédures, qui s’y retrouvent renforcées, 
permettra la résolution tout aussi rapide et efficace des différends qui lui seront 
soumis, au service des victimes de discrimination notamment.
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